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Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of the mechanism.

We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidates' characteristics and policies. Candidates' immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) are exogenously differentiated, while candidates can choose any policy for the remaining issues to maximize their winning probability. Voters have general preferences over the vectors of candidate characteristics and policies, and vote sincerely. Candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences. We characterize a condition on voter preferences (satisfied in most existing models) under which candidates' equilibrium policies generically converge. In contrast, for voter preferences that violate this condition, we construct a class of models in which policy divergence arises in the unique and strict Nash equilibrium. As a normative criterion, we define competition-efficiency and provide conditions under which the equilibrium is or is not competition-efficient.

We develop a formal model in which the government provides public goods in different policy fields for its citizens. We start from the basic premise that two office-motivated candidates have differential capabilities in different policy fields, and compete by proposing how to allocate government resources to those fields. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median-voter model. While candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. We also analyze under which conditions candidates choose to strengthen the issue in which they have a competence advantage, and when they rather compensate for their weakness.

We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.

We consider the empirical relevance of two opposing hypotheses on the causality betweenincome and democracy: The Democratic Transition claims that rising incomes cause a transi¬tion to democracy, whereas the Critical Junctures hypothesis denies this causal relation. Our empirical strategy is justified by Unified Growth Theory, which hypothe¬sizes that the present international income differences have roots in the prehistoric past. Thus, we use prehistoric measures of biogeography as instruments for modern income levels, and find a large long-run causal effect of income on the degree of democracy. This result rejects the Critical Junctures hypothesis, which is an important part of the Primacy of Institutions view.

Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote buying prohibitively costly.

The present paper studies the effects of bandwagon and underdog on the political equilibrium of two-party competition models. We adapt the generalized Wittman-Roemer model of political competition for voter conformism, which views political competition as the one between parties with factions of the opportunists and the militants that Nash-bargain one another, and consider three special cases of the general model: the Hotelling-Downs model, the classical Wittman-Roemer model, and what we call the ideological-party model. In the Hotelling-Downs model, where the militants have no bargaining power in both parties, political parties put forth an identical policy at the equilibrium, regardless of the type of voter conformism, and this is the only equilibrium. Thus neither bandwagon nor underdog has any effect on the Hotelling-Downs political equilibrium. In both the ideological-party and classical Wittman-Roemer models, parties propose differentiated policies at the equilibrium, and the extent of policy differentiation depends on the degree of voter conformism. In these models, multiple equilibria generically exist when the bandwagon effect is sufficiently strong. We characterize the relationship between the extent of voter conformism and equilibrium party platforms in dynamically stable equilibria of these models.

This paper proposes a new model of wage determination and wage inequality. In this model, wage-setters set workers' wages; they do so either directly, as when individuals vote in a salary committee, or indirectly, as when political parties, via the myriad of social, economic, fiscal, and other policies, generate wages. The recommendations made by wage-setters (or arising from their policies) form a distribution, and all the wage-setter-specific distributions are combined into a single final wage distribution. There may be any number of wage-setters; some wage-setters count more than others; and the wage-setters may differ among themselves on both the wage distribution and the amounts recommended for particular workers. We use probability theory to derive initial results, including both distribution-independent and distribution-specific results. Fortuitously, elements of the model correspond to basic democratic principles. Thus, the model yields implications for the effects of democracy on wage inequality. These include: (1) The effects of the number of wage-setters and their power depend on the configuration of agreements and disagreements; (2) Independence of mind reduces wage inequality, and dissent does so even more; (3) When leaders of democratic nations seek to forge an economic consensus, they are unwittingly inducing greater economic inequality; (4) Arguments for independent thinking will be more vigorous in small societies than in large societies; (5) Given a fixed distributional form for wages and two political parties which either ignore or oppose each other's distributional ideas, the closer the party split to 50-50, the lower the wage inequality; and (6) Under certain conditions the wage distribution within wage-setting context will be normal, but the normality will be obscured, as cross-context mixtures will display a wide variety of shapes.

This is the first study that assesses the economic effects of direct democratic institutions on a cross country basis. Its results are based on up to six new measures produced to reflect the legislative basis for using direct democratic institutions as well as their factual use. In addition, a more general overall indicator is used. On the basis of these two different data sets only some of the results of the former intra-country studies are confirmed. An analysis based on the more general democracy index for 87 countries shows that a higher degree of direct democracy leads to lower budget deficits and higher government effectiveness. The effects on government expenditure, corruption and productivity have the expected signs but do not reach conventional levels of significance. A more fine grained analysis for a cross section of 88 countries based on the second data set shows that institutional detail matters a great deal. In particular, the mere possibility of drawing on direct-democratic institutions is often not sufficient to induce significant effects whereas the frequency of their factual use has a number of substantive effects on economic variables.

