Search

Many professionals want to both achieve professional success and contribute to society. Yet, in some professional contexts, these aims are in tension because serving elite clients is considered the pinnacle of professional success, but professionals themselves may view serving this clientele as antithetical to making a societal contribution. Drawing on interviews with 84 architects and designers who self-identify as people seeking to contribute to society—that is, who hold a prosocial identity—we develop theory about how professionals navigate tensions between their prosocial and professional identities and with what consequences for their work with clients. We identified four strategies that professionals used to ease these tensions, all of which gave the prosocially oriented professionals a sense of identity integration. However, these strategies differently shaped professionals' approach to power relations with the client, depending on the client's status and the types of knowledge and skills each professional viewed as central to their work. Professionals with marginalized social identities, such as women and ethnic/racial minorities, were more likely than others to embrace working with low-status clients and to use broader definitions of the knowledge and skills required for their work. Our findings contribute to scholarship on professional identity construction and prosocial work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revision of the constitution in 1848 ended the constitutional role of the nobility. Their national political power declined from the end of the 19th century in line with the modernisation theory. Data collected on all burgomasters for 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 confirm this trend at the local level: the percentage of municipalities with a noble burgomaster declined as well. Following Lammers' sociological theory on occupation regimes, Dutch nobility could make use of the opportunities during the Nazi-German occupation to maintain or regain their power by taking up burgomasters' positions. To avoid dismissal, the pre-war appointed burgomasters had to accept and implement measures imposed by the occupying forces. Our research shows that noble burgomasters were just as often dismissed as non-noble burgomasters. Also, noble burgomasters resigned as frequently as non-noble burgomasters in protest against the Nazi-German policies. Vacant burgomasters' posts offered openings to obtain local power. Only eight of the about 550 newly appointed burgomasters during the occupation were a member of the nobility. Seven of them were a member of the National Socialist Movement (NSB) compared to about 337 newly appointed non-noble burgomasters. It looks like the German occupier failed in attracting the nobility to cooperate as burgomasters while the nobility wasn't very keen in taking up these positions. Why weren't there more noble burgomasters in power during the occupation years? Following Dronkers' theory that during upheaval being of noble origin loses its significance, members of the nobility had to compete with pro-German NSB-members during the occupation years. Supporting Dronkers' finding that the nobility used university education to regain power, the share of university graduates was twice as high among noble burgomasters in 1940. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Business families directly participating in political roles have considerable influence in various countries. We explore political business families' unique economic and social characteristics through a social embeddedness lens. We build a comprehensive dataset of Chilean business families and identify their direct political participation from 1989 to 2020. We find limited support for economic features tied to political participation, whereas social characteristics, such as nationally rooted origins, religious affiliations, and family generation, are shared features of political business families. We extend the literature by analyzing how business families with greater social embeddedness act as legitimate representatives of the big business class in the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the violence trap framework, ruling elites use rents to control contending elites who pose a violent threat. Political development results in transitions from a fragile state, wherein rents are tentative and personalized, to a basic natural state, and then a mature natural state, through standardization of elite privileges, consolidated state control of the political-military apparatus, and the enactment of a credible contracts regime. Accordingly, the institutional logic of fragile states is rooted in the incentives that undergird elite bounded rationality, transacting under highly personalized, tentative patronage networks. The paper addresses the question of why fragile states fail to develop into basic natural states. In doing so, it applies the violence trap analytical framework to illustrate the logic of the fragile state through a most different systems (MDS) comparison of Afghanistan and South Sudan. The main finding is that the institutional logic of the fragile state in the two cases is rooted in a lack of three necessary conditions: institutional incentives for broadening elite consensus, credible patronage agreements among different elite groups, and a consolidated state with specialized political and military functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT We examine the educational backgrounds of the global elite, using new data on a diversity of organizational leadership roles as well as the population of the super‐rich across the world. Four trends emerge when examining the university education of the global elite. First, we find a small number of globally prestigious universities to take on super prominent roles, suggesting a strongly hierarchical distribution of credentials among the global elite. Second, we find a consistent and unique place for Harvard University within this system. Third, we