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'Power Projection: Proceedings from the 2022 Strategic Landpower Symposium includes chapters by authors from the detailed research conducted for the 2022 Strategic Landpower Symposium at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The symposium chapters examine the challenges of intelligence, sustainment, leadership, homeland defense and homeland security, information operations, irregular warfare, security force assistance, special operation forces, partnership programs, strategic guidance, and future trials. Power Projection collects this important research, inspiring new ideas for scholars to continue researching and thinking about future challenges to create novel concepts'--

Fighting the Fleet recognizes that fleets conduct four distinct but interlocking tasks at the operational level of war--striking, screening, scouting, and basing--and that successful operational art is achieved when they are brought to bear in a cohesive, competitive scheme. In explaining these elements and how they are conjoined for advantage, a central theme emerges: despite the utility and importance of jointness among the armed forces, the effective employment of naval power requires a specialized language and understanding of naval concepts that is often diluted or completely lost when too much jointness is introduced. Woven into the fabric of the book are the fundamental principles of three of the most important naval theorists of the twentieth century: Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, and Captain Wayne Hughes. While Cares and Cowden advocate the reinvigoration of combat theory and the appropriate use of operations research, they avoid over-theorizing and have produced a practical guide that empowers fleet planners to wield naval power appropriately and effectively in meeting today's operational and tactical challenges.

'A Game of Hare & Hounds: An Operational-level Command Study of the Guilford Courthouse Campaign, 18 January-15 March 1781 provides a systematic analysis of this key battle in the American Revolution. This guide is intended for the instructor/facilitator, the individual who guides the execution of an applied history training event'--

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike. On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed.

As a British infantry officer in the Royal Gurkha Rifles Emile Simpson completed three tours of Southern Afghanistan. Drawing on that experience, and on a range of revealing case studies ranging from Nepal to Borneo, War From The Ground Up offers a distinctive perspective on contemporary armed conflict: while most accounts of war look down at the battlefield from an academic perspective, or across it as a personal narrative, the author looks up from the battlefield to consider the concepts that put him there, and how they played out on the ground. Simpson argues that in the Afghan conflict, and in contemporary conflicts more generally, liberal powers and their armed forces have blurred the line between military and political activity. More broadly, they have challenged the distinction between war and peace. He contends that this loss of clarity is more a response to the conditions of combat in the early wenty-first century, particularly that of globalisation, than a deliberate choice. The issue is thus not whether the West should engage in such practices, but how to manage, gain advantage from, and mitigate the risks of this evolution in warfare. War From The Ground Up draws on personal experience from the frontline, situated in relation to historical context and strategic thought, to offer a reevaluation of the concept of war in contemporary conflict. SHORTLISTED FOR THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER MEDAL FOR MILITARY LITERATURE 2013.

The study of operations research arose during World War II to enhance the effectiveness of weapons and equipment used on the battlefield. Since then, operations research techniques have also been used to solve several sophisticated and complex defense-related problems. Operations Research for Military Organizations is a critical scholarly resource that examines the issues that have an impact on aspects of contemporary quantitative applications of operations research methods in the military. It also addresses innovative applications, techniques, and methodologies to assist in solving defense and military-related problems. Featuring coverage on a broad range of topics such as combat planning, tactical decision aids, and weapon system simulations, this book is geared towards defense contractors, military consultants, military personnel, policy makers, and government departments seeking current research on defense methodologies.

The ongoing conflict between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah is now in its fourth decade and shows no signs of ending. Raphael D. Marcus examines this conflict since the formation of Hezbollah during Israel's occupation of Lebanon in the early 1980s. He critically evaluates events including Israel's long counterguerrilla campaign throughout the 1990s, the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the 2006 summer war, and concludes with an assessment of current tensions on the border between Israel and Lebanon related to the Syrian civil war. Israel's Long War with Hezbollah is both the first complete military history of this decades-long conflict and an analysis of military innovation and adaptation. The book is based on unique fieldwork in Israel and Lebanon, extensive research into Hebrew and Arabic primary sources, and dozens of interviews Marcus conducted with Israeli defense officials, high-ranking military officers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), United Nations personnel, a Hezbollah official, and Western diplomats. As an expert on organizational learning, Marcus analyzes ongoing processes of strategic and operational innovation and adaptation by both the IDF and Hezbollah throughout the long guerrilla conflict. His conclusions illuminate the dynamics of the ongoing conflict and illustrate the complexity of military adaptation under fire.With Hezbollah playing an ongoing role in the civil war in Syria and the simmering hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border, students, scholars, diplomats, and military practitioners with an interest in Middle Eastern security issues, Israeli military history, and military innovation and adaptation can ill afford to neglect this book.

