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Previous research has indicated that witnessing gender discrimination may instigate women's participation in collective action for gender justice. However, relatively little is known about the role of perceived female support in motivating collective action among women who witness gender discrimination in public life. This study aims to analyse whether and when perceived support from feminist-minded women moderates the association between women's witnessing gender discrimination and their willingness to engage in collective action for gender justice. We argue that the association between witnessing gender discrimination and willingness to engage in collective action depends on the support women perceive from their female friends and family members. In studies of women in the U.S. (Study 1; N = 271) and Ukraine (Study 2; N = 256), witnessing gender discrimination predicted greater willingness to participate in collective action for gender justice, and this association was stronger when female support was perceived to be lower. Study 3 (N = 1,304) replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 with self-identified feminist women in Turkey. Our research offers novel insights regarding why perceived lack of female support may encourage women to engage in collective action for gender justice.

The perspectives of laypeople within conflict settings are important because the ways in which they perceive and understand ongoing conflict can shape its course. While limited, existing research suggests that diaspora communities can also play a pivotal role in influencing conflict from outside their homeland; however, systematic examination of the different ways that members of diaspora communities frame conflict occurring within their homelands has not received attention. Using Entman’s (1993) systematic frames analysis, research by Uluğ and Cohrs (2016) examined conflict frames used by laypeople from different ethnic groups in Turkey. The current research replicates and extends this work by examining conflict frames used by members of the Kurdish-Turkish diaspora in Germany following the same frame analysis: (a) problem definitions, (b) sources of the problem, (c) moral evaluations, (d) solutions to the problem, and (e) barriers to the solution of the problem. Q methodology, a mixed-methods approach, was used to discover socially shared viewpoints regarding the Kurdish conflict with 43 people from the Kurdish and Turkish diaspora in Germany. Results highlighted four different conflict frames, labeled as (a) a freedom for Öcalan frame; (b) a nation-state ideology and democracy frame; (c) an independence and identity for Kurds frame; and (d) a terrorism, economy, and foreign power frame. These diverse viewpoints are evidence of the importance of emphasizing the role of diaspora groups’ perspectives in conflict resolution and peace processes. The article concludes with a discussion of similarities and differences across laypeople in Turkey and diasporic communities in Germany.

The Ball State University Center for Peace and Conflict Studies in the United States has compiled altruistic stories from different countries such as India, Australia, the United States, and England since the onset of the COVID‐19 pandemic. We examined those stories to understand (1) who receives the most support, (2) what type of support is provided, (3) who those supporters are, and (4) why people support each other during the pandemic. Conducting a qualitative content analysis of 104 altruistic stories, we first identified that (a) older individuals , (b) people with sensitive health conditions, and disabilities, (c) frontline workers, and (d) working class and marginalized communities received the primary support. Second, we identified three types of support: (a) material, (b) social/emotional, and (c) psychological. Third, we found that support was coming from (a) different organizations, (b) advantaged groups, and (c) volunteers. Last, (a) sharing a community/humanity identity, (b) allyship, and (c) showing gratitude were the reasons behind altruistic and prosocial behavior. Our findings contribute to the literature by providing some possible reasons and ways that allies have supported disadvantaged communities via sharing the available resources and how showing gratitude can be a reason for altruism and prosocial behavior in a pandemic.

People's religious identity is often the central identity in many ethnopolitical conflicts. These identities in conflict contexts may be associated with how people see conflict and their willingness to forgive the outgroup members for their wrongdoings in the past. Study 1 (N = 287) tested how religious group identification in the Northern Irish context predicted forgiveness through the endorsement of dominant conflict narratives (i.e., terrorism and independence narratives) among Protestants and Catholics. We also tested how group membership may moderate these relationships. The results showed that among Protestants, higher Protestant identification predicted less forgiveness through higher endorsement of the terrorism narrative and less endorsement of the independence narrative. Among Catholics, on the other hand, higher Catholic identification predicted stronger endorsement of the independence narrative, and in turn, less forgiveness. Study 2 (N = 526) aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a larger sample and extend them by testing the role of an alternative conflict narrative (i.e., the Northern Irish identity narrative). The results were largely replicated for the independence and terrorism narratives, and the Northern Irish identity narrative was associated with higher forgiveness across both groups. We discuss the results in terms of how ingroup identities and conflict narratives can become both facilitators of and barriers to peacebuilding in post-conflict societies.

