Search

Soviet Marxism is often characterized by the term ontologism. The latter could be defined as a totalizing assertion about material being as inherently dialectical, often coupled with an understanding of thought as mere reflection. This fundamental assertion is said to remain unchallenged among dogmatic party philosophers and critical Marxists alike. Far from an innocent misconception, Soviet ontologism is associated with some of the harshest historical events like the Lysenko affair, where the imposition of the dialectical optic onto the natural sciences resulted in an ideological blockade of research. Various sources of this peculiarity have been identified in Soviet Marxism, from the endorsement of dialectics of nature to the rejection of Cartesian metaphysics. However, a political account of Soviet ontologism is yet to be written. This article will address the question of ontologism as it has been theorized in relation to the philosophy of Evald Ilyenkov. Tracing the history of Russian ontologism from the nineteenth century, we will recover its nationalist dimension. Then, drawing on the philosophical controversies between Lenin and Bogdanov, which in turn will be linked to Ilyenkov's intervention, we will examine the various strands of ontological thinking in Soviet Marxism and identify Ilyenkov's position. Finally, we will ask what insights can the ontological thinking of Soviet Marxism provide in the context of contemporary philosophical turns towards ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The inherent contradictions of the modern world order prompt researchers to seek interpretations for some of their manifestations beyond traditional discourses. The article proposes to examine the concept of international integration through the lens of the conformity discourse, since it is possible to describe such a complex process of today’s integration of sovereign states only within the interdisciplinary approach. The theory of axiological ontologism plays a crucial role in unfolding the conformity discourse within the realm of the sociology of international relations. Guided by this theory, researchers have the opportunity to transpose the concept of conformity from social psychology into the subject area of the sociology of international relations. This transposition leads to a shift in the semantics of the concept: conformity might be interpreted as the inclination of a nation state to reshape its values and change a behavioral strategy on the world stage under the pressure of the “international community”. However, it is essential to take into account that different theories of international relations make it possible to appeal to various conformity discourses. According to the author, the normative conformity aligns more with neorealism, since this theory considers actors of world politics to be engaged in integration processes based on the political environment, without being prone to sacrificing their interests for the sake of symbolic “unity”. The discourse of informational conformity is advisable to be developed from the standpoint of neoliberalism, which regards actors of world politics as assimilating values of the “international community” and accepting them through repetitive integrational practices.

The article explores the intricate relationship between the concepts of "dao" and "One" in Daoist philosophy, emphasizing the significance of the One in various aspects of early Daoism. Topics include the role of the One as the central concept, its ontological, generative, and political implications, and the varying perspectives on whether the One or dao takes precedence in Daoist thought.

Descartes appears to hold that everything we believe is the product of a voluntary choice. Scholars have been reluctant to take this particularly radical version of doxastic voluntarism as Descartes' considered position. I argue that once Descartes' compatibilist conception of free will as well as his position on the 'freedom of indifference' are taken into account, the primary motivations for the rejection of the aforementioned radical version of doxastic voluntarism lose their force. Consequently, we may take Descartes at his word when he maintains that everything we believe, we believe freely – even if we cannot believe anything we wish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In line with how ethics has developed for the last three centuries, public health ethics has been widely dominated by a deontological as well as a utilitarian approach. The latter is a version of consequentialism, which states that maximizing utility is the primary goal of the majority of individuals or group action, while, on the other hand, virtue ethics, or at least the appeal to virtues, has been largely marginalized. The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, we aim to highlight the political and ethical nature of public health interventions, often interpreted and presented as mere scientific enterprises. Secondly, we try to highlight the need to integrate or at least recognize the value of appeal to virtues in public health measures. The analysis will reference the Italian COVID-19 vaccination program as a case study. Initially, we