1. Information, Insider Trading, Executive Reload Stock Options, Incentives, and Regulation
- Author
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Monique Pontier, David Feldman, David B. Colwell, Wei Hu, UNSW Business School, University of New South Wales [Sydney] (UNSW), Curtin University [Perth], Planning and Transport Research Centre (PATREC), Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse UMR5219 (IMT), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse (INSA Toulouse), Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès (UT2J), Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier (UT3), and Université de Toulouse (UT)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
- Subjects
Non-Transferable ,Reload ,media_common.quotation_subject ,Executive Stock Options ,[QFIN.PM]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/Portfolio Management [q-fin.PM] ,Blackout ,Enlarged Filtration ,Stock options ,Insider ,Insider Information ,Shareholder ,JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C61 - Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis ,medicine ,JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G11 - Portfolio Choice • Investment Decisions ,Insider trading ,JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C0 - General/C.C0.C02 - Mathematical Methods ,media_common ,Finance ,business.industry ,JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G13 - Contingent Pricing • Futures Pricing ,Incentive ,Non-Hedgeable ,Constrained Portfolio Optimization ,medicine.symptom ,business ,Welfare - Abstract
We introduce a theoretical model of executives with insider information (insider-executives) granted incentivizing executive stock options (ESO). We show that while insider-executives optimize their wealth, using their insider information nullies ESO incentives, misaligning their and shareholders' interests. We oer realigning methods: granting insider-executives reload stock options (RSO) and imposing blackout trading periods (blackouts). Eective blackouts keep insider-executives incentivized without being overly restrictive, i.e., without reducing their welfare below that of outsiders. We introduce RSO pricing for insider-executives and oer policy implications: reestablishing the currently out-of-favor RSO, and allowing rms, not regulators, to set blackout periods on securities they issue.
- Published
- 2023