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Many ceasefire and peace agreements stipulate the disarmament and demobilization of pro-state armed groups involved in the conflict, yet few of these groups ever completely demobilize. This study seeks to explain the process of incomplete demobilization by advancing a theoretical argument that pro-state armed groups are least likely to disarm and demobilize when the monopoly on violence is fragmented, and when there is relative balance of capabilities and interests between the government and pro-state armed groups. Under these circumstances, both governments and pro-state armed groups may favor incomplete demobilization enabling them to pursue their strategic objectives. We draw on unique interview data with pro-state paramilitaries from Ukraine to empirically illustrate our theoretical expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the threat posed by paramilitary groups on the state? This paper seeks to examine the role and impact of paramilitary forces on domestic politics and how their involvement results in political (in)stability. It examines how the interplay between the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary force in Sudan and the Sudan Armed Forces has resulted in a humanitarian crisis since the overthrow of Omar Al Bashir's government in 2019. The authors argue that the formation of paramilitary groups is aimed at protecting the government from internal and external threats, yet these paramilitary groups can shift or withdraw their loyalty to the political leadership. Such a shift the paper finds creates a high potential for confrontation between the paramilitary forces and regular forces leaving the citizens vulnerable to mass atrocities and war crimes. The paper begins by examining the origin, spread and activities of militia groups globally and at the regional level before examining the concept of paramilitary forces. The authors then look at Sudan's historical and contemporary experiences with paramilitary groups before discussing the recent crisis between the regular forces and the paramilitary force in Sudan. They find that the preferential treatment of paramilitary forces influences their actions during a crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the threat posed by paramilitary groups on the state? This paper seeks to examine the role and impact of paramilitary forces on domestic politics and how their involvement results in political (in)stability. It examines how the interplay between the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary force in Sudan and the Sudan Armed Forces has resulted in a humanitarian crisis since the overthrow of Omar Al Bashir's government in 2019. The authors argue that the formation of paramilitary groups is aimed at protecting the government from internal and external threats, yet these paramilitary groups can shift or withdraw their loyalty to the political leadership. Such a shift the paper finds creates a high potential for confrontation between the paramilitary forces and regular forces leaving the citizens vulnerable to mass atrocities and war crimes. The paper begins by examining the origin, spread and activities of militia groups globally and at the regional level before examining the concept of paramilitary forces. The authors then look at Sudan’s historical and contemporary experiences with paramilitary groups before discussing the recent crisis between the regular forces and the paramilitary force in Sudan. They find that the preferential treatment of paramilitary forces influences their actions during a crisis.

This text is a political analysis of the events surrounding the demise of the Austro–Hungarian administration in Transylvania and its replacement by the Romanian one at the end of World War I. It focuses on the months of November and December 1918. In particular, the text looks at the Romanian paramilitary groups called the National Guards. I argue that in Transylvania in November and December 1918, the National Guards played a pacifying and state-building role through their repressive and anti-Communist function. Unlike the paramilitary phenomenon in the rest of Europe, in Transylvania it was the very counter-revolutionary function of the paramilitary troops that produced constructive and constitutive effects. At the same time, unlike Romanian historiography, which almost unanimously has seen the role of these troops as only a positive one, I underline the repressive function of the National Guards, which made them act violently against any alternative political projects of that period in the region. The revolutionary state of the province in those days had to be calmed down for Transylvania's autonomy to be ensured under the control of the local Romanian authorities. The Romanian elite's state-building project needed security to gain legitimacy. To this end, this elite took control of the various paramilitary forces of the region and monopolized them under the National Guards umbrella. These groups were crucial in the repression against the republican movement and the perceived Bolshevik threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asserts that paramilitary police reformers like former U.S. congressman and Confederate general Winfield Scott Featherston constituted an important class of New South thinkers and state builders. Topics discussed include the intellectual history of southern paramilitarism between 1877 and World War I, the political and ideological center that emerged from Mississippi's white ruling class after Reconstruction, and mob violence in Mississippi.

