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On August 2023, Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker signed a bill into law that, for the first time, allows the imposition of punitive damages in torts cases that originate in someone's death. Unfortunately, the law is flawed because it still unjustifiably bans the imposition of punitive damages in medical and legal malpractice cases. In doing so, by looking to minimize the extent of possible liability in malpractice cases, the legislature focused too much on protecting tortfeasors who act egregiously and too little on creating incentives to reduce the incidence of conduct that constitutes malpractice. As it is, the state of the law favors the wrongdoers and, more importantly, leaves the most severely injured victims without a complete means of redress. In theory, the more wrongful the tortfeasor's conduct is, the more public policy calls for the imposition of punitive damages. The current state of the law in Illinois undermines this public policy. For this reason, this Article argues that, even though we must celebrate the adoption of the new policy, we must denounce its implementation and continue to advocate for change so that it is amended to become fully inclusive and fair. The Article discusses the recently adopted new approach to punitive damages in personal injury cases and concludes that it is important that the General Assembly eliminate the ban on punitive damages in medical and legal malpractice cases so we can finally bring death actions into complete harmony with the general body of law governing other types of tortious conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the classification of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in personal injury lawsuits, particularly focusing on whether PTSD should be considered a bodily injury. It explores how courts typically treat PTSD as an emotional injury rather than a bodily injury and examines the legal implications of this classification. It provides a comprehensive review of case law, scientific research, and legal arguments to support this proposal.

Civil litigation involving the forensic neuropsychiatric evaluation of a personal injury case requires an assessment of damages and causation. The expert witness is obliged to integrate data from three critical sources of information: the review of records; the results of neuropsychological testing; and the findings from the clinical examination. In civil litigation involving a personal injury claim, the expert witness can be expected to address causation and prognosis of any neuropsychiatric damages. We discuss the undertaking of a forensic neuropsychiatric evaluation, psychiatric disorders often encountered in personal injury litigation, provide case vignettes and describe a number of special types of forensic neuropsychiatric evaluations, for example, Workers' Compensation, VA Disability and Social Security Disability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Streetcars were the greatest American tortfeasors of the early twentieth century, injuring approximately one in 331 urban Americans in 1907. This empirical study presents never-before-assembled data concerning litigation involving streetcar companies in California during the early twentieth century. This Article demonstrates the methodological folly of relying upon appellate cases to describe the world of trial court litigation. Few cases went to trial. Plaintiffs lost about half their lawsuits. When plaintiffs did win, they won very little money. Regarding the bite taken out of the street railway company, the Superior Court was a flea. Professor Gary Schwartz and Judge Richard Posner have presented inaccurate empirical data concerning early twentieth-century personal injury litigation. Professor Gary Schwartz was wrong to characterize tort law as generous. Likewise, Judge Richard Posner has been wrong to call tort law efficient. Like Professors Lawrence M. Friedman and Morton Horwitz, I see the amount taken from the street railway companies as quite small. However, I see no deliberate efforts to subsidize the industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence (AI) is almost ubiquitous, featuring innumerable facets of daily life. For all its advantages, however, it carries risks of harm. In this article, we discuss how the law of tort should deal with these risks. We take account of the need for any proposed scheme of liability to protect the existing values of tort law without acting as a barrier to innovation. To this end, we propose a strict liability regime in respect of personal injury and death, and a bespoke fault-based regime for dignitary or reputational injuries. For other losses, we take the view that there is no justification for introducing any new regime, on the basis that AI applications do not introduce substantial added degrees of risk that would justify departing from the existing scheme of liability arising under the current law of tort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advancements in genetic testing have led to unprecedented improvements in detecting disease predispositions on an individual basis. Quantifiable data can replace qualitative speculation about a person's likelihood of developing particular disorders. Consequently, genetic testing has also caused inconsistencies in how courts use genetic evidence. There is a growing reliance on genetic evidence in toxic tort and personal injury litigation. Litigants have numerous strategic avenues to bolster their arguments using genetic evidence, but not without drawbacks. Disclosing genetic information creates privacy concerns for genetic screening subjects and their family. Genetic information disclosures are necessary to resolve litigation, and implicated third parties must be protected when plaintiffs are subject to genetic tests. This Comment will discuss issues involving genetic evidence and proposed solutions to resolve hesitations in relying on genetic evidence in civil litigation. The first section will provide an overview of DNA, gene functionality and disease, and genetic tests. The second section will consider genetic testing applications in civil litigation. Lastly, the third section will present issues involved with genetic testing in civil litigation, followed by proposed solutions to mitigate these concerns. Adhering to established applications of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the principal framework for protecting health privacy. Rule 35 motions for compelling a medical examination must be sufficiently narrow in scope and supported by good cause to justify disclosing genetic information. In conjunction, Rule 26(c) protective orders may further protect plaintiffs that are subject to a court-ordered medical examination and their families. Physicians privy to genetic information must similarly be wary of their duty to warn implicated family members and ensure that they discharge this duty with respect to the patient's wishes. Lastly, as accessibility to personal genetic data increases, manufacturers must adapt their policies to warn idiosyncratic consumers that can be identified as at-risk when using a product. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bien que les préjudices professionnels des jeunes victimes de dommage corporel soient reconnus dans leurs principes par le groupe Dintilhac et confirmés par la cour de Cassation au nom de la réparation intégrale du préjudice, leur évaluation reste difficile et source d'un abondant contentieux judiciaire. La reconnaissance et l'évaluation de l'incidence professionnelle pose la question du risque de double indemnisation : le cumul entre l'indemnisation viagère des PGPF et l'indemnisation de l'IP initialement non reconnu par la 2e chambre de la cour de Cassation est source d'un débat doctrinal et jurisprudentiel. Le cumul entre l'incidence professionnelle et le PSUF bien que source de discussion est plus consensuel. Though professional damages in respect of young personal injury victims are recognized in principle by the Dintilhac group, and confirmed by the Court of Cassation in terms of full compensation for damages suffered, the assessment of such professional damages remains difficult, and the source of myriad legal disputes. The recognition and assessment of professional incidence raises the question of the risk of double compensation: The cumulative award of lifetime compensation for lost future earnings and of compensation for professional incidence not recognized at first by the 2nd chamber of the Court of Cassation is a source of debate in terms of both doctrine and jurisprudence. Though a source of discussion, the cumulative award of compensation for professional incidence and for educational, academic or training damages (PSUF) is more consensual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a court case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that the couple James and Norma Gund were injured during the course of their employment as peace officers when they responded to a sheriff's call to check on their neighbor's well-being. The couple suffered lifelong injuries as their throats were slashed by an attacker. In the case Gund v. County of Trinity, the couple filed a lawsuit to recover damages from their injuries.

