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This article examines narrative construction in the Chinese official Party newspaper Inner Mongolia Daily (IMD), analyzing narratives within the context of bilingual education reform among Mongolians. Three key frames emerge: collective development and prosperity under the Chinese Communist Party's leadership, Inner Mongolia as a model of ethnic unity, and the integration of minority religions into socialist society. This study reveals how IMD portrays Inner Mongolia during education reforms using media framing theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book "The general elections of November 2019" analyzes in depth the elections in Spain from multiple perspectives. It highlights the demobilization in the elections of April and November 2019, the impact of Vox on electoral competition, the use of social networks by parties, and the role of the economy in voting. It also addresses the influence of factors such as nationalism, party leadership, and emotions in voting decisions. [Extracted from the article]

This article tests Poguntke and Webb's theory of 'electoral presidentialization' through a comparison of Silvio Berlusconi and Boris Johnson. Johnson and Berlusconi stand as particular examples of 'electoral presidentialization', where dominance lies in power as an election 'winner' and 'mediatised leader'. This approach is highly contingent and reliant on continuous validation, and, as a result, both leaders failed to translate electoral 'autonomy' into concrete and lasting change. Utilising the three presidentialization 'faces', we identify three crucial weaknesses. First, their own electoral and mediatized focus created a pressure to permanently campaign and generate conflict, driving a 'politics of spectacle' that distracted from the politics of governing. Second, the centrality of their personality left them exposed to personal scrutiny, which increasingly focused on corruption, wrongdoing, and irregularities. Third, despite electoral command, their 'presidentialized' style rested on fragile party and coalition dynamics, leading to volatility and internal conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an integral part of the socialist culture with Chinese characteristics, CPC's revolutionary spirit is the root of promoting the construction of a strong socialist culture. In the more than 100 years of evolution of promoting the continuous development of the CPC's revolutionary spirit, the Communist Party of China has demonstrated its distinct cultural confidence and accumulated valuable cultural experience. To inherit the CPC's revolutionary spirit, it needs to adhere to the guidance of Marxism and its achievements in the theory of Sinicization and modernization, and stick to the central task of the Party, persist in criticizing wrong thoughts and trends，and persist in innovating the content and form according to the changes of the times. Standing on the new journey of comprehensively building a great modern socialist country, to promote the inheritance and development of the CPC's revolutionary spirit, we must strengthen the overall leadership of the Party, enhance the sense of struggle, adhere to the concept of"putting the people first", adhere to the integrity and innovation, and pay attention to the integration of foreign countries, which is of great significance to gather the mighty strength of the Chinese people and devote themselves to building a strong cultural country, building the modern civilization of the Chinese nation, and realizing national rejuvenation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on Chinese studies of the Soviet collapse since 1992, this article examines the main arguments and relative influence of Sovietologists and ideological scholars from their publications in relation to the contexts of China's political and ideological changes. The study finds that although Sovietologists dominated the academic discourse on the Soviet collapse during Deng's lifetime, they were gradually eclipsed by the ideological scholars in the post-Deng era. As the Communist Party leadership expanded Marxist schools and allowed ideological scholars more room after Deng's death, historical nihilism eventually displaced "irreformable structural failures" as the dominant school for the collapse of the Soviet Union in contemporary Chinese academia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political representation does not function well for citizens whose positions on political issues differ from those of elected representatives. In this paper, we argue that opinion incongruence leads citizens to want to bypass elected representatives and place more decision‐making power in the hands of the public. We theorise that this is because incongruent citizens are highly dissatisfied with the existing political system and/or think they will benefit from direct decision‐making in terms of improved policy responsiveness. Using data from the 2019 Belgian Election Survey (n = 3413) and Party Leadership Survey, we find that greater incongruence between citizens' positions and those of their elected representatives is related to higher support for direct decision‐making. This holds for opinion incongruence with the party voted for and incongruence with Parliament as a whole. This paper contributes novel insights into the consequences of the quality of political representation as well as the drivers of citizens' support for direct decision‐making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the complexities of policy transfer between China and Tanzania, focussing on the influence of linguistic and cultural discrepancies. It explores how African governments, particularly Tanzania, interpret and adapt Chinese policy concepts to align with their domestic priorities. The study employs a multi‐method approach, including interviews, document analysis and literature review, to investigate the dynamics of Sino‐Tanzanian relations. Findings reveal that while China's development and security discourses resonate with African policymakers, the semantic nuances and historical contexts of Chinese terms often lead to divergent interpretations. Despite several initiatives from China to infuse policy concepts into Tanzanian discourse, including projects such as a party leadership school and party‐to‐party dialogues, there are to date no successful adaptations or transfers of Chinese macro‐policy concepts to Tanzania. The research highlights the critical role of language and cultural context