Es entspricht einer gängigen Meinung, dass ?die Politik? schlecht funktioniert. Politiker genießen nur eine mäßige Wertschätzung. Die Parteien sind auch für politisch engagierte Bürger als Plattform für eigene Aktivitäten zunehmend unattraktiv geworden und werden eher als notwendiges Übel wahrgenommen. Die Bürger - formal der Souverän einer demokratischen Gesellschaft - empfinden ihre Rolle als marginal. Tatsächlich haben sie auch als Wähler nur wenig inhaltlichen Einfluss auf ?ihre Repräsentanten?. Die Kluft zwischen der ?Politischen Klasse? und den Bürgern ist dramatisch angewachsen. Es besteht ein gravierendes ?gefühltes Demokratiedefizit?. Bezüglich einer effektiven Reformfähigkeit im Sinne einer Verbesserung dieser Lage sind die Einschätzungen überwiegend resignativ.

There are two innovations in the paper as compared to the previous literature on democracy and growth. First, we consider not only the level of democracy, but also changes in this level in the 1970s-1990s as measured by increments of Freedom House political rights indices. Second, the distinction is made between democracy and law and order (order based on legal rules); the latter is measured by the rule of law, investors' risk and corruption indices. We discuss two interconnected threshold hypotheses: (1) in countries where law and order is strong enough, democratization stimulates economic growth, whereas in countries with poor law and order democratization undermines growth; (2) if democratization occurs under the conditions of poor law and order (so that illiberal democracy emerges), then shadow economy expands, quality of governance worsens, and macroeconomic policy becomes less prudent. We adduce a number of stylized facts to support our hypotheses. However our econometric findings are mixed: we report results that support the hypotheses as well as regressions that contradict them.

We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec-tion. We analyze the role of the parties.and voters.preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.

We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad politicians care about rent extraction. Voters want to control politician misbehavior and to select good politicians. We show that reelection concerns may compel a good politician not to implement a socially desirable policy if he sufficiently cares about the future. Second, reelection concerns may induce a bad politician not to undertake a socially undesirable policy. The reason for this is fear of being ruled by another bad politician if unseated. This finding exhibits the disciplining function of elections. A striking result in our paper is that bad politicians may act more in tune with the public interest relative to the good politicians.

"Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera regime which differ with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supporters receive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters have to fight harder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. Leaders, then, would like to induce the divide-et-impera regime even when every supporter has veto power over his leadership." (author's abstract), "Könige und Diktatoren, aber auch die Vorstände von Unternehmen und Parteivorsitzende verdanken den Fortbestand ihrer Herrschaft der Unterstützung einer Gruppe von einflussreichen Helfern in Schlüsselpositionen. Diese können ihren Einfluss für, aber auch gegen den Fortbestand der bestehenden Herrschaft einsetzen und werden von den Herrschenden in der Regel für ihre Loyalität bezahlt. Wir untersuchen, welchen Einfluss bestimmte, in der Realität praktizierte Nachfolgeregelungen auf die Machtverteilung zwischen Herrschern und ihren Gefolgsleuten haben und wie diese Nachfolgeregeln die Verteilung der Vorteile und Renten aus Herrschaft beeinflussen. Wir vergleichen zwei unterschiedliche Regime der Nachfolgeregelungen: Das so genannte Konklave-Regime und das divide-et-impera-Regime. Die beiden unterscheiden sich darin, welche Rolle den Gefolgsleute des alten Herrschers im Zusammenhang mit der Neubesetzung des Amts des Herrschers und der Schlüsselpositionen der Unterstützer unter dem neuen Herrscher zukommt. Der Nutzen des Herrschers ist höher und Gefolgsleute erhalten im divide-et-impera-Regime einen geringeren Anteil an den Renten, die mit der Herrschaft einher gehen, da sie um die Nachfolge härter kämpfen, weil sie im Zuge des Herrschaftswechsels mehr zu verlieren haben. Daher sind Herrscher bestrebt, das divide-et-impera-Regime einzuführen." (Autorenreferat)