The coronavirus pandemic has caused unemployment to skyrocket, exposed the longstanding inequalities in health care services and working conditions, and mainly affected the poor in different parts of the world. In the current study, we focus on social identity and social class-related factors that are critical during the pandemic to gain insights into what predicts support for policies favoring economic equality in the post-pandemic period. We argue that to the extent that individuals 1) identify with all humanity during the pandemic, 2) are aware of their socio-economic status-based privilege, 3) do not hold classist attitudes, they would support policies favoring economic equality. In Study 1, survey data from 1212 participants in Turkey were analyzed by means of hierarchical linear regression analysis. The findings showed that stronger identification with all humanity, higher awareness of socio-economic status-based privilege, and less endorsement of classist attitudes predict more support for socio-economic equality policies in the post-pandemic period, after controlling for socio-demographic and socio-political characteristics of participants. Study 2 (N = 212) replicated the findings in a different context, namely the U.S. Our findings extend previous studies by showing the importance of a global identity, such as shared human identity, in the ongoing and potentially in the aftermath of the pandemic. In addition, our findings highlight the joint contributions of socio-economic factors such as classist attitudes and awareness of class-based privilege to the support for socio-economic policies.

Three studies tested whether witnessing incidents of racial discrimination targeting Black people may motivate White people to engage in collective action for racial justice. In studies of White Americans (Study 1) and self-identified White activist “allies” (Study 2), witnessing incidents of racial discrimination predicted greater willingness to participate in collective action for racial justice, through the pathway of enhanced awareness of racial privilege. Studies 1 and 2 showed that awareness of racial privilege uniquely predicted the link between witnessing incidents of racial discrimination and willingness to participate in collective action for racial justice; these effects were consistent both with and without controlling for Whites’ sense of identification with their own racial group. Study 3 tested experimentally how witnessing incidents of racial discrimination may compel White people to become more motivated to engage in collective action for racial justice. Compared to those in a control condition, White participants who were randomly assigned to watch a brief video depicting recent discriminatory incidents targeting Black people (e.g., Starbucks incident in Philadelphia, housing incident at Yale University) tended to show greater motivation to engage in collective action for racial justice, an effect accounted for largely by enhanced awareness of racial privilege. How witnessing incidents of racial discrimination can transform views of privilege and willingness to stand up for racial justice among members of advantaged racial groups is discussed.

Social media has been integral for the organization and success of right-wing populist movements in the United States and Europe. Within online communities, discussions take place in which ideologies are formulated, iterated upon, and disseminated. One particular forum, hosted on the popular website reddit.com, r/The_Donald, has received media attention for its political influence. Despite the influence of online spaces in populist, far-right movements, relatively little attention has been paid to qualitative content of discussions that take place within such spaces, including r/The_Donald. Guided by a social representations approach, we analyzed how discussions on r/The_Donald represent sociopolitical groups. We focused on discussions of political affiliations, race relations, immigration, and culture. From a dataset of 8,198 posts, we selected 1,292 segments from 883 unique Reddit usernames and analyzed them using qualitative content analysis. The results showed that the majority of posts discussed liberals, race relations, and conspiracy theories, and in these posts, liberals and liberal ideas were delegitimized and mocked through their representations. These posts represented conservatives through antinomic contrast and comparison to liberals and liberal policies. The meanings of those representations in intergroup relations are discussed.

Since the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel‎, the YPG) has been one of the most notable groups in Syria. The group has become increasingly known especially after playing a significant role in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and, later on, declaring autonomy in northern Syria in 2014. While various political, economic, and social dimensions of the Rojava struggle and of the YPG have been examined within a wide array of fields, the group and its identity have not been adequately examined through a social-psychological lens thus far. In this study, we seek to fill this gap by examining how YPG supporters represent, understand, and express the identity and behaviour of their own group and their adversaries on social media, particularly on Twitter. In light of social identity theory, we explore YPG supporters’ (1) ingroup representations (both ingroup members and allies), (2) ingroup social norms, (3) outgroup representations, and (4) outgroup social norms. Thus, we not only present the first empirical study in this regard, but also discuss the meanings of identity content and social norms in relation to the processes of mobilization and solidarity among YPG supporters.