The article presents a court case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an award of nominal damages can redress a completed injury, thus, reversing the ruling of a district court and the Eleventh Circuit. In the case Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, students Chicke Uzuegbubam and Joseph Bradford filed a case against officials of Georgia Gwinnett College enforcing speech policies to seek monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

The article presents several court cases heard by the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding legal issues like divorce, personal injury, summary judgment motions, and pretrial detention. Among the cases are Taylor v. Taylor, Huitron v. Kaye, and Jessup v. Five Star Franchising.

This paper argues that the Supreme Court made a serious mistake last term, when, in a case of interstate government tort, it tore up useful options that should be available to each state for the rare cases in which they would be of service. In seeking to insulate a state from liability when its employee intrudes on a sister state's territory and causes injury there, the Court stripped every state of power, in cases of interstate government tort, to try injuries occurring on its own territory to its own residents--an unprecedented disregard of a state's acknowledged traditional interests. Indeed, the Court went beyond interstate government tort and seemed to say that the Constitution prohibits litigation against a state in all cases, whether to enforce state or federal law, whether in state or federal courts. It is argued that the Court's originalist and structural arguments cannot withstand scrutiny. Moreover, the Court's position, if firmly established, would balk the actual interests even of a state as defendant. The states typically do see a need to meet their tort responsibilities. Real damage has been done, but it is argued that conservative and liberal views on judicial review of government action in time may well converge to put an end to judicial abnegation of the duty to place government at all levels under the rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses issues involving the caps on non-economic damages awarded to most severely injured personal injury plaintiffs in Kansas, as well as the ruling by the Kansas Supreme Court on the issue in the case Hilburn v. Enerpipe, Ltd.

The article offers legal news briefs in the U.S. as of March 2020. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. appealed a circuit court's order rejecting its motion for arbitration on its former staff's claim of disability discrimination. Also mentioned are the appeal made by Dwight Tuttle on a ruling dismissing his claims for relief for age discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), and the personal injury appeal by Andrea Steinbach in her case against Anastasia Collier.