in policy transfer processes, challenging the traditional view of passive policy reception in the Global South. It contributes to the broader understanding of policy transfer, emphasising the need to recognise the dynamic interplay of language, culture and political agency in the process. The study concludes with recommendations for recognising and addressing the interpretive challenges in international policy transfers to enhance mutual understanding and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: This study analyzes the partisan connections of individuals who attain ministerial positions in the Dominican Republic, identifying the influence of political parties, economic elites, and technical profiles in the formation of presidential cabinets. Methodology: Following the typology proposed by Camerlo and Castaldo, we categorize the partisan profiles of the governments of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) from 2016 to 2020, and the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM) from 2020 to 2024. This aims to characterize their internal variation in scenarios of low formal institutionalization that are not captured by traditional dichotomous classifications. Conclusions: The heterogeneity in the influence of party leadership illustrates how Dominican parties diverge from the party government model. The predominance of non-partisan profiles in the core planning ministries, along with the presence of politicianbusinessmen in the rest of the portfolios, highlights the risk of political capture in this country. Originality: These results call into question the influence of the party as the center of power in dominant presidentialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article addresses the party politics of foreign policy through a theoretically informed analysis of the political survival imperative in a domestic context. Building on recent research on party ideologies and political survival/power-seeking, it offers a fresh perspective on the influence of partisan politics on foreign policy. Drawing on qualitative data, including expert interviews, the article uses the case of Turkey as a hybrid, and thus unstable, regime to examine the partisan aspects of foreign policy with a focus on two basic links between party politics and foreign policy behaviour: party ideologies and party leadership. Specifically, the article argues that the ruling AKP’s need for domestic survival led to increasingly nationalist, populist behaviour and the formation of an alliance with the main nationalist party MHP, which in turn led to the dominance of a nationalist discourse in Turkish foreign policy, contributing to coercive or risky international moves. This is best exemplified by the AKP government’s strong support for Azerbaijan in the 2020 Karabakh war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how parliamentary party groups decide who speaks for them on specific issues in parliament. We build on three strands of the literature: the work on the institutional foundations of parliamentary speech; the literature on committee assignments in parliamentary systems which points to different rationales behind parliamentary specialisation and the division of labour; and the literature on issue competition. First, we expect that the party leadership will assign more speaking time on issues that parties 'own' to Members of Parliament (MPs) they favour. Second, we expect an informational rationale regarding the allocation of speaking time by which MPs speak on issues for which they have pre-existing expertise. Third, we expect MPs to speak on issues if they have ties to relevant constituencies outside parliament. We analyse a new data set of all speeches in the Dutch lower house between 1998–2017. The analyses point to the importance of two rationales in the allocation of speaking time: high-status MPs (reflected by their list positions) speak on issues that parties prioritise, and MPs speak on issues on which they have specialised knowledge. Our analyses shed important light on how parliamentary party groups (PPGs) function, specifically how they divide labour within their ranks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Xi Jinping's Thought on Culture is "an unfolding and open ideological system", which profoundly expounds the position, mission, subject, security, tasks and other theoretical issues of ideological and cultural publicity in the new era. Logically, Xi Jinping's Thought on Culture is rooted in the rich soil of China's excellent traditional culture, originates from the cultural thought of Marxist theory, and arises from the historical exploration of the cultural construction of the Party's leadership. It is also nurtured in Xi Jinping's extensive practical experience, and stems from the original mission of cultural construction in the new era. In terms of connotation, Xi Jinping's Thought on Culture includes the cultural stance of meeting the needs of the people's spiritual and cultural life, the cultural mission of striving to build a modern civilization of the Chinese nation, the cultural subjectivity of consolidating the cultural subject of the Chinese nation, the cultural security of upholding the guiding position of Marxism, and the cultural task of applying the Party's innovative theory to educate the entire Party and educate the people. In terms of characteristics, Xi Jinping's Thought on Culture highlights a fundamental stance of people's supremacy, a logically rigorous theoretical character, a development feature of upholding integrity and innovation, and the global vision of embracing the world. The new journey in the new era requires careful study and deep understanding of Xi Jinping's Thought on Culture, to better guide the propaganda and ideological and cultural work, and promote the great development and prosperity of socialist culture with Chinese characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent trend has confounded observers of India's political system. Dalits—a population that has historically been deprived of vital resources and socially ostracized by upper-caste Hindus—have increasingly given their vote to the Hindu nationalist movement led by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). Why have some members of India's most marginalized caste come to support a party that has preserved caste hierarchies and catered to the socially dominant sections of society? This article explores this question through the case of Kerala, where Dalit support for the BJP is additionally