find evidence for a significant yet variable ‘home‐bias’ in the education of the global elite. This is moderated by the fourth regularity, the hegemony of Anglo‐American credentials. These four global regularities can enhance ongoing research on global elite populations. Our findings are robust to both the removal of all American elites in the sample, to dynamic stratified sampling of the network boundary and to disaggregating the sample into different elite roles. The analysis of this article is the first of its kind to offer a large‐scale descriptive mapping of central tendencies in global elite university education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2010, Zanzibar, a sub-state within the United Republic of Tanzania, became a unique case of power sharing in Africa. The country conducted a referendum before establishing a government of national unity and entrenched it in Zanzibar's Constitution of 1984. The aim was to make the power-sharing system durable and rooted in society to achieve peace and development. Nevertheless, a political system must be accepted, practised and routinised to be rooted in society. Usually, peace settlements involve elites, who negotiate, sign and occasionally benefit from the pact—and Zanzibar is not an exception. What is missing in peace negotiations is the broad-based participation of the citizens. Based on a survey and expert interviews, this article examines how power sharing in Zanzibar has nevertheless become rooted in society over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing literature on finance, debt, and inequality depicts economic elites as a creditor class. According to a popular thesis, over the past four decades, the rich and ultra-rich households have experienced a saving glut (excess income), which they have invested in the debts of the poor and their governments. While it is undeniable that the rich have expanded their income share at the expenses of the poor, to refer to them as 'creditors' or 'lenders' is a misrepresentation of how they actually expand their wealth and income shares by financial means. For it conceals the fact that a great deal of their investments is leveraged, that is, carried out with borrowed money. This article shows that the debts generated for the sake of affluent households easily surpass those of all other households. However, these debts are not accounted for in statistics on household debt. This is because affluent households, particularly multi-millionaires and billionaires inside the top 1%, do not simply borrow from banks, like normal households do, but they are instead absentee debtors who borrow through corporate structures of which they are dominant shareholders and ultimate beneficiaries. To gain an insight into their invisible leverage, the article looks at how much hedge funds borrow and why their leverage matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper opens the black box of the role of the state when regulating the process of financialization of a national economy. For this purpose, we firstly study two recent Spanish executives' closeness and similarity to financial, insurance and real estate sectors – usually identified as the 'FIRE sector'. We secondly study how the process of specific law production and regulation during two different political terms has significant effects in the finance, insurance, and real estate complex. Our research explains that this specific regulation is related to the evolution of the FIRE sector in Spain, something that reflects the role of state agencies to favour financialization dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to investigate social mobility by introducing an innovative data source: surnames in newspapers. The core hypothesis posits that frequent mentions in newspapers are indicative of greater social relevance. Through the collection of local newspaper data in the municipality of Modena, Italy, from 1921 to 2011, we examine variations in the relative representation of surnames in newspapers with respect to their presence in registry data. The results suggest that surnames in newspapers are not a random sample of the population, supporting the assumption that they reflect social significance. Surnames belonging to privileged groups exhibit a higher representation compared to other social groups. This higher relative representation seems to be transmitted to future generations and converges over time toward the mean, with variations depending on the considered high-status group. This kind of analysis could contribute to identifying different mobility patterns at the local level and represents a useful alternative when established data sources, such as income, education, and occupational data, are not available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Angola is governed under a presidential system characterised by a weakly institutionalised parliament ruled by the MPLA liberation movement since independence. UNITA, the largest opposition party in parliament, is also a liberation movement and former belligerent in the protracted Angolan civil war. Despite facing an uneven playing field, UNITA has seen its share of parliamentary seats increase in successive post-war elections. This makes it a relevant case study to understand patterns of elite formation and political representation more broadly. This article examines the composition of UNITA parliamentary elites in Angola in post-civil war legislatures, and how UNITA members of parliament (MPs) perceive representation tasks and engage in constituency-focused activities. We do so through a longitudinal study of post-civil war legislatures (from 2008, 2012, 2017 and 2022), drawing on new biographical data and interviews with MPs. We argue that, following the transition from rebel movement to political party, parliament became an arena in which UNITA was able to achieve a nationwide reach by integrating MPs with diverse backgrounds and by engaging with constituents. Additionally, while institutional rules favour national over local