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This document is a general summary of the activities of the German forces opposing the Seventh US Army during the period indicated. It was prepared by the G-2 Section Seventh Army to relate chronologically, month by month, the enemy's tactics, composition and organization. It is not a history of Seventh Army Operations, as such a document is being produced by the Seventh Army Historical Section.

The attached report of General Eisenhower is circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The outline plan embraces two plans: a. one based upon the assumption that assault craft and shipping for two divisions will be available as now allocated; and b. a second based upon the assumption that this allocation will be increased sufficiently to permit of an assault by three divisions. Section I- appreciation. Section II- outline plan. Section III- list of annexes.

Chapter VII: the capture of Toulon and Marseille. Chapter VIII: the German retreat from southern France. Chapter IX: the battle of Montelimar. Chapter X: protecting the eastern plain/flank. Chapter XI: consolidation of Seventh Army gains. Chapter XII: the junction of Dragoon and Overlord. Chapter XIII: the Moselle. Chapter XIV: problems of rapid advance. Included are various annexes with charts detailing Dragoon area build-up (projected and actual cargo tonnage- cumulatively), projected and actual number of vehicles, projected and actual strength, projected and actual ammunition tonnage, projected and actual petroleum tonnage, a map of supply dumps and phase lines (D-Day through September), and a map of Germany.

On 19 December 1943, Seventh Army Headquarters in Palermo received a message which interrupted a four-month period of comparative inactivity since the end of the Sicilian campaign. It was a telegram from Allied Force Headquarters: "An estimate is required as a matter of urgency as to the accommodations which you would require for your planning staffs should you be asked to undertake the planning of an operation of a similar size to Husky…" Chapters include: preliminary planning; the target area and German defense plans; final planning; training; moving to the assault; the VI Corps assault; and annexes.

The control aspect of embarkation procedures is one that cannot be too strongly emphasized nor its importance exaggerated in the mounting of a large-scale operation such as the one described herein. The control developed by the embarkation group concerned with the mounting of 7th Army forces from the Port of Naples for the invasion of Southern France is noteworthy and will be the one discussed in this outline. Commencing with the time a unit is notified by Task Force Headquarters to prepare for movement to the staging areas for embarkation until the time that the unit actually embarks, the control maintained by the embarkation group must never be relaxed in order that the success of the operation will not be impaired or jeopardized. In preparing for the invasion of Southern France, it was planned that the mounting of the large majority of the troops involved (7th Army augmented and reinforced) would take place from the Port of Naples, Italy. The responsibility for the reception, staging and embarkation of these units was placed on the Commanding General, Communications Zone (formerly SOS NATOUSA) MTOUSA. Headings include an introduction, formation of the embarkation group, control instructions and forms, and a summary.

The matter of arriving at firm decisions with regard to Overlord and Anvil is pressing. If delayed much longer it will definitely interfere with the preparation of forces and will jeopardize meeting the target dates. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force and the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, confer and submit their recommendations by February 1.

The following is a brief chronological record of the part played by Headquarters SOS NATOUSA in the mounting of Operation Dragoon (formerly known as Operation Anvil), which had for its objective an amphibious assault on the southern coast of France, and which was consummated on 15 August 1944.

Logistical planning for Operation Dragoon was definitely completed with the departure of the Assault Forces 12 August 1944. While it is recognized that inevitable last-minute changes may be required in subsequent phases, all plans therefor have been completed in accordance with present directives. It is apparent that all agencies involved have done splendid work to accomplish the supply mission laid down many months ago but not firmed until mid-June.

Sections include: intelligence; G-2 estimate; order of battle index- organic units of German divisions in Southern France; movement tables; tactical study of terrain; beach reports; personnel assignment by ships; smoke plan, obstacle clearance; etc.

The purpose of this document is to present a graphic picture of the operation "Dragoon" in sufficient detail so that others with field experience will be able to understand and use if applicable, the information contained herein. An effort has been made not only to indicate what was done but also to indicate why it was done and the reasoning behind the decisions that were made. It covers the planning and actual operational activities of the XII Air Force Service Command in the supply and service to an air force in support of an invasion and advancing army.

Report on use of DD (amphibious) Tanks for Operation Dragoon, Southern France August 1944.