This work explains and critically examines the main theoretical aspects of operational warfare at sea. It utilizes diverse examples from naval history, ranging from the ancient era to the present day, to offer a comprehensive description and analysis of the key components of operational warfare at sea today. Specifically, it explains the military/naval objectives, levels of war, types of major naval/joint operations and maritime campaigns, and their main elements. In contrast to many works, this book focuses on the role of the naval operational commanders in command and control and decision-making. It also describes in great detail the main elements of naval operational leadership and operational thinking, which are illustrated by examples of successful warfighting admirals. This new edition has been completely revised and updated, with three new chapters, and analyses in even more detail the planning and execution of major naval/joint operations and maritime campaigns.This book is intended to serve as a primer of how to plan, prepare, and execute major naval/joint operations and maritime campaigns for naval operational commanders and their staffs, but will also be of great interest to students of naval power, strategic studies, and military history in general.

This book provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of US warfare, including its military practices and the domestic and global challenges it faces. The need to undertake a comprehensive analysis about the future of warfare for the US is more pressing today than ever before. New technologies and adversaries, both old and new, have the potential to revolutionize how wars are fought, and it is imperative that policy makers, military planners, and scholars engage with the latest analyses regarding these new threats and weapon systems. The primary aim of this book is to provide a clear and comprehensive depiction of the types of conflict that the United States is likely to become involved with in the future, as well as the methods of warfare that it may employ within these struggles. While a number of scholarly books have previously considered some of the potential features of US warfare in the future, many of these writings are either outdated or have limited their focus to just one or two of the main types of warfare that may occur and omitted consideration of the others. This book intends to remedy this deficiency in the literature. The volume consists of thematic chapters which address the key issues relevant to the future of US warfare, including cyber warfare, asymmetric conflicts, drone warfare, and nuclear strategy. Through the provision of a series of analyses by leading international academics, the volume provides an important interdisciplinary examination of the different areas of warfare that the United States is expected to use or encounter in the future. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, military studies, strategic studies and International Relations in general.

As we enter an era of multidimensional warfare, and technologicalinnovations continue to accelerate the pace of war, the importanceof decisions made by junior military leaders — some of them withstrategic impact — continues to grow exponentially. US Marine CorpsGeneral Charles C. Krulak coined the term ‘The Strategic Corporal'nearly two decades ago, and it is more relevant today than ever.This book is the first scholarly analysis of the challenges facingStrategic Corporals — and those who seek to prepare and equipthem — in the 21st century. The topics addressed include leadershipand education, military culture, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency,cyber warfare, and private military contractors and NGOs in thecontemporary battlespace. Also included is a historian's reflection onGeneral Krulak's development of the ‘Strategic Corporal'concept,and a practitioner's response to the scholarly arguments containedin the book. This book will be of interest to scholars of contemporarysecurity and armed conflict as well as practitioners who are, or servealongside, today's Strategic Corporals.

Israel has fought many wars since its founding in 1948, from conventional military conflicts with Arab forces to irregular clashes with guerrilla and terror groups. A study of these confrontations reveals strategic and military patterns. Written by a former member of the Israel Defense Forces, this book compares the wars fought in Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization (1982) and against Hezbollah (2006), and in the Gaza Strip (1956, 1967, 2008-2009 and 2014). The author draws similarities between Israel and Western nations--mainly the United States and Britain--in their waging of conventional and irregular warfare, and offers a comparison of the Vietnam War to Israel's struggle with Hezbollah in the 1990s.

Renowned and respected military expert Dr. Harold S Orenstein is well known for his translations and analyses of Soviet military history and doctrine. In this volume he has collected a number of historical papers discussing topics such as Soviet tactics, deep battle, deep operation, successive operations and operational art. These papers were written by leading Soviet military leaders and theoreticians and shine a fascinating light on the tactics and strategy of the Red Army.

Georgii Samoilovich Isserson (1898-1976) was one of the most prescient and prolific authors on military art in the years preceding World War II. His theories greatly influenced the Red Army's conduct of operations and were instrumental in achieving victory over Germany. This book gathers together for the first time English translations of Isserson's most influential works, including some that are still classified. His writings on the preparation and conduct of the deep offensive operation--the deployment of tanks, mechanized infantry, air power and airborne troops to penetrate deeply echeloned defenses--also serve as a primer on how to construct a position to defeat such an attack. His well argued defense of the deep operation based on an examination of recent wars and his reminiscences about the people and events that shaped Soviet military theory in the 1930s are included.

