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This article describes how Livy uses the topic of madness to recreate patrician M. Manlius Capitolinus's history as exemplum of a man who aspired to the kingdom of Rome and whose ambition led him to be sentenced to headlong hurling from the Tarpeian Rock. Such punishment was a rhetorical strategy in the late Republic used to discredit political opponents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at Roman law as a growing field of historical study, discussing changes in conceptual and theoretical approaches to the subgenres of ancient legal history while also exploring how narratives and legal commentaries provide context for understanding the development and interpretation of Roman laws. Particular attention is given to how narratives help identify rule-makers as well as how commentaries can be used to discover the diachronic development of criminal law in Rome.

Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute provides that the application and interpretation of its applicable law must be consistent with 'internationally recognized human rights'. Notwithstanding this unambiguous commitment to operate within the parameters of human rights, neither the Rome Statute nor the jurisprudence of the Court provide adequate guidance as to the boundaries of this commitment. 'Internationally recognized human rights' remain undefined. 'Application and interpretation' has been the subject of competing interpretations. Drawing on the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation, this article sketches a principled methodology for identifying 'internationally recognized human rights', proposing a persuasive approach to the phrase 'application and interpretation'. It will be argued that, as a result of the generative power of Article 21(3), the violation of an identifiable 'internationally recognized human right' may command redress that is not explicitly provided for in Article 21(1). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the writing of Roman historian Titus Livius Patavinus, known as Livy, with reference to his writing on the trial of Caeso Quinctius in the work "Ab urbe condita." Topics mentioned include the concept of vadimonium in Roman law, the views of Livy on Roman law and legal thought, and symbolic elements of the name Caeso and Livy's writing on the subject.

The material gathered in this study provides a rich and diverse context for understanding the indebtedness of the common law to the Roman law, the historical and continuing contribution of Roman law, the Roman contribution to the common law, and the relationship between the Roman and the canon law. The paper generates insights about law as an object of knowledge, Roman legal reasoning as a complex logic operating within specifically definable formal systems, the richness and complexity of the Roman heritage, and the uses of Roman law in the modern world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The classification of the form of guilt set forth in Article 30 of the Rome Statute into certain concepts of the criminal law is not easy, as it seems to be at the first glance. The task is even more difficult due to the limited scope of the provision, vague and incomplete provision of Article 30 and position of the interpreter of the Law. The Statute did not finally define the form of the guilt in Article 30 although it should be a general provision, common for the entire Statute. The provision of Article 30 relates only to this Article and the form of guilt may be prescribed in other articles of the Statute as well. There is no obstacle to define the forms of guilt in other articles of the Statute and this has been done in several instances. By doing this, the meaning of different forms of guilt, which have the same or similar title, is being mixed. It should be noted that the only forms of guilt that have content are those stated in Article 30. The content of all the others can only be speculated. Insufficiently regulated and unclearly set legal provision is clearly a product of the common law legal drafting. The comparison with some classical texts of common law criminal code, like the Model Penal Code, unambiguously leads to this conclusion. One of the most significant characteristics of the Model Penal Code that was transmitted to the Statute was a different regulation of the contents of the guilt bearing in mind different elements of the criminal act. If, during the interpreting, the provision is approached from a various angles, different conclusions will be reached. If the provision is approached from a common law angle, one conclusion would be reached; if the provision is approached from a continental law angle, a different conclusion would be reached. This is how it happened that the basic assumption of the work stating that one form of the guilt recognized by Article 30 was a direct intent and the other was indirect intent was denied. It relied on a targeted interpretation of the Statute which stated that after direct intent the next level of the guilt, from the perspective of the gravity, is indirect intent. The first form of the guilt stated in Article 30 is certainly direct intent, but the other one cannot, beyond any doubts, be considered as indirect intent. The opinions that are classifying the later in one or another form of the guilt are not correct. The solution that seems the most valid is the one that takes into consideration the fact that the Statute recognizes criminal acts related to conduct and criminal acts related to a consequence. A various content of the other form of the guilt in Article 30 related to different elements of the criminal acts leaves an open space for different conclusions. In relation to the criminal acts related to the consequence, it is beyond any doubt that the form of the guilt of Article 30 is direct intent. As far as the criminal acts related to conduct are concerned, Article 30 does not contain a clear definition, so both direct and indirect intent are possible. Although Article 30 does not state anything about negligence as a form of guilt necessary for commitment of criminal acts prescribed by the Statute, negligence is present through several doctrines, whereby the command responsibility is the most important among them all. Through the command responsibility negligence can have the same significance in the Rome Statute as intent. Therefore it seems that the creator of the Statute made a mistake by not giving a definition of the negligence in Article 30. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the problems of public accountability in current investment law practice. These problems arise from the private interpretation of international investment treaty and customary law in arbitration. It analyses these problems through the historical lens of Roman law and the Roman law tradition in international law. It suggests a Praetorian system of international accountability and explores the remarkable similarities between current investment arbitration and classical Roman civil procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents the status of family and state during the reign of the second Roman emperor through the 'Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre,' and the 'Tabula Hebana' and 'Tabula Siarensis' inscriptions. Process of mixing forms of family and state; Status and public presentation of individuals within the system; Articulation of the role of women in the imperial house.

Seeks to dispel the notion that Mark Antony and the Senate indulged in a dispute over the control of Caesar's archives. Misinterpretation of two key passages in the `Philippics'; Publication of Caesar's `Acta' in 44 B.C.; False conclusion on the intent of Sulpicius' motion.