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events (e.g. Brexit). So far, social-psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low-income and low-education are among the most robust predictors of CB (Uscinski, 2020; van Prooijen, 2017). Yet, the potential role of precarity – the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain – in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio-functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political “elites”. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID-19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self-reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social psychological understanding of CB as the by-product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio-functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio-economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB.

Despite the ongoing shift in societal norms and gender-discriminatory practices toward more equality, many heterosexual women worldwide, including in many Western societies, choose to replace their birth surname with the family name of their spouse upon marriage. Previous research has demonstrated that the adherence to sexist ideologies (i.e., a system of discriminatory gender-based beliefs) among women is associated with their greater endorsement of practices and policies that maintain gender inequality. By integrating the ideas from the system justification theory and the ambivalent sexism theory, we proposed that the more women adhere to hostile and benevolent sexist beliefs, the more likely they would be to justify existing gender relations in society, which in turn, would positively predict their support for traditional, husband-centered marital surname change. We further argued that hostile (as compared to benevolent) sexism could act as a particularly strong direct predictor of the support for marital surname change among women. We tested these possibilities across three cross-sectional studies conducted among women in Turkey (Study 1, N=118, self-identified feminist women; Study 2, N=131, female students) and the United States (Study 3, N=140, female students). Results of Studies 1 and 3 revealed that higher adherence to hostile (but not benevolent) sexism was associated with higher support for marital surname change indirectly through higher gender-based system justification. In Study 2, the hypothesized full mediation was not observed. Consistent with our predictions, in all three studies, hostile (but not benevolent) sexism was found to be a direct positive predictor of the support for marital surname change among women. We discuss the role of dominant ideologies surrounding marriage and inegalitarian naming conventions in different cultures as obstacles to women’s birth surname retention upon marriage.

While public health crises such as the coronavirus pandemic transcend national borders, practical efforts to combat them are often instantiated at the national level. Thus, national group identities may play key roles in shaping compliance with and support for preventative measures (e.g., hygiene and lockdowns). Using data from 25,159 participants across representative samples from 21 nations, we investigated how different modalities of ingroup identification (attachment and glorification) are linked with reactions to the coronavirus pandemic (compliance and support for lockdown restrictions). We also examined the extent to which the associations of attachment and glorification with responses to the coronavirus pandemic are mediated through trust in information about the coronavirus pandemic from scientific and government sources. Multilevel models suggested that attachment, but not glorification, was associated with increased trust in science and compliance with federal COVID-19 guidelines. However, while both attachment and glorification were associated with trust in government and support for lockdown restrictions, glorification was more strongly associated with trust in government information than attachment. These results suggest that both attachment and glorification can be useful for promoting public health, although glorification's role, while potentially stronger, is restricted to pathways through trust in government information.

U.S.-based research suggests conservatism is linked with less concern about contracting coronavirus and less preventative behaviors to avoid infection. Here, we investigate whether these tendencies are partly attributable to distrust in scientific information, and evaluate whether they generalize outside the U.S., using public data and recruited representative samples across three studies (Ntotal = 34,710). In Studies 1 and 2, we examine these relationships in the U.S., yielding converging evidence for a sequential indirect effect of conservatism on compliance through scientific (dis)trust and infection concern. In Study 3, we compare these relationships across 19 distinct countries. Although the relationships between trust in scientific information about the coronavirus, concern about coronavirus infection, and compliance are consistent cross-nationally, the relationships between conservatism and trust in scientific information are not. These relationships are strongest in North America. Consequently, the indirect effects observed in Studies 1–2 only replicate in North America (the U.S. and Canada) and in Indonesia. Study 3 also found parallel direct and indirect effects on support for lockdown restrictions. These associations suggest not only that relationships between conservatism and compliance are not universal, but localized to particular countries where conservatism is more strongly related to trust in scientific information about the coronavirus pandemic.