will explore the political and ethical nature of any public health measure, using the implementation of the COVID-19 vaccination program in Italy as an example. Subsequently, we will illustrate the deontological approach to ethics, the utilitarian one, and the virtues one, focusing on the dynamic of the agent's perspective. Lastly, we will briefly analyze both the Italian COVID-19 vaccination program and the communication campaign that promoted it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mastering of the "sociology" major by domestic students takes place in accordance with the curricula approved by the management of each university, taking into account the normative documents of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. Therefore, modern applicants (students) are initially inclined to functionalism and systemic theory in sociology, offering to study the works of the classics of sociology of the end of the 19th century - the beginning of the 20th century. However, the applicants will later learn about theoretical polyparadigmism in modern sociology and the possibility to choose not only classical concepts for the implementation of their scientific developments. This possibility was a consequence of the fact that changes were taking place in the paradigm of system theory. This influenced the evolution of sociological theorizing. Therefore, the above now affects the choice of applicants, post-graduate students and doctoral students of the basic concept for their sociological explorations, in order to avoid accusations of ignorance of modern sociological theory. The situation, as a rule, has two contradictory sides. So, on the one hand, there are classical instructions or settings for scientists to carry out their cognitive procedures (for example, diagnosis, classification, stratification, typology, or systematization in general). On the other hand, alternative post-classical foundations have already been proposed, which are rather only outlined in most textbooks and textbooks on sociology, and therefore deserve in-depth study in order to reveal their diverse potential (heuristic, diagnostic, methodological, etc.). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews Sergey Bulgakov’s critical views of the basic concepts of German idealism. The particular nature of the Russian philosopher’s reconstruction is brought to light, and the author shows that its distinguishing feature is the rejection of gnosiological processes as an existential guide in favour of their replacement with an ontological setting. The author emphasizes that although such demands were typical of the era of ideological transition “from Marxism to idealism”, they were, nevertheless, not the only ideological strategy adopted by Russian philosophical movements of that time. Systems of Russian thought — recognizable as constructions of Russian idealists who did not consider it necessary to abandon the classical philosophical tradition in order to renew Christian philosophy — are critical of Bulgakov’s ontologism. Such constructions include, for example, the neo- Kantianism of Fyodor Stepun and the neo-Hegelianism of Ivan Ilyin, both of whom were contemporaries of Bulgakov. At the same time, mystic-rationalist Vladimir Solovyov was himself a philosophical universalist — at home with both “metaphysical ontology” and idealistic speculation. Solovyov might be called the common ground of these two trends, which when taken together can yield some productive polemic. The three-hypostatic character of being, which is Bulgakov’s fundamental theologoumenon in both his “sophiology” and his “philosophy of the name”, is seen in this article as the ontological axiom of Bulgakov’s philosophy during his Crimean period. By providing an original context for the consideration of western European philosophical thought, this “perspective from above” sheds new light on the subject, allowing us to perceive unexpected and productive twists and turns in western European thought. This perspective is of interest not only in Russia, but also in the West. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that eminent French thought historian Pierre Hadot (1922–2010) appeals to Bulgakov’s ideas in his own work. At the same time, this article stresses that in opposition to the imperative Bulgakov himself sets out, such a view cannot be unconditionally affirmed as Christian-dogma or as foundational for determining where, or where not, heresy is present. Both ontologism and antinomianism, which Fr. Sergius affirms, bring with them internal philosophical and theological difficulties. First and foremost, they often quite unexpectedly — even for the philosopher himself — lead into the territory of mythological archaism, distancing Bulgakov’s thought not only from rationalism, but also from Orthodox Christian contemplations which have been tried and tested by Holy Tradition. At the same time, Bulgakov’s systematic structures — put to the task of developing such anti-systematic principles — remain a motivation for and the foundation of much active intellectual work both on the reception of Bulgakov’s thought, and on progress in the development of a particularly Russian Christian form of thought.