The urgent requirement for US Army preparedness in conducting urban operations (UO) is very real. As global urbanization continues to increase, the contemporary threat environment makes operations in cities impossible to avoid. The past decade has demonstrated through the American experiences in Mogadishu and Russian experiences in Grozny, less capable forces will attempt to use urban terrain asymmetrically to even the balance of power against technologically superior military forces.While we have always had a serious requirement to conduct urban operations, the very nature of the cold war, which was successful by its deterrence, prevented us from ever having to face the reality of fighting such urban engagements. In the post-cold war era, the U.S. Army is forced to face the realities of fighting in the urban environment. It is not enough to speak of preparing for “future urban operations”; the future is here today and the Army must be prepared to engage in urban operations even as it moves towards the objective force. Being prepared means having solid doctrine, realistic training programs and facilities, and appropriate equipment to ensure success on the urban battlefield when the time comes to fight there.

This monograph answers the question “What must an encircled unit be provided and do in order to successfully hold?” Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent drawdown, the United States adopted a military strategy of force projection. Given this new strategy, any future adversary of the United States is likely to attack early to deny the points of entry into the theater. The initial deploying U.S. forces must be prepared to fight and defend these points of entry until relieved or reinforced.The author uses historical examples of encirclements from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam to support lessons learned during a major simulation exercise in which a division had to fight encircled. The report presents the preconditions that an operational commander must set for the encircled unit which are: provide the necessary combat power, apply external pressure on the enemy, maintain air superiority, provide logistical support, and give the tactical commander freedom of action. Then the report takes a systems perspective to analyze the tactical commander's mission using the battlefield operating systems as a tool. The author presents the specific tasks the commander must execute and the concepts that he must consider. If the operational commander does not provide the necessary preconditions for success or the tactical commander does not take a systems perspective when setting up the defense, the encircled unit will fail.

One of German General Carl Von Clausewitz's key concepts is culmination. His primary work On War describes culmination for the attacker as the point beyond which he can no longer continue his attack and risks destruction from a counterattack. For the defender it is the point beyond which the defender gains no more advantages by continuing his defense. At this point the defender must decide to act. Clausewitz envisioned that at this point the defender would release his flashing sword of vengeance and counterattack. Clausewitz developed the concept of culmination for what we regard today as the strategic and operational levels of war. This paper seeks to answer the question, Does the concept of defensive culmination apply at the tactical level and can the tactical defender use it to determine when to counterattack?This paper uses three historical examples to examine when and how commanders executed tactical counterattacks. The examples are used to evaluate a theoretical framework of Clausewitz's defensive concepts. The criteria used to evaluate the historical cases are: defensive preparation, terrain, availability of intelligence on the attacker, timing for the defender and attacker, determination of the defender's defeat mechanism, depth of the defense, type of counterattack, the timing of the counterattack, and condition of the attacker and defender when the counterattack was executed. The key concepts examined are culmination and counterattack timing.

The dynamic nature of the British operation at Cambrai in 1917, in particular related to the actions of the British CINC Douglas Haig, provides useful insights into the nature of operational leadership for today. This is true in large part because the Cambrai operation came at a time when technology, tactics and strong political pressure came together to exert their combined influence on all levels of war, particularly the operational level. A similar situation exists today. The primary lessons which can be drawn from Haig's experience as an operational commander at Cambrai include; the need to define and communicate the commander's intent, an operational commander's need to avoid involving himself at the tactical level, and the requirement for an operational commander to examine carefully his motives for deciding on a particular course of action.

The rise of industrialization coupled with the growth of technology have contributed to creating a complexity to modern warfare that far exceeds the primitive conditions of earlier periods. Defined as the creative use of distributed operations for the purposes of strategy, success at the operational level requires that commanders practice operational art. Although current doctrine recognizes that the operational commander must link theater strategy to tactical operations through operational art, it fails to provide an adequate description of the commander role in campaign planning. Thus, this monograph examines the operational commander's role in planning and executing a successful campaign.The monograph begins by describing how industrialized societies and technology affected the evolution of warfare thus creating a new medium known as operational art. Next it discusses suitable criteria for determining the commander's role in operational campaigns followed by an explanation of the campaign analysis model consisting of the operational operating systems described in TRADOC Pam 11-9. The monograph then analyzes three successful campaigns: Field-Marshal Slim as the 14th Army commander in Burma; General MacArthur in the World War II Cartwheel Operation and General Ridgway as the 8th Army commander in Korea.

This monograph addresses operational art during a specific period of the Korean War. Both General Walton Walker and General Douglas MacArthur developed operational approaches to unify Korea when the decision was made to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. General MacArthur's approach used two major ground commands, was more daring, but more complicated. General Walker, on the other hand suggested an approach under one unified ground commander, seemed more methodical, and less daring. Ultimately, General MacArthur's approach was the one executed. The X Corps amphibious assault did not bring the anticipated result. The out loading of X Corps, in preparation for the assault took longer than anticipated and the enemy had mined the sea approaches to Wonsan. These two factors combined with an unsynchronized ground attack by I ROK Corps eliminated the chance of a successful envelopment.The monograph provides insight in the relationship between the commander's personality, his previous operational experiences, and his preference for a particular type of operational approach.