U.S.-based research suggests conservatism is linked with less concern about contracting coronavirus and less preventative behaviors to avoid infection. Here, we investigate whether these tendencies are partly attributable to distrust in scientific information, and evaluate whether they generalize outside the U.S., using public data and recruited representative samples across four studies (Ntotal=37,790). In Studies 1–3, we examine these relationships in the U.S., yielding converging evidence for a sequential indirect effect of conservatism on compliance through scientific (dis)trust and infection concern. In Study 4, we compare these relationships across 19 distinct countries, finding that they are strongest in North America, extend to support for lockdown restrictions, and that the indirect effects do not fully appear in any other country in our sample other than Indonesia. These effects suggest that rather than a general distrust in science, whether or not conservatism predicts coronavirus outcomes depends upon national contexts.

Previous research in the Turkish–Kurdish conflict context highlighted two opposing conflict narratives: (a) a terrorism narrative and (b) an independence narrative. In this article, we argue that these narratives are relevant to protracted and asymmetrical intergroup conflict (e.g., independence struggles), and therefore have consequences for conflict- and peace-related outcomes regardless of conflict contexts. We tested this generalizability hypothesis in parallel studies in the context of Turkish–Kurdish (Study 1) and Israeli–Palestinian relations (Study 2) among majority group members (Turks and Jewish Israelis, respectively). We also investigated competitive victimhood as a potential mediating variable in the relationship between conflict narratives on the one side and support for non-violent conflict resolution, forgiveness, and support for aggressive policies on the other, in parallel studies with the two aforementioned contexts. We argue that the terrorism narrative is essentially a negation of the narrative of the other group, and the independence narrative is a consideration of that narrative; therefore, competitive victimhood would be lower/higher when the narrative of the other is acknowledged/denied. Results point to the crucial relationship between endorsing conflict narratives and conflict- and peace-related outcomes through competitive victimhood, and to the possibility that these conflict narratives may show some similarities across different conflict contexts.

While researchers have long discussed the impact that ingroup-outgroup identities may have on participant-researcher dynamics, no previous study that we know of has investigated how these identities impact participants’ decisions to participate in research in conflict contexts. In this study, we aimed to examine participants’ perspectives on their decisions to participate in research and how those decisions may be related to both their and the researchers’ identities as well as other important dynamics, such as political ideology. We used the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as a case and examined participants’ perspectives on Turkish researchers in this conflict context. More specifically, we investigated (1) opinions and feelings about Turkish researchers; (2) reasons for (not) participating in research by Turkish researchers; (3) the ways Turkish researchers affect participants’ decisions; and (4) attitudes toward Kurdish researchers. We used a survey with open-ended questions to explore participants’ perspectives and analyzed the data from 137 participants who identify as Kurdish using qualitative content analysis. Results highlighted the important opinions and feelings about Turkish researchers such as researchers’ ideological positions, objectivity, and sincerity, as well as how researchers’ other identities may affect participants’ evaluations of their research and how Kurdish researchers are perceived by Kurdish participants. We discuss the ingroup-outgroup dynamics together with other identities in relation to existing identity literature, as well as practical implications of our research for participant recruitment.

OBJECTIVES: Using the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, Studies 1 and 2 tested how ethnic identification predicted support for minority rights through the pathway of the endorsement of the conflict narrative of the minority group (i.e., independence narrative) among Kurds (Study 1) and Turks (Study 2) in Turkey. Study 2 also tested whether the paths between (a) ethnic identification and endorsement of the minority group's conflict narrative and (b) endorsement of the minority group's conflict and support for minority rights would be moderated by ally identification (i.e., Turkish ally identification). \ud \ud METHODS: 201 self-identified Kurdish participants in Study 1 and 271 self-identified Turkish participants in Study 2 participated in an online survey voluntarily. \ud \ud RESULTS: In Study 1, stronger Kurdish identification predicted more support for minority rights through the pathway of more endorsement of the independence narrative. Study 2 showed the opposite findings with regard to the relationship between ethnic identification and support for minority rights. For the majority group, higher ethnic identification predicted less support for minority rights, through the pathway of less endorsement of the minority group's conflict narrative. Study 2 also found that the strength of the relationship between (a) ethnic identification and endorsement of the minority group's conflict narrative is particularly strong among strong allies, whereas the strength of the relationship between (b) endorsement of the minority group's conflict narrative and support for minority rights is particularly strong among weak allies. \ud \ud CONCLUSIONS: Results point to the important relationship between ethnic and ally identities, conflict narratives, and intergroup-related outcomes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Engaging in political action can ensure adequate political representation for citizens. Except for voting, however, only a nonrepresentative, small group of people regularly engages in political action. Social psychological theories provide individual, group, and system-level explanations for why people could remain inactive. However, they often focus only on personally held attitudes and do not fully consider the dynamics of attitude formation in interactions. Based on 26 focus group discussions conducted in Brazil, Hungary, and the Netherlands, we explored how citizens explain political inaction. We used latent thematic analysis, informed by social psychological theories, to understand how people form opinions about their own and others’ political inaction. In all three countries, the prevalent norm in the focus group discussions was that political inaction should be reduced but a lack of political efficacy constituted a core theme in explaining why people remain politically inactive. Depending on the sociopolitical context and how people self-categorized within the discussions, people blamed unresponsive governments, or cited personal fears of repercussions and cultural differences within and between countries as reasons for inaction. The findings and interpretations are discussed within a framework that extends and integrates previous perspectives on why people remain politically inactive.

