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A sorry state of affairs was discovered by the Newfoundland Royal Commission of 1933. This article is a review of its Report. No attempt is made to describe subsequent events or to consider the actual results of the publication of that remarkable document. These matters are treated elsewhere. Here we are only concerned to disclose its substance and to criticize its arguments and recommendations.The immediate cause of the appointment of the Commission was financial. The government of Newfoundland was unable to meet its obligations. At the end of 1932 the governments of Canada and the United Kingdom had arranged an advance to save Newfoundland from default and a further advance had been made by the United Kingdom on the following first of July (p. 55). This explains why the Commission was appointed by His Majesty on the advice of his ministers in Canada and Great Britain, as well as in Newfoundland. The commissioners were Lord Amulree, a British lawyer with wide experience of official investigations and industrial conciliation, raised to the peerage under the Labour government of 1929-31; Mr. C. A. Magrath, whose most outstanding work had been as chairman of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission; and Sir William Stavert, who had “had the privilege of establishing the first Canadian Bank, the Bank of Nova Scotia, in the island” (p. 29), whose later banking connections had been with the Bank of Montreal, “bankers of the Government” (p. 45), and who had become in 1932, on the recommendation of the latter bank, the government's “financial advisor” (p. 55). The secretary was Mr. P. A. Clutterbuck of the Dominions Office; and two other British civil servants were also assigned to assist in the Commission's work (p. 233). The whole of the terms of reference consists in the few words: “To examine into the future of Newfoundland and, in particular, to report on the financial situation and prospects therein” (p. 1).

I Was asked to write a paper about “Keynes in Cambridge,” to supplement two other papers about his work as a public servant and as an economist. I am glad to do this, but let me explain at the beginning the limits of my qualifications. I worked under him as an undergraduate for two years, 1928 to 1930, and I saw something of him on three later visits to Cambridge in 1931,1934, and 1936. I saw him again in the United States several times during the war when he was representing the Government of the United Kingdom in financial discussions. From all this you will gather that I cannot claim for a moment to have been an intimate friend. Nevertheless I understand I am supposed to write in a rather more personal vein than those who are reading the other papers.Let me begin by talking, about Keynes as a teacher. During the years in which I happened to work under him, 1928 to 1930, his thinking on monetary theory was changing. These were the transition years between his traditional quantity-theory-of-money approach, in his Tract on Monetary Reform published in 1923, and his novel savings-and-investment approach, in his Treatise on Money published in 1930. He put forward his new ideas in a series of eight lectures—one a week for one term. Obviously the lectures had to be highly condensed and, despite the pleasantness and clearness with which they were delivered, I doubt that many undergraduates got very much out of them. However, they were not primarily intended for undergraduates; Keynes was trying out his new ideas on anyone who cared to listen, and there was always a group of his fellow dons at his lectures, as well as some graduate students who were still rather rare in Cambridge.

This paper is primarily an account of Canadian relations with the War Production Board and with the Office of Price Administration, and with their antecedent agencies. Large sections of the Washington scene, with which the writers had no special familiarity, are completely omitted. In particular there is little reference to the agencies controlling shipping and overseas trade, or to the armed services themselves. Further, there is no account of relations with the War Food Administration, or with the Combined Food Board on which the United Kingdom is represented as well as the United States and Canada. Even the two Combined Boards dealing respectively with production and resources (on which Canada is represented) and with raw materials (where it is not) are omitted although relations with these Boards are almost indistinguishable from relations with the War Production Board which supplies their United States membership. In short, this paper is concerned almost entirely with relations between Canada and the United States in regard to supplies moving directly between them. In this all-important field the relations amounted to a co-operation so close, continuous, effective, and friendly that the two sovereign nations might in many respects have been two parts of one country.It is convenient to consider first relations in the field of war supplies because it was in this field that war-time co-operation and collaboration first became necessary. Here a pattern was established for subsequent collaboration in the field of civilian supplies.

that in the immedate future we were going to take a detour, and a rough one, into quotas and restrictions. If we look for a single reason why we have to make this detour, we shall find it in the announcement in August, 1947 that the British Government could no longer continue "convertibility" of sterling. In July they had undertaken, not without misgiving, to give any country which had (like Canada) a "favourable" trade balance with them, cash, that is gold or United States dollars, for the difference between imports and exports. However, after a little more than a month they found that they could not continue. This did not affect us very much at the time because our excess exports to England and the rest of the "sterling area" were being financed by our 1946 loan to the United Kingdom. It did mean, however, that we could no longer look forward in the fairly near future, when the loan ran out, to getting cash for our excess exports. Therefore, we had to embark on some new policy. The breakdown of our hopes for selling to England traditionally our chief customer for cash was part of a wider breakdown. Until August, 1947 we, together with other countries, had been trying to build a world in which many wartime controls could be done away with and in which freer trade would be possible. In particular, we were trying to get rid of special tariff and quota arrangements designed to penalize, or to favour, one country or one group of countries rather than others; we were trying to get trade onto a true "multilateral" basis. The great achievement of the Geneva Trade Conference of 1947 was that the United States offered very sweeping reductions in its

R. F. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes, reviewed by A. F. W. Plumptre Allardyce Nicoll, ed., Shakespeare Survey: An Annual Survey of Shakespearian Study and Production, reviewed by H. S. Wilson Henry N. Paul, The Royal Play of Macbeth: When, Why, and How It Was Written, reviewed by H. S. Wilson Willard Farnham, Shakespeare's Tragic Frontier, reviewed by H. S. Wilson E. K. Brown, Rhythm in the Novel, reviewed by Hugh MacLennan A. L. Rowse, The England of Elizabeth: The Structure of Society, reviewed by Millar MacLure Thomas A. Goudge, The Thought of C. S. Peirce, reviewed by Henry S. Leonard Ruth Wallerstein, Studies in Seventeenth-Century Poetic, reviewed by Roy Daniels C. E. Carrington, The British Overseas: Exploits of a Nation of Shopkeepers, reviewed by J. B. Conacher William P.D. Wightman, The Growth of Scientific Ideas, reviewed by T.A. Goudge Lewis Mansfield, Tobias Smollett: Doctor of Men and Manners, reviewed by Eugene Joliat W.M. Frohock, The Novel of Violence in America, 1920–1950, reviewed by Gordon Roper

When people receive their money incomes they may employ them in any of three ways: (1) they may spend them on imported products, (2) they may spend them on services or goods produced locally, (3) they may save, accumulating bank deposits or securities. The way in which people in general and exporters in particular dispose of additions to their incomes, and the manner in which they economize when their incomes diminish, are important factors in determining the ultimate effect of an initial change in the level of incomes. If most of an increase of incomes is spent upon the purchase of goods produced within the country, it will induce re-employment and a further increase in incomes; if spent upon imports, its effect will be upon the foreign exchange situation rather than employment.The Marginal Propensity to Import. The extent to which a community devotes any addition to its existing incomes to the purchase of goods from abroad has been called by Mr. Paish the “marginal propensity to import.” The high per capita trade of the Dominions ensures a fairly high propensity to import. But another cause contributes to the high propensity. Their imports are, in considerable degree, high grade manufactures and luxury articles: just the sort of things which will be more in demand if incomes rise and will be dispensed with if incomes fall. Moreover, machinery and capital goods rank high amongst their imports, and these will be in demand chiefly when incomes are rising.