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This article presents a study of the 'wars of words' among selected parties involved in the Syrian conflict. Based on a combination of content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA), it examines actors' discourses within the United Nations Security Council (2011–2015), the global arena of confrontation and international legitimisation of armed actions. Here, it investigates their instrumentalisation of the word 'terrorism' and the war on terror narrative, and it explores the dynamics of discursive (de)legitimisation of the use of violence in Syria. The article shows how parties instrumentalised this narrative to criminalise their enemies while legitimising their own violent actions. By doing this, the paper also offers a broader reflection on the global narrative on terrorism, and its different reception and instrumentalisation by core and peripheral actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On April 8, 2019, President Trump announced that his administration would designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This is the first time the United States has designated an arm of another government, rather than a non-state actor, as an FTO. In his announcement, Trump asserted that the Iranian government has used the IRGC to engage in a campaign of global terrorism. The measure, which officially took effect on April 15, expands on previous terrorism-related sanctions imposed on the IRGC and Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a reversal of decades of U.S. foreign policy, on March 25, 2019, President Trump issued a presidential proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, a strategic piece of territory captured by Israel from Syria during the Six-Day War in 1967. This move, which generated international criticism, is the latest in a series of actions by the Trump administration that advance the interests of the Israeli government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the phenomenon of individual Islamic terrorist attacks, or Lone Wolf, that is taking place in Europe, Israel and the U.S. in the 21st century. It examines the effectiveness of intelligence agencies in preventing terrorism, particularly those of lone wolf attacks. It also explores the counterintelligence measures developed in the U.S., and the identification of terrorists' threats.

This study moves beyond theories emphasising “state failure” as the cause for terrorist “spill-over”. The aim is to offer new theoretical and empirical considerations concerning the determinants of terrorist groups’ geographical strategies. The main argument this article presents is that transnationality for nationalistic terrorist organisations can be costly. This is the case due to themobility,socialandstrategiccosts of operating beyond controlled territories. Hence, the article proposes an interpretation of these decisions as being mainly generated by states’ counterterrorism strategies. Using data gathered from the GTD Dataset and secondary sources such as specialised reports and strategic documents, the article explores the argument by presenting observations and empirical findings on two groups, AQIM and Boko Haram. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the treatment of domestic terrorism cases in the U.S. criminal system. Topics discussed include domestic terrorism incidents and its relation to mental health portrayal in the media and treatment in the legal system following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the dehumanization of Arabs and Muslims as inherently violent, and the institutionalization of Arabs and Muslims as a distinct class in the criminal legal system.

