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AbstractThis study aims to explain the pattern of state sponsorship of civil wars in Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen. Recent studies have improved our scholarly understanding of decisions regarding intervention and sponsorship. Yet, our understanding of state sponsorship decision in conflict that precedes an escalation remains limited. Herein, I develop a multicausal framework to analyze state sponsorship decisions, employing fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to account for state support. The results suggest novel insights into how strategic interests drive states to influence civil war dynamics for desired benefits. Contrary to conventional wisdom, bilateral rivalry alone does not guarantee a sponsorship decision. States tend to support when they perceive opportunities that are aligned with their economic interests or when countering transnational threats from violent non-state actors who are backed by another state. These findings elucidate how initial state sponsorship decisions might relate to conflict escalation over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the analysis of current legislation, available scientific, journalistic and methodological sources, the article clarifies the content of the system of subjects of administrative and legal support of information security in Ukraine. It is proposed that the system of subjects of administrative and legal support of information security should be understood as a set of legislative, executive and judicial authorities, state, public and other organizations and associations, and citizens who may participate in administrative and legal support of information security in accordance with the legislation regulating relations in the field of information security. It is established that the system of subjects of administrative and legal support of information security includes a wide range of structures of both state and non-state affiliation. The first group (state entities) is represented by the State represented by the President of Ukraine, legislative, executive and judicial bodies, which, having different competencies in the field of administrative and legal support of information security, perform key tasks and functions in it. The second group (non-state actors) can be divided into two subgroups. The first one includes society represented by legal entities, namely, commercial companies and non-governmental organizations (educational institutions, research institutes, research and analytical centers, etc.) The second group includes individuals (citizens) who may be directly involved in ensuring information security, represented by specialists, experts, information security consultants, etc. It is proposed to: include all non-state actors in the mechanism for implementing the goals and objectives of the Information Security Strategy; make the widest possible use of the capabilities of non-state actors in this area, and therefore intensify the involvement of citizens, public associations, organizations, etc. in solving the problem of information security; create an Interagency Commission on Information Security within the structure of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The education landscape in low-income countries (LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs) is characterised by improving levels of school enrolments, but low levels of learning and systems performance, and critical shortfalls in education financing. In asking the question "what is the role of non-state actors in basic education in LICs and MICs?," this article describes six features of the non-state sector landscape: (i) the non-state sector provides a large and growing share of basic education provision in LICs and MICs, (ii) this sector caters to the poor, but not to the extreme poor (nor probably should it without public subsidy), (iii) evidence on the performance of the non-state sector is mixed, (iv) Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in education are the norm rather than the exception, though regulation and PPPs are generally not done well by Governments, (v) the non-state sector has been uniquely hurt by COVID-19, but also proved to be resilient, and (vi) there are successful advocacy campaigns against the non-state sector and PPPs. Against this backdrop, we propose 10 policy measures for Governments, national actors and the international community, with a view to maximising the contribution of non-state actors to driving system-wide goals of equity, learning, and social cohesion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of ideologically driven inquiry and advocacy, debates about school choice and public-private-partnerships in education have produced more "light than heat." Although scholars have recently emphasized the need for a greater focus on the particulars of policy design, limitations of existing frameworks have inhibited rigorous policy research capable of enhancing understanding of the effects of different policy designs, particularly when considering cross-national and comparative experiences. This article critically analyzes a set of prominent frameworks from the field before proposing a new Framework for Comparative Educational Pluralism that could inform a more design-sensitive and evidence-rooted approach to policy analysis and design pertaining to the role of non-state actors in education systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pundits, advocates, and scholars have increasingly focused on the strategies of transnational repression employed by autocratic states to deter opposition and control the voices of emigrants abroad. Typically, transnational repression is understood as various forms of state-directed tactics executed by institutional actors who are deployed, trained, and organized by the state. Yet, the tactic of inciting hatred and division among emigrants to undermine dissidents—part of a nationalist strategy that mobilizes non-state actors for repression—has not been thoroughly explored. This article reveals a unique form of diaspora actorhood: the repressive nationalist diasporas, which consist of culturally driven migrants who support their authoritarian homelands and exert significant influence in various aspects of transnational migrants' civic life, including student groups, ethnic associations, and grassroots organizations. Through these networks, diaspora migrants provide autocrats with the means to extend their repressive reach internationally. This paper examines the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a case study, demonstrating how the state leverages