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Our values possess a previously unrecognized distinctive kind of underlying unity. Discussion here begins with moral values, and it is argued that recent approaches like Scanlon's and Parfit's run together moral and rational values in an unintuitive way. A defense is then briefly given of a more intuitively plausible moral approach that focuses on empathy, and it is argued further that empathy itself can be theoretically grounded in updated versions of yin 陰 and yang 陽, with yin understood as receptivity and yang as directed purpose. The discussion then takes up notions like practical rationality, well-being, the (impersonally) Good, moral approval/disapproval, and nonethical value concepts like "good knife" and "beautiful face." It is argued that in every one of these spheres of evaluation positive value judgments imply attraction and negative value judgments repulsion but that in all cases these implications can be canceled in a Gricean way. And it also turns out that we can use yin/yang to better understand not only the positive and negative implications of value judgments but also the ways those implications can be contextually canceled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of interpersonal comparisons of utility is about the possibility (or not) of comparing the utility or welfare or the mental states in general, of different individuals. Embedded in the conceptual framework of utilitarianism, interpersonal comparisons were admissible in economics as part of the theoretical justification of welfare policies until the first decades of the twentieth century. Under the strong influence of the scientific philosophy of positivism as reflected in the works of early neoclassical economists and as epitomized by Lionel Robbins, utility comparisons were subsequently rejected as a value judgement. Robbins' methodological stance is still prevalent among mainstream economists. Despite the explicit rejection of comparability by the majority of economists, interpersonal comparisons are necessary for many key policy issues, such as progressive taxation, social welfare policies, GDP-based welfare comparisons, cost–benefit analysis, and public goods provision. In this paper, the case of interpersonal utility comparisons is discussed as an illustrative example of the usefulness of the study of the role of value judgements, and generally of the interrelationship between ethics and economics. It is argued that the current tension between theory and policy practice might be resolved through the efforts of prominent economists and philosophers to challenge positivism, and especially its problematic treatment of value judgements and of ethical assumptions in general. The discussion also provides more strength to the view that policy makers and their economic advisers cannot avoid ethical questions in their analysis of the workings of the economic system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the structurally contingent nature of value in literature and intellectual work, emphasizing the complexity of value judgments influenced by various social positions and contexts. It mentions journal "Critique," highlighting the intricate web of evaluative practices, revealing the multifaceted dimensions, including institutional, financial, and personal factors, that shape the field of value judgments in intellectual production.

Copyright of GRID - Architecture, Planning & Design Journal is the property of GRID - Architecture, Planning & Design Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the concept of "surplus value" in images and their varying social, cultural, and critical valuations. Topics include the historical and cultural impact of images, the role of value judgments in image criticism, and the conceptual distinction between images and pictures, as well as their evolutionary function in cultural and symbolic systems.

In this essay, I will focus on translation as a cultural appropriation. I argue translation could be a philosophy which has a built-in anxiety for questions, and it could also be a transfiguration from and for literature, which tries to respond to questions but never intends to fully answer them. When so many people have already discussed either the absence or presence of translation and translators, I would rather focus more on how the metaphor of 'mirror' helps us see translation as both absent presences and present absences. In my eyes, the gap between original texts and translation versions, and the attempt to fill in the gap are both beneficial, which contribute immensely to the comprehension of different aesthetics and value judgements. I will put forward some further questions about untranslatability in the concluding part. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Actual Problems of Jurisprudence / Habaršy. Zan̦ Seriâsy is the property of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Perceiving a moral identity in a visual image of a fictional character is a recurrent experience in childhood. "This man is evil" or "that woman is good" are common responses of children to certain physical characteristics represented in a specific range of color or with a specific facial expression. In this study, we aimed to determine whether children perceived a moral identity in a series of illustrations of characters in children's literature. To do so, we created a sample of thirty pictures of different characters; twelve with "evil" profiles, twelve with "good" profiles, and six neutral. The sample was viewed by forty-six children (twenty-one girls and twenty-five boys) who expressed their perceptions of the characters' ethical nature, basing their impressions on their physical appearance alone without any knowledge of a possible plot or narrative link. They expressed their opinions on a seven-level visual analog scale, on which 0 indicated maximum goodness and 7 maximum evil. The results indicated a notable consensus with regard to the perceived ethical profile of the characters; the figure's appearance provided enough clear information to apportion a moral identity of evil or goodness. This leads us to think about the existence of certain visual codes that allow us to understand questions about the identity of a character and, in this case, his/her moral identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the value of persons. Our primary goal is to chart a path from equal and extreme value to infinite value. We advance two arguments. Each argument offers a reason to think that equal and extreme value are best accounted for if we are infinitely valuable. We then raise some difficult but fruitful questions about the possible grounds or sources of our infinite value, if we indeed have such value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Violence is a social phenomenon that has been present throughout human history. Its conceptual clarifications are multiple and its approaches multimodal, which makes it a topic of interest for philosophy, particularly for philosophical anthropology, given the effects on real subjects in divergent contexts. For this reason, defining violence is highly complicated; however, one cannot lose sight of the conjunctural factors that lead to condition it as part of a hegemonic system in crisis, resulting in the presence of social anomalies such as patriarchy, sexism, domestic violence, crime, alcoholism, femicide, among others. This responds to a global logic that promotes exclusion and social injustice, as well as the presence of a culture of fear, while masking new ways of exercising violence in the Latin American region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In diesem Aufsatz würdigt Heinz Kurz den Beitrag Max Webers zu den Sozial- und insbesondere Wirtschaftswissenschaften aus Anlass seines 100. Todestages. Nach einem Überblick über Leben, Werk und Wirken geht er kurz auf Webers methodologische Betrachtungen und seine Rolle im „Werturteilsstreit" im Verein für Socialpolitik ein. Es folgt eine Auseinandersetzung mit Webers Aussagen zur Werttheorie und Grenznutzenlehre. Der Hauptteil der Arbeit gilt Webers Beiträgen zur Religionsökonomik. Nach einer Zusammenfassung des Werks „Die protestantische Ethik und der ‚Geist' des Kapitalismus" und der darin exemplarisch behandelten historischen Macht von Ideen beleuchtet der Autor einige Aussagen Webers vor dem Hintergrund der neueren Theorie und macht auf Grenzen des Arguments aufmerksam. Es folgt ein Überblick über die Aufnahme des Werks damals und heute und die große Bedeutung der „Weber-These" in der modernen Religions- und Kulturökonomik. Nach einer kurzen Erörterung des Verhältnisses von Weber zu Marx wirft Kurz ein Streiflicht auf Webers Beitrag zum Verständnis von Macht und Herrschaft. Webers Werk erweist sich als gewaltige Schatzkammer von Ideen, von denen mehrere noch darauf warten, aufgegriffen zu werden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is to provide an exegesis of Galbraith's theory of consumption and the conception of preferences on which it is grounded, which has often been misunderstood. From the point of view of the history of economic thought, this paper sheds new light on the origins of Galbraith's analysis of consumption. This reappraisal also leads us to show that the latter is bound to a challenge to the Consumer Sovereignty Principle. Consequently, Galbraith's theory contradicts the logic underlying Welfare Economics. Thanks to this exegesis, I finally explain the rationale behind Galbraith's endorsement of the thesis of non-neutrality on the problem of value judgments in economics, which is illustrated by his presidential address to the American Economic Association. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People often get unnecessarily mired in trivial decisions. Four studies support a metacognitive account for this painful phenomenon. Our central premise is that people use subjective experiences of difficulty while making a decision as a cue to how much further time and effort to spend. People generally associate important decisions with difficulty. Consequently, if a decision feels unexpectedly difficult, due to even incidental reasons, people may draw the reverse inference that it is also important and consequently increase the amount of time and effort they expend. Ironically, this process is particularly likely for decisions that initially seemed unimportant because people expect them to be easier (whereas important decisions are expected to be difficult to begin with). Our studies demonstrate that unexpected difficulty not only causes people to get caught up in unimportant decisions but also to voluntarily seek more options, which can increase decision difficulty even further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Half a century after the "Second Great Debate" in international relations (IR) started, scholars still perceive the qualitative versus quantitative division as their principal divide, and yet we do not have a good grasp of the impact of this divide. My research explores how the divide shaped the incentives and behaviors of scholars and influenced the organization of our academic communities and knowledge production. The impact of the divide expressed itself in the distribution of research among methodologies in terms of relative quantity and impact. Less obviously, and yet more importantly, the divide influenced the distribution of quantitative research among different institution types, across fields and journals, and with respect to policy engagement. Using the TRIP database of 7,792 IR articles in twelve top journals from 1980 to 2014, I classify journal articles into three categories—quantitative-only, qualitative-only, and mixed-methods—and categorize author institutions into similar types—publishing quantitative research only, producing nonquantitative work only, and publishing various proportions of quantitative research. Notably, qualitative and quantitative works switched positions over time in terms of relative quantity and impact, with quantitative research more likely published but only slightly more cited in the recent decade. More importantly, the divide produced other less obvious but more serious outcomes. Among 1,111 institutions that ever published IR research in twelve top journals over thirty-five years, two-thirds published nonquantitative research only; fifty-three institutions published more than half of all quantitative articles; institutions publishing quantitative-only or nonquantitative-only research constituted two modal categories. Political science journals published more quantitative research, persistently and with growing convergence; IR journals also evolved toward publishing more quantitative research though with persistent divergence and forming two clusters. Quantitative articles and political science journals were significantly less engaged in providing policy prescriptions than qualitative articles and IR journals. To overcome this lasting and self-perpetuating divide, we must better understand its impact, learn to appreciate alternative approaches, and change the way we train future scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes three eighteenth-century sodomy cases in New Mexico to highlight the ways in which colonial authorities passed judgment on their subjects and the landscapes that they inhabited. Examining how ethno-centric outlooks shaped the ways in which Spanish colonizers interlinked sin and physical space illuminates the process by which colonial authorities made biased value judgments, deeming native peoples and indigenous spaces as sinful. The first case (1728) examines the denunciation and subsequent exoneration of a Spanish resident accused of sodomy. The second case (1731) highlights the tensions between spaces regarded as civilized and other areas removed from the purview of the Spanish state that colonizers viewed as morally suspect. The third case (1775) reveals how colonial authorities attempted to normalize local denizens’ sexual comportment in locations deemed asexual. By analyzing gender and sexuality alongside the environment, this essay problematizes descriptions of seemingly natural landscapes and elucidates the cultural construction behind pejorative tropes used to justify conquest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the conference organized by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences based on the role of econometrics in formulating development plans in 1963 which represents work of Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch. Topics discussed include econometrics as a tool for improving the human condition of living, scientific status of the model, and role of value judgment in the work of the econometrician in the practice of econometric modeling.

