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In the spatial public goods game (SPGG), punishment effectively promotes cooperation but often reduces the collective benefits of cooperators and punishers. In order to increase revenue, we propose a probabilistic interaction domain model considering both strategy type and payoff level. In this model, players are divided into two types, successful players with payoffs higher than the payoff threshold and failed players with payoffs lower than the payoff threshold. A successful player is less likely to change the interaction range than a failed player. Through extensive simulations, it is shown to verify that a higher payoff threshold leads to a more pronounced promotion effect on cooperation and corresponds to a higher cooperation return. Moreover, introducing dynamic interaction domain can rapidly remove defectors from the vicinity of cooperative players on regular lattices. Reducing the payoff gap between punishers and cooperators helps mitigate the system’s second-order free-riding problem. Additionally, through analysis of the critical parameters, it is revised that incorporating diversity in interaction structures substantively enhances cooperation level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a center-periphery Neo-Kaleckian model that addresses a traditional theme in the literature on economic development, namely the redistribution of rents from exporters of natural resources toward firms in sectors that are relatively more technology-intensive. This conflict has been reshaped in the past three decades by financialization, capital flights, the acceleration of technical change and the key role governments play in providing strategic public goods to foster competitiveness. We argue that in this more complex international context, the Balance-of-Payments (BOP) constraint on output growth assumes different forms. We focus on two polar cases: the financialization constraint, in which capital flights hamper the capacity of the government to finance the provision of strategic public goods even when the trade balance is positive; and the trade deficit constraint aggravated by capital flights, in which private firms in the more technology-intensive sector cannot finance the imports of all the capital goods they need to expand industrial production at a faster rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2000s, rather than choosing between abandonment and restructuring, Russian authorities opted to maintain the socio-economic status quo in monotowns, an important source of support for the Putin regime. Yet, this status quo is not a given equilibrium; it needs constant maintenance through cooperation between state and business actors, especially under the severe financial constraints of regional and local budgets. This single case study explores how and why local authorities and large companies cooperate in monotowns to provide public goods at the nexus of vertical pressures and horizontal incentives. We show that public goods are produced through resource pooling in a network-like cooperation between public and private actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why, and to what extent, must taxpayers share the costs of raising children with parents? The most influential argument over this question has been the public goods argument : Taxpayers must share costs with parents because and to the extent that child-rearing contributes toward public goods by helping to develop valuable human capital. However, political theorists have not examined the public goods argument in a context in which replacement migration is available: If replacement migration can provide valuable human capital more efficiently than child-rearing, can the public goods argument still justify a taxpayer obligation to share the costs of child-rearing? This article argues that there are importantly different versions of the public goods argument, and that on a plausible version of that argument, it can withstand the replacement migration challenge under most circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition and cooperation are not always at odds and contributions to public goods are almost never one‐off one‐shot temporally isolated events. We examine voluntary contribution in a new public good experiment where "self‐love" competitive motivations and time dynamic interdependencies are simultaneously considered. The competitive motivations are manipulated via subjects competing in each group (intragroup competition) for higher return factors on their public expenditure, whereas time dynamic interdependencies are modeled by letting returns from previous periods available for future contributions to public goods (CG). We ran two control conditions where intragroup competition (C) and time dynamic interdependencies (G) are separately implemented. Our findings showed that shares of endowment contributed were significantly greater and increasing over time when endowments growth and heterogeneous returns factors were simultaneously introduced. This effect can be attributed to return factors obtained in previous periods. Accordingly, wealth exponential growth has been greatly accelerated relative to our control condition. Distributive equity concerns have been also documented. Although Gini coefficients were significantly lower in the presence of heterogeneous return factors and endowments growth, inequality trends seemed to converge at control condition values in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developing countries have increasingly decentralized power to local governments. This paper studies the implications of a central element of decentralization (polity size) using population-based discontinuities that determine local government boundaries for over 100,000 Indian villages. Over the short and long run, individuals allocated into local governments with smaller populations have better access to public goods. We provide suggestive evidence that these results are related to heightened civic engagement and stronger political incentives, but not to other mechanisms such as elite capture. (JEL D72, H41, H75, H76, O17, O18, R50) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the welfare effects of the interaction of a rule of indirect tax harmonization under the destination principle and the provision of public goods that are global in nature. It stresses the role of international transfers between governments set in order to equalize the social (i.e., worldwide) marginal cost of public funds across countries. Under this condition, it is shown how the combination of the tax and expenditure side of such a "harmonizing fiscal policy" can give rise to a potential Pareto improvement. This requires considering aggregate revenue effects (and the ensuing effects on the provision of public goods) of the fiscal reform jointly with under/over provision of public goods in the (first‐best) Samuelson sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When is state coercion for the provision of public goods justified? And how should the social surplus of public goods be distributed? Philosophers approach these questions by distinguishing between essential and discretionary public goods. This article explains the intractability of this distinction, and presents two upshots. First, if governments provide configurations of public goods that simultaneously serve essential and discretionary purposes, the scope for justifiable complaints by honest holdouts is narrower than commonly assumed. Second, however, claims to distributive fairness in the provision of public goods also turn out to be more complex to assess. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cities increasingly address climate change, e.g. by pledging city-level emission reduction targets. This is puzzling for the provision of a global public good: what are city governments' reasons for doing so, and do pledges actually translate into emission reductions? Empirical studies have found a set of common factors which relate to these questions, but also mixed evidence. What is still pending is a theoretical framework to explain those findings and gaps. This paper thus develops a theoretical public choice model. It features economies of scale and distinguishes urban reduction targets from actual emission reductions. The model is able to explain the presence of targets and public good provision, yet only under specified conditions. It is also able to support some stylized facts from the empirical literature, e.g. on the effect of city size, and resolves some mixed evidence as special cases. Larger cities chose more ambitious targets if marginal net benefits of mitigation rise with city size—if they set targets at all. Whether target setting is more likely for larger cities depends on the city type. Two types are obtained. The first type reduces more emissions than a free-riding city. Those cities are more likely to set a target when they are larger. However, they miss the self-chosen target. Cities of the second type reach their target, but mitigate less than a free-riding city. A third type does not exist. With its special cases, the model can thus guide further empirical and theoretical work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What strategies can help communities to overcome the public goods problem in the maintenance of communal spaces and infrastructure in urban environments? This paper investigates whether an intervention targeted at Community-Based Organizations can motivate them to make increased contributions to the public good, thereby improving outcomes for the community as a whole. Using a randomized controlled trial conducted in Dakar, Senegal, the analysis tests the effectiveness of a program that provides incentives to community groups to encourage them to keep their neighborhoods clean, with the ultimate goal of reducing flooding. After one year, the intervention proved to be effective in engaging communities, improving cleanliness, and reducing flooding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zhejiang Electric Power is the property of Zhejiang Electric Power Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With the increasingly severe environmental challenges, the practice and dissemination of green behavior by the public is of great significance for promoting sustainable economic and social development in China. This study is based on the voluntary provision experiment of public goods, and uses non-parametric tests and multiple regression analysis methods to explore the impact of various factors and incentive measures on the public's willingness to spread green behavior. The results indicate that: Spiritual benefits are an important factor affecting the public's willingness to spread green behavior. Secondly, the punitive measures have limitations on the public's willingness to spread green behavior, and their intervention leads to a downward trend in willingness. Thirdly, positive incentive measures have a positive impact on increasing the public's willingness to spread green behavior. The effect of double incentive measures is better than that of single material or spiritual incentives. And higher level of self-interest preference and environmental awareness can significantly enhance the public's willingness to spread green behavior. Finally, heterogeneity analysis shows that there are differences in significance and degree of influence between each group and the total sample, but the positive and negative relationship of variable coefficients is basically consistent with the results of the total sample. Finally, this study suggests strengthening public environmental awareness education, selecting appropriate incentive and guidance measures while considering spiritual benefits, and implementing diversified incentive plans to achieve the vision of the whole society practicing green behavior together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article defines a public good, arguing that higher education should be considered a public good. This requires moving away from an orthodox economistic understanding of public goods. It also requires understanding the relationship between higher education as both a private good and a public good to the extent that it promotes individual flourishing necessary to the public good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The long tradition of research on cooperation includes a well-established finding that individuals respond to the degree of conflict between self-and collective interests (that is, the relative benefits from cooperation) in providing public goods. Existing empirical evidence builds upon settings where participants make multiple decisions or strategically consider alternative scenarios. Here, we consider a decision setting where participants face a one-time (single-decision) setting. One-time cooperative encounters often occur in volunteering or donating to immediate needs for crisis relief. For these distinct and highly relevant settings, we report a lack of responsiveness to increases in cooperation benefits, thereby highlighting limits to our understanding of the determinants of one-time cooperation encounters. Across two studies, n = 2,232 individuals participate in treatments where we vary across participants the relative benefit from contributing to a public good (that is, the marginal per capita return, the MPCR). We examine decisions from alternative participant pools (UK general