Reports 73 to 41 cover September 17, 1944 to October 19, 1944. Each report is followed by an overlay. Many of the overlays were washed out and have been photoshopped to extract the existing data. The overlay for report 41 is completely washed out and no data was retrieved. This collection is not complete and has gaps. The following links are part of this series: https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5091/rec/1 https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5093/rec/2 https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4867 https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4616 https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4393

The report covers the plans for the operation Anvil-Dragoon, a description of the action, and comments (rations, bivouacs, religious services, post exchanges, rest and training areas, conduct of troops, movies, and TOE's). Other headings include preliminary training, seaborne movement, capture of Marseille and Toulon, free French of the Interior, infantry, artillery, armored, tank destroyers, antiaircraft artillery, air support, SIAM (Signal Information and Monitoring), and the use of liaison squadron.

Letter by Major Benjamin Chidlaw: The securing and supply of a beachhead is one of the most difficult feats of warfare. The invasion of Southern France not only presented the usual problems connected with a landing operation but, in addition, presented the problem of supporting a rapidly advancing front within a relatively short time after the landings had been accomplished. The story of how the XII Air Force Service Command within Southern France alone transported, supplied, and maintained the Twelfth Air Force indicates that with proper planning and coordination an Air Force is capable of maintaining and supplying itself in a rapidly changing situation.

This document contains G-3 reports for the time period of September - October 1944. Reports 73 to 41 cover September 17, 1944 to October 19, 1944. Each report is followed by an overlay. Many of the overlays were washed out and have been photoshopped to extract the existing data. The overlay for report 41 is completely washed out and no data was retrieved. This collection is not complete and has gaps.

Letter by Major Benjamin Chidlaw: The securing and supply of a beachhead is one of the most difficult feats of warfare. The invasion of Southern France not only presented the usual problems connected with a landing operation but, in addition, presented the problem of supporting a rapidly advancing front within a relatively short time after the landings had been accomplished. The story of how the XII Air Force Service Command within Southern France alone transported, supplied, and maintained the Twelfth Air Force indicates that with proper planning and coordination an Air Force is capable of maintaining and supplying itself in a rapidly changing situation.

Originally titled Operation Anvil and then re-designated to Operation Dragoon, this is a collection of reports, annexes, maps and overlays used by the 36th Infantry Division for planning purposes.

During WWII, the United States conducted large-scale combat operations in its fight against Nazi Germany. On August 15th, 1944, the Allies initiated Operation Dragoon in southern France and within a day ad hoc formation known as Task Force (TF) Butler conducted a 300-mile pursuit of fleeing Nazi forces. Within three months, Allied forces once again reacted quickly to defeat the unexpected German Ardennes Offensive with the 4th Armored Division (AD) relieving the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne. Most historical studies of these operations focus on either the tactical or strategic decisions and actions made by the United States and the Allies. This monograph contributes to the analysis of WWII by focusing on the operational level by exploring the actions through the lens of operational art. This study conducts a structured, focused comparison of Operation Dragoon and the relief of Bastogne by asking eight research questions related to operational art. These questions focus on testing three hypotheses concerning the military leadership's understanding of the strategic environment and its efforts to combine and arrange tactical actions by accounting for tempo, operational reach, culmination, and risk. The empirical evidence examined supports this monograph's thesis that 4th AD and TF Butler employed operational art to achieve the stated strategic objectives during the planning and execution of the Relief of Bastogne and Operation Dragoon. The commanders and staffs ensured the plans were flexible, maintained a higher operational tempo in relation to the enemy, extended operational reach, prevented culmination, and mitigated operational risk.

The decision to concentrate combat power in France for a direct approach into Germany was not an obvious choice for Allied strategy in the European Theater of World War II. The British advocated for an indirect approach in the Mediterranean theater where Axis powers proved vulnerable. The Soviets wanted material aid and a second front opened against the Germans in Europe to relieve their desperate war of attrition on the Eastern Front. The United States sought an end to the war as quickly as possible through a direct approach on the European continent. The decisions regarding how best to implement each alliance member's preferences took the Allies over two years to formulate as a collective group, which manifested in an equilibrium strategy achieved through interdependent decision-making. This study uses primary sources and theories of strategy, alliances, and rational choice to explain how the Allies conducted interdependent decision-making to achieve an equilibrium strategy for large scale combat operations in the European Theater of World War II. The monograph consists of two primary sections. The first section defines strategy and social science theories for cooperation and interdependent decision-making using current literature and US doctrine. The second section provides a historical case study of Allied strategy in the European Theater using theory and doctrine defined in the first section to describe how the Allies achieved an equilibrium strategy through interdependent decision-making, ultimately defeating Axis powers in Europe. The case study supports the monograph thesis that strategic planning through interdependent decision-making enables national leaders to make rational choice decisions that mutually support grand strategy and a balance of interests for coalition operations.

