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This thesis examines the interpretation and application of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK), Part 11 Chapter 1, which came into force on 15 December 2004. Part 11 Chapter 1 concerns evidence of bad character, a concept approximately comparable with common law similar fact evidence, in relation to all parties who may be connected with a criminal trial. The admission and use of similar fact evidence has often been the subject of controversy, and the significant changes made by the CJA 2003 have attracted their own body of support and criticism. The nine chapters of this thesis attempt an in-depth study into the impact of the legislation on the robustness and effectiveness of the criminal trial, and consider whether the criminal trial is suited to the level of exposure of bad character now facilitated by the CJA. In particular, the thesis focuses upon the key provisions governing the uses of bad character evidence of the defendant: the seven gateways set out in s 101 of the CJA. The operation of those gateways and their accompanying explanatory provisions is examined through a combination of engagement with the Law Commission’s Report 273 (which preceded the enactment of the legislation), the range of Court of Appeal cases dealing with the legislation, and academic commentary. It was foreshadowed by commentators and early case law that the new provisions might not be easy to interpret or apply, and subsequent cases have borne out this prediction. An analysis of the bad character provisions suggests that, even though the CJA was intended to provide clarity in regulation, it has itself led to confusion in some important respects. Certain central terms lack definition, and some provisions have unintended consequences. The case law reflects this in its frequent, often brief, and sometimes inconsistent analysis of the specific parts of the legislation, which can make it difficult to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence in a precise and scrupulous manner.

This thesis compares criminal defences of insanity and idiocy between 1660 and 1830 in northern England and southern Scotland, regions which have been neglected by the historiographies of British crime and "insanity defences". It is explained how and why English and Scottish theoretical principles differed or converged. In practice, however, courtroom participants could obtain to alternative conceptions of accountability and mental distraction. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are employed to reveal contemporary conceptions of mental afflictions and criminal responsibility, which provide inverse reflections of "normal" behaviour, speech and appearance. It is argued that the judiciary did not dictate the evaluation of prisoners' mental capacities at the circuit courts, as some historians have contended. Legal processes were determined by subtle, yet complex, interactions between "decision-makers". Jurors could reach conclusions independent from judicial coercion. Before 1830, verdicts of insanity could represent discord between bench and jury, rather than the concord emphasised by some scholars. The activities of counsel, testifiers and prisoners also impinged upon the assessment of a prisoner's mental condition and restricted the bench's dominance. Despite important evidentiary evolutions, the courtroom authentication of insanity and idiocy was not dominated by Britain's evolving medical professions (including "psychiatrists") before 1830. Lay, communal understandings of mental afflictions and criminal responsibility continued to inform and underpin the assessment of a prisoner's mental condition. Such decisions were affected by social dynamics, such as the social and economic status, gender, age and legal experience of key courtroom participants. Verdicts of insanity and the development of Britain's legal practices could both be shaped by micro- and macro-political considerations. This thesis opens new avenues of research for British "insanity defences", whilst offering comparisons to contemporary Continental legal procedures.