nationalist sentiments to alienate dissidents and fuel enmity among its loyalists overseas. The consequences are extensive, involving surveillance, harassment, and assaults on dissidents such as Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Taiwanese, and mainland Chinese—aiming to silence those who criticize the PRC regime. Ethnographic research, interviews, and publicly available data are used to reveal, describe, and analyze the role and global reach of the repressive nationalist diaspora in the transnational repression mechanism as part of modern autocratic statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Access to land and to adequate housing—a constitutionally granted right in Brazil—is currently under attack by non-state armed actors, the so-called militias, in Rio de Janeiro. In their attempts to widen territorial control, "militias" weaponize urban development. To understand such form of militarization, I argue that we need to add a geographical perspective to literatures on criminal governance: Terrain and its political materiality is the basis and not only the outcome of spatial claims to power. To sustain this contribution, I turn to local scales and add insights from ethnographic studies on how paramilitary groups affect the lives of residents. I trace the paramilitary influence along their terrain-shaping and urban development activities. The empirical basis of my argument is drawn from the northern periphery of Rio de Janeiro, looking at how "militias"—emerging as armed developers out of a past as Death Squads—expand their influence by investing in urban development. In this paper, "militia" is conceived as a floating signifier. As such, the meaning of militia is contested, as it encompasses a wide range of practices including civil construction, laying infrastructure, and landscaping. This way, the term "militia" becomes a cornerstone of a militarized urban development discourse and practice. "Militia," as the encompassing center of a narrative cluster, bolsters bellicose forms of governing urban expansion, thereby further militarizing the everyday life of a large part of the marginalized urban society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The renewed global efforts to contain climate change have meant a gateway for some Latin American countries to declare new military actions. The "war on deforestation," announced in 2021 by Iván Duque, the former president of Colombia, is a paradigmatic example. Through Operation Artemis (Operación Artemisa), the Colombian armed forces were assigned to protect the forests against threats from armed non-state actors (ANSAs) predominantly located in the country's Amazon rainforests. We argue that this war was a rhetorical and political model of the Duque government that sought, based on the re-elaboration of the counterinsurgent categories shared with the United States for half a century, to implement in the Amazon the first state military strategy to reach global agreements against climate change. Why does a state wage war in the name of protecting forests? We argue that in this novel rhetorical, military, and criminal framework, the war on deforestation encouraged the renewal of the war on drugs and the transformation of the internal enemy. Drawing on analyses of presidential policies passed since 1970 and, more recently, green crime law, this article showcases a new chapter on the state's goal of achieving territorial control through green militarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review examines Votes, Drugs, and Violence, Authoritarian Police in Democracy, Resisting Extortion, as well as Democracy and Security in Latin America to outline the latest scholarly developments on how the region has dealt with the challenges posed by violent, militarized state and non-state actors. Leveraging distinct cases and methods, these four recently published books discuss the political rationale behind the military and institutional responses that have shaped public security in Latin America over the last three decades. Beyond unpacking their contributions, common themes, tensions, and shortcomings, we argue that by focusing on the political dynamics behind state interventions, these volumes highlight the persistence of a democratic paradox : rather than curtailing militarism and violence, or facilitating their containment via reforms, electoral dynamics and partisan incentives—part and parcel of democratic politics—have enabled the endurance of state and non-state militarization and violence. Relatedly, as Eduardo Moncada's new title underscores, ordinary Latin American citizens have had to adopt civilian militarization as a bottom-up resistance strategy to navigate the uncertainty this worrying paradox presents. By examining work by scholars including Guillermo Trejo, Sandra Ley, Brian Fonseca, and Yanilda María González this review helps to delineate future research as well as policy interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Hu Jintao era, policy intellectuals participated in public debates, openly criticizing existing government policies. During the Xi Jinping era, despite regime efforts to tame intellectuals, some critical voices have retained influence over policymaking processes. What adaptation strategies have they utilized to circumvent the regime's control over public speech? This article points to two strategies. First, policy intellectuals formed shifting collaborations with both state and nonstate actors. Second, they utilized collaborations with state actors to enter consultative forums. The article finds that policy intellectuals not only formed Beijing-based alliances but also cultivated closer cooperation with local officials. By "going local" in this way, they bypassed Beijing's tightening political environment. This article focuses on two important policy intellectuals in the healthcare arena who have gone local. It also includes a comparison between these two policy intellectuals and seven of their prominent peers who did not go local, as well as with intellectuals from another policy arena: education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1985, Dutch businessman Frans Lurvink created the Alerdinck Foundation and its Centre for East-West Communications. A private venture, Alerdinck set out to achieve greater understanding between Eastern and Western media to reduce Cold War tensions. An example of citizen diplomacy aimed at promoting peace, Alerdinck's story illustrates the strengths of a private initiative in creating spaces for dialogue and relationship-building, and the limitations of a non-state actor aiming to alter international relations. The article chronicles