population vs. students), implementations varying the physical distance between participants (online vs. in the laboratory), and more complex decision settings considering group-to-group interactions including not only providers but also donors to public goods. Throughout, neither average contribution levels, nor the distribution of contributions are significantly affected by the increases in cooperation benefits. The mechanism behind these results can be explained by the close correlation between expectations of other's cooperation and own cooperation, and the fact that these expectations do not increase with higher benefits from cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperation is the cornerstone of social stability and human development. In order to promote mutual cooperation among individuals, some researchers analyzed the important factors influencing individual behavior from the perspective of group selection, while others revealed the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behavior in groups from the perspective of network reciprocity. However, group selection and network reciprocity actually work together and simultaneously drive individuals to cooperate with each other. Analyzing each mechanism in isolation provides an incomplete understanding of the interaction process. Inspired by this, we integrate the coupled effects of both group selection and network reciprocity on the behavior of individuals. We develop a structured public goods game model to study the evolution of individual cooperative behavior in multiple groups, where each individual can interact not only with intra-group individuals but also with inter-group individuals. Based on the fixed probabilities of multi-group selection, including intra-group and inter-group selection, we derive a general condition that promotes cooperation among individuals. Besides, we discuss the effects of the number of neighbors in a group, group size, and group size on the selection of cooperative behavior. Finally, we systematically compare our model with the well-mixed case, and the results show that a structured population enhances cooperation. Increasing the number of populations boosts the fixation probability of cooperation. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the cooperative evolutionary dynamics of multi-group selection in structured populations through public goods games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing studies have revealed a paradoxical phenomenon in public goods games, wherein destructive agents, harming both cooperators and defectors, can unexpectedly bolster cooperation. Building upon this intriguing premise, our paper introduces a novel concept: constructive agents, which confer additional benefits to both cooperators and defectors. We investigate the impact of these agents on cooperation dynamics within the framework of public goods games. Employing replicator dynamics, we find that unlike destructive agents, the mere presence of constructive agents does not significantly alter the defective equilibrium. However, when the benefits from constructive agents are outweighed by the damage inflicted by destructive agents, the addition of constructive agents does not affect the ability of destructive agents to sustain cooperation. In this scenario, cooperators can be maintained through a cyclic dominance between cooperators, defectors, and destructive agents, with constructive agents adding complexity but not fundamentally changing the equilibrium. Conversely, if the benefits from constructive agents surpass the harm caused by destructive agents, the presence of constructive agents nullifies the ability of destructive agents to foster cooperation. Our results highlight the nuanced role of constructive agents in cooperation dynamics, emphasizing the necessity of carefully assessing incentive balances when encouraging cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major challenge in ecology is to understand how different species interact to determine ecosystem function, particularly in communities with large numbers of co‐occurring species. We use a trait‐based model of microbial litter decomposition to quantify how different taxa impact ecosystem function. Furthermore, we build a novel framework that highlights the interplay between taxon traits and environmental conditions, focusing on their combined influence on community interactions and ecosystem function. Our results suggest that the ecosystem impact of a taxon is driven by its resource acquisition traits and the community functional capacity, but that physiological stress amplifies the impact of both positive and negative interactions. Furthermore, net positive impacts on ecosystem function can arise even as microbes have negative pairwise interactions with other taxa. As communities shift in response to global climate change, our findings reveal the potential to predict the biogeochemical functioning of communities from taxon traits and interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agri‐environmental policies in England stand on the threshold of significant change, with a new suite of Environmental Land Management schemes set to embody more of the 'public money for public goods' principle. In addition, two tranches of these schemes appear heading towards a more collaborative approch towards delivering these public goods—suggesting that landholder collaborations would be a vital key to achieving this goal on such a scale. Running in parallel with this policy change is a countryside that has been undergoing a transition over the past several decades. This has seen a growing diversification in landholder types ‐ prompting a re‐examination not only with regards to the range of landholders who should be recruited into public goods delivery but the incentivisation strategies needed to recruit them as well. In this article, we examine the limitations of the behavioural approach utilised by past agri‐environmental schemes to incentivise farmer uptake. We then propose the use of a Theories of Practice and Theory of Capital framework that shifts the approach towards a more targeted pattern of incentivisation, one which enables the recruitment of a much broader set of public goods providers into landholder collaboration. To demonstrate how this framework can be applied, we present a case study around a range of collaboration models. Our findings suggest that in order for collaborations to be sustained in the long term, policymakers will need to think more directly with regard to the different aspects of collaboration that different landholders place value in. This would ensure opportunities for various forms of capital to be generated or for the recrafting of practices through