This study is a historical analysis of the cavalry raids led by Confederate Major Generals Earl Van Dorn and Nathan Bedford Forrest in December 1862 and Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson in April 1863. Each raid is examined in detail based on the historical data available and focuses on the operational concerns and considerations of Union and Confederate commanders.Some of the conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation are: the use of cavalry had evolved to large, independent units for separate operations; the operational benefit of cavalry was demonstrated first by the Confederacy, then refined and used by the Federals during the Vicksburg Campaign; the synchronization and orchestration of units from different commands against a common target produced significant benefits; and sufficiently strong units, capable of self-sustainment, can be detached from the main body of an army to operate behind enemy lines to destroy the enemy Infrastructure.The study concludes that operational raids can be a significant economical operation to attack an enemy center of gravity without using the bulk of the army. The historical examples from the Vicksburg Campaign can be compared to today's force structure to show that capability is limited for the modem commander.

The stalemate in World War I created the need for a solution to escape this resource intense form of warfare. Following five unsuccessful German offenses in early 1918, the Germans found themselves in a solely defensive scenario conducting defensive battles, named “Abwehrschlachten.”Based on the findings of previous research on these offensives, the monograph analyzes German operational thinking and the display of operational art in the subsequent defensive scenario from the last unsuccessful offensive in July 1918 to the armistice in November 1918.The paper relies on two approaches. First, it analyzes data from primary sources to identify changes in the strategic context from a German perspective, by using a model from Collin S. Gray, and derives implications for the German ability to apply operational art. Second, it reflects German military actions during the “Abwehrschlachten” upon a framework of operational elements, derived from the previous case study of David T. Zabecki on the German offensives.The analysis results in a confirmation of previous findings about the level of German operational thinking at that time, but also depicts the limitations the Germans faced in their attempts to apply their thinking through military action. Those limitations predominately emerged from significant changes in the operational environment in 1918. Current consensus, in line with Clausewitz's thoughts on the defense, is that the defense, tied to a negative aim, is a temporary form of warfare and military leaders always strive to seize the initiative to transit to the offensive form of war-fighting, tied to a positive aim. Based on the analysis of this solely defensive scenario from a German perspective, the monograph questions the applicability of today's understanding of operational art in such a purely defensive scenario and suggest the evolution towards a framework for operational art in the defense.

This monograph examines Soviet operational centers of gravity during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Specifically, the examination focuses in two areas: (1) German planning for Operation Barbarossa; (2) the operational objectives selected for the second phase of the campaign.The second phase was selected because it was during this phase that the focus of the German military effort became diverse. Two competing strategies within the German political and military command structure caused this. While political-ideological and economic factors influenced one, purely military concerns influenced the other. In the end, the Germans diluted combat power in phase two towards three operational objectives: Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine.Thus, the research question for this monograph is: Which, if any, of the German operational objectives for the second phase of the campaign were also Soviet operational centers of gravity?The analysis of operational objectives uses Colonel William Mendel's and Colonel Lamar Tooke's analytical model called “Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity.” Potential centers of gravity are analyzed using a validity and a feasibility test.This monograph concludes that Moscow was the operational center of gravity for the campaign by virtue of its direct and intrinsic relationship to the strategic center of gravity—the Soviet Military.

By 1863, the Civil War was basically a stalemate between the two belligerents. Though the Union forces had achieved some success in conducting joint expeditions that resulted in securing the Mississippi River and the majority of the Southern ports, the major land armies of the Union were generally ineffective. In March 1864, General Ulysses S. Grant was named General-in-Chief of the Union army; he designed a campaign for future operations that called for synchronized operations by the Union armies supported by the Union navy. This monograph examines the naval support to Grant's campaign to determine whether or not the provided support was by design or just coincidence.The monograph initially establishes the theater of war setting that Grant inherited when he assumed the billet of General-in-Chief. This is followed by a summary of the campaign from a naval perspective. The monograph concludes with an analysis of the naval support provided to the campaign using the four components of a successful campaign espoused in Lieutenant Colonel James Dubik's “A Guide to the Study of Operational Art and Campaign Design.”Based on the analysis, it is evident that the naval support was provided by design. Grant demonstrated an extraordinary ability to visualize operations in the entire theater of war. He fully understood and appreciated the usefulness of the sea dimension and exploited its use. The Union navy's command of the seas and resourcefulness allowed Grant to maintain his freedom of action, to operate from secure bases of operation, and to destroy the South's capacity to wage war.