the formation, ambitions and obstacles faced by Alerdinck as it endeavoured to improve cross-bloc dialogue through its conferences, bilingual newspaper, and journalist exchange programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers an analogy between the Roman wars against Mediterranean piracy in the 70s and 60s BCE, especially on Crete and in Cilicia, and the United States' long wars against terror, which now span more than two decades (2002–), especially in Afghanistan, until recently, and Iraq. The article hopes to show that there are fruitful points of convergence, especially useful for drawing ethical and political lessons from history. Wars against piracy are waged against non-state actors and nearly impossible to prosecute to a negotiated settlement. Such wars quite naturally result in "mission creep," particularly when situated in a region with broader strategic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This article examines the role of grassroots actors in regions of violent conflict where competing governance systems exists. Specifically, it focuses on those living in the borderlands of South America, where alternative forms of governance may be created in response to violence between state and criminal organizations. In this context, how can grassroots actors overcome protracted armed violence and establish new, legitimate forms of social governance? To explore this question, our methodology employs data triangulation, combining literature, news reports, and fieldwork data collected in two violence‐prone territories: the borderlands of Cúcuta (Colombia)/Táchira state (Venezuela) and Pedro Juan Caballero (Paraguay)/Ponta Porã (Brazil). We argue that grassroots actors can develop innovative and alternative governance structures that differ from those of the state and criminal groups. This research also contributes to the ongoing discussion about the agency of local actors in violent conflicts between nonstate actors and the state. The findings demonstrate that grassroots actors in violent border regions can actively transform conflicts and build peace, particularly in areas such as migration, security, health, and education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transboundary water management in the Sixaola basin, shared by Costa Rica and Panama, has historically involved significant contributions from third parties. This study investigates their evolving roles and the implications for governance in this context. We conducted a comprehensive analysis of non-State actors interventions over time, focusing on changes in strategies, priorities, and their impact on transboundary basin governance. Our findings indicate that while non-state actor initiatives have attracted attention and financial resources, they have also introduced significant governance challenges, leading to inconsistencies in basin development. The analysis reveals that limited governmental involvement and the technocratic turn in development strategies have raised questions about basin development and its tangible impacts. Additionally, reterritorialization efforts highlight a local tendency to better align existing functional spaces with local concerns. This study contributes to the literature on transboundary basin management by providing insights into the multifaceted role of non-state actors in the Sixaola basin. It explores a case where governments remain distant in defining governance systems, highlighting the added value of focusing on non-state actors to grasp the complexity of hydropolitics and discussing the politics of river basin development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractIndustrial fisheries are some of the most dangerous workplaces in the world. This paper argues that oceans deserve to be understood as ‘working spaces’ embedded within complex jurisdictions, material processes, and social relations. I coin the term ‘labor governance frontier’ to develop a conceptual analysis that captures the ways in which material processes and governance programs, introduced by state and non-state actors, seek to expand and improve labor rights at sea. Labor in fisheries is an emerging field that has caught the attention of diverse disciplines. I argue that, to date, little research has explored workers’ individual and collective agency in relation to the materiality of working at sea. I explore the potential of the concepts labor regime, labor precarity, and hybrid governance, to comprehend and expand the labor governance frontier. I conclude by outlining a research agenda for labor governance frontiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) in northwest Laos exemplifies an experimental governance model, where sovereign powers are partially privatized to drive economic development. Established in 2007 through a 99-year concession with the Kings Romans Group (KRG), a Chinese gaming company, the GTSEZ is integral to Laos's strategy of leveraging Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for modernization. This paper examines the complex dynamics between the Lao state and non-state actors within the GTSEZ, highlighting its fragmented yet pragmatic statecraft. Drawing on extensive fieldwork from 2014 to 2018, the study examines the GTSEZ's historical connections to the opium trade and its contemporary socio-political and economic roles. The zone's creation has generated both enthusiasm and criticism, particularly concerning sovereignty, local impacts, and controversial activities. The paper also discusses the broader implications of SEZs in Laos's nation-building efforts, and the GTSEZ's balance of economic openness with regulatory oversight, enhancing the understanding of experimental governance in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of ungoverned (and ill-governed, and ungovernable) spaces has resulted in increases in insecurity in Nigeria's rural communities, especially breeding insurgencies and other forms of militancy. As a corollary, non-state security actors have arisen as community-created mechanisms to reduce the ever-increasing rates of crime. This study investigated the establishment of these NSSAs, with a view to understanding community perceptions of their effectiveness. Using selected inclusion/exclusion criteria, the study targeted two rural communities in Southwest Nigeria and collected data using a structured online survey. Data were analyzed using a simple linear regression model. The findings revealed that the residents of the communities feel safer under the protection of the vigilante groups, and the groups have been effective in reducing crime rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing line of research