representation, MPs seem to invest in and value links with constituents. The study highlights how nationwide recruitment and connections with constituents contribute to elite formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes a political sociological look at the knee-taking in football (or soccer) inspired by the Black Lives Matter campaign. Based upon a study of the new elites, it explores the essence of this performative act and situates it within the 'obsession' with racism and anti-racism. Based less on the reality of the problem of racism than upon the emerging values of this new 'class', the celebration and promotion of taking the knee is understood as a new type of political etiquette that combines a sense of shame-awareness with a certain contempt for the 'masses' who attend football matches. The confusion about whether the support for Black Lives Matter was political or not is discussed with reference to the idea of the changed and to some extent incoherent nature of the modern elites whose values, it is suggested, are more a form of anti-matter than a clear projection of ideas and beliefs. As a result, the quasi-religious nature of the sentiment expressed in modern anti-racism and the action of taking the knee are considered in relation to the ideas of 'raising awareness' and of 'educating yourself', both of which have an implicitly elitist quality but also lack precision or clarity about either the problem being addressed or any solution to it. Often more therapeutic than overtly political, elite anti-racism is almost by necessity performative, but also comes with a disciplinary dimension for those who refuse to 'take the knee' to it. Ultimately, it is suggested that the contestation over the knee-taking gesture reflects a growing cultural divide between the disconnected globalist elites and the more grounded and situated masses who often opposed those who demand their acquiescence towards this performative form of anti-racism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the importance of, and variations in, political alignment within African regimes. Political alignment is how leaders establish sufficient political support across elites: we posit that formal appointments are the primary way that leaders manipulate political coalitions in order to secure their collective authority and tenure. Appointments, individually and collectively, can take on multiple characteristics: they can create inclusive or exclusive coalitions, transactional or loyal support, volatile or stable elite networks. Appointment powers have greater salience since governments institutionalized and formalized in governance systems across democratic and autocratic states. Manipulating who holds and secures power at the subnational and national levels, rather than repressive control or state capacity, underpins the stability, security, and survival of modern African regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When nine Ghanaian banks collapsed during the country's 2017–2019 financial crisis, a Charismatic Pentecostal pastor was at the center of public accusations as the board chairman of one of the failed banks. His role put a spotlight on the growing influence of Charismatic Pentecostal institutions and elites in Ghana's financial market. Shifting the perspective between diverse actors who reckoned with the bank's collapse, from ordinary Christians to artist‐activists, this article explores how Ghanaians evaluated the culpability of the pastor and in so doing problematized who Christian elites involved in banking and business are accountable to: God, their congregants, or the public at large? We argue that global financial liberalization has generated new types of financial elites, Pentecostal pastors among them, who become subject to new lines of accountability. Holding someone accountable comes with stakes expressed through vernacular registers that demonstrate how financial markets are engulfed in broader social relations and regimes of ethical evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When conducting qualitative research on elites, researchers often face issues regarding time-constraints, power asymmetries, and rapport building. In this article, I outline the methodological concept of "the hustle" so that we might better understand how these issues intersect and how the difficulty to access elites for interviews alters research and researcher. The hustle is defined as the pushing or jostling of the qualitative researcher in the face of resistance to access research settings or participants. Inspired by my own hustle when researching elites who design AI recruitment technology (AI-rec-tech), I argue that the hustle has four major effects: first, it requires the researcher to act as networker; second, it influences how much data can be collected; third, it dictates research design; and fourth, it alters interview dynamics. The hustle is an important conceptual umbrella which draws together themes which have arisen in qualitative research on elites for decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais is the property of Centro de Estudos Sociais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Network Analysis is still gaining momentum within Neo-Assyrian (c. 934-612 BCE) scholarship. Studies are exploring different types of networks, and what various centrality measures highlight in their datasets. In this contribution, we suggest how weighted k-core centrality could be used in the identification of elite groups within a co-attestation network. The network is built from co-attestations in correspondence dated to the reign of Sargon II (721-705 BCE), and we present a weighting scheme that reflects the strength of communication between those attested in a single document. We then use this weighting scheme to identify the weighted k-shells of the network. Our results align with a group whom traditional Assyriological research has identified as part of the elite, and they show promise for further studies into Neo-Assyrian elites.

