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The attitude of France towards the Sino-Japanese War that started in 1937 has given rise to various judgments. Officially neutral, France is often presented as having taken, at least morally, a favorable attitude toward China. Yet the French government had officially prohibited the transit of war materiel en route to China across the Indochinese border. This issue became increasingly important as the Japanese blockade of China progressed and conditioned the capacity of Chiang Kai-shek's government to continue the fight. The diplomatic archives of the United States, greatly concerned by the situation in China, shed more light on France's policy in East Asia. By comparing historical accounts produced by contemporaries and historians with the diplomatic archives of the United States, this article intends to bring more evidence relating to the issue of French "neutrality" during the Sino-Japanese War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Sino–Japanese relations have been on a recovery course, the deterioration of ties in the first one and a half decades since 2000 should not be forgotten. This article aims to unpack China's perception formation mechanism toward Japan during these turbulent fifteen years by introducing the perspective of strategic perception. Because China's strategic perception toward Japan is largely derived from its overall perceptions of the international system, this article focuses on China's strategic elites to systemically trace the evolution of China's perception of Japan and its policy implications, and to provide a new perception equilibrium that reduced the US factor in the formation of a mutual Sino–Japanese perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Britain both found themselves in extremely precarious situations by the early summer of 1940, when Japan demanded that Britain close the Burma Road, a vital overland supply route for Chinese forces fighting against Japanese aggression. The British had just seen all of their continental European allies fall like dominoes to Hitler's forces over the span of a few weeks, while China was fighting a losing defensive war against Japan with minimal outside support. China desperately needed to maintain its overland supply line to the British Empire, the Burma Road, but Britain feared that the very existence of this conduit of war materiel would provoke a Japanese attack on vulnerable British colonies in the Far East. American policy on Japanese aggression was ambiguous at this point and neither Britain nor China could realistically expect help from Washington in the short term. As a result, Britain signed a one-sided confidential memorandum to close the Burma Road to buy time and shore up its East Asian position to the extent that it was able. This deal, a lesser-studied counterpart to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy in Europe, compromised the Chinese war effort against Japan, paved the way for the Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia, and ultimately failed to prevent Britain's defeat in East Asia. Recognizing that this temporary concession would not moderate Japanese behavior, Britain reopened the Burma Road three months later. This paper examines the vital role of the Burma Road in the Chinese war effort in 1940 and why Japan demanded that London close it, then explores the factors that led to Britain's unavoidable capitulation on the issue and subsequent reversal three months later, along with the consequences for the Allied war effort in the Far East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prosecuted Japanese military servicemen for war crimes committed during and after the Sino-Japanese War. This paper examines written confessions left by those Japanese war crimes suspects and considers to what extent they were used by the CCP to prosecute sexual violence during the trials. The historical analysis is contextualized by an examination of the representation of the CCP's legal approach to sexual violence in articles from the People's Daily. This paper finds that although accounts of sexual violence are found in the confessions written by suspected Japanese war criminals, the courts did not make rape a focal point of the prosecutions and did not pursue the so-called "comfort women" issue. Furthermore, no victim of rape was called to testify before the court. The CCP's approach to the issue of sexual violence in the 1956 trials closely corresponded to the discourse and propaganda in the People's Daily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As most studies on Middle East–East Asian relations focus on the interregional dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan's quasi-military activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy's revision. That, in turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain role in their relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Based on a close study of the Sino-Japanese collaboration in Kunqu Opera The Peony Pavilion (2008), this article proposes a different conception of interculturalism onstage in East Asia in comparison with the prevailing East-West paradigm of intercultural performance and theatre. Some of the interesting questions that are raised and discussed in this paper are. How does the Japanese actor Bando Tamasaburo impersonate a young lady Du Liniang in the Chinese classical play without speaking the Chinese language? In what ways does the Sino-Japanese co-production connect and interweave Kunqu Opera and Kabuki? How has the intercultural performance been mediatized, received as well as perceived in China, Japan and elsewhere? The Sino-Japanese co-production features such important notions of interculturalism as connecting instead of othering, sharing instead of influencing, and complementing instead of exploiting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of Local military conflicts after the September 18th Incident, Chiang Kai-shek didn't use force to resolve, but keep low-key mediation, and recognize the reality. This is Chiang Kai-shek's basic logic to process the Local military conflicts, and basic judgment to solve the Warlord. On the one hand, the logic and judgment was one way of solving the problem, and achieved considerable success; on the other hand, it was a continuity logic to solve the problem by force, though failed to completely eliminate the Warlod's localism and sectionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to develop a coherent analytical tool