Grundlage des Verhältnisses zwischen Arzt und Patient ist der Behandlungsvertrag nach den § 280 Abs. 1 i.V.m. § 630a BGB. Unterläuft dem Arzt im Zuge dieses Vertrages ein vorwerfbarer schuldhafter Fehler, so spricht man von einem Behandlungsfehler, der sowohl zum Schadensersatz, als auch zum Schmerzensgeld gem. § 253 BGB berechtigt. Bezüglich der Höhe des Schmerzensgeldes gibt es eine große Kasuistik, die sich nicht nur im Bereich der Behandlungsfehler, sondern insbesondere auch im Bereich der Personenschäden abspielt. Eine Änderung der Höhe des Schmerzensgeldes bei Personenschäden hat somit auch Auswirkungen auf das Schmerzensgeld nach Behandlungsfehlern. Daher lohnt sich eine Gesamtbetrachtung. Die Regulierung von Personenschäden hat neuen Wind bekommen durch eine Entscheidung des OLG Frankfurt (OLG Frankfurt, Urt. v. 18.10.2018 - 22 U 97/16, GesR 2018, 776= NJW 2019, 442) und der Aufarbeitung durch Schwintowski/Schah Sedi/ Schah Sedi im „Handbuch Schmerzensgeld”. Die jahrzehntelang gelebte Praxis zur Berechnung des Schmerzensgeldes wird in Frage gestellt. Tenor der Überlegung: Die Dogmatik sollte geändert werden. Eine konkrete Umsetzung scheint es aber noch nicht zu geben. Grund genug jedoch, sich inhaltlich mit dem Thema auseinanderzusetzen. Dem Schmerzensgeld immanent ist das Problem, dass subjektive Beschwerden nicht über einen Kamm geschoren werden können, aber gleichzeitig ein Wunsch nach Transparenz und Gleichheit besteht. Ausgehend von einer pauschalen Einordnung des Gesundheitsschadens wären jedoch vielleicht nicht nur Juristen gefordert, die Lücken des subjektiven Empfindens mit Sachverhalt und Informationen zu füllen und so einen gerechten Ausgleich sowohl in genereller als auch individueller Form zu schaffen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In almost every North Dakota personal injury trial, a jury must decide the reasonable value of an injured plaintiffs medical care in determining damages. Despite settled case law, there is disagreement about the evidence a jury should be allowed to consider in making the determination. Specifically, parties argue whether a jury should be allowed to consider the amounts billed by a plaintiffs medical providers, the amounts paid by a plaintiffs health insurer, or both. North Dakota district courts have not universally reached the outcome supported by long-standing North Dakota Supreme Court precedent interpreting the State's collateral source statute. As a result, this Article details how North Dakota law and principles of equity and public policy support the conclusion that a district court should only allow a jury to consider the amounts billed by a plaintiffs medical providers in determining the reasonable value of the plaintiffs medical care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers the economic consequences of the growth of subrogation on personal injury litigation to U.S. lawyers working in this area. Topics covered include how subrogation works for three types of insurers, such as Medicare, Medicaid and private health and motor vehicle insurers, an examination of whether health plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) must make a contribution to the legal fees of the plaintiffs.

In Diamond v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWCA Civ 585, the Court of Appeal mistakenly applied the wrong test to the issue of the causal link between the surgeon's failure to disclose material information and her physical injury. Even had that test been correct, its application to the facts was open to question and arguably unsympathetic. The decision is also of note for adding to a line of previous Court of Appeal decisions, which have held that breach of the duty of disclosure does not create a stand-alone right to damages for loss of autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legal disputes concerning the use of airboats. Topics mentioned include the legal areas of jurisdiction, the involvement of airboats in claims for personal injury and wrongful death due to operator error, the limitation of liability, and a description of courts cases involving airboats.

Automobile accidents in the United States account for thousands of deaths and millions of dollars in personal injury and property damage claims every year. Because human error is the overwhelming cause of these accidents, the development of autonomous or self-driving vehicles is a valuable and inevitable contribution to the well-being of society. Tort liability in automobile accident litigation has long been based on legal principles of fault. When computers begin to drive cars, where does the blame fall and who pays for the injuries? Current state liability frameworks for automobile litigation need to be modified and supplemented with federal requirements in order to provide an equitable solution for allocating risks, costs, and responsibilities in a driverless environment. Although the continued use of personal fault-based liability schemes from state to state is ideal in the near future, once self-driving cars share the road with human drivers, certain no-fault liability systems must be removed to avoid abuse and inconsistency. Outside of personal injury lawsuits, a federal mandate for automobile manufacturers' products liability insurance would balance competing interests in protecting consumer interests and promoting technological and commercial development without the stifling burden of endless litigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a court case Doe v. Etihad Airways, in which the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a district court erred in interpreting the language of the Montreal Convention and ordered the court to conduct further proceedings to determine fault in the personal injury case.