The purpose of this paper was to study the practice of military art at the operational level of war. The story of Wellington's ultimate success against Napoleon's Marshals was selected as a case study as it seemed rich in the application of mental agility to achieve an asymmetrical military advantage in a theater of war. As military theory recognizes two general types of military art, classical strategy and operational art, the research question was constructed to determine if Wellington practiced pure classic strategy, or an early/transitional form of operational art.In order to provide a basis of analysis, the essential elements of both classic strategy and operational art are next defined. The history of classic strategy is outlined, then the theory of Clausewitz and Jomini used to define its four basic elements. The practice of operational art is then traced, from its inception by U.S. Grant during the American Civil War, to Soviet operational theory developed in the 1920's. The theory of Dr. James Schneider, a primary interpreter of both Grant and the Soviets, provides the eight essential elements of operational art. To round out the section on military art, U.S. operational doctrine is outlined and discussed.Like most military officers, Wellington was a creature of his own experience, therefore a chapter is dedicated to the lessons he learned as a young officer in India. The following chapter is dedicated to a study of the Peninsular War. As the research question deals with both the operational and strategic levels of war, Wellington's tactics are neglected in favor of his campaign concepts and execution.

This is the book on war that Napoleon never had the time or the will to complete. In exile on the island of Saint-Helena, the deposed Emperor of the French mused about a great treatise on the art of war, but in the end changed his mind and ordered the destruction of the materials he had collected for the volume. Thus was lost what would have been one of the most interesting and important books on the art of war ever written, by one of the most famous and successful military leaders of all time. In the two centuries since, several attempts have been made to gather together some of Napoleon's'military maxims', with varying degrees of success. But not until now has there been a systematic attempt to put Napoleon's thinking on war and strategy into a single authoritative volume, reflecting both the full spectrum of his thinking on these matters as well as the almost unparalleled range of his military experience, from heavy cavalry charges in the plains of Russia or Saxony to counter-insurgency operations in Egypt or Spain. To gather the material for this book, military historian Bruno Colson spent years researching Napoleon's correspondence and other writings, including a painstaking examination of perhaps the single most interesting source for his thinking about war: the copy-book of General Bertrand, the Emperor's most trusted companion on Saint-Helena, in which he unearthed a Napoleonic definition of strategy which is published here for the first time. The huge amount of material brought together for this ground-breaking volume has been carefully organized to follow the framework of Carl von Clausewitz's classic On War, allowing a fascinating comparison between Napoleon's ideas and those of his great Prussian interpreter and adversary, and highlighting the intriguing similarities between these two founders of modern strategic thinking.

This monograph examines the nature of operational art during the third and final phase of the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949. During this period Mao Tse-Tung and the Red Army fought Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Army for the military and political control of China.The initial portion of the monograph discusses the areas of military strategy and the development of operational art. This area was developed using contemporary monographs, research projects, and professional journal articles. Professional military journals such as Parameters and Military Review publish relevant articles covering these subjects on a recurring basis. The majority of the information covering Mao's thoughts and writings were drawn from The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung published in Beijing, China by the Foreign Languages Press.The section dealing with the essence of operational art was developed primarily from James Schneider's theoretical paper; Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art. In this paper Schneider identifies, defines, and argues that eight key attributes must exist for the fullest expression of operational art to be manifested. These eight attributes are; the distributed operation, the distributed campaign, a system of continuous logistics, instantaneous command and control, the operationally durable formation, operational vision, the distributed enemy, and distributed deployment. This monograph uses Schneider's eight key attributes of operational art as a measure of effectiveness for evaluating the use of operational art during the Chinese Civil War.This monograph concludes that while Mao Tse-Tung was one-step removed from the operational level of war, the commanders of the Red Army, guided by his theory of protracted war and his controlling strategy, successfully applied operational art to decisively defeat a larger, better equipped, and trained military force in a sequential series of battles and engagements.

This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, on effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military.First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese.

This thesis describes how German doctrine and command and control evolved in World War II with respect to supporting arms. Structured knowledge of a subject, based on empirical data and experience, contributes to successful practice and future development. The German experience of the Second World War is used to discern the applicable lessons of command and control for understanding the development of modern warfare as it relates to supporting arms.

A category of military art called naval operational art exists in the Soviet Union. For the Soviets the art is the scientific skill of planning and conducting the interlinked engagements, strikes, and maneuvers that comprise the modern naval operation. The Soviets exercise naval operational art according to principles of the art which the Soviets emphasize with a stiff formalism that can be exploited by the West. This study describes the art and its style and suggests Soviet naval war fighting scenarios based on the application of the principle of naval operational art.