Given the socio-political environment of the United States, the identities of religious and racialized Muslims have been scrutinized. Using qualitative semi-structured interviews with religious Muslim American men, I explore discussions that indicate a preference for some strategies for managing stigma over others. I focus specifically on name-changing as a strategy that is polarizing in interview data. Based on my findings I conclude that religious names are a prominent identifier of Muslim identities and may be managed by changing names or choosing nicknames. Furthermore, statements made by Muslim men that center on the management of identities through name-changing come with ingroup value-judgements which appear to reveal a hierarchy in the desirability of certain stigma management strategies over others for these religious Muslim men. This preferential stigma management can be interpreted as boundary work whereby religious Muslims--who regularly attend mosques--construct meaning around unapologetically presenting one's religious identity. This investigation is relevant to discussions that center on the racialization process, boundary work, and the experiences of Muslims in the post-terror United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review offers an articulated argument and commentary on the evaluation section of the proposal for a new regulation on EU Cohesion Policy. The main arguments are based on the comparison of the new proposal with past experience and unresolved problems in previous programming periods. The new proposal includes some improvements which may reinforce future evaluation, but also some shortcomings that may weaken evaluations and reproduce past failures. There is time enough to discuss and modify the proposal of the regulation to avoid these risks. My ideas and suggestions focus on the necessity to continue and strengthen the commitment to improve the evaluation process and quality but do not imply a drastic change of the proposed framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonplace for majority culture values to pass into local church culture without much biblical or critical assessment. The equation of cultural values with biblical norms can have the knock-on effect of limiting minority culture representation, both at leadership level and within the church at large. With a particular focus on the question of class, this paper will explore some indicative examples, provide biblical analysis of these cultural value judgments and offer some suggestions as to how we might overcome our cultural biases to increase representation of minority cultures within the church. Basing the cultural values on a summary of Ruby Payne's characteristics of generational poverty by Tim Chester, this paper will consider the issues of speech, time, dress and social interaction from working- and middle-class perspectives. It will consider how these things play out in the local church context and how they can affect the way in which the majority culture views minorities, particularly in respect to their suitability for leadership roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical realists hold (i) that our ethical concepts, thoughts, and claims are in the business of representing ethical reality, by representing evaluative or normative properties and facts as aspects of reality, and (ii) that such representations are at least sometimes accurate. Non-naturalist realists add the further claim that ethical properties and facts are ultimately non-natural, though they are nonetheless worldly. My aim is threefold: to elucidate the sort of representation involved in ethical evaluation on realist views; to clarify what exactly is represented and how non-naturalism comes into the picture for non-naturalists; and to defend worldly non-naturalism against some objections. The first question addressed is how we should model evaluation on any realist view, which should in turn guide the identification of which properties and facts are credibly regarded as ‘evaluative’ ones. Then the question is: what role might non-natural properties and facts play, and how are they related to what is represented in ethical evaluation? Once that is clear, we will be in a position to answer certain objections to non-naturalist realism from Jackson, Gibbard, Bedke, and Dreier. I argue that the objections all mischaracterize the role played by non-natural properties and facts on plausible versions of non-naturalist realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In De Gustibus , Peter Kivy raises the important and somewhat neglected issue of why we argue against the aesthetic views of those who disagree with us. He thinks this phenomenon is evidence for the objectivity of aesthetic value judgments and also of our need and tendency toward community with others, but it can be said that such arguments may separate people from one another, rather than help create community. Kivy also says that the/my idea that aesthetic value predicates are dispositional with respect to aesthetic opinions can help support the objectivity of aesthetic value judgments, but I suggest a new way one might try to argue for such objectivity : namely, via the application of Saul Kripke’s ideas about reference fixing to terms like beautiful. This has not been attempted previously but has a good deal of promise and plausibility as an approach to and in favor of aesthetic value objectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the practice of evaluation in various sectors of society, including its role in increasing productivity in the business world, shaping the direction of science and culture, and its versatility in different institutional spaces. It discusses two perspectives of evaluation affecting university research in social sciences such as administrative perspective and reflective possibilities of evaluation. It also mentions perspectives involve considerations of value judgments.

Conducting scientific inquiry is expected to help students make informed decisions; however, how exactly it can help is rarely explained in science education standards. According to classroom studies, inquiry that students conduct in science classes seems to have little effect on their decision-making. Predetermined values play a large role in students’ decision-making, but students do not explore these values or evaluate whether they are appropriate to the particular issue they are deciding, and they often ignore relevant scientific information. We explore how to connect inquiry and values, and how this connection can contribute to informed decision-making based on John Dewey’s philosophy. Dewey argues that scientific inquiry should include value judgments and that conducting inquiry can improve the ability to make good value judgments. Value judgment is essential to informed, rational decision-making, and Dewey’s ideas can explain how conducting inquiry can contribute to make an informed decision through value judgment. According to Dewey, each value judgment during inquiry is a practical judgment guiding action, and students can improve their value judgments by evaluating their actions during scientific inquiry. Thus, we suggest that students need an opportunity to explore values through scientific inquiry and that practicing value judgment will help informed decision-makings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I critically analyze Kevin Elliott's A Tapestry of Values in order to tease out his views on the nature and status of values or value judgments in the text. I show there is a tension in Elliott's view that is closely connected to a major lacuna in the philosophical literature on values in science: the need for a better theory of values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors comment on the comparison of field methods. Topics discussed include a proposed simple and consistent approach based on fundamental aspects and principles, the need to focus on common sense, fit -for-purpose, judicious use of statistical analysis and value judgements and a recommended stepwise approach to method comparison that will identify all components of error in the majority of cases.