The article focuses on how responsible lawyers can help clients achieve favorable settlements and at the same time serve the long-term interests of everyone involved in a family dispute. It mentions that a good family lawyer chooses the alternative dispute resolution or other tools best suited for the circumstances. It also informs on why representing a client in a family case is unlike representing a client in a personal injury or criminal case.

Previous research demonstrates that lawyers and law students are, on average, prone to overconfidence bias and self-serving judgments of fairness when they take on a representative lawyering role. This is the first study to investigate individual differences in susceptibility to these biases. Expanding on two previous experiments, and utilizing as our sample 468 law students from twelve geographically diverse U.S. law schools, we examined whether differences in students' Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) -- a motivational desire for clear answers over ambiguity -- would affect both their judicial outcome predictions and their assessments of the "fair settlement value" of a simulated personal injury case when assigned randomly to the role of plaintiffs or defendant's counsel. We also investigated whether high- or low-NFC scores would have any effect on the efficacy of a "consider-the-opposite" ("list the weaknesses of your case") prompt given to half of our subjects in an effort to de-bias these assessments. We found that a high need for closure intensifies self-serving bias in both students' judicial predictions and fair value assessments, and that bias in students' judicial predictions could be mitigated through debiasing interventions, even with students high in need for closure. Bias in fairness assessments persisted, despite de-biasing prompts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the ruling of the Virginia Supreme Court in Cline v. Dunlora South that the landowner owes no duty to protect travelers on adjoining roadways from natural conditions on the landowner's property. Topics covered include personal injury claim for damages sustained due to a tree falling from private land onto a vehicle traveling on a public highway and how the Supreme Court confronted other cases where a danger originates from one place and injures someone somewhere else.

The article offers information on personal injury laws related to a patients right to procreation. Topics discussed include reproductive health care professionals who assist a number of individuals, chemotherapy and radiation for cancer treatment, and destruction of testicular tissues in procreation cases.

This Article examines the so-called "Baseball Rule," the legal doctrine generally immunizing professional baseball teams from liability when spectators are hit by errant balls or bats leaving the field of play. Following a recent series of high-profile fan injuries at Major League Baseball (MLB) games, this century-old legal doctrine has come under increased scrutiny, with both academic and media commentators calling for its abolition. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, courts have almost uniformly continued to apply the Baseball Rule to spectator-injury lawsuits. This Article offers two contributions to the ongoing debate surrounding the Baseball Rule. First, it provides new empirical evidence establishing that the risk of being hit by an errant ball or bat at a professional baseball game has increased considerably in recent years. Specifically, fans attending MLB games today are sitting more than 20 percent closer to the field than they were when the legal doctrine was first established. This fact, along with other changes in the way in which the game is played and presented to fans, have converged to substantially reduce the reaction time that spectators have to protect themselves from flying objects entering the stands, calling into question courts' continued reliance on the century-old rule. Second, the Article makes the novel observation that courts and academic commentators have, to date, largely failed to reconsider the Baseball Rule in light of the emergence of the law-and-economics movement, and in particular the contributions the movement has offered regarding the optimal apportionment of tort liability. By subjecting the doctrine to such an economic analysis, this Article finds that the host team will usually constitute the lowest-cost or best risk avoider, thus suggesting that the legal immunity currently provided to teams by the Baseball Rule inefficiently allocates tort liability in spectator-injury lawsuits. As a result, the Article concludes by contending that future courts (or legislatures) should reject the Baseball Rule and instead hold professional baseball teams liable for spectator injuries. Specifically, it asserts that the Baseball Rule should be replaced by a strictliability regime, thereby better incentivizing teams to implement the most economically efficient level of fan protection in their stadiums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusess various court cases. Topics include Dryden v. Johnson Matthey court case addressing employers negligence and personal injury; Bazley v. Currie court case addressing vicarious liability, and enterprise liability; and Crossley v. Faithful court case addressing reasonable care for the economic well-being of the employees.

