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Copyright of Journal of Xinjiang University (Natural Science Edition) is the property of Xinjiang University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Acta Materiae Compositae Sinica is the property of Acta Materiea Compositae Sinica Editorial Department and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper constructs a three-stage Stackelberg game model based on government, manufacturer and retailer, and comparatively analyse the optimal decisions of each participant, the transfer and distribution of carbon tax among different participants, and the impact of consumers' environmental awareness and carbon dioxide price on equilibrium decisions and social welfare when the retail market is in monopolization or competition. The results show that, in two supply chain structures, the optimal carbon tax rate increases with the increase of consumers' environmental consciousness; When consumer environment awareness or carbon dioxide price is high, carbon tax regulation can effectively improve social welfare. Even if the consumer environment awareness or carbon dioxide price is low, it is necessary for the government to impose carbon tax on manufacturers with high carbon emissions. When the optimal carbon tax rate is difficult to calculate, the intuitive tax rate can be used as a suboptimal choice for the government to implement a carbon tax regulation; and the greater the intensity of competition in the retail market, the more the intuitive tax rate closer to the optimal tax rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Central China Normal University is the property of Huazhong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyzes the difference between the Prosper and PPDai platform from the operation mode, the risk control and the model of charges, and then shortcomings are pointed out on the threshold of the borrowers, lending bills, the charges, and credit conditions. Thus on the basis of Prosper operating mechanism, this paper puts forward a kind of dynamic reverse auction mechanism (DRAM), and it is to study the trading mechanism of online P2P lending of China. In the process, the paper firstly demonstrates the incentive compatibility features of DRAM, and demonstrates the Nash equilibrium of DRAM. Further, this paper sets up two kinds of auction pricing strategies include the certainty of auction pricing time and uncertainty of auction pricing time. Finally, through the example analysis, the paper points out that the first auction pricing strategy is helpful to improve the lender earnings, and disperse investment risk. Therefore, it can be used to improve the current operation mode of online P2P lending of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]