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this article is to look at civil rights from different moral points of view. Diverse approaches in moral philosophy lead to alternative moral points of view. For the purposes of this article, five approaches have been selected. We try to see what would happen to civil rights if one takes for granted this or that approach. Section (1) deals with preliminary issues. In section (2) the nature of law and its relation to morality will be briefly discussed. Section (3/1) deals with civil rights from the virtue ethics point of view. In section (3/2) civil rights will be looked at from the deontological point of view whilst section (3/3) will explore civil rights from the utilitarian point of view; and finally, section (3/4) will discuss civil rights from the ʿAdliyyah (Muʿtazila & Imamiya) and Ashʿari points of view. این مقاله حقوق شهروندی را از منظر اخلاق بررسی می‌کند. در اخلاق هنجاری رویکردهای گوناگونی وجود دارد که در هر یک از آنها منظر اخلاقی به شکل خاصی صورت‌بندی می‌شود. از میان این رویکردها ابتدا پنج رویکرد متفاوت را به اجمال شرح می‌دهیم و سپس می‌کوشیم به این پرسش پاسخ دهیم که «از منظر هر یک از این رویکردها حقوق شهروندی چه منزلت و وضعیتی پیدا می‌کند؟». مقاله سه بخش دارد. پس از طرح مباحث مقدماتی در بخش (1)، در بخش (2) سرشت قانون در فلسفۀ حقوق را به اجمال بررسی می‌کنیم. بخش (1/3) به بررسی حقوق شهروندی از منظر اخلاق فضیلت‌مدار اختصاص دارد. در بخش (2/3) حقوق شهروندی از منظر اخلاق وظیفه‌گرا مورد بررسی قرار خواهد گرفت. بخش (3/3) حقوق شهروندی را از منظر اخلاق فایده‌گرا شرح می‌دهد. و سرانجام، بخش (4/3) به بررسی حقوق شهروندی از منظر اخلاق عدلیه (معتزله و امامیه) و اخلاق اشعری می‌پردازد.

In line with how ethics has developed for the last three centuries, public health ethics has been widely dominated by a deontological as well as a utilitarian approach. The latter is a version of consequentialism, which states that maximizing utility is the primary goal of the majority of individuals or group action, while, on the other hand, virtue ethics, or at least the appeal to virtues, has been largely marginalized. The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, we aim to highlight the political and ethical nature of public health interventions, often interpreted and presented as mere scientific enterprises. Secondly, we try to highlight the need to integrate or at least recognize the value of appeal to virtues in public health measures. The analysis will reference the Italian COVID-19 vaccination program as a case study. Initially, we will explore the political and ethical nature of any public health measure, using the implementation of the COVID-19 vaccination program in Italy as an example. Subsequently, we will illustrate the deontological approach to ethics, the utilitarian one, and the virtues one, focusing on the dynamic of the agent’s perspective. Lastly, we will briefly analyze both the Italian COVID-19 vaccination program and the communication campaign that promoted it.

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them.

Considered one of the leading proponents of natural theology in the 20th century, E. L. Mascall (1905–1993) taught philosophy and theology at King’s College London for most of his career. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he insisted that classical theism, embodied in the writings of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, could be successfully revived for a modern audience. Known for his vigorous defense of neo-Thomism, Mascall offered an unusual interpretation of The Five Ways. While modern scholastics typically read the proofs as syllogistic exercises, Mascall maintained that God’s existence could not be deduced from premises, but must be grasped by means of a unique type of “metaphysical intuition” which he called “contuition.” In my paper, I will re-examine his position, explore his reasons for adopting it, and finally raise several questions concerning its significance for the history of neo-Thomism.