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

The compromise enhancing effect of lobbying on public policy has been established in two typical settings. In the first, lobbies are assumed to act as 'principals' and the setters of the policy (the candidates in a Downsian electoral competition or the elected policy maker in a citizen- candidate model of electoral competition) are conceived as 'agents'. In the second setting, the proposed policies are solely determined by the lobbies who are assumed to take the dual role of 'principals' in one stage of the public-policy game and 'agents' in its second stage. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that in the latter setting, the compromising effect of lobbying need not exist. Our reduced-form, two-stage public-policy contest, where two interest groups compete on the approval or rejection of the policy set by a politician, is sufficient to show that the proposed and possibly implemented policy can be more extreme and less efficient than the preferred policies of the interest groups. In such situations then more than the calf (interest groups) wish to suck the cow (politician) desires to suckle thereby threatening the public well being more than the lobbying interest groups. The main result specifies the conditions that give rise to such a situation under both the perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests.

This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behavior while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.

Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. \divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends on whether electoral accountability can discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a veto is beneficial only if the government's special interests are expected to be harmful. In contrast, when bad types care about (re-)election, a veto always increases expected welfare, providing a new rationale for the frequent occurrence of "divided government". Without policy rivalry, an opposition veto fares even better.

We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where `citizen candidates' form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be `disconnected'. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining.

This paper studies the location decisions of political parties. We propose a game where agents vote according to ideology and valence, and media create candidates' charisma. The results we obtain show that candidates realize the power of media and therefore locate themselves at some point between the position and the mediam voter and that of the media. However, and more importantly, we further obtain that depending on the media outlets the voters choose to attend, the equilibrium location of candidates may differ. Thus, when voters choose among the outlets, candidates may differentiate their platforms. On the other hand, when voters are exposed to all the outlets in the economy, candidates tend more to moderate their ideology, in an attempt to get the favor of all the media. This result suggests that political competition may end in differentiation if voters only attend to the media that are ideologically close to their convictions. In contrast, political moderation is more easily reached if voters get information from various sources and therefore make more balanced judgements.

Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labor rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human capital rather than financial wealth, they prefer a less risky environment even when this reduces profits, as labor rents are exposed to undiversifiable firm-specific risk. In general, labor and lenders prefer less corporate risk, since their claims are a concave function of firm profitability. This congruence of interests can lead the political majority to support bank over equity dominance. As shareholdings by the median voters increase, the dominance structure will move towards favoring equity markets with riskier corporate strategies and higher profits.

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences. For instance, if only campaign promises are allowed, then the winning party depends not only on the relative size of the budgets, but also on the excess support of the party with the a priori majority, where the excess support is measured in terms of the (minimal) total utility of supporting voters who are in excess of the majority needed to win. If up front vote buying is permitted, and voters care directly about how they vote (as a legislator would), then the determination of the winning party depends on a weighted comparison of the two parties' budgets plus half of the total utility of their supporting voters. These results suggest that vote buying can lead to an inefficient party winning in equilibrium. We find that under some circumstances, if parties budgets are raised through donations, then vote buying can be efficient. Finally, we provide some results on vote buying in the face of uncertainty.

This paper analyzes simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education with three overlapping generations and productivity differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. The presence of productivity differences introduces a time-consistency problem with repeated voting. This can be solved by trigger strategies which do not punish upward deviations in the wage tax rate. If there are multiple equilibria, then higher tax rates are associated with more education. Surprisingly, the median voter may be a young citizen even when cohorts are of the same size.

In this paper we consider the effects of «multiplicative» uncertainty about the structure of the economy in the standard partisan model. An increase in the uncertainty decreases of the inflation rate pursued by the liberal policymaker, but increases the inflation rate pursued by the conservative policymaker. For certain configurations of the parameters, an increase in the uncertainty reduces the expected loss of both parties.

We develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and ?middle of the road? voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast to ideology-driven individuals, ?middle of the road? voters care about the state of the economy in the sense that a policy reform is desirable for them when the fundamentals of the economy change. However, information is 'sticky? in the sense that the process of information diffusion about the state of the economy, which is determined by some exogenous stochastic process, is imperfect. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that an increase in ideological polarization may enhance social welfare by mitigating the friction in information flow.

A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral competition induces political parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences. We show that the answer to this question depends on the cost of information collection. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information may lead to divergence of policy platforms.