In philosophy of action, we typically aim to explain action by appealing to conative attitudes whose contents are either logically consistent propositions or can be rendered as such. Call this “the logical criterion.” This is especially difficult to do with clear-minded, intentional incontinence since we have to explain how two judgments can have non-contradicting contents yet still aim at contradictory outcomes. Davidson devises an innovative way of doing this but compromises his ability to explain how our better judgments can cause our continent behaviors. In this essay, I preserve Davidson’s approach to the logical criterion but deviate from his broader theory of action by developing a default-interventionist dual systems theory of action. To do this, I focus on the dynamical relationship between System 1 and System 2: (1) the logical construction of value judgments in System 2 from System 1 and (2) the imaginative construction of non-propositional conative attitudes in System 1 from System 2. I draw on Street’s Humean constructivism and Peacocke’s theory of imagination for logical and imaginative construction, respectively. Within this framework, I provide a new definition of continence and incontinence that satisfies the logical criterion and explains how our better judgments can cause our continent behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Many attitudes are acquired in early childhood. However, due to a lack of experimental research, little is known about the processes of how they are acquired. Two experiments were therefore conducted with 153 German kindergarten children aged 3-6 years that provide first evidence for childhood attitude formation in terms of evaluative conditioning. Specifically, it was found that children preferred novel stimuli previously paired with liked stimuli over novel stimuli previously paired with disliked stimuli. This effect occurred independently of age, generalized toward similar novel stimuli, and did not depend on children's recollection of how stimuli were paired. The findings are discussed in terms of the processes underlying childhood attitude formation, and implications for related research areas are highlighted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais is the property of Centro de Estudos Sociais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the last 20 years, approaches (i.e. concepts, theories, methods) from the systems fields have increased in popularity among evaluators and evaluation commissioners. Their popularity stems in part from a widespread view that systems approaches transform evaluation practice, despite a lack of evidence. There have been few empirical examinations of the implications of these approaches for evaluation practice. This study analyzed eight cases of seasoned evaluators using systems approaches in diverse areas of evaluation practice to identify implications for how these professionals practice evaluation. Case materials included semi-structured interviews with each evaluator and descriptions of evaluations they conducted. Findings support a variety of case-specific transformations rather than a wholesale transformation in evaluation practice. Future directions for evaluator training, evaluation commissioning and contracting, and research are identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses Zak Lancaster's 2016 discovery that academics do not actually write the way They Say/I Say says they do to reflect on relations between, on the one hand, facts about academic writing and, on the other, the pedagogical values that underlie and guide those facts--or, put another way, to reflect on how values we may espouse relate to the facts of actual practice. What implications for how we teach Basic Writing follow from the facts of how academics write? I argue that what "follows" is deliberative, not deductive: although value-laden practice may emerge from and relate to certain facts, such practice is not necessarily entailed by those facts. Some discussion of is/ought relations helps explain this argument, i.e., that how things go is not always how they should. This argument also points, then, toward the good that Basic Writing should promote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frank Ramsey's 'Truth and Probability' sketches a proposal for the empirical measurement of credences, along with a corresponding set of axioms for a (somewhat incomplete) representation theorem intended to characterize the preference conditions under which this measurement process is applicable. There are several features of Ramsey's formal system which make it attractive and worth developing. However, in specifying his measurement process and his axioms, Ramsey introduces the notion of an ethically neutral proposition, the assumed existence of which plays a key role throughout Ramsey's system. A number of later representation theorems have also appealed to ethically neutral propositions. The notion of ethical neutrality has often been called into question—in fact, there seem to be good reasons to suppose that no ethically neutral propositions exist. In this paper, I present several new, Ramsey-inspired representation theorems that avoid any appeal to ethical neutrality. These theorems preserve the benefits of Ramsey's system, without paying the cost of ethical neutrality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to show that