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The Kabbalah tries to explain the existence of suffering and evil by introducing new details in the myth of Creation. Isaac Luria’s school created the concepts of /Tsimtsum/ (contraction), /Shevirat kelim /(breaking of vessels) or /Tikun olam /(World restoration) in order to focus on the imperfection of Creation and to highlight human responsibility towards the world, as the man is considered God’s allied in the restoration. These ideas have drawn the attention of a group of contemporary Hispanic poets, who have put them in the context of their own creative experience. They could help the contemporary world develop a reflection on human responsibility towards the threatened nature.

Is there a Jewish conception of the individual subject? The issue is quite problematic, for several reasons: 1) it is difficult to speak of Judaism in a monolithic manner, because Judaism is a multifaceted reality, varying according to different epochs and places, to the point that we should speak of “Judaisms”, in the plural; 2) if the question of the individual subject is connected to the vision that the Western (meaning, European, essentially Christian) culture has constructed, Judaism can hardly be defined as “Occidental” or “Oriental”. After a short analysis of these two points, we present the conceptions of the individual subject as developed by two major Jewish thinkers of the twentieth century: Martin Buber (1878-1965) and Erich Fromm (1900-1980). Both based their visions on traditional Jewish sources (Bible, Talmud) but attributed them a universal value.

In his Mishneh Torah, Maimonides insists on the immutability of the Torah and describes the messianic era as a time when it will be completely restored. On the contrary, some passages from his Guide of the perplexed seem to draw a conception of the Mitswot (commandments) according to which they are determined, as far as their content is concerned, by the general human behaviours at the time of the revelation of the Torah. In other words, once these specific behaviours disappeared, the commandments became obsolete. In this study, I try to reconcile these two theses, by suggesting that this very contradiction hints at a unitary and original conception of Law, temporarily inapplicable in its entirety, yet absolutely effective and significant at all time, appropriate thus for its principal aim: combating a perverted rapport with the world and with the laws, which is referred to as idolatry.

This essay examines the ways in which Israeli philosophy has approached the question of war. Because of the influence of the neo-Kantian pacifism on the first generation of Israeli philosophers, it is only in the aftermath of the 1982 Lebanon war that a punctual reflection on issues of military ethics develops (as for instance in Weiler’s and Casher’s thought). The problem of the peculiarity of Israel’s wars, however, has been the focus of other Israel thinkers only in the light of the relationship between State and religion (as in Leibowitz and Margalit) as well as between the civil society and the political institutions (as in Adi Ophir). In conclusion and in spite of its unquestionable originality, Israeli philosophy differs from other Western intellectual traditions only in the fact that it has generally avoided the question of war at the expense of other issues perceived as more urgent.

Yeshayahou Leibowitz is better known as a scientist, a theologian of Judaism and a great polemicist than as a political theorist. This paper seeks to demonstrate that he has developed a systematic and original thinking on important realities such as the nation, the land and the State. His reflections on these topics led Leibowitz to a serious but limited Zionist engagement, which was not conditioned by his religious convictions.

The present article does not attempt to trace a possible influence of the Jewish mystical tradition on Heidegger’s Seinsdenken, but to provide a general survey of the role played in both Cabbalistic tradition and Heideggerian ontology by the notion/concept of non-being (Nichts/Nichtlichkeit and Ayn) as well as of the place held by the two systems of thought in the history of meontology (the doctrine of non-being). Notwithstanding the fact that the Heideggerian “question of the sense of being” excludes any “question of God”, there are noteworthy ‘affinities’ between his reflection on being/origin – conceivable exclusively in their tension with non-being – and the Cabbalistic reflection on the groundless origins (of being and of God). In terms of ‘affinity’ rather than of ‘influence’, Heidegger’s a-theistic quest of a primordial thinking of being could be seen as carrying to its ultimate consequences the very paradox underlying this type of mystical approach.

This interpretation aims to comment upon a few passages from the essay “La trace de l’autre,” 1963, written by Levinas for a journal and included in En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (1967) and subsequently in Humanisme de l’autre homme (1972). In this text, “God” is conceived as absolutely distant from the question of his existence or non-existence, which must however be traced back to his significance and, in particular, to the meaning of the name that enunciates him, the word “God.” Here, in short, we refer to that measureless idea expressed by the excessive term of “God.” In any case, this is not an argument that Levinas – and I with him – formulate as a theologian (as one may expect), but rather as an unfaithful phenomenologist, who aims to find “the phenomenological concreteness” in which the word “God” acquires significance, such as the concreteness of the “face” or of the “trace”.