intervention points. We conclude that the recrafting of the collaborative conservation practice not only can be accomplished through its constituent elements but by changing its practitioners as well—as exemplified by the different configurations of landholders that make up each of our five models of collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing literature has documented widespread variation in the extent to which insurgents provide public goods, collect taxes, and regulate civilian conduct. This paper offers what is, to our knowledge, the first study of the long-term economic legacies of rebel governance. This effect is theoretically unclear. Rebel governance may generate incentives for households to expand production and accumulate resources. However, rebel rule may be too unstable to maintain such incentives. We explore empirically the effect of rebel rule on households' economic resilience using a longitudinal dataset for Colombia. Results show a positive relation between wartime rebel rule and the ability of households to cope with weather shocks in the post-war period. Households in regions where armed groups were present but exercised limited or no intervention fare worse. This effect is associated with infrastructure improvement led by armed groups, their intervention in dispute adjudication, and their close interactions with local populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the case of Pakistan, this article explores the distribution and politics of public goods provision in urban slums. Across slums, we find that public goods are mainly provided to households located in central slums rather than those in the urban periphery. Within slums, we find politicians target spending towards wealthy households but do not go through brokers, unlike the more-studied case of India. Overall, the article shows how electoral incentives in Pakistan are biased against programmatic public goods provision for the urban poor. Our results then point to variation in patronage politics among slums in the Global South. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privately financed infrastructure agreements (PFIAs) are increasingly being used across the globe, bringing private money into the delivery of public goods. How does introducing private actors to such a process change how we think about distributive politics? I investigate this question using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, uncovering a relationship consistent with PFIAs being used as distributive goods and exploring how the credit‐claim potential of PFIAs may affect their distributive use. My quantitative analyses (on 16 middle‐income countries) present evidence suggestive of a relationship between electoral variables and the likelihood of a PFIA being present in a district. In districts aligned with the national ruling party, PFIAs are more likely to be concentrated in swing districts than core districts. I find that this relationship is more pronounced for PFIAs that are more directly attributable to the government. My qualitative press analysis provides insights into how politicians use various features of PFIAs to create credit‐claiming opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social mindfulness and Zhongyong thinking style are of high importance when evaluating relevant co‐actors in the social world. The current study investigates the influence of social mindfulness and Zhongyong thinking style on cooperative financial decision making in a public goods game among a Canadian sample. We hypothesize that higher perceived social mindfulness and higher perceived Zhongyong thinking style will increase the amount of money contributed to a joint project in a public goods game. The sample was a prolific‐based online recruited sample of n = 125 Canadians. We observed a significant main effect of Zhongyong thinking style on the amount of contributed money in the public goods game. Social mindfulness did not reach significance. The influence of Zhongyong thinking style was qualified by a significant Zhongyong by gender interaction, indicating that females but not males reduced their contributions if the Zhongyong thinking style of the co‐actor was manipulated as being low. It is shown that Zhongyong thinking style is also relevant in a Western cultural setting. Future research is needed, however, to investigate further the reasons for the differences between females and males. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many collective action problems individuals' contributions increase the probability of a collectively favorable event rather than affect the quantity of public goods provided. Such problems, that we refer to as collective prevention games, remain largely unexplored in the literature. We fill this gap by setting up an experiment where subjects' contributions increase the probability of a fixed collective benefit or reduce the probability of a fixed negative externality. Our main result is a substantial increase in cooperation in the probabilistic loss environment compared to the deterministic one. We explore some behavioral mechanisms that could drive this result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many nations around the globe, including Pakistan, education is losing ground as a public good to become another market-based commodity as the state shrinks its responsibility to schooling. This presents challenges to democratic futures, and particularly for young democratic states such as Pakistan. The government of Pakistan is pouring a significant amount of money into the private provision of education, encouraged by the policies and investments of international donor-partners such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. These changes in educational provision represent the impacts of neoliberalism and globalisation on Pakistani policymaking and the growing influence of the conceptualisation of education as a private commodity. To address these trends, we offer a normative philosophical framework for a conception of education as a critical public good in Pakistan, drawing on Islamic tradition, public good theory, human rights, and common good global education theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gender quotas are intended to address the underrepresentation of women in government. However, their effectiveness remains controversial. This study explores the random assignment of gender quotas across villages in India, examining whether women members of local councils affect public goods allocation in their constituencies and identifying potential challenges they face when implementing policies. We conducted a field survey in 100 villages, each with a population of approximately 400, a size