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The text narrates the events that occurred on the night of August 30, 1996, when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) took control of the Municipality of Capitanejo-Santander. It explores how the residents remember this event and the significance it holds for the people of Capitanejo, a narrative laden with violence from the past. The study is based on semi-structured interviews, contrasted with press archives from the time, police records, and research on the armed conflict in the region. The information is analyzed in light of the theoretical contributions of Pierre Nora, Roger Chartier, and Danièle Hervieu-Léger. The article highlights how the residents of Capitanejo remember that night, described as the beginning of a new cycle of violence, as paramilitary forces arrived after the guerrilla's establishment, reinforcing a violent past that, at times, seems to collectively define them. The memories of that tragic night and the narratives of the people of Capitanejo demonstrate how memories and representations have contributed to the construction of a common identity around violence, leading to a lack of recognition of their diverse past and efforts to seek a dignified and peaceful life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise" by Susan L. Shirk is a comprehensive and well-researched book that examines China's domestic and foreign policies. The author argues that since the late 2000s, China has pursued counterproductive policies that have negatively impacted its international standing. Shirk highlights the dysfunction within China's collective leadership under Hu Jintao and the unchecked power of Xi Jinping, which has led to a more inwardly driven and antagonistic approach to the world. While the book downplays the role of structural international factors, it provides valuable insights into China's domestic workings and is recommended for readers interested in understanding China's rise and its impact on global affairs. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Nuevo Foro Penal is the property of Universidad EAFIT and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The new Polish military branch, the Territorial Defense Force (TDF), has been described both as a defensive tool against Russian hybrid warfare and as a private paramilitary force of the incumbent Law and Justice Party. This paper examines the strategic, political, and military purposes of the Territorial Defense Force using two theoretical models. One is designed for analyzing units intended to protect against external threats, the second for units targeting internal threats. Comparing these models with the officially declared objectives of the TDF, our results indicate a stronger correlation of the new branch with the second model and reveal distinct political motivations for its creation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociedad y Economia is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Maguaré is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Departamento de Antropologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The text explores the issue of militarization in Latin America, specifically in relation to extractive industries like mining. It highlights the high number of conflicts surrounding mining projects in countries like Mexico, Chile, and Peru, and the criminalization and repression faced by those who resist these projects. The militarization of the region has increased over the past two decades due to factors such as extractivism, drug trafficking, and citizen security concerns. This militarization aims to protect the interests of large extractive companies and is connected to other forms of violence such as paramilitarism, drug trafficking, and colonial and patriarchal violence. The text also discusses the militarization of public security in Brazil, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, where militias and paramilitary groups exert control over communities. The influence of militias and the military is growing in Brazil's political and social landscape, with military and civilian police holding elected positions and advocating for arming the population. The extractive model in Brazil has led to conflicts over land, with armed groups and the military involved in advancing extractivism. Women often lead the resistance against extractivism and militarism, facing significant risks and consequences. The resistance movements are met with attrition tactics supported by paramilitary forces, allowing ruling classes and imperialism to maintain control while bypassing democratic institutions. [Extracted from the article]

The participation of the Cossack formations in the military operations of Dniester in 1992, together with paramilitary forces recruited locally and supported politically and militarily by the Russian Federation, remains a topic known superficially at the level of public opinion and approached almost entirely by chance by qualified researchers. This article aims to put into circulation hitherto unused information; to systematize and interpret the information dissipated in the memoirs, contemporary media, and chronologies drawn up by the participants in the events; and to open the phenomenon (much better developed later) of the mercenary engaged in the interest of the great powers. The authors apply interdisciplinary methodology, borrowed from historical, military, political, sociological, and psychological sciences. Consequently, the conclusions will reveal ideological motivations, tactics, and strategies; alliance and subordination policies; but also serious ethical slippages—all specific to mercenary behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The processes that transitioned Sudan from a deeply securitized kleptocracy into a fledgling democracy have