This study investigates the significant effect of mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, and topographic engineering on the American Civil War Campaign of Chancellorsville. The operations occurred near Fredericksburg, Virginia, in April and May of 1863. In the battle, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia decisively defeated the Union Army of the Potomac. Engineer-related considerations contributed immensely to the Confederate victory.Engineer battlefield functions influenced the operations of both armies. The Union Engineer Brigade constructed numerous pontoon bridges to overcome the river obstacles prior to and following the battle. This capability allowed the Union Army to initially surprise and envelop the Confederate Army. The natural obstacles of the rivers and forests and manmade obstacles of abatis hindered maneuver. Survivability was a significant factor during the fighting. At Chancellorsville, the Confederates used entrenchments for the first time in open operations. This strengthened their economy of force in front of the Union Army and gave “Stonewall” Jackson mass during his successful enveloping attack. Finally, topographic engineering was important through map production and reconnaissance by engineers.This study concludes that the Confederate Army integrated the engineer battlefield functions more effectively than the Union Army. In part, this explains the decisive Confederate victory.

This monograph examines the practice of operational art from the perspective of the Kursk Campaign of July-Oct., 1943. The study begins by presenting the German and Russian campaign plans as examples of two different methods of achieving a desired end state. Each plan's vision of the future was heavily influenced by the nature of the strategic situation and the personalities of the two principal artists: Adolf Hitler and Marshal Georgii Zhukov. These two leaders had vastly different understandings of strategic possibilities, time-space dimensions of the battlefield, and the means required to achieve their desired end states. The success of Zhukov's campaign plan was directly related to his linkage of appropriate means and methods toward a desired end state, while Hitler's failure represented a failure to do likewise. The monograph also uses Kursk to examine several theoretical concepts of war. These include the relative strength of offense and defense, culminating points, the art of combinations, use of reserves, and the center of gravity.The Russian decision to defend first against an expected German offensive is an excellent example of the use of operational art. Acting on the information of the LUCY espionage network, Zhukov constructed his campaign around an unprecedented tactical defensive system in an effort to destroy the German armored formations as they attacked toward Kursk. He intended to initiate his counteroffensive at the point where the German panzer corps had been so attrited that they would not be able to prevent a Russian onslaught which would expel all German forces from the Donetz Basin. German operational flexibility, which had been the hallmark of their previous campaigns, was eliminated by Hitler's centrally devised and executed plan, reducing commanders such as Manstein and Model to mere tactical actors. In the end the Russian victory was a complete one: tactical, operational and strategic.

On 2 April 1982, after more than 16 years of inconclusive diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain, Argentina launched Operativo ROSARIO, a military campaign designed to take by military means what the Argentine government could not secure by political means: the Islas Malvinas or what the British and the Islanders call the Falklands. As happens in many such instances, the Argentine government miscalculated the political resolve and military response of their British opponent. Refusing to accept the Argentine military action as a “fait accompli”, the British government responded to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands with Operation CORPORATE, a military campaign to regain her lost territory. Great Britain, a major world political power and NATO member, and Argentina, a 3rd world nation with major power aspirations, resorted to military force to resolve their political differences over the future of a small cluster of mostly uninhabited islands in the South Atlantic. Thus began the Falkland Islands conflict.This paper will analyze the Falkland Islands conflict from the viewpoint of an operational commander. To facilitate this process, three general areas will be reviewed: (1) political considerations, (2) strategic objectives, and (3) operational factors, including objectives, centers of gravity (COGs) and employment of forces. Based on my conclusions, specific recommendations will be offered which directly impact on the operational level of war for the U.S. commander.

This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design during the initial US ground combat in the Vietnam War. The focus is on the linkage of national strategic ends with military means and ways from the Spring of 1965 through the results of the la Drang battles of November 1965. The monograph identifies lessons from this period that are applicable to current US Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of US military action under the American system of civilian control of the military.First, the monograph evaluates current US doctrine for campaigns and identifies the concept of linkage of national strategic ends with military ways and means as critical to successful campaign design. Then the monograph assesses US military doctrine in 1965, identifying the weakness of unconventional warfare capabilities. A detailed discussion of the concept of both limited war and gradualism as national strategies, includes the limits on military action imposed by these strategies. Section III identifies specific military objectives identified by the National Command Authority, including preventing the war in Vietnam from escalating to a general war. The primacy of President Johnson's domestic concerns is also identified.The monograph then assesses the effectiveness of US military campaign planning and execution in 1965. The conclusion is that the operational ways and means used by General Westmoreland in the conduct of his chosen strategy of attrition were not linked in any way with the national strategic aim of limited warfare. The monograph also identifies a failure in supervision by civilian leaders, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the military planning and conduct of the air and ground campaign in South Vietnam. Too little supervision was the cause of failure, not over supervision by the civilian and military leadership.