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed equity investors even if this reduces profits.The reason is that labor claims are exposed to undiversifiable risk, sovoters with small financial stakes may prefer lender (or large share-holder) dominance, as they choose lower risk strategies. The modelmay explain the great reversal phenomenon in the first half of the20th century (Rajan and Zingales, 2003), when some financially verydeveloped countries moved towards bank or state control as a finan-cially weakened middle class became concerned about income risk.We offer evidence using post WW1 inflationary shocks as the sourceof identifying exogenous variation.

This paper analyses a new framework for decision-making in e-democracies that exploits the power of Internet based public knowledge, which is called briefly e-cognocracy. This is not a procedure to improve technical aspects using the Internet (e.g. e-voting); it is rather a procedure to add a new quality to the democratic system by using the network. This proposed system of e-cognocracy would allow those who are interested to solve highly complex problems by participatory decision-making. Furthermore, we suggest the multicriteria framework for the modelling and resolution of such complex problems. Similarly, using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) approach, we propose decisional (analytic and informatic) tools for searching the knowledge - relevant for the decision-making process. This knowledge of patterns of behaviour, trends, opportunities, decisions and stylised facts will be the starting point of a consensus-reaching process, which is aimed to effectively solve problems of high complexity of the Internet society.

This paper provides a theoretical model of electoral competition in a multidimensional political arena with a heterogenous electorate and politically active interest groups. The emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters and interest groups, attract the policy platforms. The platforms move in parallel instead of towards each other, while the difference in policy platforms is reduced only under certain conditions.

Strengthening elements of direct democracy has become a hotly debated issue especially in purely representative democracies where distrust in political institutions and policymakers has been continually growing in recent years. We develop a compensation model of interest groups seeking a majority for their projects by compensating potential losers. Assuming a centre-left government backed by a parliamentary majority, we apply the model to interest groups of varying size and ideology acting in democratic systems with and without faction discipline. With faction discipline in a representative system, direct democracy is comparatively advantageous and efficiency-enhancing if a leftist interest group initiates a project. For rightist project proposals, direct democracy performs better only if the winning group is small; this obeservation that indirect democracy has a comparative efficiency advantage for medium-sized and large winning groups can be seen as a demonstration of Olson's encompassing group effect. With faction discipline removed, direct and indirect democracy are generally equivalent. The case in which all members of the governing faction have to be compensated constitutes the only exception for which indirect democracy is superior.

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of political institutions in privatization. The empirical testing relies on a new political database with continuous and time-varying measures of the political-institutional setting, and of the partisan orientation of the executive. Using panel data for 21 industrialized countries in the 1977-1999 period, first we show the likelihood and the extent of privatization to be strongly and positively associated with majoritarian political systems. On the contrary, in consensual democracies privatization seems delayed by a “war of attrition” among different political actors. Second, we identify a partisan determinant of the choice of the privatization method. As theory predicts, right wing executives with re-election concerns design privatization to spread share ownership among domestic voters.

We examine a model in which two politicians compete for office and for wages. Their remunerations are either set by the public or are offered competitively by the candidates during campaigns. Our main finding shows that competitive wage offers by candidates lead to lower social welfare than remunerations predetermined by the public, since less competent candidates are elected or wage costs are higher.

This paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. The latter consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters who base their voting decision primarily on one issue of the political agenda. Parties follow a lexicographic objective function, aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions. The emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters, attract the policy platforms. The difference in policy platforms is not reduced. The conclusions are found to be compatible with some major empirical findings of the Manifesto Research Group.

Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability.

Politiker und Wahlstrategen messen der politischen Mitte eine zentrale Bedeutung bei. Durch welche Charakteristika wird diese so genannte (neue) Mitte bestimmt? Welche Politik können wir von diesem Wettkampf um die politische Mitte am Ende erwarten?

Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.

Recent studies have claimed that states with initiatives systems of legislation use this more direct from of democracy to improve productive resource allocation. This paper compares the economic performance of states with initiatives to states that do not have initiatives. We first construct a simple growth model to identify the channel through which initiatives play an important role in determining economic activity; we then test the implications of this model using data for the 48 contiguous United States over the years 1969-1986. Our findings suggest that states with initiative systems waste between 20 to 30 percent fewer resources than do non-initiative states resulting in better economic performance in terms of higher GDP growth and faster convergence.