to explain the dynamics of Sino-Japanese pluralized leadership. Highlighting the constructivist concept of critical strategic practice, it argues that the nature of pluralized leadership is not fixed by existing social structures, but rather can be dynamically changed by potential leaders through critical reflection and actions to transform identities. It then suggests three possible types of pluralized leadership: collective leadership, competitive coexistence, and a blocking power relationship. These are determined by whether two leadership aspirants succeed in establishing institutionalized social networks and shared norms between them and whether a leadership aspirant gains a majority of followers for its leadership project. The paper shows that China and Japan have engaged in both competitive coexistence and a blocking power relationship through their critical strategic practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When David Kennedy’s magisterial Freedom from Fear criticizes Franklin Roosevelt’s East Asian policy making it is to suggest that “a little appeasement—another name for diplomacy—might have yielded rich rewards.” Some 430 pages earlier, Kennedy passed over the Stimson Doctrine, except to attribute its “timid” stance to isolationist public opinion, stressing instead how, “On the wind-scoured plains of Manchuria, Japan thus set the match in 1931 to the long fuse that would detonate the attack on Pearl Harbor.” By setting aside what I call Tenaka teleology to concentrate on the psychological and ideological reasons for Henry Stimson’s persistent interventionism following the Mukden (Shenyang) Incident, this article seeks to build on Kennedy’s intimation that diplomatic appeasement could have slowed, detoured, or even stopped the Japanese juggernaut. After emphasizing Stimson’s initial inaction, and then showing how U.S. diplomats and State Department officials—Stimson included—approved of Japan’s involvement in Manchuria and sympathized with its difficulties there, this article argues that far from leaving well alone as realpolitik sensibilities demanded, Stimson acted instead to satisfy a string of personal affronts to his honor. God-fearing American elites, in his understanding, shouldered the responsibility of extending civilization westward, into Asia. As Secretary of State for the nation so charged by providence, Stimson internalized his role as the arbiter of moral behavior. Upstart Orientals running amok in the Pacific, particularly when they claimed to emulate Americans, roiled the order he felt it was his duty to police, offending his sense of self and jeopardizing his legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article considers political cartoons and maps created in China and Japan during the first half of the twentieth century which highlight aspects of Asianism, or a unified view of Asia. Topics considered include competing notions of self and other, stereotypes, propaganda, east and west, and the influence of Western civilization on Asia. A discussion of international relations after World War I which emphasized the role of the nation-state and nationalism is presented. The Sino-Japanese Conflict and Sino-Japanese War are also explored.

This article examines 70 years of debate about Ding Ling's 1941 influential short story about a woman spy, “When I was in Xia Village.” In the article I show that the re-absorption of “our” female spies into post-conflict solidarity narratives is a fraught process. For national governments, the difficulty lies in asserting the moral legitimacy of their rule in the face of evidence about their deployment of women as sex spies. For national populations, the difficulty lies in the desire to construct reassuring victory stories within which peacetime normalcy can be restored. The diverse exegeses around Ding Ling's “Xia Village” reveal that even decades after the hostilities cease, “our” women sex spies still require an explanation to communities seeking to consolidate or “remember” their national virtue. The evolution of this process of “explaining” reveals the on-going importance of sexual morality to governance in current-day China. Specifically, through the analysis of the critiques of “Xia Village” the article demonstrates that female chastity has been and continues to be an important commodity in establishing and sustaining popular perceptions of the moral virtue of the PRC as a nation, and the CCP as its legitimate government. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Suiyuan anti-Japanese war in 1936 terminated the history of Chinese humiliation since the Mukden Incident, especially the two victories in the battles of Honggeertu and Bailingmiao made the whole Chinese people excited so a massive and unprecedented movement to assist Suiyuan risen in the whole country. On the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek stated hypocritically to fight against the Japanese aggression; on the other hand, he wanted to suppress all anti-Japanese actions so he declared Shanghai National Salvation and the Red Army as his greatest enemies, and slandered the Red Army as a traitor. He did not expect to become a prisoner in the Xián Incident which finally straightened out the process of Chinese history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1932 Sino-Japanese conflict in Shanghai was the first example of a modern war waged in a large city between two heavily equipped armies. It was also the first urban conflict during which massive destruction, especially aerial bombing, ensued with utmost disregard for the consequences to civilians. This paper looks at the damage and losses the two contending armies suffered. The group of Chinese armies involved in the conflict was not prepared either to handle the consequences of using highly lethal weapons or to provide the appropriate level of medical assistance to their soldiers involved. The result was a catastrophic level of casualties. The battle for Shanghai announced the frightening massive waves of destruction that World War II would unleash on European and Japanese cities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) was vexing for China-Japan relations. As such, the five years since Koizumi left office, particularly the change in Japan's ruling party, were initially expected, and sometimes perceived, to realize a half-decade of recovery and reconciliation in Sino-Japanese ties. While tensions did decrease, “icebergs” blocking improvement in relations have not completely thawed, and may harden again. Competition