generated stressors that are now threatening its collapse. The country's two rival generals—Abdel Fattah al‐Burhan of the Sudan Armed Forces and Mohammed Hamden Dagalo (nom de guerre Hemedti) of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces—have plunged Sudan into a bloodbath. Khartoum, the capital that had been an island of civility since it was ransacked by Dervishes in 1885, has been engulfed in fierce battles since the two groups turned on each other in April 2023. Unpacking the host of factors that prompted the bloody conflict is a complex task, but the rivals and their allies are the chief culprits. Once created as a means to run counterinsurgency strategy on the cheap, the Rapid Support Forces has expanded its capacity and become a major power center. Originating in Darfur as a plunder machine of the Janjaweed militias, the group outgrew its function and became a private army capable of routing overlords in quick succession. This article traces the roots of the Rapid Support Forces to demonstrate the structural factors threatening Sudan's stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indigenous Misak women are subjected to various forms of violence: from the paramilitaries threaten them (rapes, murders) to the Creole feminism that rejects their forms of expression, considering them feminizing. I ethnographically narrate their struggles to regain their centrality as political actors through the construction of their ethnogeneric condition in the woman-indigenous intersectionality, through the ecology of the fabric. The thread translates their sensibilities and experiences into acts of resistance that produce subjective feminine territorialities. I conclude that, paradoxically, the silence and contempt that have always enveloped their practices are the spur to oppose the hegemonic forms of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the role of politicians in counterinsurgent governance in Colombia, especially in the period of vigorous paramilitary expansion from the mid-1990s to 2006. Using several archival sources and new data and cases, I show that politicians were a fundamental cog in the machinery of Colombian paramilitary governance, precisely because they did what politicians usually do: aggregate and process their constituents' demands – including demands for violence – link different territorial levels, produce legitimising rhetoric, and articulate and coordinate different actors. The analysis has analytical implications and fills a lacuna in the rebel governance literature, which has hardly found a place for politicians in the understanding of armed group territorial control in general, and of counterinsurgent control in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the relationship between Gjon Marka Gjoni, head of the Mirdita tribes in North Albania, and the phenomenon of mobilization and recruitment of many men from the hinterland of North Albania in the irregular and paramilitary forces, i.e., in the voluntary bands and the Milicia Fashiste Shqiptare [Albanian Fascist Militia], during the Italian occupation (1939-1943). In addition to his personal role and interpersonal ties, it focuses on the personal motivations of these forces, with an emphasis on both economic ones - wages, benefits, and potential banditry opportunities - and emotional ones, the latter driven by various kinds of fears. Finally, to better understand their local activity and the dynamics that emerged, this paper also addresses the nature and the extent of their violence and the consequent impact on the population.

The case of Northern Ireland and ex-IRA informers demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with the informer legacy post-conflict. We explain why Sinn Féin and the UK state have dealt with some conflict legacy cases involving informers but not with others. Contemporary political and reputational reasons are an important explanation, but there are also legal considerations and communal pressures at play. Divisions amongst alleged and self-confessed informers further facilitate this unstructured approach to legacy. These difficulties with informers' legacy are not unique to Northern Ireland. Similar challenges in reconciling former state agents with paramilitaries are evident across other conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paramilitary organizations have increasingly become a cause for concern among policy makers and the media in recent years, in part because the former are often seen as a potential threat to peace (or at least to the status quo of the current political systems) in the countries in which they emerge. Organizations such as the Oathkeepers and 3 Percenters (also known as III%ers) in the United States have grown significantly in the last two decades, while paramilitary organizations playing a key role in both offensive and defensive actions in Crimea and the Donbas Region have become a focus of discussion in the Russian war on Ukraine. Although they have not always garnered as much attention, paramilitary organizations in Central and Eastern Europe have a long history. While most are relatively inactive, others play a wide variety of active roles, sometimes even running operations in parallel with a state's official armed forces (e.g., the PMO serving the state in Poland, or the Night Wolves helping Russia capture Crimea). Despite the increase in the number and activity of these paramilitary organizations, little is known about the personal, social, moral, and psychological background of the individuals who join them. After reviewing the history and ideology of the largest paramilitary organization in the Slovak Republic, this article presents and discusses the results of a survey administered to the group. This survey used different measures of personality, morality, and identity, as well as information about