Although scholars have suggested that relationships with people of color can enhance White people’s commitment to racial justice, many women of color have questioned whether White people, and White women in particular, actually “show up” to protest for racial justice. Focusing on the contact experiences and closeness White women have with people from racial and ethnic groups different from their own, we tested how these relationships may predict their reported motivations to engage in protests for racial justice. With a broad online sample of White American women (Study 1), and White women who attended the 2017 Women’s March (Study 2), our results showed that both positive contact and closeness to people targeted by prejudice predicted White women’s willingness to participate in protests for racial justice (Studies 1 and 2). Only closeness to people targeted by prejudice significantly predicted actual participation in collective action for racial justice (Studies 1 and 2) and also predicted motivation for racial justice among those who attended the 2017 Women’s March (Study 2). Findings suggest that White women’s inclinations to protest for racial justice may be linked to the close relationships they have with people targeted by prejudice, while more general forms of positive contact may not be related to such action. Additional online materials for this article are available on PWQ ’s website at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0361684319840269 . Online slides for instructors who want to use this article for teaching are available on PWQ' s website at http://journals.sagepub.com/page/pwq/suppl/index

Groups in conflict often resist efforts toward reconciliation with the outgroups. Despite the growing research examining processes underlying support for reconciliation, we know little about how resentment might drive members of victim groups that have experienced violence and atrocities to oppose reconciliation and reduce their willingness to forgive the perpetrator group. Using the context of the Turkish–Armenian conflict, the present research investigated the association of ingroup identification, ingroup glorification, and resentment with willingness to reconcile and forgive among Armenians in their homeland context (Armenia; Study 1) and Armenian-Americans in the hostland context (the United States; Study 2). In Study 1, stronger Armenian identification and Armenian glorification predicted more resentment toward the Turks, which in turn predicted less forgiveness and less support for reconciliation. Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 regarding the associations of ingroup glorification but not ingroup identification. However, Study 2 also demonstrated that identification with diaspora identity (i.e., American identity) predicted positive intergroup outcomes. Results point to the important relationship between different modes of identification both in the homeland and in hostland countries and intergroup-related outcomes through resentment, and to the obstacles to reconciliation and forgiveness among victim groups of unacknowledged past trauma and genocide.

Previous research has shown that positive intergroup con-tact among disadvantaged group members may predict a so-called sedative effect according to which positive con-tact is associated with reduced support for social change. Conversely, positive contact is associated with increased support for social change toward equality among advantaged group members. This raises the important question of under which circumstances intergroup contact can encourage support for social change among both disadvantaged and advantaged groups. In this theoretical article, we tackle this question by introducing a new Integrated Contact-Collective Action Model (ICCAM). We first provide an up-to-date review of how intergroup contact may promote or hinder social change for both disadvantaged and advantaged groups. We, then, use ICCAM to examine when the many forms of intergroup contact promote or hinder sup-port for social change, proposing the existence of two different paths for disadvantaged and advantaged group members. Finally, we discuss the implications of the model for social intervention and make policy recommendations stemming from a review of available evidence.