examines causes and consequences of militant group competition. However, empirical work on these topics has limitations. Most quantitative research uses relatively rough proxies for competition, such as counts of groups in a country. Other work uses dichotomous indicators, ignoring the intensity or degree of rivalries. Additionally, many studies examine either terrorist organizations or rebel groups, overlooking cross-type rivalry (e.g., terrorist vs. rebel). We address these issues by introducing time-varying dyadic rivalry data on hundreds of groups – rebels, terrorists, and pro-government militias – in Africa and Asia, 1990-2015. Rivalry levels include denouncements, threats, and violence. After presenting the data, we test the "outbidding" hypothesis: the notion that inter-organizational competition leads to more terrorism. This argument has found support in qualitative analyses, but quantitative tests using rivalry proxies show mixed results. Using our data we find support for the hypothesis. We conclude with research questions that could be addressed with the data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Only a few studies on biological terrorism have ever been conducted empirically. Many of these focus on CBRN terrorism as a whole, rather than biological terrorism, specifically. Other accounts utilize a case- or historical analysis instead. This study serves as the most comprehensive empirical assessment of bioterrorism to date by drawing on the Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-State Actors (POICN) Database at START as well as additional databases. The databases were merged to create a database whereby both CBRN and non-CBRN cases were included for both individuals and groups. Several binary logistic regression models (1990-2016) were then executed on biological weapons pursuit. The type of actor and ideology seem to be the most important factors for predicting biological weapons pursuit, although ethnic fractionalization was also negatively correlated with biological weapons pursuit. Governance measures had variable, but negative relationships with pursuit as well. Implications and recommendations are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commercial drone advancements have enabled terrorists with crude airpower, challenging states' aerial dominance. Today, many groups skillfully use drones for propaganda generation, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, and attacks. Despite their obvious value, there is wide variation in adoption begging questions about who is using drones and why. Prominent in practitioner and security provider circles, academics are just skimming the surface of this important phenomenon. The small existing literature suggests that violent nonstate actor drone use is little more than Iran-sponsored jihadist terrorists with territory in the Middle East. Using an original data set on characteristics across 998 armed nonstate groups from 1995 to 2019, we explore the empirical determinants of drone adoption. Although Iran-sponsorship is a significant factor, we find that network affiliations are the strongest predictors of adopting a drone program. We also demonstrate that groups with more intensive attack profiles and narco groups are more likely to pursue unmanned aerial systems. Our study provides the first quantitative probe of the drivers of armed nonstate drone use, putting academic assertions and policy prescriptions on firmer empirical ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey, as the largest refugee-hosting country, provides insights into the externalization of European borders and the internalization of its own borders. Oscillating between open-door and strict-border policies, alongside the political inactiveness of public authorities and CSOs governing Syrian mobility, Turkey reveals crucial dynamics. Focusing on Syrian refugees' housing in a refugee hub of Izmir, this study unravels internal bordering and explores its rationales and the involvement of non-state actors. Syrian refugees encounter three internal bordering mechanisms affecting their housing inclusion: selective overpricing, ethnic filtering and arbitrary interrogations. These differential inclusion practices, led by market actors (landlords and realtors), ethnic networks, and street-level bureaucrats (mukhtars and municipal officers), are driven by the prevalence of anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey, where Syrians are perceived as unwanted or undeserving. The internal bordering mechanisms are rooted in ethnic, economic, cultural, and security-based rationales, influenced by the personal interests and socio-economic backgrounds of the involved actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the pivotal role of non-state actors in Albania's European integration process, focusing on Albania as a candidate for EU membership. The aim is to assess how various non-state actors in Albania, including civil society organizations (CSOs), think tanks, businesses, and grassroots movements, have influenced and can further influence the country's path towards EU integration. Key findings emphasize the importance of transparency, accountability, and fairness in fostering trust among CSOs, politicians, and stakeholders. The study highlights the necessity for enhanced collaboration between local and central governments, institutions, and CSOs to streamline the integration process. Creating an inclusive environment where diverse voices are considered is identified as a crucial factor for successful collaboration. The paper also stresses the importance of regular information exchange and consultation between governments and CSOs. Sustainable and transparent financing mechanisms are deemed essential for CSOs' effectiveness, with recommendations for dedicated funds and improved financial transparency. Capacity-building support is acknowledged as vital for CSOs' continued positive impact on Albania's EU accession. The thesis advocates for investment in training and specialized courses to enhance CSOs' capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Only a few studies on biological terrorism have ever been conducted empirically. Many of these focus on CBRN terrorism as a whole, rather than biological terrorism, specifically. Other accounts utilize a case- or historical analysis instead. This study serves as the most comprehensive empirical assessment of bioterrorism to date by drawing on the Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-State Actors (POICN) Database at START as well as additional databases. The databases were merged to create a database whereby both CBRN and non-CBRN cases were included