This paper discusses Hilan Bensusan's new book, Indexicalism: Realism and the Metaphysics of Paradox, from two different yet interrelated angles. On the one hand, it examines its problematic admixture of subtractive and chiastic logics for approaching the Otherwise, and questions its unresolvedness thereof. On the other hand, it analyses its anti-ontologism and criticises its subsequent mistrust of the conceptual beyond the perceptual. An in-depth reconsideration of philosophy's original distinctiveness and a polyvalent conversation with extramodern ontologies guide the discussion, through which we nonetheless stress the relevance of Bensusan's proposal in a philosophical arena dominated by the power negative and agree with him on the importance, if not on the absoluteness, of indexicality for the renewal of contemporary thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show that utilitarianism remains the essential way to justify social policies, despite the criticisms received from deontological approaches. Two questions are of interest: one of them concerns the utilitarian roots of social reforms which have led to the improvement of the situation of disadvantaged people; the other concerns the type of answers that can be given in order to maintain the utilitarian position. If we analyse the distinction between utilitarianism of action and utilitarianism of rules, we can understand that there is a kind of cunning of utilitarian reason which makes it possible to achieve maximization of general utility without directly seeking this goal. It would then be possible to extend this view and consider in the same way the unavoidable question of universal rights and obligations (that are concepts from the opposite approach). Thus, we can admit that some non-utilitarian principles of moral action can be inserted into the general logic of the production of happiness, in order to obtain mixed criteria of decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russian philosophy underwent many phases: Westernism, Slavophilism, nihilism, pre-revolutionary religious philosophy, and dialectical materialism or Soviet philosophy. At first sight, each one of these phases seems antithetical to the preceding one. Yet, they all appear to have in common a certain negative attitude towards the subjectivism of Kantianism and German Idealism. In contrast to the latter, Russian philosophy typically displays a tendency towards ontologism, which is generally defined as the view that there is such a thing as being in itself, i.e., being independent of cognition, and that this being is to some extent knowable. We discern, in these otherwise diametrically opposed movements, an underlying ontologism that constitutes a common thread running in a straight line through the history of Russian philosophy. In this article, I provide an overview of Russian ontologism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the ontological foundations of the Soviet interpretation of dialectical materialism (Diamat) as exemplified by one of its "founding fathers," Abram Deborin, in his works of the late 1920s. It has been claimed that the "ontologizing" tendency in Soviet philosophy is due to the influence of Friedrich Engels and his ideas pertaining to the dialectics of nature. However, a more plausible interpretation is that the ontologism of Soviet philosophy is connected with the rejection of the Kantian Copernican turn in philosophy and the idea of the primacy of gnoseology it implies. In this article, I argue in favor of the latter thesis. Ontologism, i.e., the tendency to give priority in philosophy to questions concerning Being, and anti-Kantianism are but two sides of the same coin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of this article is the convergence of the fundamental theoretical intuitions of two independent currents of Christian philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Italian Catholic spiritualism and the internally diversified current of the Russian religious philosophical Renaissance proved to be convergent in their ontological realism based on the metaphysics of cognition. This consonance undermines the stereotype about the total difference between the Russian Orthodox and the Western Catholic mentality. The article tries to show that these two denominations both drew inspiration from the Patristic heritage and that, contrary to all appearances, Russian religious philosophy owes much to the Augustinian tradition. The paper reminds the discovery of this convergence made by Vladimir Ern, and discusses certain elements of the teachings of Vladimir Solovyev and Evgenii Troubetzkoy in comparison with the basic philosophical intuitions of the Italian philosopher Antonio Rosmini. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shpet's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology has caused puzzlement because of the lack of clarity with which he treats the transcendental turn in Appearance and Sense (1914). I suggest that we find a more comprehensive discussion on the topic in Shpet's 1917 article, "Wisdom or Reason?" There, Shpet reacts to Husserl's treatment of a cluster of problems related to the latter's transition to transcendental idealism. I read "Wisdom or Reason?" not only in relation to Husserl's Logos article of 1911, but also to his 1907 lecture series "The Idea of Phenomenology." My analysis of Shpet's phenomenology reveals that he followed through with the transcendental turn, although his philosophy developed in a direction different from Husserl's transcendental idealism. Shpet postulates a collective consciousness, in which meaning-constitution takes place, and discovers the "word" as the foundation for any cognition. Shpet's phenomenology remains ontological, as he considers language or culture as the "form of being" in which human beings live. In "Wisdom or Reason?," Shpet argues that we can have direct knowledge of this meaningful reality: being is not "represented" but "presented" in a word. A certain compatibility thus exists between Shpet's phenomenology of cultural reality and Husserl's search for the absolute validity of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Semyon Frank (1877–1950) opposed the Neo-Kantian School and admitted the real existence of the objects of cognition. He treated ontologism as essential to the entire movement of Russian religious philosophy. For Frank, one can only know about something thanks to the absolute, which exists prior to the knowing subject. Ontologism, affirming the priority of being over cognition, has a great significance not only for metaphysics and epistemology, but also for the philosophy of religion. In particular, Frank taught that the most privileged mode of cognition of God is intuition, an immediate experience of God or faith (the so-called living knowledge). Intuition is at the heart of the ontological proof, which can be found in St. Anselm, Descartes, and Frank himself. Frank dedicated a number of articles to this topic: "K istorii ontologicheskogo dokazatel'stva" ("On the History of the Ontological Proof," 1915), "Ontologicheskoe dokazatel'stvo bytiya Boga" ("Ontological Proof of the Existence of God," 1930), as well as texts recently discovered at the Bakhmeteff Archive, including "Dokazatel'stvo bytiya Boga" ("Proof of the Existence of God"). In this way, Russian ontologism leads to a new interpretation of the traditional ontological proof, one which acknowledges the existence of God, not on the basis of arguments resting on His definition, but on the basis of the intuitive recognition of His being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of ANAFORA is the property of Anafora and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the term womanly nihilism and radical feminism. Topics discussed include pursuit of a radical feminism that rejects ontologies of ownership and the class politics that sustains them; the benchmark of success and the slogan for neoliberal feminism; and iteration of a formula that has come to galvanize mainstream attitudes toward feminism.

This article provides a four-fold typology of comparative sports policy studies: Type 1, Seeking Similarities, is a nomothetic approach seeking law-like gener­alization; Type 2 is Describing Difference, an ideographic approach seeking to capture the specificity of policy systems; Type 3, Theorizing the Transnational, goes beyond the nation-state as the unit of analysis to fuse global and local levels of explanation; and Type 4, Defining Discourse, seeks to analyze ways in which policy discourse defines the reality of the policy problems it seeks to address. The authors underline the ontological and epistemological assumptions of such approaches that are often only implicit, and they employ selected examples to illustrate the contribution to knowledge of the different approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Ethical approach is one of the paramount aspects of life. The position of this approach in medical occupations has always been noticed. This study was carried out to analyze the types of ethical approaches in midwives and their relationship with their demographic features. Materials and Methods: The current descriptive-correlation and cross-sectional study was conducted from October to December 2014 using quota random sampling technique. The participants consisted of 189 midwives employed in Isfahan, Iran. The data collection tool was a researcher-made questionnaire. The midwives' attitudes were examined in the four fields of virtue ethics, deontologism, utilitarianism, and religious ethics. Data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics in SPSS software (p < 0.050). Results: The highest score belonged to religious ethics with the mean value of 64.36 out of 100. A positive significant relationship was found between deontologism and education level (F = 8.74; p = 0.004), and total ethical approach and workplace (F = 2.60; p = 0.053). There was a reverse significant relationship between age and work experience and virtue ethics (r = −0.15; p = 0.035 and r = −0.20; p = 0.005, respectively). Conclusions: The existing high percentage of religious ethics shows the religious tendency of the participants. The determination of ethical approach among midwives as one of the important medical groups and creation and improvement of the most appropriate attitude among them based on the present regulations and requirements in society are principles that we should attempt to achieve.