corresponding to only one council member for representation in the council. The findings suggest that the performance of women council members generally aligns with that of their men counterparts in terms of public goods allocation. However, women members exhibited less effectiveness in delivering water facilities. Factors potentially hindering female members include influence from nonmember actors, such as husbands; lower educational attainment; and diminished electoral incentives. Additionally, the gender and caste of the council president impacts the performance of women council members, suggesting that overall gender and caste composition of the legislature is an important aspect to consider when evaluating the performance of women politicians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Politicians may target public goods to benefit their constituents, at the expense of others. I study corruption in the context of Indian electricity and estimate the welfare consequences. Using new administrative billing data and close-election regression discontinuities, I show that billed electricity consumption is lower for constituencies of the winning party by almost 40 percent, while actual consumption, measured by nighttime lights, is higher. I document the covert way in which politicians subsidize constituents by manipulating bills. These actions have substantial welfare implications, with an efficiency loss of US$0.9 billion, leading to unreliable electricity supply and significant negative consequences for development. (JEL D72, D73, L94, L98, O13, O17) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the conceptualization of innovation as a public good using an empirical analysis of patent transfers. It proposes that patents make inventions both excludable and alienable, in contrast to secrecy which only makes them excludable. A survival analysis finds that 10% higher complexity of patent descriptions is associated with 9% higher patent transfer hazard. This suggests that inventors more often patent complex inventions for the alienability motive – as opposed to the excludability motive. Small inventors transfer their patents less likely, but they do so sooner than other inventors. This suggests that patents enable an exchange of inventions that would otherwise be kept secret, but small inventors may not benefit from this function disproportionately more than others. These findings have implications for the conceptualization of innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Continued innovation in contract design may enhance the delivery of agri-environmental climate public goods (AECPG), but barriers to adoption arise in terms of how farmers perceive the economic benefits. Therefore, this paper examines survey data from Ireland and the Netherlands to analyse whether land managers agree that results-based, collective action, value chain and land tenure contracts for the delivery of AECPG are understandable, applicable to their farm and economically beneficial. Using Probit models, we also identify groups of land managers who perceive the different contract types as being economically beneficial, and these findings can inform policymakers of farmer groups who need adequate consideration during the design of agri-environmental contracts. For example, greater incentives could encourage older farmers to enrol in results-based contracts in Ireland and value chain contracts in the Netherlands. We also find a link between contract duration and the perceived economic benefits of collective action contracts in both countries, with land managers in Ireland desiring a longer duration. We highlight that policymakers and land managers in Ireland could apply lessons from the design of agri-environmental contracts in the Netherlands, where they are more common and varied. Greater knowledge exchange between users and non-users of such contracts would also help bridge the gap between theory and practice in both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When two parties are engaged in conflict and each distrusts the other's ability to cooperate or make peace, concessions can be used to indicate an interest in cooperation or peacemaking. However, when negotiating parties are concerned that concessions could be used against them in the future, a lack of trust can prevent optimal concessions from being made and therefore reduce the possibility of peace or cooperation. Using a repeated game that is preceded by an opportunity to signal one's commitment to cooperation through the provision of concessions, we formally demonstrate that concerns over the future use of concessions can explain the existence of inefficient concessions. We then use mechanism design to explore ways a third-party mediator can act as a guarantor that promised concessions would be delivered, thereby reducing inefficiencies and increasing the potential for peace and cooperation. In this process, we open up a new rationale for mediation: to increase the efficiency of signaling in a preliminary round of negotiations and to overcome the concern that concessions could be used against the giver in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a stylized, dynamic model to address the issue of sorting online. There are two large homogeneous groups of individuals. Everyone must choose between two online platforms, one of which has superior amenities (akin to having superior local public goods). Each individual enjoys interacting online with those from their own group but dislikes being on the same platform as those in the other group. Unlike a Tiebout model of residential sorting, both platforms have unlimited capacity so there are no constraints on cross-platform migration. It is clear how each group would like to sort themselves but, in the presence of the other type, only the two segregated outcomes are guaranteed to be equilibria. Integration on a platform can be supported in equilibrium as long as the platform is sufficiently desirable. If online integration of the two communities is a desired social outcome, then the optimal policy is clear: make the preferred platform even more desirable. Revitalizing the inferior platform will never lead to integration and even increases the likelihood of segregation. Finally, integration is more elastic in response to an increase in platform amenities than to reductions in intolerance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider an economy with a countably infinite number of consumers and pure public information goods. Each of these differentiated products is produced by a single monopoly firm that enters the market if it can cover costs. Thus, the product space is endogenous. We assume that the population of agents has diverse tastes, but bounded