for both individuals and groups. Several binary logistic regression models (1990-2016) were then executed on biological weapons pursuit. The type of actor and ideology seem to be the most important factors for predicting biological weapons pursuit, although ethnic fractionalization was also negatively correlated with biological weapons pursuit. Governance measures had variable, but negative relationships with pursuit as well. Implications and recommendations are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces southern blue criminology, a novel theoretical framework that extends traditional criminological analysis to encompass the environmental harms affecting the world's oceans, particularly from a Global South perspective. This approach critiques crime-centric analysis and expands upon the concept of "harmscapes" - areas significantly impacted by ecological damage - by integrating socio-economic and cultural contexts often overlooked by prevailing enforcement paradigms developed in the Global North. Through a critical review of existing criminological theories and maritime enforcement practices, this study highlights the inadequacies of current approaches that fail to account for the transnational and complex nature of oceanic harms. Southern blue criminology is proposed through four integrative perspectives: shifting from a crime-centric view to embracing a broader conception of ocean harmscapes; moving beyond state-centric responses to foster whole-of-society involvement including non-state actors; transcending Western-centric governance models in favor of context-dependent strategies that respect local knowledge and practices; and expanding the analytical frame from human-centric approaches to include human-nonhuman assemblages, recognizing the ocean as an active participant in ecological and social interactions. The framework aims to foster more effective and sustainable management of marine environments, proposing a shift from a punitive focus to a more comprehensive, preventive, and restorative approach. The implications of this research are significant, suggesting a transformative shift in policies to better address the intricate web of factors contributing to maritime environmental crimes and to enhance global ecological justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During armed conflict civilians often inhabit areas of contested governance or areas where rebel groups, NGOs, and/or criminal syndicates vie for authority and challenge the control of the state. As non-state actors confront the authority and legitimacy of the state, civilians become central players in that competition asked to uphold or undercut these alternative governance claims. In this paper we examine the long-term impact of rebel governance for citizens living in spaces where state governance is challenged. Leveraging survey data from areas historically under PKK control in Southeastern Turkey, we focus on the ways in which contestation over governance during the conflict influenced future trust and engagement with the Turkish state. Specifically, we find that individual engagement with rebel governance institutions and personal conflict experience are important factors in understanding the effects of contested governance. Our findings increase our understanding of the long-term impact of armed conflict on civilians and the potential lasting impacts of rebel governance on the post-conflict state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement represents the notable characteristics of global environmental governance, namely multi-actor and multi-level governance. Despite these changes, limited empirical studies have investigated the actors in global environmental governance who participate in political discourse on climate change. To comprehend whether or not the Paris Agreement's actors represent the transformation of global environmental governance, we adopted a big-data approach to analyze Twitter's climate-change discourse. The classification of actors provided an understanding of the diversity of the actors involved in providing public information. We also calculated the closeness centrality and identified the changes in the actors' influence, comparing the changes in the 5 years since the Agreement was adopted. The results showed an increased diversity of actor types. Non-state actors are not homogeneous in their changes, and Intergovernmental Organizations exhibited an increased influence. The findings indicated that the actors participating in the climate-change discourse post-Paris Agreement partially reflect the changes in global environmental governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on empirical fieldwork, this article analyzes the negotiation of a Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA) at the World Health Organization (WHO) between 2011 and 2016. The study examines the long and difficult negotiation process, which shifts from a mere adaptation of guidelines by the WHO Secretariat to an intergovernmental negotiation led by a core group of Member States. This negotiation process cannot simply be explained by traditional dialogues among delegations and hierarchical relationships within international organizations. Other factors played important roles in the process as well – the high political stakes of the issue, non-traditional coalition games, heterogeneity among the actors, and the WHO Secretariat's role as a negotiating party – all advocating for the development of a triangular, multi-voice negotiation model within international organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars commonly argue that international law and organizations promote democracy by helping dictators to credibly commit to accountability, individual rights, and transparency. Yet dictators routinely join treaties and international organizations without transitioning to democracy. International law and organizations can generate asymmetric costs for domestic actors because international rules often apply to both governments and non-state actors, yet dictators can limit how these rules are upheld at the domestic and international level. We argue that dictators are most likely to join such treaties and international organizations when they face strong domestic political competition. We illustrate our argument using the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has extensive powers to prosecute individuals for international crimes, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. We show that ICC investigations and prosecutions have become a tool for incumbent dictators to target their domestic opponents. We examine the implications of our theory for multiple outcome variables, including the decision to join the ICC, violence, and the survival of dictators in power. Our evidence suggests that dictators are most likely to join the ICC when they face strong political opponents and are subsequently less likely to commit violence and more likely to survive in office. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the question of who and what drives forced migration governance in origin, host, and transit states, drawing on empirical material from the contemporary Syrian and Libyan, and the historical Algerian displacement situations. These three cases are examples for different forced migration governance approaches, ranging from open-supportive (Algeria), to restrictive-selective (Syria) and laissez-faire (Libya). We identify three key drivers of forced migration governance to explain variation in governance outcome: domestic, geopolitical, and international-normative drivers. We understand forced migration governance as a state-making strategy for different state and non-state actors in origin, transit, and host countries. We argue that while forced migration governance is negotiated around humanitarian principles in which international organizations and civil society play a crucial role, the international-normative driver remains strongly bound to domestic and geopolitical logics. Political and economic interests are key factors of forced migration governance in host countries, especially if they align with political interests and state-making strategies of state and non-state actors in origin countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within Latin America during the 20th century, the practice of terrorism manifested itself in the form of state and non-state actors alike. The voracity with which both pursued their goals to subjugate the other occasionally created a causality relationship that exacerbated the societal chaos. In Argentina and Peru, their respective governments pursued increasingly harsh and repressive methods to subdue non-state terrorist groups. However, in Argentina, growing authoritarianism and state violence, particularly during the Dirty War, instigated increasingly reactionary non-state terror responses from well-organized groups, such as the Montoneros. By contrast, Peru saw the rise of unremitting revolutionary terrorism by non-state actors such as Shining Path that drove the Fujimori government into acts of state terrorism. These two diametrically opposed models serve to demonstrate the complexities of understanding the causes of terrorism in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do armed groups consolidate power in conflict landscapes packed with rival factions, paramilitary militias, and local warlords? Extant scholarship has studied the causes and consequences of rebel fragmentation, but the reverse process in which power that is dispersed among many armed actors becomes concentrated among a handful of factions is underexplored. In this special issue, we bring together eight case studies to illustrate at least three pathways to militant consolidation. Cooperative consolidation involves organizations growing consensually through alliance formation and mergers. Competitive consolidation entails a gradual process of increasing political and military power by outcompeting rival groups for fighters, popular support, and international sponsors. Coercive consolidation occurs when militant organizations violently eliminate rivals. This framing article considers several factors that may explain the choice of consolidation mode, including the role of territorial control, permeability of group boundaries, and state sponsorship. By investigating this under-examined aspect of civil conflict, we forge fundamentally new theoretical ground in the study of internal wars and weakly-governed societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reveals how the official patterns of commemorating the Soviet historical past in Russia match its local projections. Based on interviews with experts from 27 regions and some other field materials, the article maps the diversity of commemorative agendas across Russia. Focusing on the violent aspects of Soviet history, it outlines current configurations of the usable past important for local identity and notably used by regional authorities and other mnemonic actors over time. These repertoires of the usable past depend on the cultural infrastructure that was formed over time, but also on the efforts of mnemonic actors, who promote specific memories. This article argues that although regional approaches to commemorating the historical past are evidently dominated by the official federal narrative, local visions of common history are far from being uniform. The aspects that are downplayed or silenced at the federal level might be indispensable to regional and local identities. Expert interviews suggest that collisions between the narratives circulating at different levels typically do not escalate to open conflicts. The commemorative projects supported by regional authorities tend to conform to the federal-level framing, which is flexible enough to tolerate some local peculiarities. However, in many regions there are also non-state mnemonic actors who promote a commemorative agenda that deviates from the official state discourse. While being short of resources for developing memory hardware, they affect public discussions raising awareness about the downplayed aspects of the local past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, Russia and Turkey emerged as two principal players providing security assistance to opposing warring parties. While interventions on the part of the two foreign powers have introduced new dynamics into intractable and volatile armed conflicts, the underlying intention was to inject extraneous goals into ongoing conflicts and project power in the southern Mediterranean region. This article investigates security assistance theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we propose a typology that distinguishes between formal, informal and semi-formal processes of wartime security assistance across the state-non-state dimension. Empirically, drawing on rare access to state officials, former and active rebels, as well as mercenary actors in Syria and Libya, we give a unique description of the patterns of security assistance provided by Russia and Turkey to state and non-state armed actors. We examine the ways in which the two foreign powers have created a nexus between the two conflicts by capitalizing on pre-existing security assistance frameworks in Syria to recruit and deploy fighters to Libya. Although security assistance has