Copyright of Stylos is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to epistemic deontologism, attributions of epistemic justification are deontic claims about what we ought to believe. One of the most prominent objections to this conception, due mainly to William P. Alston, is that the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' (OIC) rules out deontologism because our beliefs are not under our voluntary control. In this paper, I offer a partial defense of Alston's critique of deontologism. While Alston is right that OIC rules out epistemic deontologism, appealing to doxastic involuntarism is not necessary for generating that tension. Deontologists would still have a problem with OIC if doxastic voluntarism turned out to be true or if deontologism did not require voluntarism. This is because, in short, epistemic justification does not imply 'can'. If, as deontologists maintain, epistemic justification implies 'oughts', then epistemic justification must also imply 'can' given OIC. But since epistemic justification does not imply 'can', OIC dictates that we reject deontologism. I end by exploring the possible consequences of this incompatibility between OIC and deontologism. My conclusion is that at least one of the following claims must be true. Either (1) 'ought' does not imply 'can', (2) attributions of epistemic justification are not deontic claims, or (3) epistemic claims lack necessary or categorical normative authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories that posit metaphysical structure are able to do much work in philosophy. Some, however, find the notion of 'metaphysical structure' unintelligible. In this paper, I argue that their charge of unintelligibility fails. There is nothing distinctively problematic about the notion. At best, their charge of unintelligibility is a mere reiteration of previous complaints made toward similar notions. In developing their charge, I clarify several important concepts, including primitiveness, intelligibility, and the Armstrong-inspired "ontologism" view of the world. I argue that, ultimately, their charge is best understood as an objection whose central premise is that the notion of 'structure' runs contrary to an important presupposition of contemporary metaphysics. But that central premise is, on closer inspection, implausible. I respond to the objection by identifying three popular metaphysical theories that violate the alleged presupposition but are still generally regarded as intelligible. The objection thus fails to show that a theory that posits metaphysical structure is unintelligible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of História da Historiografia is the property of Sociedade Brasileira de Teoria e Historia da Historiografia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This essay asserts that the intellectual and moral attitude that legitimates, justifies and ennobles violence derives from the fact that the evolution of modern philosophical history has been dominated by the ‘rationalist’ paradigm (versus the ‘ontological’ one). This process is clarified by reference to four European scholars, whose analysis is different but in many respects analogue: Huizinga, Del Noce, Eisenstadt, and Spaemann. The triumph of violence and injustice (in the form of coercion as a-normativity) in late modern societies demonstrates the failure of this paradigm; and its failure perhaps provides an opportunity for the realist/ontological paradigm to strengthen its position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay asserts that the intellectual and moral attitude that legitimates, justifies and ennobles violence derives from the fact that the evolution of modern philosophical history has been dominated by the ‘rationalist’ paradigm (versus the ‘ontological’ one). This process is clarified by reference to four European scholars, whose analysis is different but in many respects analogue: Huizinga, Del Noce, Eisenstadt, and Spaemann. The triumph of violence and injustice (in the form of coercion as a-normativity) in late modern societies demonstrates the failure of this paradigm; and its failure perhaps provides an opportunity for the realist/ontological paradigm to strengthen its position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Discusiones Filosóficas is the property of Universidad de Caldas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (0034-8244) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article presents the author's views on the ontological turn in Mesoamericanist ethnology. Topics discussed include relation between ethnography and ontology, social conditions in emerging countries, national problems faced by ethnologists, poststructuralism, criticism on ontologism and multinaturalism.