Coalition warfare will continue as a critical element of US military interactions, emphasized in both the 2017 National Security Strategy and the US Army’s future operational concept, multi-domain battle. Operation Dragoon provides a valuable case study for how Seventh Army rapidly integrated a disparate Franco-American coalition despite strategic disagreements. Clearing southern France while collapsing German resistance, Dragoon’s main objectives, the ports of Toulon and Marseille, doubled the Allied supply chain in France and provided critical throughput for US divisions. Seventh Army achieved this through effective negotiations bridging operational and strategic considerations, personal relationships and structural agreements, balancing national capabilities with constraints, multi-echelon organizational design, and centralized supply arrangements. Dragoon suggests methods for increasing pre-conflict habitualization, enabling future hasty coalition integration absent a period of forming and normalization provided by traditional alliance structures.

The invasion of Southern France, Operation Dragoon, was characterized by an "on again -off again" attitude at the highest political levels. Prime Minister Churchill had always favored an invasion of the Balkans, to be followed by a sweep up the Danubian Plain into the heart of Germany, even before the capture of Sicily or the invasion of Italy. President Roosevelt, however, in agreement with his military advisors, had always preferred what he considered a more direct line of attack across the Channel, through France, into the heart of Germany. In August of 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting with the President and the Prime Minister in the Quebec (Quadrant) Conference conceived of the operation against Southern France (then designated Operation Anvil), "- in order to create a diversion in connection with Operation Overlord (Neptune) -". At the Cairo-Teheran (Sextant) Conference, in November and December of 1943, the President and the Prime Minister assured Marshal Stalin that the opening of a major second front in Europe would be made before the summer of 1944. Studies indicated a critical shortage of landing craft would prevent a successful invasion before that date. It was decided at that conference that Operation Overlord would be delayed until about 1 June 1944 and that the Southern France operation, originally to be made simultaneously with Overlord, would be postponed until after the Normandy assault so that landing craft could be first used in the Channel, then rushed to the Mediterranean to be employed against Southern France. The situation in Italy became stalemated early in 1944 when the Anzio "end run" to outflank the German positions at Cassino was securely bottled up by the Germans. It then became obvious that the Germans were planning a last ditch defense to keep the Allies from capturing Rome. By mid-February, it appeared that any assault against Southern France was an impossibility and several alternate operations were considered- one against

Integrating partners, both joint and multinational, is essential to victory for the United States Army in today's complex world. How does a commander successfully integrate partners into his operations so that they can together attain their objectives? Current doctrine contends that this is important, but does not offer any guidance on the tools necessary to ensure effective integration. This monograph proposes that the personality of the commander is of the utmost importance when attempting to integrate partners. A commander who strives to achieve shared understanding with his partner, is willing to use his force to help his partner accomplish his mission, and is humble and self-aware can effectively integrate his unit across services or national boundaries. Two contrasting case studies will be used to support this theory. The first, LTG Sandy Patch in Operation Anvil/Dragoon in 1944, will show a humble commander who strove for shared understanding with his Air Force counterpart, and used his forces to help the Air Force achieve its mission while he sought to successfully complete his own. The second case study, LTG Joseph Stilwell in the China-Burma-India in 1944, will demonstrate how his abrasive personality, a misunderstanding of strategic objectives with the Chinese, and lack of resources led to the failed integration in the disastrous First Burma campaign. The conclusion of this monograph argues that the personality of the commander is the most significant part of operational integration. The commander who is willing to listen to, assist, and respect his partner will be far more effective at integration than the commander who cannot do any of these things.

Mission VI Corps (KODAK Force). On D day H hour assaults simultaneously beaches from CAP CAVAMIRE to AGAY employing three divisions abreast, destroys enemy beach defenses, and advances rapidly inland to contact RUGBY Force , ROMEO Force, and ROSIE Force; extends beachhead rapidly to BLUE Line , and after reorganization continues adv to W and NW; secures airfield sites in the ARGENS VALLEY between FREJUS and LE LUC from observed enemy arty fire ; after passage of lines by GARBO Force, continues adv within zone; protects Army R during assault and subsequent adv; captures LE MUY on D day; releases RUGBY Force , ROMEO Force, ROSIE Force, and CC SUDRE to Army control on Army order.