emerged as a competition site between Russia and Turkey, we demonstrate how mutual recognition of security interests has created margins for negotiation and agreement-reaching in Syria and Libya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What makes a mercenary a mercenary? This pilot project aims to address this question to establish an operational framework to assist both scholars and policymakers in distinguishing between types of private security forces (PSF). PSFs are under scrutiny by the international community for committing human rights violations and for acting against self-determination, often in the context of intrastate conflicts. This disillusionment with PSFs is historically unprecedented, as PSFs have been utilized in inter and intrastate conflicts for centuries. Current literature has produced simplistic views of PSFs as detrimental forces in conflict zones, often categorizing all PSFs as "mercenaries." This perception has limited the potential utility of PSFs, as human rights violations and acts against self-determination are not unique to PSFs nor constant. Without distinctions between types of PSFs that differentiate groups based on their operations and utility, regulations against PSFs will remain inefficient. The title of mercenary is a contentious term. At the most basic level, a mercenary is a hired independent nonstate actor that in some way supports a military operation. But how can Halliburton which operated truck convoys and cafeterias in Iraq, the Wagner Group which only agrees to contracts when directed to by the Russian government, and Executive Outcomes which have aided state governments against rebel forces in Africa all be classified as mercenaries (Hartung 2011, 5; Marten 2019, 191; Howe 1998, 316)? The usage of mercenaries has occurred since the inception of currency-based markets, recent scholarship has formulated definitions explicitly or casually through analyses of specific cases (Brewis and Godfrey 2017). This research has resulted in conflicting definitions of mercenaries under numerous monikers, such as private security contractors (PSC) or private military contractors (PMC) (Percy 2003; Singer 2008). These analyses often approach this issue with predetermined interpretations of these groups as a monolith: mercenaries violate state self-determination and prolong conflicts in order to extend their own contract and pay (UN 2021). This results in a dilemma for analyses of these actors, as the evaluation of these groups involve parameters that do not capture the specific qualities of PSFs. For this analysis, the term private security force (PSF) is employed to refer to the actors that are categorized as mercenaries. Private insinuates the independence of these groups from a state, security is in reference to the defensive or offensive operations of these groups, and force connotates a body of people conducting some action in a conflict. This article will refer to the different types of PSFs with this comprehensive term. Further, discussions of PSF contracting requires common terms to identify the actors involved, with contractor being a PSF group, contractee being individual members of the contractor, and the hiring group being the state or organization that has acquired the services of a contractor. I identify three main types of PSFs for this analysis: the previously mentioned PMC and PSC and a new classification, private logistics contractors (PLC). The difference between these contractors is their typical operations. PMCs are characterized in their tip of the spear role in military operations, as their main usage by states is to directly engage in offensive front-line operations, hence the military designation. PSCs typically act as auxiliary forces; while being capable of front-line operations, their usage is generally oriented towards defensive operations for already achieved objectives. PLCs act as logistical support for military organizations, generally facing less risk of direct combat than the other designations but still is capable of combat if need be due to operating in a conflict zone. Distinctions between types of contractors in terms of their operational orientation are still not sufficient however, as all three types of PSF vary in capabilities. Considering these groups are hired to compliment or even replace the services usually provided by the national military, states are likely to carefully evaluate PSFs to select the group that best matches their need that cannot currently be fulfilled by the state's national military. Thus, amongst PMCs, PSCs, and PLCs, I argue that they vary in their degree of utility as a contractor. In this sense, a contractor is not expected to replace a national military outright; instead, contractors have innate utility for states that national militaries do not possess. This utility of a contractor is multifaceted and can therefore not be captured in the same way as national military utility, this will be elaborated on further in the theory section. This article will analyze mainstream definitions of PSFs to form a more comprehensive evaluation system for such entities, as past literature has indirectly evaluated these groups in their attempts to define them. The article will begin by examining current literature on PSFs and four common aspects that measure PSF utility. This will result in the formulation of four evaluation axes of PSF utility: authoritative control, group motivation, internal organization, and reliability. The methodology section will then assert the usage of a diachronic crosscase study analysis to test the four-dimensional evaluation of PSFs and justify the usage of five PSF cases. An analysis will then test this evaluation system by applying it to the five PSF case studies. These findings will then be examined in the discussion which will provide recommendations for further research and how the distinctions made in this article between PSF groups and further in-group variation can help guide said research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has been seen as a key actor in constructing global environmental governance, and China has seen its rising role in global environmental politics. The Sino-EU environmental cooperation plays an important role in enabling global governance. And, while a wide range of studies on European environmental politics and the Western academic perspectives of observing China's environmental governance have been identified widely, it remains very weak in understanding China's construction of environmental discourse concerning Europe. This research employs the environmental discourse approach to observe the case of China and develop the research