Background: Ethical approach is one of the paramount aspects of life. The position of this approach in medical occupations has always been noticed. This study was carried out to analyze the types of ethical approaches in midwives and their relationship with their demographic features. Materials and Methods: The current descriptive-correlation and cross-sectional study was conducted from October to December 2014 using quota random sampling technique. The participants consisted of 189 midwives employed in Isfahan, Iran. The data collection tool was a researcher-made questionnaire. The midwives' attitudes were examined in the four fields of virtue ethics, deontologism, utilitarianism, and religious ethics. Data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics in SPSS software (p < 0.050). Results: The highest score belonged to religious ethics with the mean value of 64.36 out of 100. A positive significant relationship was found between deontologism and education level (F = 8.74; p = 0.004), and total ethical approach and workplace (F = 2.60; p = 0.053). There was a reverse significant relationship between age and work experience and virtue ethics (r = -0.15; p = 0.035 and r = -0.20; p = 0.005, respectively). Conclusions: The existing high percentage of religious ethics shows the religious tendency of the participants. The determination of ethical approach among midwives as one of the important medical groups and creation and improvement of the most appropriate attitude among them based on the present regulations and requirements in society are principles that we should attempt to achieve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while it’s true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative approach to truthmaker theory that downplays the role of explanation, and show how it releases the enterprise from a variety of problematic commitments that have troubled truthmaker theorists. The “ontology-first” approach to truthmaking that I advocate not only restores the initial impulse behind truthmaking, but also has a number of theoretical advantages. Most prominently, it dodges the infamous problem of negative existentials, and lessens truthmaker theory’s dependence on contentious intuitive judgments about both explanation and truthmaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía is the property of Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article seeks to investigate to what extent the resulting empirical data from various experiments in Moral Psychology (some behavioral, others based on evidence from neuroimaging and in patients with brain lesions associated with moral competence areas) , can contribute to a better understanding of the psychological processes (cognitive and emotional) underlying to our moral practical judgments, helping us to understand the mechanisms that influence our assessment of moral dilemmas in general and bioethics in particular. Various experiments are discussed (and the theoretical models that are supported) that reveal aspects such as the role of disgust or repugnance in the production of moral judgments, the competitive or cooperative role of emotions and cognitions in impersonal and personal moral dilemmas -and between the above mentioned, easy and difficult-, the neurophysiological bases of deontologist and consequentialist, the value attributed to the intent and the results of action, etc. The relevance of these experiments are analyzed to understand the evaluative and deliberative processes concerning various bioethical dilemmas, for which appeals to examples of conflict situations involved and our emotional resources (that activate immediate assessment ) and our higher cortical areas interact (cognitive processes responsible for slower deliberative and reflexive).

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For decades, philosophers have displayed an interest in what it is to have an epistemically justified belief. Recently, we also find among philosophers a renewed interest in the so-called ethics of belief: what is it to believe (epistemically) responsibly and when is one's belief blameworthy? This paper explores how epistemically justified belief and responsible belief are related to each other. On the so-called 'deontological conception of epistemic justification', they are identical: to believe epistemically responsibly is to believe epistemically justifiedly. I argue that William Alston's criticism of a deontological conception of epistemic justification in terms of our influence on our beliefs is unconvincing. Moreover, such a conception meets three criteria that one might put forward in order for an account of epistemic justification to be plausible: it shows a concern with the Jamesian goal of having true rather than false beliefs, it is relevantly similar to accounts of justification in non-doxastic realms, such as action, and there is good reason to think that, if spelled out in sufficient detail, it may well provide a necessary condition for knowledge. I conclude that the deontological conception of epistemic justification is stronger than is often thought: it is worth exploring whether epistemically justified belief is epistemically responsible belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text has as the objective of formulating an epistemological critique of political science, questioning the ontology underlying its conceptual framework. These conceptual settings bear some epistemological obstacles that are mostly evident in political regimes' typologies. With the aim to formulate a correction, I resort to the theory of power evolution based on Niklas Luhmann's political sociology. In the epistemological and historical analysis of political science I employ a methodology of the Foucaultian archeology of knowledge