in many cases, the State abusively restricts individuals' freedom of expression, amid confusion between exercising their right to free expression and the issue of value judgments. The State sanction applied to individuals for exercising their right to free speech is not always aimed at a legitimate purpose (the protection of rights and freedom of others) and conviction does not correspond to a pressing social need, as it should happen. ECHR jurisprudence reveals that a State interference in the right to free speech is not necessary in a democratic society more so when there is no proportionality between the sanction of state or conviction and the aim sought by the Authority. The way a person exercises his right to say what he thinks, makes it almost impossible to separate a value judgment of its abusive exercise of freedom of expression to it. In such a context, it remains to be seen whether the value judgment is an exception to the limits of free speech or if freedom of expression is the sum of value judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes research-based role-play on academic integrity. In the role-play, doctoral students negotiated the revision of an institutional integrity policy representing different groups of academics and students. On the one hand, role-play as a teaching method and learning activity demonstrated the difficulty of accommodating different perspectives; on the other, it showed the power and necessity of negotiation in matters that involve value judgments. The role-play is described in detail along with its underlying pedagogical foundations and its contextualisation in a doctoral summer school where it took place. The purpose of the article is to describe how academic integrity was approached through role-play and to discuss theoretical and pedagogical foundations of role-play in teaching academic integrity. Although the article does not describe empirical research on role-play as a teaching method, it demonstrates how role-play in teaching academic integrity was developed based on prior research on the topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Really new products (RNPs) defy classification within existing categories while challenging consumers' prior knowledge and thus are often difficult to fully appreciate. Using analogies to help consumers learn about novel features and benefits is one approach proposed in the new product literature. We examine the impact of revealing more stages of an analogy (access, mapping/transfer, and inference) and the proximity of the base domain of the analogy on evaluations of an RNP. When the base domain is similar to the new product, adding mapping/transfer information leads to more favorable evaluations, while adding the desired inference reduces evaluations. However, when the base domain is distant from the new product, revealing more information on the analogy leads to higher evaluations of RNPs. The enjoyment that arises from solving the analogy mediates the relationship between analogy completeness and product evaluations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In reviewing a content-neutral regulation affecting speech, courts ask if the regulation leaves open "ample alternative channels of communication" for the restricted speaker's expression. Substitutability is the underlying rationale. If the message could have been expressed in some other legal way, the ample alternative channels requirement is met. The court then deems the restriction's harm to the speaker's expressive right as de minimis and upholds the law. For decades, courts and free speech scholars have assumed the validity of this principle. It has set First Amendment jurisprudence on the wrong course. Permitting a speech restriction because the speaker could have communicated the same message another way distorts the First Amendment. Ample alternative channels analysis instructs courts to engage in counterfactual, post-hoc reasoning as to the expressive choices the speaker could have made, but didn't--i.e., to substitute the court's own value judgments for those of the speaker's. The modern communications world expands the doctrine's pernicious effects, since speech-facilitating technologies can always theoretically grant an alternative means of expression to any infringed speaker. And the origin of the doctrine, from Justice Harlan's concurrence in United States v. O'Brien, shows that ample alternative channels analysis was in its incipiency a misguided afterthought--born, as historical Supreme Court case files never examined before this Article show, as literally a margin note to an unpublished draft. In the place of ample alternative channels analysis, courts should ask whether a speaker's chosen mode is incompatible with the government's interest in the restriction in question. An incompatibility rule would be more consistent with the Roberts Court's turn toward reviewing content-neutral speech restrictions rigorously, as evidenced in 2014's McCullen v. Coakley. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential for financial conflicts of interest (COIs) to influence scientific research has become a significant concern. Some commentators have suggested that the development of standardized study protocols could help to alleviate these problems. This paper identifies two problems with this solution: (1) scientific research incorporates numerous methodological judgments that cannot be constrained by standardized protocols; and (2) standardization can hide significant value judgments. These problems arise because of four weaknesses of standardized guidelines: incompleteness, limited applicability, selective ignorance, and ossification. Therefore, the standardization of study designs should not serve as an alternative to addressing the interests and power relations that pervade science policy-making. Policy makers should take at least two steps to prevent powerful interest groups from co-opting standardized guidelines. First, their development and review should be made as transparent as possible and should be subjected to broadly-based deliberation. Second, standardized guidelines should be supplemented with efforts to scrutinize the conditions under which financial COIs tend to have the most worrisome effects so that additional steps can be taken to eliminate and mitigate those conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two hundred and eighty undergraduates from universities in two countries were asked to read didactic material, and then think and write about potential solutions to an ill-defined problem. The writing was conducted within a synchronous or asynchronous computer-mediated communication (CMC) environment. Asynchronous CMC took the form of email exchanges between American learners only, Southern European learners only, and American and Southern European learners together. Synchronous CMC was restricted to dyads consisting of American–American, Southern European–Southern European, and American–Southern European students dialoguing. Additionally, a number of Americans and Southern Europeans were each paired with a content-“mirroring” computer-generated partner to account of the effect of thinking with an unresponsive partner in synchronous CMC. Results revealed that dyadic learners in asynchronous CMC used significantly more reasoning skills to think about solutions to the problem, while dyadic learners in synchronous CMC exchanged significantly more personal knowledge and features of emotion. However, the tendency among dyadic learners to include emotional features in their dialogues was mediated by their cultural background. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper I explore Peter van Inwagen's conception of miracles and the implications of this conception for the viability of his version of the natural law defense. I argue that given his account of miraculous divine action and its parallel to free human action, it is implausible to think that God did not prevent natural evil in our world for the reasons van Inwagen proposes. I conclude by suggesting that on the grounds he provides for 'epistemic humility' about modal claims and value judgments 'unrelated to the concerns of everyday life,' the theist should simply embrace skeptical theism and not further attempt to construct a defense of God's permission of evil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I shall analyse and evaluate analytic theists' views of what it takes to be a person of faith. I suggest that the subject can be approached by posing requirements a person must allegedly fulfil in order to count as a person of faith. These requirements can be referred to as aspects of faith. According to my analysis, four different aspects of faith can be distinguished: the cognitive, the evaluative-affective, the practical, and the interpersonal. There have been divergent assessments about which aspects are indispensable for faith and how they should be understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Representations of smell can serve as vehicles for value judgments about social status and cultural performance. Since smell crosses boundaries, the same representations can also expose the arbitrariness of standards of behavior. This essay focuses on examples from Catullus: mainly poems 13 and 97, which include his only uses of olfacere, and 69 and 71, which share an image of animal odor and are linked to 97 by a theme of smell crossing boundaries between human and animal and between city and country; discussion of poem 6 introduces the study. In the context of more decorous representations offered by Cicero, these examples emphasize Catullus' delight in transgressions as leading to sociocultural critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal proportionality is one of the most important principles for adjudicating among conflicting values. However, rather little is known about the factors that play a role in the formation of proportionality judgments. This research presents the first empirical analysis in this regard, relying on a sample of 331 legal experts (lawyers and legal academics). The policy domain addressed by the experiment is the antiterrorist military practice of targeted killings, which has been the subject of a legal debate. Our experimental findings suggest that proportionality judgments are receptive to normatively relevant facts. We also find strong correlational evidence for the effect of ideological preferences on such judgments. These results are consistent for two proportionality doctrines. We suggest that proportionality judgment is anchored jointly in the experts' policy preferences and the facts of the case. We outline the implications of the findings for the psychological and legal literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]