This case study analyzes the role of operational art in Allied operations at Anzio, Italy and the battle for Rome (January 22-June 4, 1944). As part of the Allied Campaign in Italy, the amphibious assault on Anzio-code-named Operation Shingle, and the subsequent drive to Rome remains one of the most controversial military operations in history. Although the Allies eventually captured Rome from the Germans, the failure to use'operational thinking'led to a poorly planned and executed operation.Most historical accounts blame the failures at Anzio on the lack of aggressiveness by the Operation Shingle commander Major General John P. Lucas. However, when viewed in the larger context of the strategy to defeat Germany and the Allied Campaign in Italy, Operation Shingle is a showcase of failure at the operational level of war. Political rather than military considerations drove Shingle-dooming the operation from the start.Anzio demonstrates the importance of linking tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives. At the strategic level of war, the Allies had a sound strategy to defeat Germany. However, at the operational level of war, the decision to launch Shingle did not adequately assess risk. In operational design, commanders failed to define an objective, lacked sufficient mass, and did not include alternative plans based on potential enemy actions. During planning and preparation, the Allies misjudged the enemy's center of gravity and failed to exploit valuable intelligence. During execution, operational leadership lacked initiative. Finally, the complexity and tensions created by the combined operation made unity of effort difficult. These lessons should benefit future operations.

Japan's December 1941-February 1942 invasion of Malaya and culminating conquest of Singapore is analyzed from an operational perspective. Although overshadowed by better known Pacific Theater actions in World War II, the campaign was Japan's most successful example of joint warfare and replete with lessons for the modern operational commander. Approached from the level of the commander and staff, the background and decision making processes are reviewed, with applicable areas identified for today's leaders. The need for aggressive leadership, accurate intelligence, flexible application of power, adjustment of force based on environmental conditions, and the value of logistics are the major lessons from the Japanese victory. Poor leadership and futility of trying to defend too much are among those lessons from the defeated British.

For years, the Marine Corps has touted the prescience of Lt. Col. “Pete” Ellis, USMC, who predicted in 1921 that the United States would fight Japan and how the Pacific Theater would be won. Now the works of the “amphibious prophet” are collected together for the first time. Included are Ellis'essays on naval and amphibious operations that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps would use to win the war against Imperial Japan, as well as his articles about counterinsurgency and conventional war based on his experiences in the Philippines and in Europe during World War I. As the United States focuses on the Pacific once again, Friedman presents Ellis'ideas as a case study to inform current policymakers about the dynamics of strategy and warfare across the vast reaches of the Pacific. This collection reveals Ellis to be a thinker who was ahead of his time in identifying concepts the U.S. military struggles with even today.

In September 1943 allied armies of the United States and Great Britain landed on the European mainland in its “soft underbelly” taking another step toward the defeat of Nazi Germany. Expecting to be in Rome by the end of that year, the Allies instead found themselves embroiled in a prolonged struggle of static warfare reminiscent of the western front of 1915-16. In the end the allied armies suffered 312,000 casualties in a campaign whose purpose was not clearly decided. This monograph examines the Allies campaign in the Mediterranean in 1943-1944 in order to answer the question of whether the Allies could have “won” and, if so, how. More specifically, this study looks at the utility of military theory for explaining cause and effect, and for providing a basis for operational insight and assessment of risk. This particular historical case study is significant in that the challenges of difficult terrain, coalition command, multinational forces, limited resources, and bad weather faced by the operational commanders of this campaign are factors that may weigh heavily for operational commanders in future conflicts.Conclusions reached in this study are threefold. First, the operational commanders involved did not have a true appreciation of the operational risks taken when major operations were designed and executed in January 1944. Second, the operational and strategic commanders may have chosen a different course of action if these risks had been more fully appreciated. Third, classical theory, as represented by the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, and even Liddell Hart, does have utility in explaining cause and effect and may well have provided the commanders concerned in this case clearer insight at the operational level of war.

In 1805, a new style of operational warfare burst upon the fields of Europe as Napoleon Bonaparte's Grand Army swept from the Rhine to the Danube surrounding the Austrian army at Ulm and initiating a revolution in military affairs (RMA) whose effects are still felt today. The question remains whether this new style of warfare was merely a natural outgrowth of the work of 18th century military thinkers, whose theories were imitated by a dynamic leader, or did Napoleon bring something new to warfare, a true innovation in the conduct of operational warfare? This is the central question that this monograph will attempt to answer.David Chandler maintains that “Napoleon contributed little new.” As we struggle today with the implications of a possible RMA, it is important that we fully understand the forces that caused former RMA's to occur. For the historian, it is also important that we get our interpretations of past events as correct as possible. Was this a RMA that would have happened with any energetic leader who strictly followed the teachings of Bourcet and Guibert, as a sort of TTP put together by theorists, or did Napoleon take their theories, and meld them with his own ideas to create a new form of warfare and initiate a RMA? Does a true RMA require more than just theories and doctrine, does it require an inquiring mind on the part of the practitioner as well? These questions give relevance to the research question of this monograph.The monograph concludes that Napoleon did not imitate the two thinkers, and that the RMA initiated by him was more than just an implementation of techniques proposed by theorists. The RMA in 1805 required an imaginative practitioner who could grasp the salient features of theory and put them to use in new ways. To initiate the RMA innovation by the war fighter was required, not mere imitation.