Objectives The aim of this work is to initiate or revive a scientific discussion on the impact of professional life on the parameters of human lifespan. Material and Methods Presented analysis is based on 8578 Polish elite or well-known person who died in 2001–2021. Results The results of the conducted analysis indicate that in the case of men the highest values of the median age at death were characteristic of freelancers (median [Me] ± quartile deviation [QD] 85.5±8.5 years), followed by scientists and academic teachers of the biological and medical specialty (Me±QD 84.0±7.5 years) and officers of power structures (Me±QD 83.5±8.5 years). Subsequently, the highest value of the median age at death was recorded for social activists (Me±QD 83.0±9.5 years), clergy (Me±QD 82.0±7.5 years) and scientists and academic teachers of specialties other than biological and medical (Me±QD 82.0±8.0 years). Significantly, at the very end of this list are athletes (Me±QD 77.0±9.0 years). Nevertheless, the results of the analysis confirm that professional athletes are characterized by higher median age at death compared to the general population. Analysis made only within athletes group demonstrated that the parameters of lifespan of athletes of endurance disciplines (Me±QD 78.0±8.0 years) are the most favorable compared to athletes of other disciplines, in particular in compare to team sports athletes (Me±QD 75.0±10.0 years) or combat sports athletes (Me±QD 75.0±7.1 years). Conclusions What is new and innovative in this paper is comparing the lifespan characteristics of athletes in comparison to widely represented group of other professions with higher socio-economic status. Unexpectedly, the lifespan of athletes occurred to be lower than for fast all other analyzed occupational groups, except mainly of entertainment musicians. Finally, the results presented in this paper emphasize the need to analyze the lifespan characteristics of athletes in a broader scope than only in relation to the general population. Int J Occup Med Environ Health 2024;37(3):335–50

Este artículo cruza la Historia política de las elites y del poder con la Historia de las profesiones para analizar en una perspectiva comparada (España, Francia y Reino Unido) la cuestión del estatus social de los médicos en la Europa liberal decimonónica. Se trata de demostrar que el prestigio social alcanzado por los médicos les valía una consideración suficiente para estar contado dentro de las elites de las sociedades liberales. Pero esta condición de elite era marginal, esencialmente local y muy por debajo de lo que el conjunto de la profesión esperaba. Mientras los regímenes liberales fueron censitarios, con una participación política fundada en la propiedad o la condición de funcionario, los únicos médicos que obtuvieron títulos nobiliarios u otras recompensas honorificas fueron médicos integrados a la administración pública o médicos de Corte.