We study the efficiency of secondary school design by focusing on the degree of differentiation between vocational and general education. Using a simple model of endogenous job composition, we analyze the interaction between relative demand and relative supply of skills and characterize efficient school design when the government runs schools and cares about total net output. We show that neither a comprehensive nor a stratified system unambiguously dominates the other system in terms of efficiency for all possibile values of the underlying parameters. Since comprehensive systems generate more equal labor market outcomes, it follows that the relationship between efficiency and equity in secondary education is not necessarily a trade off. We also show that net output maximizing government policy is not always supported by majority voting. When schools are stratified, majority voting could increase the elitist nature of general schools by rising the admission standard above efficient levels. At the same time, and depending on the values of the underlying parameters, efficient stratified schools could be voted down in favor of less efficient comprehensive schools.

This paper provides a comprehensive theoretical model of the political decision making process. Therein two ideologically different political parties compete for power. Their primary instrument in this competition are programmatic concessions in favor of voters and interest groups. As any concession causes losses in utility for the party members, the parties try to win the election with as little concessions as possible. The efficient amount of concessions and their distribution on different groups of voters and interest groups is derived. These concessions are taken as an indicator for the influence of these two groups of political agents on the political decision making process. Hence the political model developed in this paper helps to determine the political influence of voters and interest groups. The illustrations show that the efficient amount of concessions depends on the closeness of the election race. The closer the initial distribution of votes, the more concessions can voters and interest groups wring from the political parties. The characteristics of the political landscape, e.g. the share of informed voters and the degree of ideological polarization, are found to determine the efficient amount of concessions and thus the influence of voters and interest groups on the political decision making process.

While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely stands on the …ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a decision structure for monetary policy rules.

Options for reforming unfunded public pension schemes that are now being discussed all share the feature that the burden induced by demographic change would be shifted towards presently living and away from unborn generations. Existing models of the political economy of pension reform can not explain why such reform options are being discussed at all. We present an alternative model in which the possibility of evasion of workers from payment of social security taxes is taken into account by modelling a labor supply function. It turns out that the burden of demographic change may fall completely or at least predominantly on the pensioners. Thus this type of model can much better explain recent trends in legislature on unfunded public pension systems in industrial democracies.

A couple of months before the Swedish election in 1998, the incumbent government distributed 2.3 billion SEK to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities. This was the first wave of a four-year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development. This temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. In this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters.

This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for an open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the pre-election period so as to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on closed economies, previous political cycle models had overlooked the influence of elections on the behavior of exchange rates. Voter uncertainty is introduced in two different dimensions. Not only are voters uncertain regarding the competency of the incumbent, but tey also ignore the degree to which the incumbent is opportunistic.

This paper challenges the assertation that European politics would be closer to the citizens' preferences if decision power were transferred from the Council of Ministers to the European Parliament. On the one hand, citizens benfit from a greater transparency in the Parliament's debates compared to the Council's decisions. On the other hand, a powerful European Parliament would be less accountable to the voters of each state since in the European election each state is only decisive with a small probability.

Skill-biased technical change is identified as the driving force behind the changing skill composition in OECD countries rather than structural change. The finding is partly the result of the sectoral view taken. This paper suggests a different view which uses the production process as a starting point. The economy is divided into physica production, personal services, and intermediate services; these branches are again subdivided. Applying the resulting grid to German data from the Socio-economic Panel shows that a structural change in the production process is driving the skill composition of the German labor force.

Klimapolitik ist aufgrund der Vielfalt der direkt betroffenen Akteursgruppen, ihrer globalen Reichweite und ihres extrem langen Zeithorizonts besonders anfällig für Verzerrungen durch Interessengruppen. Daher ist die Theorie der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie gut geeignet, die klimapolitische Realität zu erklären. Auf nationaler Ebene ist die Stärke der Emittenteninteressen selbst in Hocheinkommensländern mit einer expliziten Wählerpräferenz für Umwelt- und Klimapolitik noch so groß, daß eine ernsthafte Klimapolitik nur in seltenen Fällen zustandekommt. Meist kommt es zur klimapolitischen ?Umverpackung? von Maßnahmen, die aus ganz anderen Beweggründen zustandegekommen sind. Derartige Maßnahmen sind in der Regel ineffizient und führen nicht zu einer relevanten Emissionsverringerung. Auf internationaler Ebene widersprechen die Ergebnisse der bisherigen Klimaverhandlungen jedoch dem erwarteten Freifahrerverhalten. Die Struktur der Verhandlungen begünstigt die Interessengruppen, die sich für Klimaschutz einsetzen. Daher kommt es in der Regel zu Beschlüssen, die über den Minimalkonsens herausgehen. Allerdings reicht der Beschlußhorizont weit in die Zukunft. Die Umsetzung der Ziele in nationale Politiken gestaltet sich aufgrund der anderen Interessenkonstellation schwerfällig und unvollständig. Da der klimapolitische Prozeß erst kurze Zeit läuft, kam es bisher noch nicht zu Konflikten hinsichtlich der Inkompatibilität anspruchsvoller internationaler Ziele und schwacher nationaler Politiken. Der Ratifizierungsprozeß des Kyoto-Protokolls wird ein erster Test dafür sein. Allerdings ist damit zu rechnen, daß es auf nationaler Ebene zu einer Verschiebung der Akteurskonstellationen kommt, die langfristig zu einer effizienteren Umsetzung klimapolitischer Maßnahmen führen könnte.

