Search

The article addresses the study of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a hypothetical court of human rights. Two questions guide the theoretical reflection and aim of this study: first, can the activities of the Court be viewed through the paradigm of human rights, and second, can the ICJ be considered a functional court of human rights? To answer these questions, the broad concept of a "court of human rights" is used, which refers to an institutionalized judicial mechanism intended to take necessary legal measures to record relevant human rights violations and to protect and restore such rights, regardless of who may be the claimant in such a case (a state or a person). The study demonstrates that it is appropriate to consider the activities of the ICJ through the paradigm of human rights, as evidenced by the Court's jurisprudence and numerous academic studies in the West. However, after analyzing the relevant arguments and counterarguments, the assumption that the Court can be regarded as a court of human rights is refuted. While many human rights conventions assign a special role to the ICJ in resolving disputes, human rights have never been the sole object of dispute in these proceedings; instead, they have always been part of an interstate dispute. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly shown an ambiguous attitude towards methods of recording violations of human rights conventions, fact-finding methodology in such cases, and criteria for compensating victims of such violations, which has not contributed to the protection of human rights in relevant cases. The article also emphasizes the importance of the human factor in shaping the Court's jurisprudence and expresses hope for an evolution of quality in the ICJ's treatment of human rights, should a majority of judges adopt a human-centred approach to international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]