Rather than a radical new way of entangling space and society fashioned by late capitalism and neoliberalism, gated communities are the latest iteration of a long chain of power mechanisms devised to reproduce racial hierarchies and to defend "proper citizens" against internal and external enemies. Based on ethnographic data produced in Nordelta, one of Latin America's largest gated communities, this article concentrates on a twofold process through which Nordelteños produce their social and physical spaces: first, on the relationships they establish with their surroundings, negating its natural and cultural dimensions, and second, on the different technologies they have deployed to exclude, monitor and sanction the nearby "improper" population. In a country that has never ceased to define its legitimate citizenry upon their own category of "whiteness", this analysis contributes to understand how Argentine gated communities entangle elites, racism and segregation to produce a space of exception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism is often characterized as a rejection of scientific expertise and a key obstacle to societies' ability to address the climate crisis today. I challenge this account, arguing for a more inclusive conception of populism and a more critical account of expertise. Consistent with this, I delineate a range of responses to the challenges of climate politics in populist times. In doing so, I have two primary aims: first, to highlight limitations of "anti-populist" responses among proponents of climate change action, and, second, to lean into populist criticisms of elite expertise, by delineating how some challenges to dominant forms of science and elite power are themselves expert knowledge and integral to promising movements that address climate change. This can allow expertise to be distinguished from elitism and to be recognized in caring relations to the subjects of knowledge. Here, expertise is not manifest as separation from the common world, but as immersion in it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of inherited or family wealth in reproducing and even exacerbating wealth inequalities has been addressed in various studies in recent years. Bringing together representation studies with studies on cultural and moral economies, this article analyses how cultural norms indispensable to the preservation of dynastic wealth are negotiated through contemporary popular culture and television series. It introduces the concept of family succession drama, referring to television fiction that focuses on issues concerning intergenerational transmission of wealth and/or privileges and analyses the series Downton Abbey as a case study for interrogating the ambiguous affirmation of inherited wealth and dynastic privileges in a historical melodrama. By focusing on Downton Abbey, the article considers how hereditary rights and dynastic privileges are negotiated in a heritage drama in ways that also enable the legitimation of contemporary dynasty-making. While acknowledging the anxieties caused by class differences, Downton Abbey nevertheless affirms the necessity for various hereditary privileges and fortunes, thereby excluding any true alternatives for (contemporary) dynastic dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the context, precedents, contents, distribution, and socio-economic ramifications of deed restrictions in early-nineteenth century Boston, reviewing examples of restrictions' use and a comprehensive survey of the 1800–1839 deeds of five grantors. It shows how Boston's government and then private land developers began using deed restrictions in regards to building use, materials, height, and bulk in select geographies during this period. They did so to guarantee prestigious and stable home and work environments to wealthy consumers in the fast-changing urban context, in turn bringing into existence a prized and exclusive stratum of urban residential and commercial property. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideas of state co-optation and corruption feature heavily in Latin American debates as scholars examine how elite factions and organized crime networks capture institutional operations. Based on the case of Guatemala I signal shortcomings in this actor-focused literature and propose alternative ways to theorize elite formations and state trajectories. I draw on Bourdieu’s concepts of social field, habitus and capital to illustrate how Guatemalan elites have subsumed the state into an exclusive field of elite interactions that mediates the competition to control institutional processes. By tracing the evolution of electoral politics and the judicial apparatus, I maintain that state co-optation must be understood in line with a historically constituted habitus and the structure of this social field, as elites attempt to preserve dominance following the transition to formal democracy. The ensuing patterns of elite interactions have allowed for emerging illicit groups to decisively influence and ‘criminalize’ the state trajectory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Murle age system is often presented in a negative light in the South Sudan conflict reporting, which links age-set activities to communal violence, cattle rustling, and the abduction of women and children. Such assessments by outsiders overlook the positive effects of age-sets on interethnic relations in rural areas, where young people follow the Murle tradition and navigate the complex influence networks of Murle society. We focus on pastoral Murle youth in Pibor born in the 1980s and 1990s--that is, the laŋo age-set. By drawing on in-depth lifestory interviews, this article studies how Murle laŋo masculinity is constructed, embodied, and negotiated. The analysis of our ethnographic data exemplifies how early childhood emotional bonds with caregivers, conflicts, and marginalisation impact the life trajectory of one Murle man. Our results show