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives to form parties before the elections. In this way Duverger's hypothesis can be formally explained by the strategic behaviour of political elites. If politicians care primarily about private benefits, the equilibrium policy outcome under a proportional electoral system coincides with the median party's position. On the othoer hand, with quasilinear utility, the distance from the median voter outcome may be lower with plurality rule.

"Bestimmendie parteipolitischen Konzeption der an der Regierung befindlichen Parteien deren Fiskalpolitik? Üblicherweise wird davon ausgegangen, daß die Linke eher zu exzessiven Defiziten neigt während die Rechte eine eher vorsichtige und restriktive Fiskalpolitik betreibt. Dieser Einschätzung fehlt allerdings die empirische Basis. Gleichzeitig sind gewichtige Argumente dafür vorgebracht worden, daß die in den letzten Jahrzehnten gewachsene Abhängigkeit von den internationalen Finanzmärkten den fiskalpolitischen Handlungsspielraum drastisch eingeschränkt, wenn nicht sogar beseitigt hat. Diese Fragen werden anhand einer Reihe von Modellen überprüft, die mit Daten von 14 OECD-Ländern von 1991-1991 geschätzt wurden. Die Tests zeigen, daß die makroökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen ganz wesentlich die Beziehung zwischen parteipolitischer Orientierung und Fiskalpolitik bestimmen. Die Linke neigte dazu, Fiskalpolitik antizyklisch einzusetzen, indem sie eine restriktivere Politik verfolgt, wenn die Gesamtnachfrage hoch war, und bei geringer Nachfrage eine liberalere Politik bevorzugte, um die Wirtschaft zu stimulieren. Die Rechte dagegen hat sich eines solchen Aktivismus enthalten oder tatsächlich eine prozyklische Fiskalpolitik verfolgt. Die empirischen Resultate zeigen darüber hinaus, daß diese parteipolitischen Unterschiede im Verlaufe der letzten Jahrzehnte geringer geworden sind." (Autorenreferat), "Does the partisan character of governing parties play a role in the formation of fiscal policy? The conventional view is that the left tends toward excessive deficits while the right practices a more prudent and restrictive fiscal policy. However, there is little evidence that would sustain such a view. At the same time, some strong arguments have been advanced which hold that whatever room existed previously for partisanship in fiscal policy making has been sharply reduced if not eliminated by developments such as greater international financial interdependence in recent decades. These issues are examined with a series of models that have been estimated using data from 14 OECD countries for the period from 1961 through 1991. The evidence produced in this paper suggests that the relationship between partisanship and fiscal policy is contingent on macroeconomic conditions. The left has tended to treat fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical tool, tightening fiscal policy when aggregate demand is high and loosening it to stimulate the economy when demand is low. On the other hand, the right has either refrained from such activism or actually conducted procyclical fiscal policies. The evidence also suggests that these partisan-based differences have been reduced over the recent decades." (author's abstract)

The present paper develops a model of endogenous policy making where a 'low regulation' party / and a 'high regulation' party h compete for campaign contributions spent by a dominating low-cost firm within a regulated industry. The model shows that assuming an endogenous market structure reinforces the economic impacts of lobbying activities compared to the case of a fixed number of firms. In particular, political competition can lead to a level of regulation where all firms using the high-cost technology decide to leave the market such the dominating firm becomes a monopolist. This outcome is c.p. the more likely, the larger the cost differential between the lobbying firm and its high-cost competitors is, and the less external financial sources like, e.g., governmental grants are available to the political parties. Moreover, ideological'constraints that prevent the low regulation party from taking up its equilibrium position will also increase the probability of monopolisation.