Though greater intergroup contact has been shown to predict greater support for social change among advantaged group members, little is known about what occurs during the contact that may encourage members of advantaged groups to become willing to engage in collective action in solidarity with the disadvantaged. We argue that intergroup contact with disadvantaged group members may motivate advantaged group members’ willingness to engage in collective action through the mediating pathway of communication about group differences in power during contact. Two studies tested this proposition by examining how advantaged group members communicate about group differences with disadvantaged groups during contact in two distinct national contexts: White Americans in contact with Black Americans in the U.S. (Study 1) and Turks in contact with Kurds in Turkey (Study 2). In addition, Study 2 extended the research by specifying that it is communication about group differences in power—not communication about group differences in culture—that mediates the relation between advantaged group members’ contact with the disadvantaged and their willingness to engage in collective action in solidarity with the disadvantaged. We discuss the implications of these findings for future research on intergroup contact, along with highlighting the importance of communicating about power differences across group lines.

The present paper examines the extent to which conspiracy beliefs about the COVID-19 outbreak and distrust of epidemiological science are likely to predict optimistically biased risk perceptions at the individual and group levels. We explored the factor structure of coronavirus conspiracy beliefs and their associations with trust in science in predicting risk perceptions using survey data collected in Ukraine ( N = 390), Turkey ( N = 290), and Germany ( N = 408). We further expected conspiracy beliefs and distrust of science to predict people’s willingness to attend public gatherings versus maintaining preventive physical distancing through optimistically biased risk perceptions. Metric noninvariance for key constructs across the samples was observed so the samples were analysed separately. In Ukraine, a two-factor structure of conspiracy beliefs was found wherein COVID-19 bioweapon (but not COVID-19 profit) beliefs were negatively associated with public gathering through optimistically biased individual risk perceptions. In Turkey and Germany, conspiracy beliefs showed a single-factor solution that was negatively associated with preventive distancing and positively related to public gathering through optimistically biased public risk metaperceptions. The hypothesis about the direct and indirect effects of trust in science on risky health behaviour was partially confirmed in all three samples. The observed discrepancies in our findings are discussed.

Previous research indicates that trust in the political system increases well-being. Drawing from prior collective action research, we posit that a) the relationship between political trust and well-being would be mediated by collective action participation (mediation hypothesis) and b) political efficacy would moderate the indirect effect of political trust on well-being through collective action participation (moderated mediation hypothesis). In two studies (N = 704), we tested these relationships among opposition voters in Turkey before two highly contested elections. The findings of Study 1 showed a significant indirect effect of political trust on well-being through collective action participation and supported our mediation hypothesis. However, unlike democratic contexts, the relationship between collective action and well-being was negative. In addition, we did not find support for our moderated mediation hypothesis. In Study 2, we used more nuanced measures of political efficacy (voting efficacy and online/offline protest efficacy) and collective action (both offline and online collective action). In addition to replicating the findings of Study 1 with respect to the mediatory role of collective action participation (but only for online collective action participation), Study 2 again did not support our moderated mediation hypotheses with respect to the four moderators. Results highlight the importance of online and offline collective action among ideologically marginalized people with low trust in the political system in maintaining well-being.

Doing field research in contexts involving intergroup conflict entails practical, ethical and methodological challenges. Therefore, it is crucial for researchers to be prepared for those challenges before going to the field. We believe reflecting on potential challenges by taking one’s positions (e.g., being an insider and outsider in different contexts) in intergroup conflict into account beforehand may be a good start for doing successful field research. As new challenges may occur while in the field, reflecting on one’s own positions both during and after the fieldwork is also necessary. While there is literature on these challenges in different social science fields, little is known about opportunities that may occur in fieldwork. In this chapter, we, as Turkish researchers, aim to discuss challenges as well as opportunities that occurred in our fieldwork on Turkish-Armenian relations in Turkey, Armenia, and in the U.S. The challenges include (a) building trusting relationships between researchers and participants, (b) security of researchers and participants, and (c) censorship against researchers and self-censorship. The opportunities include (a) building trusting relationships with local contacts, (b) noticing one’s own prejudices and improving intergroup relations, and (c) reevaluating theoretical and methodological approaches. We hope the discussions throughout this chapter will be beneficial for researchers and students who are planning to do fieldwork in conflict contexts as well as contribute to new debates on opportunities of fieldwork, especially in intergroup conflict contexts.