respondents' personal background, family history, socio-economic status, and political ideology. We find significant relationships between certain individual personality traits and the importance of certain moral foundations among members of these organizations in relation to their broader social community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Kingdom's homeland resilience capacity is poor. The COVID-19 pandemic proved this. Back in 2019, the UK had been labeled as the best prepared country in the world for a pandemic. And yet, by 2020, and once COVID-19 had struck, the UK became "unequivocally" the hardest hit country in Europe – particularly in terms of excess mortality. In this article it is argued that the UK's continental neighbors coped better than the UK because they had better homeland resilience capacity. This was provided by their having civil defense organizations, paramilitary forces and militaries which are specifically designed to contribute to homeland emergencies. The UK, in contrast and almost uniquely in the world, lacks both civil defense and paramilitary bodies and, moreover, it has armed forces that are not actually structured to provide help in domestic emergencies. Given the problems highlighted during COVID-19, is it now time for the UK to set up its own bodies specifically tasked with alleviating domestic emergencies? This article explores this question by comparing the UK's pandemic response with that of Spain – a country which, according to all available data, should have performed worse than the UK. But it did not. Why? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the research was to promote a dynamic of construction and recovery of historical memory that identifies and documents the voices of the victims of the armed conflict in the district of Riachuelo, Santander. The methodology was the qualitative participatory action research in whose frame were used three instruments for collecting information: observation, semi-structured interviews and collective workshops. As a result, is presented the characterization of the narrations that Riachuelo's inhabitants make about three representative places of the territory and in which, during the conflict, the paramilitaries exercised control. Currently, the inhabitants of this jurisdiction are reluctant to talk about the violent past, given the different interpretations and affectations that it left behind; however, they share narratives about El Salto, the school and the church as cultural imaginaries, avoiding deeper meanings through mythical-religious narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text allowed the growth of paramilitary groups are examined. The demobilization on the nature of political crime and its results, as well as the mutation of these groups and the risks they represent for the stability of the country. It has been accepted that the paramilitary groups arose from the demand for security in areas affected by the guerrillas. However, considering the experience of many regions with the presence of these organizations, it is worth asking if the protection they offered involved the actual or potential use of violence and if, instead of ending a situation of insecurity, they did not end up feeding it. Despite the demobilization process derived from the Justice and Peace Law, the debate still persists, since this phenomenon is too complex because it ranges from the sociopolitical to the socioeconomic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pregled is the property of University of Sarajevo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The invasion of the Australian continent by Europeans caused massive disruptions to Indigenous cultures and ways of life. The adoption of new raw materials, often for the production of "traditional" artifact forms, is one archaeological indicator of the changes wrought by "colonization." Two camp sites associated with the Queensland Native Mounted Police (NMP), a punitive paramilitary government force that operated through the latter half of the nineteenth century in the northeastern part of the continent, contain abundant flaked glass artifacts. These were undoubtedly manufactured by the Aboriginal men who were employed as troopers in the NMP, and/or their wives and children. Produced using traditional stone working techniques applied to a novel raw material, these artifacts are a tangible demonstration of the messy entanglements experienced by people living and working in this particular — and in some ways unique — cross-cultural context. For the Aboriginal troopers stationed in alien landscapes, the easy accessibility of glass afforded a means by which they could maintain cultural practices and exert independence from their employers, unencumbered by traditional normative behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

English Abstract: In 2005, Colombia enacted the Justice and Peace Law, which was a transitional framework for addressing the legal status of demobilised members of the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [United Self-Defence of Colombia] and other armed groups. In exchange for providing intelligence on the whereabouts of the bodies of people these groups had kidnapped and killed, prison sentences could be reduced. Forensic experts from the Attorney General's Office were in charge of exhuming and identifying the bodies, placing them centre-stage as a source of scientific evidence, testimony and authority based on their presumed objectivity and non-prejudicial approach. However, forensic knowledge, like all knowledge, is situated, partial and performative. Here, I attend to the effects of forensic knowledge on victims' right to truth, memory practices and the administration of justice under the Justice and Peace Law. I argue that forensic knowledge co-produces conflict by producing victims and