attention spans for content. We show that this implies that at all Pareto efficient allocations, all agents consume a finite number of public goods, and that each public good is consumed by a finite number of agents. In effect, these two taste assumptions turn pure public goods into what amount to club goods, despite the lack of rivalry in consumption or crowding of any type. Unfortunately, the equilibrium outcomes of Tiebout-like competition between public good providers do not satisfy the First Welfare Theorem. Even non-anonymous Lindahlian price systems are not sufficient to signal all profit opportunities to firms. We conclude that information markets are likely to be inefficient, and there will always remain opportunities for economic profits in an information economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In celebration of the centennial of the birth of Charles M. Tiebout, the current essay establishes the Tiebout hypothesis regarding jurisdictional composition as an origin of club theory and the study of local public goods. The Tiebout hypothesis and club theory constitute two of many foundational contributions to public choice. Tiebout's voting-with-the-feet analysis exerts a lasting influence on empirical investigations in urban and regional economics regarding city size, regional composition, housing price capitalization, and migration patterns. The current paper displays three fundamental club models to establish an unmistakable linkage between the Tiebout hypothesis and club theory. Given that linkage, the paper also identifies essential differences between the two analyses. Myriad applications of club theory to virtually all fields of economics highlight Tiebout's far-reaching legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to providing private goods such as food, fibre and biomass, agriculture can deliver a variety of environmental public goods and ecosystem services, such as biodiversity conservation, water filtering, carbon sequestration, and landscape aesthetics for recreation. Often, however, the use of agricultural landscapes prioritises the provision of private goods, resulting in negative environmental impacts. To address this imbalance in the provision of private and public goods, targeted policy instruments (e.g. contracts) are required to ensure that public goods are provided at the level desired by society. This paper, which is written in the context of the Horizon 2020 project “Contracts 2.0 – H2020 RUR-03-2018”, aims to present a Living Lab case study in Tuscany to point out possible future scenarios of contractual solutions that could provide the right incentives for farmers and land managers to produce a specific environmental public good such as agro-biodiversity. This paper aims to evaluate the application of Living Labs in the case study, assessing what challenges might seriously hinder the collaboration process and/or the success of the participatory approach. Thanks to the participatory approach, it was possible to finalise the “dream contract” in the Living Lab case study. Contract Innovation Labs and Policy Innovation Labs members agreed on a new type of contract based on clear and measurable objectives decided together by farmers and public authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Academic Library & Information Science is the property of Anhui University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this study, we investigated the motivations behind punishing individuals who exploit common resources, a phenomenon crucial for resource preservation. While some researchers suggest punishment stems from concern for the common good, others propose it is driven by anger toward free riders. To probe these motivations, we developed a modified public goods game in which participants had the option to use their own money or the money from the common pool to punish free riders. The analysis included choice behavior, mouse trajectories, and personality traits like anger, empathy, and altruism. According to our results, investments were highest, and punishment was strongest if participants could punish using credits from the common pool, indicating that this is the preferred option to diminish free riding and maintain cooperation in public goods and common good contexts. Also, punishment was highest if the punisher's own investment was high, and the investment of others was low. Concerning traits, highly altruistic individuals tended to invest more and punish less in general but gave harsher punishments when they did choose to use the common pool punitively. Conversely, trait anger and trait empathy were linked to low investment while trait empathy also tended to be related to lower punishment. Taken together, these findings underscore the role of situational factors and personality traits in fostering cooperative behavior and shaping societal norms around costly punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Microbial secretions, such as metabolic enzymes, are often considered to be cooperative public goods as they are costly to produce but can be exploited by others. They create incentives for the evolution of non-producers, which can drive producer and population productivity declines. In response, producers can adjust production levels. Past studies suggest that while producers lower production to reduce costs and exploitation opportunities when under strong selection pressure from non-producers, they overproduce secretions when these pressures are weak. We challenge the universality of this trend with the production of a metabolic enzyme, invertase, by Saccharomyces cerevisiae, which catalyses sucrose hydrolysis into two hexose molecules. Contrary to past studies, overproducers evolve during evolutionary experiments even when under strong selection pressure from non-producers. Phenotypic and competition assays with a collection of synthetic strains - engineered to have modified metabolic attributes - identify two mechanisms for suppressing the benefits of invertase to those who exploit it. Invertase overproduction increases extracellular hexose concentrations that suppresses the metabolic efficiency of competitors, due to the rate-efficiency trade-off, and also enhances overproducers' hexose capture rate by inducing transporter expression. Thus, overproducers are maintained in the environment originally thought to not support public goods production. Microbial secretions can be costly to produce and exploited by others. Here, the authors use experimentally evolved yeasts to show that, in spite of exploitative non-producers, overproducers are maintained in the population, supporting public goods production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolution can occur over ecological