perplexing given the state's history of left-led governments that have implemented far-reaching redistributive reforms that greatly benefited Dalits. Nevertheless, in recent years the Hindu nationalists have made significant inroads among Kerala's Dalit population. Drawing on two hundred interviews and eight months of ethnography, this article identifies two major factors driving Dalits' defection to the BJP. The first is linked to the communist parties' (CPs') agricultural land redistribution program which, despite being the most ambitious of its kind in modern India, excluded the majority of Dalits and reinscribed caste hierarchies. The second factor is the cultural discrimination Dalits face while working in the CPs, including being grossly underrepresented in the party leadership. The BJP exploits these grievances by providing representation to Dalit cadres who are embedded in strategic majority-Dalit neighborhoods. These cadres win popular support through welfare brokering and also by constructing a new narrative that portrays the CPs as casteist and the BJP as a more socially just alternative for Kerala's Dalits. This article makes sense of these findings by drawing on Nancy Fraser's concept of bivalent oppression to advance a novel Gramscian theory of "bivalent hegemony." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a methodologically innovative two-stage approach for studying divisions amongst parliamentary representatives. Using the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) as our case study, we construct a dataset of all Labour MPs elected in the 2019 general election, along with their nominations in the 2020 Labour Party leadership and deputy leadership elections and their membership of, or affiliation with, various party-aligned organisations. We then conduct a cluster analysis based on this dataset, which reveals the existence of a two-cluster model—comprised of the Mainstream (N = 162) and the Left (N = 33)—and a five-cluster model—in which the Left exists alongside the Tribune Soft Left, the Labour Friends of Palestine and the Middle East Soft Left, the Unaligned Centrists, and the Right. Finally, we test the robustness of our clusters via a canonical correspondence analysis of the language used by MPs on social media (Twitter/X) and their contributions to parliamentary debates (Hansard). We show that the MPs from different clusters do use different languages to one another in both fora. We also find that the main divide within the PLP is between the left of the party and the rest of the party, and that the deputy leader, Angela Rayner, has a broader base of support amongst the PLP than its current leader Keir Starmer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout its existence, Momentum has defined itself as a 'movement'. So far, researchers have generally taken this categorisation as a starting point when analysing its organisational nature. For example, it has been labelled as a 'movement faction' (Dennis, 2019) or 'party-driven movement' (Muldoon and Rye, in Conceptualising party-driven movements, 2020). Indeed, in terms of its nature and function, Momentum straddles different types of organisational models, drawing from several different traditions within political and community activism. Differences are also apparent between Momentum's earlier and later development as well as between the national organisation and local branches. This article accordingly questions the extent to which 'movement' is an accurate descriptor of the organisation. Drawing upon ethnographic research undertaken during the final stages of Corbyn's leadership of the Labour Party in 2018 and 2019, it argues that although self-definition as a movement may have played a role in member recruitment and retention, this categorisation does not authentically reflect Momentum's actual organisational structure and activity, nor its practical function within the Labour Party or the wider UK social and political landscape. Furthermore, activists' own conceptions of Momentum as a movement differ. The article finds that relative length and/or depth of commitment to the Labour Party and the extent to which their own identities are primarily aligned with party political activism are central to whether activists perceive Momentum as a movement and to their continuing commitment to the group following Corbyn's departure as Labour Leader. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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How do male-dominated populist radical right (PRR) parties relate to and influence norms around women's political inclusion and leadership in mainstream political parties? While research has focused on describing the male dominance of PRR parties or its influence on mainstream political parties' policies, particularly immigration, we know less about how PRR parties relate to norms on women's inclusion or gender-balanced representation in mainstream parties. In a theory-building effort, we posit that PRR parties may seek to (a) adapt to mainstream parties' norms and include more women in leading positions (positive contagion) or (b) negatively affect or even challenge norms around women's inclusion in mainstream parties (adverse contagion). Seeking to theorize this relationship further, we explore leadership selection in the Swedish Parliament, where gender balance constitutes a strong norm. Yet, following the 2022 elections, the proportion of women parliamentary leaders dipped below 30% for the first time in decades. At the same time, the Sweden Democrats, a male-dominated PRR party, emerged as the second-largest party in Parliament. Drawing on interviews with nomination committees, party documents, and data on leadership, we empirically investigate continuity and change in committee leadership appointments in the Swedish Parliament and the role of the radical right in this process. We do not find signs of adverse contagion in the short run: as of 2023, norms promoting gender balance appear to remain robust and enjoy widespread support among mainstream parties. Yet, neither do we find signs of positive contagion where the radical right adapts to mainstream norms around gender balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three years after the forceful imposition of Soviet rule in Georgia, the Bolshevik leadership there, itself fractious and lacking a broad base of popular support, faced a large-scale armed uprising in August 1924. Making use of a range of recently available and underutilized primary sources from the