This monograph analyzed whether Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck used operational art to defeat British forces in the East African campaign of World War I. British forces were superior in quantity of men and equipment, but slow moving and heavily dependent on secure lines of communication. Lettow-Vorbeck's forces maintained an asymmetric advantage in mobility, knowledge of terrain, and responsive logistics. An analogy was suggested that the U.S. Army in the twenty-first century is similar to British forces in 1914, and the nation's future adversaries could potentially use Lettow-Vorbeck's unconventional warfare and asymmetric tactics woven together in a comprehensive campaign plan.This monograph reviewed the origins and characteristics of operational art. The Army's emerging doctrine, Student Text 3-0, Operations defines operational art as the “use of military force to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategic, campaigns, major operations, and battles” and serves as the entry point for discussion. A synthesis of Shimon Naveh and James Schneider's theories revealed five primary characteristics of operational art and was used as the criteria to evaluate the research question. The five characteristics were: operational objectives, operational maneuver, disruption, operational approach, and operational logistics. The East African campaign was analyzed from the perspective of Lettow-Vorbeck linking his strategic aim of forcing the British to commit forces to a secondary theater of operations to his limited resources. The four-year campaign was divided into three phases based on Lettow-Vorbeck's operational objectives and the correlation of forces. Significant tactical vignettes were examined as part of an overarching campaign plan. Finally, this monograph considered how the U.S. Army would fight an asymmetric enemy in a similar environment.

This report examines the development of the Soviet Army's operational art against the Germans during World War 2. It examines the reconstruction and reorganization of the Soviet military forces after Hitler's invasion, the development and coordination of military tactics on the various fronts and the deployment of forces for defense or attack in several battles.

Operation Market Garden was the largest paratroop drop of the Second World War; It was also one of the worst operational failures. What strategy could have led the Allies to such an incredulous failure and what lessons can be learned for future military operations? Several timeless lessons are apparent from an analysis of the operation: (1) at the strategic level, military planners must never lose sight of the political reasons which fostered the initial conflict; (2) at the operational level, total coordination and planning with all elements of an operation remain critical to the successful execution of any plan; (3) logistics shortages caused the troops to be ill prepared; (4) most importantly, at the tactical level commanders must learn to'read the troops,'watch their collective behavior and be ready to step in to keep them focused on the ultimate goal, the satisfactory completion of the mission; (5) from a leadership perspective, we learn that truly great leaders sacrifice their personal ambitions for the good of the unit effort and the successful execution of the mission.

The Battle of Britain was the first major defeat for the Germans of WWII. The Battle of Britain was an air operation designed to give Germany air superiority over both the English Channel and England. Gaining air superiority was considered by the Germany Army and Navy as absolutely essential prior to “Operation Sea Lion,” the landing and invasion of England. Because the Luftwaffe was never able to establish the requisite air superiority, Sea Lion was cancelled.This paper examines the German Operational Art issues from a historical perspective. It concludes the failure of the Luftwaffe belongs to Reich-Marshall Goring, operational commander for the Battle of Britain. His main failure, as operational commander, was repeatedly making tactical decisions from the operational level rather than leaving this to on-the-scene tactical commanders. Secondly, he was never able to identify Fighter Command as the British Center of Gravity. Thirdly, he never understood the intelligence advantage gained by the British as a result of their newly invented radar early warning system. As a result, Germany lost the battle.

Robert E, Lee, in his first campaign as the new commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, stopped the Union offensive against Richmond in a series of engagements known as the Seven Days. Although eventually successful, Confederate operations were clumsy and erratic and often missed opportunities to secure greater success. At the end of the Seven Days Lee reorganized his forces and began preparations for his next campaign. This new campaign, which resulted in the Battle of Second Manassas just two months later, is widely considered to be one of Lee's most brilliant operations.The purpose of this monograph is to identify the changes and improvements that occurred within Lee's army which enabled it to show this vast improvement in such a short time span. The monograph uses LTC James Dubik's model for campaign analysis which is a modification of the familiar “ends, ways, and means” characterization of campaign planning. It evaluates four components of a campaign: intellectual, cybernetic, psychological-physical, and harmonic as a methodology for comparative analysis.Despite his inexperience, Lee was able to learn from his first campaign. He could recognize what needed to be done and had the patience, intelligence, and courage to do it. Each of the adjustments and modifications he made were important but not decisive by themselves. It was the synergism of wise personnel and organization changes combined with improved operational planning which proved to be the secret in transforming Lee's troops into the legendary Army of Northern Virginia.