the connectedness of political orientation, tradition, and masculinity to intergenerational conflict and competition for political and societal power in Murle society. The study increases our understanding of Murle laŋo men's survival strategies. Specifically, it shows that these rural marginalised Murle youth build alliances beyond kinship and ethnic ties, defend land, advance the goal of peace with neighbours, volunteer for unpaid community work to fight idleness, and act as a counter force to prevent manipulation by political and military leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fire at Grenfell Tower, a block of public housing flats in The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, London, in June 2017 has come to epitomize the growing divide between Britain's rich and poor in the last decade. Yet, the proximity of Kensington Palace, home of many senior British royals, has been almost entirely ignored in scholarship and commentary on the Grenfell Tower atrocity. This is especially remarkable given the philanthropic 'work' the monarchy has undertaken since the fire's aftermath. This paper explores Together: Our Community Cookbook (The Hubb Community Kitchen. 2018. Together: Our community cookbook. London: Ebury Press), a cookbook released by Meghan Markle as part of her royal charitable 'duties', to raise money for The Hubb Community Kitchen – a group of women displaced in the fire, who prepared meals for survivors in the aftermath. The cookbook repeatedly emphasizes unity, collectivity and togetherness: the importance of a local community response to rehabilitate Grenfell survivors. By analysing the cultural politics of Together through radical contextualization, this paper argues that in releasing the cookbook, the British monarchy itself is incorporated into this narrative of community and recovery, which erases the classed and racialised inequalities between the monarchy and Grenfell survivors (and, indeed, those in similar socioeconomic positions). Fundamentally, the cookbook obscures the ongoing culpability of 'the elites' for the sociopolitical and socioeconomic inequalities experienced by citizens in Britain. Together evidences how inequalities in contemporary Britain are normalized and legitimized in the public imaginary through media representations, obscuring the structural inequalities that underpinned the conditions at Grenfell, and instead individualizing the survivors as 'responsiblised' neoliberal subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which autocratic elites are more likely to be punished after being removed from office? Purges are an important tool of autocratic survival, helping dictators to eliminate potential rivals. However, expulsion is not always the end for victims, as some also suffer detention or execution. Although we have compelling theories on why certain elites are purged, we still lack strong understanding of why punishments may differ. Using individual-level data on autocratic elites from communist Eastern Europe between 1917-1991, I find evidence that military and internal security elites are more likely to be detained than civilians, owing to the higher coup risk they pose. Internal security elites are also more likely to be executed than other elites, due to long-term threats of their professional knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political leaders often change sides. But what happens to the citizens? What are the movements that concern them? Definitely, they are really willing to change their coats, i.e. sides, perhaps following the leader? And to what extent? The case of the first Italian republic is sufficiently emblematic of a crystallization of positions and political choices. Observing, however, the second republic, many studies have highlighted a continuity in choices in relation to the sides (few are willing to decidedly change sides), while the choice between parties of the same group are decidedly more likely. Diamanti, summarizing these tendencies, spoke of the muro di Arcore, highlighting thus a sort of impenetrability between the two sides. Changes are welcome, but only between the parties of the same "field" of reference. Rarely between the two major alignments or poles. Is this interpretation still valid? The purpose of this study is exactly to attempt to understand it. In this contribution the attention is in fact focused on a specific case: the recent elections policies of 2022. Using data from the Itanes 2022 survey (Italian national election studies), I will try to argue how, even today, Italians change rather easily party but much less pole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates how the type of elite to which a person belongs and their intergenerational contextual experiences are associated with attitudes towards inequality among elite individuals. We propose that membership of the economic elite and access to private schools, higher education business schools and affluent residential areas may contribute to the development of views that favour inequality. Using unique survey data collected in 2018 from a sample of 416 individuals belonging to Chile's economic, political and cultural elites, we construct an additive score to measure attitudes towards inequality. Results of our regression analyses indicate that individuals belonging to the economic and political elite are more tolerant of inequality than members of the cultural elite. Moreover, intergenerational experiences at both private schools and higher education business schools significantly contribute to the formation of attitudes that favour inequality. These contextual experiences also relate to significant attitudinal variations within all elite groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores private art museums' role for elite legitimization processes. Based on interviews with founders, directors, and curators of Germany-based private museums, I explore the discourses participants invoke to