period as well as the existing secondary literature, this article considers the 1924 uprising in Georgia from several different perspectives – of the Georgian Government-in-Exile in France, of the leadership of the Communist Party in Georgia, of the Georgian secret police, the Cheka, and of the central Bolshevik leadership in Moscow – in order to explore the likely causes and consequences of these events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractFollowing the 2013 electoral setback and post-election protests, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party has pursued policy concessions to mobilise support from workers in the garment industry. This article examines the role of government-aligned unions in vote mobilisation. It is argued that despite their under-performance in the 2013 election, government-aligned unions retain the trust of the Cambodian People’s Party leadership and continue to play a vital role in facilitating co-optation by communicating public policies and political messages to workers, influencing the minimum wage determination process, and delivering free healthcare services. This article contributes to the growing literature on the Cambodian People’s Party’s post-2013 adaptation and the broader literature which often focuses on labour unions in single-party regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political parties are considered the basic institutions in a representative democratic system. It engaged the party members through internal and external party activities. The members of established political parties have gained more power to select candidates and party leadership in developed democracies. Pakistan is a developing democratic country; Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf announced an intra-party election in 2012 to elect candidates for the general election 2013 in Pakistan. However, it is a fact that intra-party participation promotes equality and increased vote bank, party membership and turnout in general elections. The main aim of this paper is to examine the consequences of the intra-party election of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf held in 2012. Hence, this study concludes that the membership and vote bank of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf has increased, grass-roots members promoted through proper channels and many candidates elected first time as members of parliament, as well as impacted the turnout in general elections of Pakistan. This study is an attempt to examine the impact of intra-party elections on the party membership, vote bank and turnout in general elections held in Pakistan before and after this intra-party election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explain the sources of territorial resilience in Russia. It demonstrates that the basis of territorial resilience is the "power vertical," i.e. the current model of center–regional relations. This model ensures political centralization and, consequently, political uniformity. The model is supported by several formalized institutions, including the selection of governors, the guidance and monitoring of governors by the presidential administration, and the interactions of governors with the United Russia party leadership. In addition, regional governors are included in patronage networks organized around the highest state officials and "state oligarchs." This additional informal subsystem provides center–regional relations with a flexibility that is important for maintaining resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, both the Communist Party and the government have placed great emphasis on the advancement of traditional Chinese medicine. Acupuncture and moxibustion have been actively involved in combating major epidemics such as malaria, schistosomiasis, and COVID-19. This article conducts a historical review of these three significant cases to elucidate how the acupuncture community has effectively utilized its unique advantages and characteristics through theoretical discussions, clinical practices, experimental research, as well as receiving administrative leadership and political support from the Communist Party of China and government. We provide an objective evaluation of their effectiveness while summarizing historical experiences to serve as a reference for future utilization of acupuncture and moxibustion therapy in epidemic relief efforts. Additionally, propose four suggestions: strengthening Party leadership and enhancing political support; timely summarization of experiences to establish programs and systems; deepening scientific research by integrating experimental findings with clinical practice; focusing on public awareness campaigns and education to solidify grassroots foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do politicians publicly attack the leaders of their own party, even when they have no opportunistic reasons to do so and such attacks are electorally costly? The article addresses this question by presenting a model in which the leader faces a preference conflict with dissenting members of his party, and voters are learning about their own policy preferences over time. Here, by publicly attacking the leader (and thereby harming the party in the upcoming election), the dissenters can change his incentives to choose more or less extreme policies, which affects the amount of voter learning. This induces a trade-off between winning the current election and inducing the party leadership to pursue the dissenters' all-things-considered more preferred policy. Optimally balancing this trade-off sometimes involves public dissent that damages the party in the short run. In equilibrium open dissent arises precisely because it is electorally costly, in order to induce a policy response by the leader. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article utilises an original dataset covering all members of the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) to analyse the basis of support for Rishi Sunak, Boris Johnson and Penny Mordaunt in the October 2022 British Conservative Party leadership election. The significance of our findings is that they form the basis for a new understanding of how conservatism in the UK is changing post-Brexit. Our political variables include constituency majority size, red wall status, constituency support for leave, an MP's position in the June 2022 vote of confidence in Johnson's leadership of the Conservative Party, ministerial status and rebellion rates on key legislation. Our ideological variables include EU referendum position and membership of the European Research Group and the Conservative Environment Network, along with whether MPs are classed as socially liberal, socially conservative or pro-levelling up. We find that candidates appealed to different, often rival, sections of the Conservative Party. In line with previous studies of this nature, social liberalism still represents a key dividing line within the party, and the European dimension of intra-party conflict has remained significant in light of the UK's decision to leave the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intra-party regulatory system for ecological civilization serves as the legal foundation for the Party's leadership in ecological civilization construction. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Party has continuously advanced the construction of the intra-party regulations on ecological civilization on the basis of long-term historical law experiences. This effort leads to the formation of a primary structure that includes the Party's special regulations on ecological civilization, the "1+4" intra-party regulations that have regulatory effects on the construction of ecological civilization, the Party's normative documents on ecological civilization, and a series of systems including the shared responsibility of the Party and government, ecological environment monitoring, ecological reviews of officials upon leaving office, and central environmental protection inspections. This structure and systems are of great significance in strengthening the Party's political leadership in ecological civilization construction, perfecting the construction of scientific systems of ecological civilization, and enhancing the capabilities of supervising and guaranteeing ecological civilization construction. To further develop the intra-party regulatory system for ecological civilization, future measures should include strengthening the hierarchical management system, supplementing specialized regulations at different levels, and building a rule of law system for ecological civilization with intra-party regulations at its core. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the discursive articulations of populism with egalitarianism in the parties of the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the German The Left Party (Die Linke). I draw on tools of political discourse analysis and use a discursive-analytical perspective to develop an analytical framework for examining egalitarianism and populism as separate yet interconnected concepts in the examined cases. My data is drawn from speeches and interviews of each party’s leadership during the national and European Parliament elections from 2009 to 2019. The aim is to make an argument for the analytical utility of ‘the elite’ term and its importance within each party’s socio-political context to separate egalitarian from populist elements in each party’s discourse and offer a renewed understanding of the distinction between egalitarianism and populism as two concepts that are often conflated in radical left parties. The analysis showed that there was a distinction between egalitarian and populist discursive elements in both parties’ discourses, with each party employing them on different levels depending on their respective contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text provides a concise overview of the political career of Andrew Stunell, a former member of the Liberal Democrat party in the UK. Stunell was initially drawn to Liberal politics due to his concerns about the British government's treatment of Kenyan Asians. He had a successful career, serving on various councils and eventually becoming a Member of Parliament. Stunell played a significant role in the negotiations for the merger of the Liberal and Social Democratic parties and served as deputy whip and later chief whip for the Liberal Democrats. He was also involved in various policy areas, including energy and communities and local government. Stunell retired from the House of Commons and became a life peer in the House of Lords. [Extracted from the article]

The research focuses on the impact of transformational leadership on the decision to stay mediated by commitment after a court refusal regarding illegal extraordinary congress involving the outsiders of a political party in Indonesia (in this case, it is the Democratic Party currently led by Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono), where this phenomenon is classified as a crisis. Theories and the previous literature pointed out that transformational leadership would significantly affect an individual's decision to stay with the institution through commitment. Therefore, this research empirically analyzes the hypotheses using quantitative methods on 349 respondents who are central (DPP) and local (DPD and DPC) active committees of the Democratic Party. Respondents are collected using cluster random sampling. Referring to theories and the previous literature, the latent variables of this research are constructed using dimensions. Transformational leadership (TL) has four dimensions which are charisma (idealized influence), inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individual considerations. Commitment has three dimensions which are affective, normative, and sustainable commitments. The decision to stay has two dimensions, which are intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. By using Structural Equation Modeling–Partial Least Square (SEM–PLS), the research revealed that the direct effect shows that transformational leadership and commitment significantly influence the decision to stay. On the other hand, the indirect effect indicates that commitment significantly mediates the relationship between transformational leadership and the decision to stay. The result indicates strong transformational leadership performed by Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono as the chief of the Democratic Party in Indonesia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the phenomenon of personalization within well-established political parties in democracies. It highlights the case of Donald Trump's Republican Party in the United States as an example of personalization within an institutionalized party. The article aims to gain a better understanding of personalization through a collection of case studies using a common conceptual framework. The conceptual framework defines personalization as the displacement of decision-making authority, loyalty, and reputation from the party organization to a single leader. The article also explores the dimensions of institutionalization and the potential consequences of personalization for the party and the polity. [Extracted from the article]