perpetrators whose identities and stories can be at odds with other accounts of the violence that occurred. French Abstract: En 2005, la loi sur la justice et la paix a été promulguée en Colombie. Il s'agissait d'un cadre transitoire permettant de régler le statut juridique des membres démobilisés du groupe paramilitaire Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [Autodéfenses unies de Colombie] et d'autres groupes armés. Cette loi prévoyait la réduction des peines de prison en échange de renseignements sur l'emplacement des corps des personnes que ces groupes avaient enlevées et tuées. Des experts médico-légaux du bureau du procureur étaient chargés d'exhumer et d'identifier les corps. Cela les plaçait au centre de la scène en tant que source de preuves scientifiques, de témoignages et d'autorité, en raison de leur objectivité présumée et de leur approche non préjudiciable. Cependant, la connaissance médico-légale, comme toute connaissance, est située, partielle et performative. Je m'intéresse ici aux effets des connaissances médico-légales sur le droit des victimes à la vérité, les pratiques de mémoire et l'administration de la justice dans le cadre de la loi Justice et Paix en Colombie. Je soutiens que les connaissances médico-légales coproduisent des conflits en produisant des victimes et des auteurs dont les identités et les histoires peuvent être en contradiction avec d'autres récits de la violence qui s'est produite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an overview of the worsening crisis in Sudan, focusing on the city of Al-Fasher in Darfur. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has resulted in political instability, a humanitarian emergency, and human rights abuses. The RSF has imposed a siege on Al-Fasher, raising concerns about the city falling to the RSF and the potential for genocide. Rebel groups are also involved, and the conflict has an ethnic dimension. The RSF may establish a parallel government in Darfur. The conflict has spread to other parts of Sudan, with clashes between the army and the RSF. The situation has led to a high number of casualties, displacement, and attacks on villages. External actors are involved, and there are fears of further violence and fragmentation in Sudan. The African Union Commission chief has called for an end to the fighting, while the US has condemned the attacks and called for accountability. The RSF and the military-led government have accused each other of targeting specific communities based on ethnicity. The authorities have been cracking down on suspected RSF members, but the army denies involvement in the execution of RSF fighters. Additionally, the article briefly mentions reports of violence and clashes in other African countries such as Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Morocco, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. [Extracted from the article]

Non-state armed actors can shape provision of public goods by impeding provision, becoming providers themselves, or taking control of the means for provision. While the literature is prolific at analyzing the former two channels, the third one is underexplored. How does criminal governance affect public goods provisioning via state capture? And do these dynamics facilitate the survival of non-state armed groups? This paper seeks to answer these questions. I argue that institutional cooptation by non-state armed actors (NSAs) affects public goods provisioning negatively in contexts of institutional decentralization. In these circumstances, public resource transfers can strengthen rather than weaken NSAs. To test my argument, I analyze the Colombian case, where criminal insurgencies took control of and diverted public health funds toward their pockets. Using data on health care providers, as well as the presence of NSAs at the municipal level, I show via two-way fixed effects models that municipalities experiencing paramilitary cooptation see a decrease in public health care provision. Similarly, public resource transfers decrease paramilitary demobilizations. This has important implications for the evaluation of decentralization as a strategy for political stabilization, peacekeeping, and development in fragile contexts, as well as for understanding the impact of public spending in strengthening rather than weakening NSAs. • State capture by non-state armed actors (NSAs) hinders public goods provisioning. • Decentralization strengthens NSAs when criminal governance occurs via state capture. • NSA state capture in Colombia stalled health care expansion and NSA demobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that, at a tactical level, loyalist terrorism in the Irish border region between 1972 and 1974 worked. Cross-border attacks including bombings in Irish towns prompted the Irish government to reinforce security along the border—a long-standing loyalist demand. The loyalist campaign led to the IRA embarking on an effort to punish those who were believed to have passed information to loyalists, resulting in the killing of an Irish Protestant senator and widespread condemnation of the organization in the Republic of Ireland. However, short-term gains were outweighed by a growing perception among nationalists that the British state tolerated or even colluded in such attacks, undermining the British Army's campaign to gain trust (and information) within the Catholic population of Northern Ireland. The article also contends that middle-class loyalists played an important role in mobilizing and equipping loyalist paramilitary organizations. It concludes that the British Army showed an excessive tolerance of loyalists with political capital or ties to the security forces, despite evidence that such individuals were directly supporting the activities of loyalist paramilitaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]