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The argument from evil in the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion changed from the logical problem to the evidential problem of evil, and recently to the problem of horrendous evil. D. Z. Phillips refuses instrumentalist solutions to the previous forms of the argument, because the problem of horrendous evil shows the absurdity of instrumentalist solutions, which imply a personal concept of God. The Thomistic concept of God is not acceptable either, because it is just an abstract concept. He suggests understanding of God as love, which does not interfere in worldly affairs. M. M. Adams responds to several objections raised by Phillips and proposes a better solution through the concept of being a morally good person. A critical analysis of the debate favors the concept of a personal God as it is used in the majoritarian analytical philosophy of religion.

Lonergan explains the four-level activity of human consciousness in the context of his analysis of scientific methods and objectives. Human consciousness is correlated to lower “coincidental manifolds,” and it integrates and directs functional „schemes of recurrence” of the brain and neural systems. In these conscious configurations, objective and unbiased assessment of truth and acceptance of the reality play a crucial role. In a similar way, effective human freedom and responsibility play a crucial role in an authentic development of human knowledge. This is also true of scientific research, which cannot advance without freedom and responsibility of the researcher. A neuroscientific affirmation of the illusory character of freedom and responsibility results therefore self-contradictory. Lonergan explains that some phenomena on a higher level may seem chaotic and illusory from a lower level, but there is no reason to give human mental activity less valuable status. Hardly any scientist would state that he is not free and responsible in his research, or claim that he does not have his “thoughts and behavior under control” (Cozolino).

C. Hughes has raised some interesting questions regarding the explanation of divine foreknowledge in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The difficulties in understanding Aquinas originate not so much in his texts, but rather in a search for a deeper understanding of his position in the context of contemporary philosophy. Explanation of God’s knowledge and foreknowledge leads to an evaluation of the meaning of divine eternity and to a consideration of different kinds of necessities (absolute, ex suppositione) assigned to God’s omniscience. The meaning of different necessities requires a better articulation in the context of recent metaphysics, because any obscurity depreciates Thomistic position in comparison with other theistic accounts.