Objective: Under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, Likud—Israel's most successful political party in the past 50 years—transformed from a highly institutionalized leader party into a personal party. This study explores the personalization of Likud and its various manifestations and analyses the causes of this process and its consequences. Methods: A case study. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Results: Although the Likud party leader's formal roles, powers, and authorities did not change significantly, many informal developments enhanced the firm grip Netanyahu held on the party. Netanyahu manipulated leadership contests, and they became uncompetitive; the party's internal institutions were almost nullified and became no more than a rubber stamp to Netanyahu's interests; and Likud's representatives in the Knesset were transformed into a group of submissive cheerleaders. Conclusions: We conclude that essential, routinized procedures within Likud were abandoned in favor of personalization of decision making; the "value" of the party organization was replaced with that of a single leader as perceived by important internal party actors and the electorate; and that other parties perceived Likud as personalized. On all fronts, the Likud underwent a personalization process. Moreover, the personalization of Likud, the ruling party, contributed to Israel's democratic backsliding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research indicates that affective polarization pervades contemporary democracies worldwide. Although some studies identify party leaders as polarizing agents, affective polarization has been predominantly conceptualized as a product of in-/out-party feelings. This study compares levels of party affective polarization (PAP) and leader affective polarization (LAP) cross-nationally, using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Applying like–dislike scales and an identical index to both concepts, we reveal that while the two strongly correlate, LAP is systematically lower than PAP. The United States emerges as an exceptional case, being the only country where LAP significantly exceeds PAP. Drawing on regime input/output and institutions as theoretical building blocks, we explore cross-national variations and show that the relative strength of LAP vis-à-vis PAP is increased by presidential regime type, poor government performance, and low party system fragmentation. The findings of this study contribute to the thriving research on affective polarization and personalization of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The success or failure of the revolutionary leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam is determined by human factors. Therefore, in order to have groups of professional and effective leaders and managers, it is necessary to have long-term and systematic preparation, practice, and training. In each period, the Communist Party of Vietnam always pays attention to and perfects directions, guidelines, and policies on training, utilizing, and attracting talented leaders and managers. Currently, along with renovating the Party's leadership method, streamlining and optimizing the political system's organizational structure, and enhancing public knowledge, Vietnam has simultaneously implemented talent training, attraction, and utilization. The article focuses on clarifying the importance of talented individuals in leadership and management, related issues, and proposing a breakthrough policy to improve the effectiveness of training, attracting, and utilizing them in Vietnam's public sector today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Procedures of party leadership selection have attracted considerable scholarly attention in recent years, but voting motives of party members in leadership elections have not been fully studied yet. This paper presents a new model of voting in party leadership elections that is inspired by previous models that were mostly tailored to more exclusive selectorates (such as the parliamentary party). We adopt an inductive research strategy that is based on an open question in member surveys that were held on the occasion of three Belgian party leadership elections. As a result, we obtain a comprehensive model with eight different vote motivations: policy positions, electability, competence, perceptions of personality traits, socio-demographic characteristics, personal relationships, party-organisational reasons and negative voting. Our findings also show that the kinds of motivations that are put forward by members are dependent upon the number of contenders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the latter half of 2015, in adherence to both central and state mandates aimed at expediting the establishment of world-class universities and disciplines, Peking University tasked each of its schools with formulating tailored reform strategies aligning with their individual developmental trajectories. The School of Pharmaceutical Sciences, upon scrutinizing its faculty, pinpointed various issues, including a dearth of professorial dedication to undergraduate teaching, a deficiency in outstanding young and middle-aged academic leaders, lenient admission criteria for principal investigators, and a prevalent nepotistic culture. Subsequently, under robust support and guidance from the school's party and government leadership, the institution devised the "Comprehensive Human Affairs Reform Plan of Peking University School of Pharmaceutical Sciences", marking its distinction as the inaugural school within Peking University Health Science Center to embark on such a reformative journey. Throughout the plan's execution, the school intensified efforts to fortify the ideological, political, and ethical dimensions within its talent pool, thereby fostering an environment conducive to the professional development of young tenure-track academics. As of now, the school has successfully reversed the trend of prioritizing research at the expense of teaching, witnessing an increased involvement of eminent research talents in undergraduate education. Young talents have demonstrated noteworthy developmental potential, contributing to a burgeoning cohort of emerging young