This interpretation aims to comment upon a few passages from the essay “La trace de l’autre,” 1963, written by Levinas for a journal and included in En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (1967) and subsequently in Humanisme de l’autre homme (1972). In this text, “God” is conceived as absolutely distant from the question of his existence or non-existence, which must however be traced back to his significance and, in particular, to the meaning of the name that enunciates him, the word “God.” Here, in short, we refer to that measureless idea expressed by the excessive term of “God.” In any case, this is not an argument that Levinas – and I with him – formulate as a theologian (as one may expect), but rather as an unfaithful phenomenologist, who aims to find “the phenomenological concreteness” in which the word “God” acquires significance, such as the concreteness of the “face” or of the “trace”.

In his Mishneh Torah, Maimonides insists on the immutability of the Torah and describes the messianic era as a time when it will be completely restored. On the contrary, some passages from his Guide of the perplexed seem to draw a conception of the Mitswot (commandments) according to which they are determined, as far as their content is concerned, by the general human behaviours at the time of the revelation of the Torah. In other words, once these specific behaviours disappeared, the commandments became obsolete. In this study, I try to reconcile these two theses, by suggesting that this very contradiction hints at a unitary and original conception of Law, temporarily inapplicable in its entirety, yet absolutely effective and significant at all time, appropriate thus for its principal aim: combating a perverted rapport with the world and with the laws, which is referred to as idolatry.

The present article does not attempt to trace a possible influence of the Jewish mystical tradition on Heidegger’s Seinsdenken, but to provide a general survey of the role played in both Cabbalistic tradition and Heideggerian ontology by the notion/concept of non-being (Nichts/Nichtlichkeit and Ayn) as well as of the place held by the two systems of thought in the history of meontology (the doctrine of non-being). Notwithstanding the fact that the Heideggerian “question of the sense of being” excludes any “question of God”, there are noteworthy ‘affinities’ between his reflection on being/origin – conceivable exclusively in their tension with non-being – and the Cabbalistic reflection on the groundless origins (of being and of God). In terms of ‘affinity’ rather than of ‘influence’, Heidegger’s a-theistic quest of a primordial thinking of being could be seen as carrying to its ultimate consequences the very paradox underlying this type of mystical approach.

The Kabbalah tries to explain the existence of suffering and evil by introducing new details in the myth of Creation. Isaac Luria’s school created the concepts of /Tsimtsum/ (contraction), /Shevirat kelim /(breaking of vessels) or /Tikun olam /(World restoration) in order to focus on the imperfection of Creation and to highlight human responsibility towards the world, as the man is considered God’s allied in the restoration. These ideas have drawn the attention of a group of contemporary Hispanic poets, who have put them in the context of their own creative experience. They could help the contemporary world develop a reflection on human responsibility towards the threatened nature.

This essay examines the ways in which Israeli philosophy has approached the question of war. Because of the influence of the neo-Kantian pacifism on the first generation of Israeli philosophers, it is only in the aftermath of the 1982 Lebanon war that a punctual reflection on issues of military ethics develops (as for instance in Weiler’s and Casher’s thought). The problem of the peculiarity of Israel’s wars, however, has been the focus of other Israel thinkers only in the light of the relationship between State and religion (as in Leibowitz and Margalit) as well as between the civil society and the political institutions (as in Adi Ophir). In conclusion and in spite of its unquestionable originality, Israeli philosophy differs from other Western intellectual traditions only in the fact that it has generally avoided the question of war at the expense of other issues perceived as more urgent.

The article focuses on the theme of the affinity between medicine and philosophy in the works of Moses Maimonides (1138 – 1204), the Jewish medieval rabbi and philosopher. The author uses two examples taken from the history of philosophy. The first one is reminiscent of the antique theory of the four elements which constitute man’s body and widely influence his psyche. According to Maimonides, the problem of evil is related to matter and the manifestation of a disease is due to the particular proportion of elemental qualities. The second example discusses the Aristotelian moral theory of the middle way, with its horizontal and vertical aspects. The text concludes by stating that, when compared with the Aristotelian conception, Maimonidean ethics is an ethics of extremism. The article focuses on the theme of the affinity between medicine and philosophy in the works of Moses Maimonides (1138 – 1204), the Jewish medieval rabbi and philosopher. The author uses two examples taken from the history of philosophy. The first one is reminiscent of the antique theory of the four elements which constitute man’s body and widely influence his psyche. According to Maimonides, the problem of evil is related to matter and the manifestation of a disease is due to the particular proportion of elemental qualities. The second example discusses the Aristotelian moral theory of the middle way, with its horizontal and vertical aspects. The text concludes by stating that, when compared with the Aristotelian conception, Maimonidean ethics is an ethics of extremism.

Yeshayahou Leibowitz is better known as a scientist, a theologian of Judaism and a great polemicist than as a political theorist. This paper seeks to demonstrate that he has developed a systematic and original thinking on important realities such as the nation, the land and the State. His reflections on these topics led Leibowitz to a serious but limited Zionist engagement, which was not conditioned by his religious convictions.