for political and economic influences and interests in the same region, concern over one another's future security posture and relations with Taiwan, territorial disputes, misunderstanding about the other's historical sensitivities and feelings of distrust, occasionally manipulated by nationalists, still pervade the relationship. Therefore, though there is mutual desire, indeed a necessity, for cooperation on many issues affecting both countries, this typically couples with a disconcerting or anxious feeling towards the other's intentions that results in competitiveness. There are deep roots to this need/fear complex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1931 to 1941, when China and Japan were at undeclared war, China's propaganda was fairly well-circulated in America through her American friends who played a leading role in shaping American opinions on the Far Eastern crisis. But the United States State Department maintained a neutral stance toward the Sino-Japanese conflict until after 1939 and considered the pro-Chinese opinion not so much a national consensus for policy consideration as a partisan view propped up by propaganda groups. Thus, the State Department guarded its Asian policy from the pressure of propaganda activities and partisan opinions on the Asian conflict, whilst utilising them occasionally as tools of diplomacy toward China and Japan. This article examines the State Department's attitude toward public opinion and propaganda on the Far Eastern conflict from 1931 to 1941 to illustrate how American officials handled partisan opinions on a foreign crisis when most of the information on foreign policy was privately initiated and circulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Owing to Mukden Incident, Peter H. L. Chang was to blame for his "Non-resistance" policy. In response, Peter H. L. Chang once claimed that he would neither argue nor contend about it, and whether he should be praised or condemned for it was open to debate. In his oral accounts, however, the problem Peter H. L. Chang expounded most was the "Non-resistance" policy in Mukden Incident. He not only introspected, but also defended for himself. He disputed about the details, which he believed were vital to reconstruct the distant past; he admitted his misjudgment, but denied his "Non-resistance" policy. The so-called "No Argument" debates actually have overturned many historical perspectives, eliminated important historical doubts and helped people see clearly Peter H. L. Chang's adventures of mind as a person involved in the incident. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines a recent incident in which a Chinese fishing boat was seized by the Japanese Coast Guard in territorial waters claimed by both countries. We will use a variety of sources to explain and analyze this incident, explain how it fits into the pattern of tensions between these two great Asian countries, and assess what the incident means for the future of their relationship. The relationship between China and Japan is a critical one given their mutual economic interdependence (China and Japan are the world's second and third largest economies respectively, and China is Japan's largest trading partner), China's status as a rising global and regional superpower, and the historical legacy of unresolved tensions going back to World War Two that still resonate between these two countries. Our research will be among the first scholarly analyses to come out on this latest incident, and for this reason alone it will be interesting to other scholars, and to a broader public. It will also contribute to a body of existing research and writing on Sino-Japanese relations, on rising power conflicts, and on the pursuit of diplomatic solutions to entrenched conflicts of interest in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the promotion of Mongolia as a source of mounts by the Japanese army through a campaign that gathered momentum in the late 1920s. This campaign was one part of a larger campaign to promote the importance of 'Man-Mō' (Manchuria-Mongolia) within Japan, a campaign that made use of evocative language to trumpet Japan's claim to the region. The promotion of Mongolia as a source of mounts continued into the 1930s and 1940s and made use of a range of media, including print, film and sound recordings. The promotion of Mongolia as a source of horses was often couched in romantic terms, with Mongolia as a place of sweeping plains, lone horsemen and mysterious strangers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After just one year of the Spanish Civil War, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident led to the Sino-Japanese War, both conflicts remaining for two years as daily reminders of the world conflicts of the time. This article attempts to emphasize the importance of the coincidence in time of those conflicts in delimiting each bloc, especially through a decision that was particularly divisive for the Japanese government, such as recognition of Franco's rebel government after the outbreak of the war in China. Efforts by Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki to avoid a decision that would further Japan's pro-Axis drift show the lines of division in the government. His maneuvers progressively failed, including the November 1937 proposal for negotiations to include the recognition of Manchukuo, accepted first by Franco's Spain, later by Italy and finally by the Germans. The article emphasizes the role of Italy in Asia, the reasons for Spanish actions, and the aims of other key persons in this period, such as Prime Minister Konoe, the postwar leader Yoshida Shigeru, or Ishihara Kanji, the officer who masterminded the 1931 invasion of Manchuria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the Japanese occupation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. It also explores the development of the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the process of colonization. It explains the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese military and civilian governments. It demonstrates that although the Japanese occupation brought economic welfare, it also brought discrimination towards Taiwanese people. The paper looks at the movement organized by Taiwanese intellectuals and students who wanted to gain political participation. Final remarks are given about the fifty years that Taiwan was occupied by the Japanese. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional economic unification must overcome some economic obstacles, such as how to remove the trade and non-trade barriers, how to realise monetary stability in the region and how to develop a regional market, dominated by internal demand. However, in the long run, social obstacles will be more troublesome than the economic obstacles and could also be counterproductive. The integration process in Asia has been lagging behind the other continents of Europe and North America for many reasons. One of them is that the Asian unifi cation process has mainly been a top-down approach by politicians and leaderships in this region, without wider and broader participation from the societies and civil groups. Nonetheless, there are strong trends favouring the ongoing regional cooperation in Asia. While envisioning bright prospects, the Asian economic integration process, however, is destined to encounter social obstacles. One of them is clearly the Sino-Japan dispute. The article argues, that the principle of subsidiarity (bottom-up approaches) (Horst Rolly 2003) being applied in European unifi cation, may serve as the key solution-and strategic approach-to improve Sino-Japan relations. Asian nations, especially China and Japan, could draw on the lessons and experiences of European countries and adapt from their principle of subsidarity, which may serve to overcome the impending obstructions. Otherwise, the Sino-Japan dispute may become the largest barrier in building up the regional cooperation structure in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 1931, Japanese-hired Chinese 'plainclothesmen' attacked strategic locations in the Chinese portions of Tianjin leading to the eruption of a mini war for most of the month. At the time the Chinese and Japanese sides engaged in a bitter dispute about the basic facts of the events. The use of photographs in the service of these conflicting narratives shows that on the Chinese side coverage emphasised the link between the plainclothesmen and Japan by contrasting Japanese aggression with Chinese victimhood. Photographs in Japanese sources portrayed an enclosed and claustrophobic Japanese concession surrounded by threats from Chinese agitators goaded on by the Nationalist government. In all versions, photographic content and political narrative often fit awkwardly. Captions, juxtaposition and accompanying news stories placed otherwise cryptic photographs in larger political narratives. The ubiquitous use of photographs indicates a belief in their power which derived from both their claim on veracity and their ability to create an emotional conenction with the viewer. As a political tool, the photograph functioned in public mass media where readers hungered for the poignant and sensational. In the end, veracity and emotional charge, political narrative and sensationalist photo, militarism and wartime reporting were all inextricably linked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Japanese invasion of Rehe, a province of China, in 1933. The author examines the conflict in light of nationalistic movements in China in the 1920's and 1930's. Japan's activities in northeastern China at that time, the article states, provided the Chinese Nationalist Party, the Guomindang, with a critical test of its ability to defend China. The use of non-resistance by China's president, Jiang Jieshi, in the face of Japan's attack is examined. Also discussed are China's expectation of foreign intervention to stop Japan's attack.

This article reports on the violent 20th century history that still affects international relations in East Asia, and of which most Americans are largely unaware. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's offensive remarks about Korean "comfort women," or sex slaves, in World War II are examined in historical context, as is the destruction of the Korean War and Japanese actions in northeastern China.

This article discusses the efforts of Japanese and British international lawyers to present Japan's behavior in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 as entirely "civilized." It presents three issues that answers the question of whether Japan had prosecuted the war in accordance with international law during the Sino-Japanese War.

Why did Japan's military and government leaders trigger the Manchurian Incident and then launch the Sino-Japanese War? Why did the nation opt to go to war with the United States and continue to fight recklessly? Wasn't it possible to end the war before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? To find answers to these questions, we, the War Responsibility Reexamination Committee, an ad hoc in-house panel of the Yomiuri Shimbun, delved thoroughly into, combed through and examined historical developments during the period from the early 1930s to 1945. The Yomiuri Shimbun presented its readers with its findings of a yearlong "War Responsibility" series ending on August 15, 2006, the 61st anniversary of the end of World War II. We comprehensively touch on Japan's mistakes committed at various key points from the Manchurian Incident to the Soviet Union's entry into a war with Japan and named those who should chiefly be held responsible for each event. We elaborate upon the accountability of those who were so deeply responsible and we summarize a host of historical lessons from which we should leave for the future generations to learn. The Yomiuri Shimbun decided to define the wars in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean as the "Showa War." This series of wars has been called the Great East War or the Second World War, the Pacific War, the 15-Year War, the Asia Pacific War or the Second World War. Each of these titles has some justification, but they are not necessarily appropriate when considering factors such as the sense of resistance against certain ideologies, the period of the wars and the areas where fighting took place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented which discusses articles in the issue including one on human-crocodile relations in the Philippines, one on the impact of animal husbandry on forests in Swedish Lapland, and one on the ecological impact of refugee migration and the Sino-Japanese War in China.

The article reports on the number of Chinese students studying in Japan. While once Japan sheltered more Chinese seeking education than any other country, the Sino-Japanese controversy over Manchuria has curtailed sharply the number of Chinese willing to study Japanese colleges. Statistics showed that the number is set to reduced sharply in the next few months.