timescales, suggesting a potentially important role for rapid evolution in shaping community trait distributions. However, evidence of concordant eco-evolutionary dynamics often comes from in vitro studies of highly simplified communities, and measures of ecological and evolutionary dynamics are rarely directly comparable. Here, we quantified how ecological species sorting and rapid evolution simultaneously shape community trait distributions by tracking within- and between-species changes in a key trait in a complex bacterial community. We focused on the production of siderophores; bacteria use these costly secreted metabolites to scavenge poorly soluble iron and to detoxify environments polluted with toxic nonferrous metals. We found that responses to copper-imposed selection within and between species were ultimately the same--intermediate siderophore levels were favored--and occurred over similar timescales. Despite being a social trait, this level of siderophore production was selected regardless of whether species evolved in isolation or in a community context. Our study suggests that evolutionary selection can play a pivotal role in shaping community trait distributions within natural, highly complex, bacterial communities. Furthermore, trait evolution may not always be qualitatively affected by interactions with other community members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced a multi-decade programme – dubbed AUKUS – for tripartite collaboration in the development of nuclear-powered submarines and other advanced military capabilities. This article explores the extent to which AUKUS signals a departure from a spectrum of US-centred international security arrangements ranging from a plurilateral model, as exemplified by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to the bilateral (hub-and-spoke) model more common in the Indo-Pacific. The paper argues that AUKUS complements US-centred protective arrangements along NATO and hub-and-spoke lines. In leveraging US technological leadership and military investments to enhance partner-specific military capabilities, and AUKUS breaks new ground, being less about deterrence of, and military responses to, an attack aggression on one or more of its members, and more about enhancing interoperability, combined operational s/synergy, and reciprocity in new capability formation by the parties. The work concludes that the AUKUS arrangements stand to provide less scope for free-riding by the parties, while giving them greater incentive to invest in interoperable military capabilities, thereby creating more contingent (real) deployment options for the future, US-led combined military operations, to be exercised by the parties in response to emergent military contingencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Environmental Land Management Scheme is now established as the central plank of financial assistance for farmers in England post-Brexit. Early articulations of policy directed the focus of the Scheme to the delivery of public goods, with a high level of ambition. More recently, however, greater weight is being accorded to food production and food security, with particular reference to the Sustainable Farming Incentive component, which is achieving broad coverage and accounting for the majority of the Scheme budget, but the environmental actions which it requires to unlock payment would not seem materially to be raising the bar. By contrast, the Landscape Recovery component remains ambitious in terms of scheme design, collaborative approach, emphasis on outcomes, duration and implementation at landscape scale, with the consequence that good reasons may be presented for its expansion within the policy mix. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The population dynamics of early replicators has revealed numerous puzzles, highlighting the difficulty of transitioning from simple template-directed replicating molecules to complex biological systems. The resolution of these puzzles has set the research agenda on prebiotic evolution since the seminal works of Manfred Eigen in the 1970s. Here, we study the effects of demographic noise on the population dynamics of template-directed (non-enzymatic) and protein-mediated (enzymatic) replicators. We borrow stochastic algorithms from evolutionary game theory to simulate finite populations of two types of replicators. These algorithms recover the replicator equation framework in the infinite population limit. For large but finite populations, we use finite-size scaling to determine the probability of fixation and the mean time to fixation near a threshold that delimits the regions of dominance of each replicator type. Since enzyme-producing replicators cannot evolve in a well-mixed population containing replicators that benefit from the enzyme but do not encode it, we study the evolution of enzyme-producing replicators in a finite population structured in temporarily formed random groups of fixed size n. We argue that this problem is identical to the weak-altruism version of the n-player prisoner's dilemma, and show that the threshold is given by the condition that the reward for altruistic behavior is equal to its cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Low-income individuals who do not file Canadian personal income tax returns miss out on several important benefits delivered through the tax system and may have challenges in verifying eligibility for other income-tested public goods and services. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) could complete simple returns for many low-income families, subject to filer correction. Using the Longitudinal Administrative Databank, we estimate that this approach could be successful for more than half of families in the lowest four ventiles of the population and between 60 and 88 percent of families who rely on provincial income assistance programs. We also estimate that as many as 4.6 million returns for those with income less than $25,000 and that are classified by the CRA as simple have likely involved a commercial tax preparer or software, emphasizing the potential advantage of the CRA providing completed returns in such cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies how a continuum of individuals interacting in a binary public goods game can secure cooperation through transmitting and enforcing norms. The evolutionary model consists of three distinct dimensions: behavior, norms, and approval preferences. In line with the indirect approach proposed by Güth and Yaari (1992) , behavior results from utility maximization, while norms and approval preferences evolve over time. The underlying evolutionary processes differ concerning speed and nature. Whereas norms