legitimize museum founders as actors in the artworld and as elites generally. I draw out a two-pronged legitimation strategy. First, respondents posit private museums' increasingly important role for today's art ecosystem, implying logics of discursive innovation and organizational flexibility vis-à-vis public museums. Second, interviewees construct intra-group status hierarchies via notions of the autonomous and ethical collector-founder versus other ostentatious private collectors and unethical wealth elites more widely. Together, these narratives effectively conflate seemingly opposite discourses of private entrepreneurialism and authenticity, allowing interviewees to signal legitimacy for founders over both public and other private actors. This elite legitimation work is performed by both founders and those institutionally connected to them, showing how legitimization can be a complex and institutionally mediated process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the slow progress on increasing racial and ethnic diversity at the highest levels of society, it is important to ask what role racialisation plays in the experience of minoritised individuals who do reach an elite position. More specifically, this article asks how minoritised elites respond to racial inequality in their careers. Drawing on 30 interviews with British racialised minorities who have achieved positions of notable leadership or societal influence, we map three different strategies they use, from “challenging”, to “diversifying”, to “role modelling”. We also explore how the likelihood of using the three different strategies are classed, gendered and racialised. In doing so, this article details some of the enormous diversity between British racialised minority elites and the different strategies they use to address racial inequalities, including a strong refusal to assimilate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I compare Christopher Lasch's thought to specific features that research in political science attributes to contemporary populism. Lasch openly favoured a historical form of populism but is rarely considered when current forms of populism are discussed. The research literature characterizes populism as superficially tied to democracy while undermining it, as committed to the moral binary of people and elites, and as intellectually "thin" because it does not engage with the complex theories that ground other ideologies. These characters make populism incoherent and inimical to democracy. Lasch manifests all three characters while connecting them to a sustained worldview. Humans' awareness of death is the core feature that makes them rational, ethical and equal. Attempts to dilute that awareness are inimical to the equality at democracy's basis. Experts and professionals encourage this dilution by promising remedies and progress. Democracy depends on ordinary people who resist elites and their complex phraseologies. Résumé: Je compare la pensée de Christopher Lasch aux caractéristiques spécifiques que la recherche en sciences politiques attribue au populisme contemporain. Lasch a ouvertement favorisé une forme historique de populisme, mais il est rarement pris en compte lorsque l'on discute des formes actuelles de populisme. La littérature caractérise le populisme comme étant superficiellement lié à la démocratie tout en la minant, comme étant engagé dans la binaire morale du peuple et des élites, et comme étant intellectuellement « mince » parce qu'il ne s'engage pas dans les théories complexes qui fondent d'autres idéologies. Ces personnages rendent le populisme incohérent et hostile à la démocratie. Lasch manifeste ces trois caractères tout en les reliant à une vision du monde durable. La conscience de la mort chez les humains est la caractéristique essentielle qui les rend rationnels, éthiques et égaux. Les tentatives de dilution de cette conscience vont à l'encontre de l'égalité qui est à la base de la démocratie. Les experts et les professionnels encouragent cette dilution en promettant des remèdes et des progrès. La démocratie dépend des gens ordinaires qui résistent aux élites et à leurs phraséologies complexes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Spanish Civil War, around 15,000 women were deployed as nurses or auxiliaries in the military health service of the Francoist army. Many of them worked behind the firing lines and came close to the combat and destruction. When the war drew to an end, these frontline nurses were demobilized and sent home to hearth and family. For some of them, returning home was a relief; for others, it meant the end to a professional career and meaningful vocation outside family control. Some of them used the tumultuous 'post-war' months to raise their voices, demanding the same treatment as male veterans. They wanted the same privileges these men enjoyed, such as free university access or ex-combatant status. Rallying together in support of such interests, they transcended several social borders, like Francoist ideas of complementary gender roles, concepts of nurses being acquiescent angels at sickbeds, and values of unconditional subordination and obedience. By pushing marriage into the future, they further violated Francoist expectations of a woman's 'proper' biographical trajectory. In all these endeavours to gain a place at the table of Francoist Spain, they found support from their male colleagues and superiors. Drawing from sources of the Francoist military health service, this paper argues that their petitions echoed the elitist and gendered views concerning the making of the victor's society. These perspectives reflected the intricate integration processes within the heterogeneous support base from which the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco drew his legitimacy and backing both during and after the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflict generates uncertainty and a supply of violent actors willing to contract