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This article explains how right-wing populist leaders in Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey have transformed their states' foreign policy institutions through personalization and politicization. We examine the transformation of foreign policy institutions in the four cases and make two contributions. First, we differentiate between disparate types of personalization by proposing the term 'hyperpersonalization'—populist leaders' reliance on security institutions in foreign policy decision-making—which distinguishes the populist transformation of foreign policy institutions in Russia and Turkey. We argue that lower levels and speed of autocratization lead to politicization combined with milder cases of personalization of the foreign policy bureaucracy, while higher levels and speed of autocratization lead to higher levels of personalization in the foreign policy institutions. Second, we lay out the steps and patterns of populist politicization and hyperpersonalization that bring 'deinstitutionalizing restructuring' to foreign policy institutions. As we illustrate, this deinstitutionalizing restructuring involves concurrent bureaucratic expansion and bureaucratic retrenchment. The process is accompanied by a populist narrative that this restructuring is done to realize the 'popular will' or to regain 'full sovereignty'. We conclude the article with the policy implications of this populist transformation of foreign policy institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academic and policy debates on alliances are yet to incorporate insights from foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature. Generally, bilateral relations between allies are either analyzed with insights from traditional IR theories (such as realism) or with policy-oriented work that does not engage any scholarly literature (focusing on only the day-to-day issues of international politics). I argue that FPA theories that make linkages between scholarly work and policy-oriented questions in an evidence-based and analytical fashion are capable of accounting for the most significant policy questions of modern international politics. This article analyzes US–Turkey relations in, arguably, their worst decade, with a role theoretic outlook. I claim that despite being close political and military allies since the 1940s, US–Turkey bilateral relations are witnessing their worst decade since the Arab uprisings in the MENA, due mostly to ideational factors that shape foreign policy. The conflictual relations originate from a change in US and Turkish foreign policy-makers' role conceptualizations vis-à-vis their countries' roles in the MENA region after the Arab uprisings and the role conflict this has caused with one another. Misaligned interests during the Arab uprisings, especially after 2014 in the Syrian civil war, have exacerbated the bilateral ties further. Drawing insights from elite interviews conducted in Turkey (2014–2016), Washington DC, and Ankara (2018–2020), I explain the sources of conflict in US–Turkey relations with a role theory perspective and offer policy prescriptions in conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cyprus problem is one of the most protracted and complex conflicts in the world. This article uses poliheuristic (PH) theory to analyze Turkey's decision-making during the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974. We utilize the PH model (Mintz 1993 , 2004) and its method to systematically examine the decision-making process and outcomes during the three crises. We present primary evidence from governmental archives and secondary from media sources. The two hypotheses derived from the PH literature are supported by evidence. Results confirm Turkish decision-makers employed two-stage decision-making during each crisis. In the first stage, Turkish leaders followed the noncompensatory rule and eliminated options that could incur losses. In the second stage, their calculations were more in line with expected utility maximization. Implications of the case study in terms of PH model, foreign policy analysis, and international relations theory are discussed in the conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the significance of the subject, studies on the foreign policy preferences of European populist radical right leaders are scarce except for a handful of examples. Are European populist radical right leaders more hostile than other world leaders or comparatively friendly? Do they use cooperative or conflictual strategies to achieve their political goals? What are the leadership types associated with their strategic orientations in international relations? Using the operational code construct in this empirical study, we answer these questions and depict the foreign policy belief systems of seven European populist radical right leaders. We test whether they share a common pattern in their foreign policy beliefs and whether their foreign policy belief systems are significantly different from the norming group of average world leaders. The results indicate that European populist radical right leaders lack a common pattern in terms of their foreign policy belief systems. While the average scores of the analysed European populist radical right leaders suggest that they are more conflictual in their world views, results also show that they employ instrumental approaches relatively similar to the average group of world leaders. This article illuminates the microfoundations of strategic behaviour in international relations and arrives at conclusions about the role of European populist radical right leaders in mainstream International Relations discussions, such as idealism versus realism. In this sense, the cognitivist research school complements and advances structural accounts of international relations by analysing leadership in world affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings of expected utility and game theory approaches in IR studies. It goes on to explore their application to a specific research subject, international bargaining on Iran's nuclear program. In this application, the article presents forecasts about Iran's nuclear program using a game theoretic, bounded rationality model called the expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). Three analyses were made in December 2005, September 2006 and March 2007. All three forecasts appear to be in line with real-life developments regarding the issue. The results show that Iran has been losing international support since the analyses started, and the last forecast suggests a pro-US position supported by all major international actors. Also, all three analyses suggest that Russian and Chinese support is vital to curb the Iranian nuclear program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]