Proscription—the designation of non-state actors as terrorist organizations—operates as one technique of counterterrorism listing, whereby individuals and populations associated with armed non-state actors are targeted for disruption, stigmatisation, and prosecution. This article examines the effects of the globalised proscription of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on the Kurdish conflict as a mode of counterinsurgency warfare. It argues that calling proscription a counterinsurgency strategy better connects its preemptive functions and objects with its deleterious effects on targeted populations. Moreover, this article argues that the transnational organization of the ban of the PKK casts light on how proscription extends and deepens colonial practices of counterinsurgency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the scrutiny of daily Iraqi newspapers, this article offers a collective profile of the commanders in the Islamic State (IS), the so-called Dawa'ish. From the highest level to the lowest ranks, Iraqis form the large majority of the commanders of IS in both Iraq and Syria. After determining the national background and discussing the role of non-Iraqis in the ranks of IS, the article focuses on the social, tribal, and regional backgrounds of the Iraqis in IS' ranks, providing in-depth information on the social and political background of IS in Iraqi society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim A 'good' classification should provide information about the composition and abundance of the species within communities, if it serves as an informative surrogate for biodiversity. A natural way to formalize this is with a predictive model, where group membership (clusters) is the predictor, and multivariate species data (site by species matrix) is the response. In this study, we aimed to develop a predictive model-based framework for evaluating the predictive performance of alternative classifications of vegetation communities, and apply it to make objective and automated decisions about classification structure. Methods We used GLMs fit to multivariate species data to predict occurrence of individual species with site groupings. We used AIC to estimate predictive performance of alternative models to: (1) identify optimal partitioning of sites among multiple competing flexible- β clustering solutions; (2) identify species that contribute most to compositional differences between clusters (i.e. characteristic species); and (3) automatically merge clusters to maximize expected predictive performance using an iterative pruning approach. Using field data from southeastern Australia, and simulated data, we demonstrate our approach for common ecological data types (presence/absence, counts, cover-abundance scores, percentage cover). We supply all code and data required for these analyses. Results AIC was a useful metric for assessing competing classification solutions. Our method produced outputs that were simple to interpret and required few subjective choices to be made by the user, while performing similarly to the popular OptimClass assessment methodology. Characteristic species defined by predictive performance were consistent between data types, and had good general agreement with existing methods for defining characteristic species. Using model performance to iteratively refine clustering produced classifications with better than expected predictive performance compared to the dendrogram hierarchy, although the flexible- β hierarchy did a reasonable job of improving predictive performance. Conclusions Appropriately specified models are a natural way to maximize the predictive performance of a classification and its associated diagnostics. We show that a model-based assessment provides a clear decision framework based on data type, offering an objective pathway to make classification assessment decisions, as well as evaluate methodological choice and performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are only some violent political actors designated as terrorists? To answer this question, I examine formal terrorism designations made by the US government. Conceptualizing terrorism designation as a marker of organizational illegitimacy, I hypothesize that groups that appear more like a state--effective, representative, and secular--are more likely to be seen as legitimate contenders for political power. As a result, these groups have a lower risk of being designated as terrorists. Conversely, groups that target more legitimate states have a higher risk of being designated as terrorists. Empirically, I demonstrate several facts in support of these hypotheses. First, the United States has disproportionately labeled weak and politically non-representative groups as terrorists. Second, it has disproportionately labeled groups in countries with greater state capacity as terrorists. Third, especially in recent years, it has disproportionately labeled Islamist groups as terrorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following article is divided into two parts, each offering a series of propositions highlighting the effects and implications of organizational naming and labeling practices and their subsequent effects on the framing of terrorist organizations and activity. In the first half, the author will highlight the importance of organizational naming and labeling in terms of how it shapes terrorism discourse. Then, the author will discuss the importance of recognizing the implications of how the events of 11 September 2001 were framed by then president George W. Bush. Important to both discussions is the relevance of organizational communication theory, particularly in terms of individual sensemaking and the communicative constitution of organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to conceptualize global counterterror actor types by examining the designated terrorist organizations lists of six countries; the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Russia, and China. It is argued that these countries should be placed into one of three distinct categories:Trendsetters,Trend Followers, andIndividual Players. Being able to classify countries according to these categories is important for global policymakers. It raises awareness of the differences between countries, and emphasizes that “one-fits-all” policies are inappropriate and have little chance of achieving global endorsement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explores the provisions under the Export Administration Act to provide sanctions from state sponsors of terrorism support for acts of international terrorism. An overview on the three laws which aimed to diminish support for terrorism through imposing sanctions is noted. It cites the goals of the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) on local and international terrorism.

The article discusses the reportedly hidden costs associated with terrorist watch lists as of May 2013, focusing on the U.S. No Fly List and analyses of the various individuals who believe that they have been wrongly included on terror-related lists. Other topics include the rights of individuals in the U.S., the collection of big data, and terrorism prevention plans. Ethnicity and religion are mentioned in regards to terrorist watch lists. Administrative self-regulation is also examined.

The article focuses on transnational security issues in the U.S. related to interaction among crime and international terrorist groups. It mentions the violent tactics used by drug trafficking organization (DTO) Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in 2006, Mexican DTO violence and kidnapping-forransom activities. It also mentions interaction patterns among terrorist groups including appropriation of tactics, organizational evolution and variation and partnership motivations and disincentives.

The article presents a study incorporating the social networking analysis (SNA) to ascertain the topography of terrorists' networks. As per the study, networks which are provincial, cosmopolitan and heterarchical in nature score low as compared to ones that maintain a balance between them. It also presents a table showing comparison of terrorist Noordin Mohammed's top terrorist networks with respect to trust, operational and combined social network measures. INSET: Noordin Top's Terrorist Trust Network.

The article discusses the Supreme Court of Canada's decision on May 14, 2015 to confirm the Alberta Court of Appeal's order that former prisoner and suspected terrorist Omar Khadr should have been classified as a juvenile and not an adult upon his return to Canada in 2012 after being detained at the U.S. military's Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp in Cuba. A mistake in the interpretation of Canada's International Transfer of Offenders Act is examined, along with plea deals and justice.

A review of the article "The Three Versions of Al Qaeda," by Clint Watts, is presented.