The article addresses the historical background of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) as an innovation in U.S. tort law. Topics covered include the threshold requirements of extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress. the notion of control in employer-employee relationships and its consequences for IIED claims, and the notion of scope of employment and its effect on the IIED claims of a plaintiff.

The article examines the impact of the declaration of Missouri's 2005 medical malpractice tort reform being declared unconstitutional on physicians practicing in Missouri. Topics covered include caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice personal injury cases, pros and cons of tort reform, effect on physician specialties where medical malpractice lawsuits are relatively possible, and lack of impact of tort reform on physician supply.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that auto manufacturer General Motors--which had undergone a chapter 11 bankruptcy in the wake of the Great Recession--could potentially be held liable for hundreds of personal injury claims resulting from product defects that existed prior to the bankruptcy sale. This case stands in stark contrast to a long history of bankruptcy cases generally disallowing personal injury claims when corporations have sold their assets to a buyer "free and clear" of all potential liabilities. This Note attempts to examine this long history and the due process implications of barring claims when individuals who were harmed had no reason to know of any potential danger at the time of the company's bankruptcy sale. Further, this Note suggests that future decisions ought to mirror the Second Circuit's analysis in order to ensure that potential claimants are not arbitrarily stripped of their opportunity to be heard in court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on the civil jurisprudence judgment taken by provincial courts. Topics include lawsuits of federal insurance coverage for damages suffered by pilot in test of motorcycling, coverage for personal injury insurance in non-sport activity and non-contractual liability of the vehicle driver for bodily injuries of a cyclists.

For infant plaintiffs, personal injury litigation damage awards for loss of earning capacity are highly speculative. To quantify damages, courts rely on general population statistics and often consider the gender of the plaintiff. This article examines ways in which courts have discounted damages to minor female plaintiffs. The author notes that this discounting broadly occurs in two ways, through the use of gendered statistics and through the application of female specific contingencies. While the courts have justified gender specific damages on the basis that tort law aims to be corrective, the author argues that these practices are no more appropriate than reducing damage awards based on factors such as race or ethnicity. The author concludes that tort law is capable of evolution and it is time that the practice of gender based damages be retired. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick, an automobilecompany was held liable for negligence notwithstanding a lack of privity withthe injured driver. Four decades later, in Henningsenv. Bloomfield Motors, the court held unconscionable the standard automobilecompany warranty which limited its responsibility to repair and replacement,even in a case involving physical injury. This suggests a puzzle: if it were soeasy for firms to contract out of liability, did MacPherson accomplish anything? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article addresses the federal tax concerns of personal injury plaintiffs and the lawyers who represent them, typically on a contingency-fee basis. It explains when plaintiffs' recoveries are taxable for income and employment tax purposes and whether and how those recoveries are required to be reported by defendants to the IRS. It also discusses whether attorney's fees and costs are deductible by plaintiffs. In addition to these tax planning and compliance issues, the Article also considers when tax evidence might be admissible. Plaintiffs and defendants often try to introduce tax evidence in an effort to increase or decrease, respectively, the amount of damages awarded. These attempts have been met with varying degrees of success, depending on the jurisdiction and context. The Article then addresses the personal tax issues of trial lawyers themselves. Structured attorney fee arrangements, whereby these lawyers attempt to defer tax on contingent fees, are discussed. The tax deductibility of litigation costs advanced by contingent fee lawyers to their clients is considered. Finally, the Article concludes with a discussion of how provisions of the 2017 Tax Act might affect trial lawyers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In most cases where a person receives lump sum damages for personal injury, it is assumed that the money will be enough to put them back in the position they would have been if the injury had not occurred (indeed, that is the aim of the law of compensation). However, in many cases people run out of compensation earlier than expected. Where such people seek social security, they are often thought to be 'double dipping', having misspent their damages, and they may be denied payment. There is little empirical data on what has happened when people run out of their lump sum damages, including on the extent to which they have recklessly misspent, on what factors have contributed to the dissipation of the funds and on whether these are factors personal to the claimant or are indeed institutional or legal system factors. Drawing on data derived from cases where the Welfare Rights Centre of New South Wales acted for people subject to a social security 'lump sum preclusion period', this article maps out the approaches of tort law and social security law to lump sum damages. The article seeks to establish a picture of the circumstances associated with a person finding themselves in this situation and concludes with some suggestions about how to reduce its occurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]