their services to third parties that makes identifying motivation for civilian victimisation difficult. In this paper, I examine how elites not only have opportunities to capitalise on violence during war for developmental interests, but also take advantage of the fog of war to lump all cases of victimisation under a clear overarching narrative of political contestation rather than repression for economic interests. I build on the literature of developmental violence in conflict to assess two cases of dam construction by the Public Enterprises of Medellin (EPM) in Antioquia, Colombia between 1995 and 2018: Hidroituango and Porce II. I argue that civilians opposing the dams were associated with one of the armed groups in the territory and elites dismissed their victimisation as a product of competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents. This conflict narrative obscures other potential realities and precludes deeper investigation into the ambiguous motivations behind attacks, even as the victims themselves may challenge and present counternarratives of developmental violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elite schools, long tasked with creating a future national elite, often now find themselves competing in a global education market. This article explores how one such school, in Switzerland, articulates with the global imaginary of its local geography – in particular, with images of luxury tourism and safety – to appeal to a globally wealthy clientele. It unpacks the material benefits derived from this articulation, for both the institution itself and the individuals who attend it. The school, I argue, fostered a 'club effect' that enhanced the social and symbolic capital of (most of) its students, brought into relief by the scholarship students who were excluded from it. This article thus explores what kind of work is being done when a particular vision – that of wealth – is attached to a school, and for whom that work is done. It closes by pointing to ways in which this educational landscape is shifting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elite schools in the UK are bound to the history of British colonialism. This paper examines the material ties between these schools and the transatlantic slave trade. We combine multiple sources to examine which schools and their alumni accrued substantial economic capital derived from the enslavement of Black people. We find two principal connections: first, in donations and foundations of schools from those who made their fortune in the slave trade; and second, through income of boys attending these schools. Drawing on the Legacies of British Slavery dataset, we show that schools with alumni benefitting from the slave trade include the most prestigious British private schools. Moreover, this paper traces the histories of several secondary schools founded by, or in receipt of, substantial donations from slave-owning families. We argue that extractive, violent forms of colonial capital accumulation have been central to, the formation and maintenance of these elite educational institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses attitudes around the projection of the EU among Latin American elites, namely the determinants of support for a Free Trade Agreement between the two regions and the trustworthiness of the EU government. We take as data elite surveys conducted in 15 Latin American countries (2014–2019) and consider sociodemographics, ideology, support for democracy, views of foreign powers, exports to the EU, and electoral democracy. Results show that ideology and support for democracy are key determinants of support for an interregional FTA, and that the trustworthiness of governments in the US, China, and Spain covary with attitudes toward the EU. The latter (trust in the government in Spain) proves to be the main driver and, furthermore, its impact is conditional on the economic strength (observed as exports) of the EU: wherever the EU is not a strong economic actor in Latin America, trust in the Spanish government does nothing but improve the image of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historisk Tidskrift is the property of Svenska Historiska Foereningen and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Though the territorial dimension of ministerial recruitment has been explored in several countries, it remains a blind spot in France. Nevertheless, the geography of political elites matters, since it tends to channel debates and national policies around specific areas. Therefore, this research note aims to fill this gap by investigating the regional origin of cabinet ministers under the Fifth Republic through an original data set entitled GeoMin. This descriptive analysis stresses the existence of three concentric circles in terms of ministerial appointments: Paris (overrepresented), mainland regions (underrepresented) and peripheral territories (almost absent). The sharing of portfolios follows the same logic. Parisian ministers have occupied all the possible positions—especially the highest ones—but most ministers from mainland France have also led important ministries. Though the matching is far from perfect, some portfolios are more frequently attributed to ministers from a given region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El objetivo de este artículo consiste en analizar las transformaciones en las estrategias económico-espirituales y los mecanismos de amortización eclesiástica implementados por la élite porteña del período tardocolonial, en el marco de las reformas de fines del siglo XVIII y comienzos del XIX. En particular, abordamos la recepción del discurso y la legislación desamortizadora en la región y su impacto en la fundación de capellanías, patrimonios para órdenes y otras obras pías. De esta forma, procuramos dar cuenta de la redefinición del vínculo entre Iglesia y élite en el Río de la Plata durante las décadas finales del período colonial.