academic leaders. The implementation of the plan has spurred innovative vigor among talents, resulting in a substantial upswing in research productivity. Synergies between academic leaders and core team members have become more pronounced, with a continuous emergence of young academic leaders. Peking University School of Pharmaceutical Sciences is gradually cultivating a moderately sized, structurally optimized, and highly effective talent pool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Achieving high-level scientific and technological self-reliance is not only the cornerstone of a strong country, but also an inevitable choice in response to changes in the international environment. To achieve high-level scientific and technological self-reliance, we need to follow three basic principles: Adhere to the principle of combining independent innovation with open innovation, adhere to the principle of combining problem orientation with goal orientation, and adhere to the principle of combining basic research with applied research. In the process of pursuing high-level scientific and technological self-reliance, our country has adopted a series of practical measures, including increasing financial investment in basic research, building a high-level basic research support platform, strengthening the construction of basic research talent teams, and conducting extensive basic research international collaboration in research. To achieve highlevel scientific and technological self-reliance, we must adhere to the party's leadership as the fundamental guarantee, adhere to the national strategic needs as the main orientation, adhere to talent as the first resource, and adhere to open cooperation as the basic approach. These experiences provide a feasible path to further improve the level of scientific and technological innovation and achieve high-level scientific and technological self-reliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the history of the political right in 20th-century Canada requires analyzing the most visible political expression of right-of-center policies and views of the post-Second World War period: the Progressive Conservative (PC) Party of Canada. For its first five decades, it was the de facto government-in-waiting when the Liberals were in office. It won six federal elections, governing 1957–1963, 1979–1980, and 1984–1993. While sometimes derided as centrist by commentators on the far right, its members defined themselves as conservatives, and their beliefs and policies incorporated elements of this ideology. The party had a more progressive wing—sometimes referred to as Red Tories—who believed the better off in society had responsibilities to care for the less fortunate. This article considers the role that progressive values and policies played within the PC Party, and how the party and its leadership responded to changing understandings of what it meant to be progressive in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Measures of party unity are commonplace in the study of legislative voting, particularly in assessments of party influence. Scholars have employed a range of measures in studying loyalty and reward in the U.S. House, but all are proxies for the scores that House party leaders construct for their own processes. These loyalty scores have never been examined in empirical scholarship. Drawing on archived leadership records, I construct leader loyalty scores for House Democrats in the 1970s and 1980s based on leadership-selected key votes in each session. I show that the content of the leader lists was very sensitive to political context as the leadership responded to short-term challenges, but in the aggregate, leader loyalty scores are closely related over time to other indicators. As predictors of party rewards—in the form of committee posts and legislative success—the leadership's measure provides some clearer evidence of reward, particularly in comparison to conventional party unity scores. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens to the electorate of a populist radical right party when the party splits? Finland provides an excellent case for an analysis of this nature. In 2017, the Finns Party split due to an internal rift. Party leadership was taken over by members of the party's anti‐immigrant faction, who, in the election of 2019, succeeded in replicating the party's previous electoral successes in 2011 and 2015. At the same time, the moderate faction that split from the party was wiped out in the election. In the election of 2023, the party gained yet another victory. Using the Finnish National Election Studies (2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023), we examine whether the party's transformation to a more anti‐immigrant populist radical right party is reflected in the policy positions and sociodemographic composition of the party's electorate. Our findings show that the electorate came to reflect the change in leadership after the party split. Furthermore, we are able to demonstrate that the pattern prevails in the newest election of 2023 under the leadership of Riikka Purra. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The earliest form of modernization was capitalization, which Marx and Engels explained as occurring "on pain of extinction." As the inherent contradictions of capitalism intensified, modernization showed a tendency to evolve in the direction of socialization, and two different and opposing models emerged: the Western European capitalist model and the Soviet socialist model. The modernization of the old China was destined to fail even while it was still on the starting line. It was not until the Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, overcame the Chiang Kai-shek regime, achieved victory in the New Democratic Revolution, and established the People's Republic of China that the country's progress along the road of Chinese modernization really began. For historical reasons, the new China was obliged to develop a novel approach to its modernization process. Reform and opening up enabled China to seize a new opportunity, and Chinese modernization began to accelerate. After socialism with Chinese characteristics entered a new era, modernization began to take flight. Chinese modernization provides humanity with a new choice as it confronts the modernization challenge. Although Chinese modernization reflects China's specific national conditions and historical opportunities, it nevertheless has a definite world-historical significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese modernization is formed in the historical process that adapts Marxism to the Chinese context and to the needs of our times. It represents a great initiative of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. Chinese modernization has broken through the problematic model of capital-centered modernization found in Western countries, and has established a model of people-centered socialist modernization that has enormous global importance. The essential requirements of Chinese modernization in the new journey of the new era are as follows: upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China and socialism with Chinese characteristics; pursuing high-quality development; developing whole-process people's democracy; enriching the cultural lives of the people; achieving common prosperity for all; promoting harmony between humanity and nature; building a human community with a shared future; and creating a new form of human advancement. This is necessary not only for building a modern socialist country in all respects and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, but also for further adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and to the needs of our times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies have revealed that fewer and fewer women are keen on pursuing leadership positions in Malaysian politics as they lack political ambitions. It has been revealed that they prefer to be party members, work for the welfare of their constituents, and mobilize political support for the party and its leadership, especially during general elections. This preference is often viewed as being subordinate to male dominance. However, this present study contends that the political ambitions of women are self-ascribed and should be understood based on their preferred ways of participation and the extent of their influence. Qualitative data from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were used to demonstrate that women can be politically ambitious party members. Furthermore, the male-dominated leadership of a party may not hinder these ambitions but give women more ease and flexibility to be the influencers and welfare providers of the party. The political ambitions of these women were determined by examining their interests, aspirations, and relentless efforts in the roles that they play in their respective political parties. The findings of this present study broaden our perspectives and understanding of the intersection between gender and political ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Committee chairs hold crucial positions in the legislative process and can push or quell legislative initiatives. While extant studies examine the formal powers and legislative consequences of committee chairs, we know less about their appointment. We examine who ruling parties (principal) appoint to committee chairs (agent) in order to minimize the risk of policy moving away from government positions. Using data from Japan (2003–2017) on the LDP, we test expectations derived from the principal‐agent framework, conditional on committee type. Japan makes an ideal case to study intraparty chair appointments due to its coalitions' office‐allocation patterns. We find that the party leadership appoints as chairs ideologically close MPs to committees with jurisdiction on high policy. However, we find no effect for chair appointments on particularistic committees. Using additional data on bill‐amendment rates, we emphasize the legislative consequences of political appointments in the legislative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when party politics is becoming increasingly personalised, conventional wisdom argues that the party leaders' power in organisations is on the rise. However, scholarship has not yet provided a thorough and systematic analysis of the role of party leaders that offers theoretical and empirical specification. The aim of this article is to provide an analytical framework for the study of party leadership by examining the concept of leadership autonomy and its components. This new conceptualisation is then applied to a number of different parties across Western Europe, showing how leadership autonomy varies across countries and different party organisations. The conclusion sets out the implications for party change and highlights the importance of placing the leaders' role at the centre of the empirical analysis of political parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Jacobs and Andrew Hindmoor's analysis of 'Labour, left and right' is a salutary corrective to 'electoral-ideological' accounts of party strategy in Britain, and rightly urges scholars to pay more attention to substantive 'policy reasoning'. Jacobs and Hindmoor's account of Labour policy is only partly convincing, however, because it is based on a sharp distinction between left-wing 'structural reform' and moderate 'redistributive' strategies which is difficult to justify historically, and understates the importance of social policy commitments to Labour's positioning. This article argues that Labour's policy trajectory since the 1980s is better understood through a fiscal lens, which reflects the importance of costings debates in UK general election campaigns and of Shadow Chancellors in opposition policy-making. Shifts in Labour's positioning can thus be explained by looking at the interplay between the party's economic thought, the leadership's perception of its electoral needs, and the changing budgetary context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The division of powers in the federally structured European Union, the lack of fixed political coalitions, the absence of effective control of voting behaviour in the European Parliament by parliamentary group leaderships and the structure of European political parties as alliances of national parties make European elections systemically specific. In the 2024 European elections, the lead candidate system for the President of the European Commission is back. This may contribute to increased voter participation and be successful if the informal preconditions for the candidates are met during nomination. During the phase leading up to the election of the President of the Commission, the Parliament achieves maximum leverage. Political forces that endanger the existing conditions of the system itself, should be categorized as extreme and be opposed by the political mainstream. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]