Recent studies have juxtaposed hedonic forms of media entertainment motivations (seeking for pleasure and fun) with eudaimonic forms (seeking for insights into the human condition). As most of this research was confined to the Western world so far, this contribution explores the impact of culture on hedonic and eudaimonic media entertainment motivations. Culture is conceptualized on both macro- and micro levels of analysis. On the macro level of countries, the study draws of Hofstede’s concept of individualism/collectivism. On the micro level of individuals, the study explores independent and interdependent self-construals and ethnic identity as potential influences on hedonic and eudaimonic entertainment. A survey was carried out with international students and non-students in Germany and Turkey ( N = 324). Cross-level operator analyses were calculated to explore relationships between cultural variables and hedonic/eudaimonic entertainment motivations. Results show consistently that variables of culture that tap into cultural belonging (collectivism, interdependence, and ethnic identity) are significant predictors of hedonic entertainment. Cultural variables that tap into distinctiveness and separation from one’s collective (individualism and independence) are significant predictors of eudaimonic entertainment. The study is among the first to explore the impact of cultural variability on entertainment motivations and thus especially relevant for sparking up a new line of research.

Purpose Exploring the understandings of conflict held by Members of Parliament (MPs) provides a meaningful picture of a conflict in a particular society. The aim of the study is to explore the Kurdish conflict understandings among MPs in Turkey. Design/methodology/approach The current research used Q methodology, which is a suitable method to identify socially shared perspectives and to identify intra- and inter-group differences, and Entman’s (1993) frame analysis to explore subjective understandings of the Kurdish conflict. Data were collected from 23 MPs from four political parties. Findings The analysis revealed four qualitatively distinct viewpoints: Turkish Nationalist view, Social Democratic view, Conservative-Religious view and Pro-Kurdish view. Originality/value This study contributes to the understanding of political parties’ perspectives on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey by representing each political party’s priorities and concerns. The meaning of these priorities and concerns, implications for conflict resolution and the usefulness of the Q methodology for exploring conflict understandings are also discussed.

Societies in conflicts develop an ‘ethos of conflict’, a set of socially shared beliefs about the conflict. We argue that the ethos of conflict can be based on different representations of the conf...

Abstract. This contribution examines the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Turkey by drawing on the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) and the slacktivism versus facilitation debate in the literature on digitally enabled collective action. Contrary to the slacktivism hypothesis that claims online collective action to lack an apparent impact on the real world, the current study indicates a facilitating role of online collective action in the Gezi Park protests. By means of a large-scale online survey (N = 1,127) and a subsequent latent path analysis, the study demonstrates that the endurance of the movement was kept alive by both offline and online collective actions. The relationship between offline/online action and protest motivations was mediated by three predictors of collective action derived from the SIMCA: perceived injustice, social identity, and perceived efficacy. Results show that protestors in Turkey, independent of whether they became active in the digital or the real world, were likely to protest again to the extent that they perceived developments in Turkey as unjust, identified strongly with the Çapulcus [Turkish for looters] as a social group, and perceived this group to be efficient in changing social injustice in the country.

While there is a wealth of literature on how and why people engage in collective action, there has been comparably less focus on the way identities that have emerged (as compared to how they are consolidated or politicized) through crowd action are understood and explained by those who carry those identities, as well as the particular importance of norm formation and adherence in this process. The Gezi Park protests in Turkey allowed studying exactly how a newly created identity - capulcu identity [Turkish for looters] - can be perceived by the protesters. The present study utilizes a qualitative approach to explore how the capulcu identity was understood by people who participated in the Gezi Park protests, as well as the norms and prototypes associated with that identity. More specifically, we investigated perceptions of (1) the defining characteristics of a new identity (i.e., meaning of capulcu), (2) prototypicality (i.e., typical capulcu), (3) expectations of capulcu behaviour in terms of social norms, and (4) out-group definitions (i.e., differentiating a capulcu from a non-capulcu). We used a survey with open-ended questions to explore capulcu identity and analysed the data from 196 participants using qualitative content analysis. Results highlighted the important defining characteristics of capulcu identity, how this identity is positioned in relation to the newly created out-group (i.e., government supporters), and social norms based on this newly created identity. We discuss the meanings of identity characteristics and social norms in the political context of Turkey in relation to existing collective action models, as well as why we need to examine identities that come about during protests qualitatively.