evolve at the cultural level through peer interactions and socialization, approval preferences are (at least partly) biologically inherited and transmitted from parents to their offspring. We find that if cultural and biological reproductive fitnesses are derived from material and social factors, then an interplay of social disapproval mechanisms gives rise to stable equilibria in which positive cooperation levels persist. Moreover, we find stable equilibria characterized by heterogeneous behavior and moral attitudes across individuals. • We propose an evolutionary model with multiple dynamic dimensions. • We endogenize the formation of behavior, norms, and preferences. • Social disapproval enables stable equilibria of norm-driven cooperation. • Different dynamic dimensions introduce ambiguous effects of disapproval mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated whether carbon taxes with and without carbon dividends improve cooperative behavior to mitigate simulated climate change. We implemented a randomized controlled trial on a large sample of the U.S. general population (N = 2 , 116). Played in real-time in groups of four, we tested three carbon-pricing treatments and a baseline condition within a modified threshold public goods game of loss avoidance. We found that a carbon tax coupled with carbon dividends reduces carbon-emitting group consumption relative to a baseline condition with no tax, and relative to a carbon tax only. A carbon tax coupled with carbon dividends paid out to below-average polluters (asymmetric dividend) worked best, with 94% of groups remaining below a critical consumption (emission) threshold. We also found that experiencing the asymmetric dividend condition positively affected perceptions of carbon pricing with carbon dividends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Hate is widespread online, hits everyone, and carries negative consequences. Crowd moderation—user-assisted moderation through, e. g., reporting or counter-speech—is heralded as a potential remedy. We explore this potential by linking insights on online bystander interventions to the analogy of crowd moderation as a (lost) public good. We argue that the distribution of costs and benefits of engaging in crowd moderation forecasts a collective action problem. If the individual crowd member has limited incentive to react when witnessing hate, crowd moderation is unlikely to manifest. We explore this argument empirically, investigating several preregistered hypotheses about the distribution of individual-level costs and benefits of response options to online hate using a large, nationally representative survey of Danish social media users (N = 24,996). In line with expectations, we find that bystander reactions, especially costly reactions, are rare. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between exposure to online hate and withdrawal motivations, and a negative (n-shaped) correlation with bystander reactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The production of public goods is a necessary condition for the survival of the species, but it comes at the expense of individual growth. In a prototype bacterial colony, we model the role of quorum sensing as a resource redistribution mechanism. Two types of bacterial colonies are analyzed, one made up of a single strain and one made up of two different strains. Based on a recent series of experimental data present in the literature, we analyze two types of strains with different extinction times: strains that consume available resources very quickly, therefore becoming extinct quickly, and strains that consume resources slowly and die due to aging. We show that the proposed quorum sensing model describes the main experimental result that coexistence may favor the survival of both strains. Furthermore, the production of public goods is maximized when both types of individuals have the maximum proliferation output. Finally, we highlight the role played by so-called dormant cells in the duration of survival time. These cells are of particular interest because their ability to counteract different types of stress (e.g., the use of antibiotics) still constitutes a challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Humanity faces numerous deeply interconnected systemic risks to sustainability—a global polycrisis. We need economic institutions that produce the knowledge required to address this polycrisis at the lowest cost, maximize the benefits that knowledge generates, and distribute those benefits fairly. Knowledge improves through use; its value is maximized when it is freely available. Intellectual property rights (IPRs), a form of monopoly, direct knowledge production towards market goods, raise the cost of doing research, and reduce the benefits by price-rationing access. Building on theories of the commons, the anticommons, and market failures, we propose the creation of a transnational green knowledge commons (TGKC) in which all knowledge that contributes to solving the polycrisis be made open access on the condition that any subsequent improvements also be open access. We argue that a TGKC is more sustainable, just, and efficient than restrictive IPRs and well suited to the motivations and governance institutions of public universities. We show how a single university could initiate the process and estimate that the cost would be more than offset by reduced IPR expenses. A TGKC would reduce the costs of generating and disseminating knowledge directed towards a sustainable future and help stimulate the transnational cooperation, reciprocity, and trust required for sustainable management of the global biophysical commons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taxation and representation are famously linked in the coercive co-authored project of political governance described through the social contract metaphor. Globalisation transforms this canonical account of the state. Many people can relocate and operate beyond state borders, consuming goods and services publicly offered by other jurisdictions. Expanding people's opportunities to satisfy their preferences and pursue their goals supports their liberty. Yet, it also limits the ability of states to collect taxes so as to provide necessary public goods and secure justice, jeopardising the bond between taxation and equal membership in a political community. The challenge for taxation under globalisation is to revitalise the very basis of the social contract. Ideally, the new social contract should support the states' just institutions and the collective self-determination of their members without rolling back the opportunities people have acquired through globalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]