and the Cambridge School of intellectual history, as well as some elements of formal logics underlying systems theory; while in its purposive part the article bears upon a socio-systemic vision of socio-cultural evolution. It is concluded that this ontological burden can be left behind by shifting to a complexity paradigm which develops a new and non-ontological language. This could be achieved by reframing crucial problems, with relation to power as a means to communicate and the functional differentiation of a political system. A salient contribution of the text is the category of cyclical configurations of power, which intends to describe with higher fidelity the set of problems that has been usually object of political regimes theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers five desiderata on a realist normative theory of politics: that it should avoid moralism, deontologism, transcendentalism, utopianism, and vanguardism. These desiderata argue for a theory that begins from values rooted in a people’s experience; that avoids prescribing a collective deontological constraint; that makes the comparison of imperfect regimes possible; that takes feasibility and sustainability into account; and that makes room for the claims of democracy. The paper argues, in the course of exploring the desiderata, that a neo-republican philosophy of government does pretty well in satisfying them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The twentieth century Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky was one of the earliest and most important proponents-but also critics-of Bergson's philosophy in Russia at a time when many Russian philosophers were preoccupied with the same complex of philosophical questions and answers that Bergson was addressing. Thus, if only from the standpoint of intellectual history, Lossky is central to the study of the reception of Bergson in Russia. In this article, I present the principal historical links, points of agreement between Bergson and Lossky, such as their respective anti-Kantianism, intuitivism, ontological realism, vitalism, organicism, Neo-Platonism, as well as their points of disagreement, including some of Lossky's key criticisms of Bergson, with special emphasis on the issues of intuition, ideal being, substance and change, time, and sensible qualities. This paper is meant as an introduction to the translations of Lossky's 'Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy' (The Defects of Bergson's Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics) (1913) and his review of Bergson's, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), which are published in the present issue of Studies in East European Thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What if—in light of the escalating pace of academic production—scholars adopted a Slow Ontology? Because this question moves beyond slowing the pace or volume of productivity to address underlying issues of ontology, it asks not how we can find a slower way of doing scholarship, but how we can find a slower way of scholarly being. A philosophy of Slowness has sparked movements around the globe regarding Slow Food and Slow Cities; these and similar movements disrupt daily practices that prioritize speed, efficiency, and output at the expense of quality. In response, a Slow Ontology approaches writing as a site of creative intervention. This article offers methodological possibilities for writing a Slow Ontology in qualitative inquiry: each attends to how we might write the materiality of our local environments. In writing a Slow Ontology, researchers might create writing that is not unproductive, but is differently productive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term of ethics of belief is appeared for the first time in Clifford's well-known essay by the same title in 1876.According to Clifford's saying that became known afterwards as Clifford's Credo or Principle "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence". This debate from the time of its presentation by Clifford has been the subject of different controversies. The main problem behind these controversies was that whether human beliefs are principally under the will of human beings to be evaluated morally or they are, like many of mental states, involuntary and passive and so excused of any moral evaluation. Some say that our beliefs are involuntary and are not under our control. In contrast, some believe in the impact of the will on our beliefs or the doxastic voluntarism. Depending on the amount of influence of the will on our beliefs, doxastic voluntarism is divided into two general kinds: direct voluntarism and indirect voluntarism. The doxastic voluntarism (direct/indirect), on the other hand, can divide into descriptive voluntarism and normative voluntarism. In normative voluntarism, we can say about a kind of epistemic deontologism in our beliefs and it is this epistemic deontologism that entails the ethics of belief. In effect, only when we can say about the ethics of belief that we believe in the epistemic deontologism in our beliefs. Martyr Motahhari believes that the reasoning (ta‘aqqul) and the thinking (tafakkur) as mental actions are in direct control of our will. For him, there is a difference between opinion (‘aqida) and thinking (tafakkur).In his view, thinking is the opinion based on a rational process which can bring about the knowledge. Taking in consideration the process of forming knowledge from him, shows that he believes in a kind of epistemic deontologism. Thus he gives some advices about the ways of acquiring the knowledge that we can place them under the title ethics of belief such as avoidance of intellectual stagnation, distinguishing between belief and the owner of belief and like that.