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In this paper, I develop a novel account of musical works according which they are situated heir lines, consisting of actual and possible work-versions that are situated in specific musical-historical contexts. And I argue that this account offers a better explanation of three core phonenomena - musical multiplicity, musical flexibility, and musical audibility - than its competitors. Finally, I introduce the broader category of musical lineages - sequences of work-versions each of which has evolved in certain ways from its predecessors - and argue that musical works can be viewed as lineages that are initiated by the requisite sorts of compositional intentions and whose constituent work-versions must satisfy standards of similarity from their original contexts of composition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Everett (2005) has argued that fictional realism runs into insuperable difficulties when faced with fictional stories in which there are indeterminate identities. By appeal to a principle linking the individuation of characters within stories and without, Everett argues that such stories entail that there are indeterminate identities outside of fiction on the fictional realist picture. And although indeterminate identities are perfectly acceptable within fiction, they are intolerable in the (nonfictional) world itself. In this paper, I develop the "extended-game" model of fiction according to which fictional characters are props—and, hence, potential objects of reference—in authorized games of make-believe for fictional works in which they appear but do not originate but are neither props nor potential objects of reference in authorized games for works in which they do originate. And I argue that this entails that Everett's linking principle, on which his argument depends, simply fails to apply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nathan Salmon has defended what might be called "weak modal anti-realism"—the view that possible-object names can refer to possible objects that neither exist nor are otherwise real. But rather than adopting a similar view in the fictional case, he instead defends fictional creationism—the view that fictional characters are existent but abstract entities created by authors of fiction. In this paper, I first argue that if weak modal antirealism is defensible then weak fictional antirealism is defensible as well. Second, I argue that there is no reason to prefer fictional creationism over weak fictional antirealism but there is very good reason to prefer the latter over the former. And third, I defend weak fictional antirealism against the charge that it cannot provide a satisfactory account of statements that prima facie involve reference to or quantification over fictional characters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Simple versions of the 'naive' semantic theory of belief ascriptions are distinguished from sophisticated versions. The sophisticated approach may avoid some objections that tell against the naive approach, but has no advantages over non-naive semantics. Views of S. Schiffer are also considered.

A minimalist correspondence theory of truth is adequate to explain successful behavior, as with the logical relations of a sentence to its truth conditions. Correspondence can be minimalist or robust, and it is opposed to deflationary theories of truth. In terms of modality, correspondence only posits a contingent relation of a sentence to its truth conditions, while deflation holds that a necessary relation exists.

The author argues that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality, only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causal efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.

The central concern of this paper is the nature of the relation between words on the one hand and their occurrences on the other. I argue here that while Kaplan's 'common currency' conception of words is immune to much of the criticism to which Cappelen has subjected it, it runs afoul of the role words play in communication. And I sketch an alternative conception u the type-continuant model u which shares the virtues but avoids the vices of Kaplan's conception.

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Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)