question: how have environmental discourses concerning Europe been constructed in China. The data for observing the discourse is collected from newspapers, academic articles, publications of environmental stakeholders, and governmental statements on environmental cooperation. The main finding is that the transition discourse and the liberal market discourse have been growing in the environmental discussion while the justice discourse has received weak attention in China. This research argues that the evolution of the environmental discourse has been determined by the types of sources, the non-state actors making the discourses, the positive image of European environmental affairs, and China's supportive attitudes towards the Sino-EU cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorism and counterterrorism are often described as "ironic", but conceptual engagement with irony has been very limited. Building on the lifework of cultural anthropologist Joseba Zulaika, this article considers irony as an analytical meta-perspective in the critical study of (counter)terrorism. It draws on the life and work of German-American Christian ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971) to argue that the ironies of (counter)terrorism under U.S. president Barack Obama, who admired Niebuhr, point to an unconscious failure of collective self-understanding. Dissolving these ironies requires new narratives of American identity that cut across foreign and domestic politics, state and non-state actors, the "war on terror" and white supremacy in a long view of history. Facilitating this multidirectional process of self-reflection and -transcendence is a key task for critical scholars of (counter)terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the Twitter/X networks of U.S. ambassadors in Israel, Iraq, and Qatar from 2017 to 2024, aiming to assess how digital diplomacy is conducted through these platforms. Utilizing Sprinklr, we gathered 586,736 mentions involving the ambassadors' Twitter handles, with a focus on evaluating the influence and communication strategies within these networks. We analyzed a random sample of 30,000 tweets from the collected data using network analysis techniques. This approach enabled the examination of centrality metrics within the ambassadors' digital networks, providing insights into the influence patterns and communicative interactions via Gephi. The analysis revealed a significant influence of state actors and established political elites who predominantly engage in unidirectional communication, despite the platforms' capabilities for interactive and reciprocal dialogues. We identified elected officials and specific non-governmental organizations as key actors shaping the diplomatic narratives, highlighting the diverse yet controlled actor interplay in digital diplomacy. This research underscores the need for strategic adjustments in digital diplomacy practices to enhance interaction and inclusivity. Our work provides policymakers with insights into leveraging digital platforms for more effective and dynamic diplomatic exchanges. The study illuminates the role of digital platforms as critical venues for shaping diplomatic narratives by both state and non-state actors. Notably, our findings highlight the use of hashtags in advancing human rights movements and in discussions surrounding the Israel–Palestine conflict, demonstrating hashtags' impact on global and regional advocacy efforts. This research offers a unique perspective on the integration of traditional diplomatic roles with contemporary digital strategies, particularly highlighting the constraints and potentials within Middle Eastern contexts. We suggest ways to enhance the inclusivity and effectiveness of diplomatic engagements through improved social media utilization, thereby contributing to the evolving field of international relations and public diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local actors have growing prominence in climate governance but key capacities and powers remain with national policymakers. Coordination between national and local climate action is therefore of increasing importance. Underappreciated in existing academic and policy literature, coordination between actors at different scales can be affected not only by politics and institutional arrangements, but also by methods of data analysis. Exploring two datasets of GHG emissions by local area in England—one of consumption-based emissions and the other of territorial emissions—this paper shows the potential for a data scaling problem known as the modifiable areal unit problem and its possible consequences for the efficacy and equity implications of climate action. While this analysis is conceptual and does not identify specific instances of the modifiable areal unit problem or its consequences, it calls attention to methods of data analysis as possible contributors to climate governance challenges. Among other areas, future analysis is needed to explore how data scaling and other aspects of data processing and analysis may affect our understanding of non-state actors' contribution to climate action. Research highlights: Data scaling could affect the efficacy and equity of climate action in the UK. Enabling local actors can help to overcome the effects of data scaling. Relationships between methods of data analysis and governance need more attention. Research is needed on data scaling and the climate actions of non-state actors is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions are deployed in complex operational environments, where a plethora of national, regional and international actors are present. These present circumstances enable the existence of an - either direct or indirect - but inexorable engagement between all stakeholders involved in similar activities. While the vast majority of current debates and research focus solely on the cooperative dimension of the CSDP in the framework of multilateralism and regionalism, the topic of the EU's engagement with local stakeholders is scarcely explored. Therefore, drawing on the multistakeholder initiative approach (MSI) in economic theory, this paper assesses the engagement of CSDP missions with civil societies and private sector entities in theatres of operations. Employing a single case study approach of inquiry, consisting of the EUCAP Somalia mission this paper aims at answering the research questions: how does EUCAP Somalia engage with local non-state actors, what are the opportunities associated with this engagement and to what extent can a MSI approach be implemented by EUCAP Somalia-By deploying a qualitative research design, this paper uses document analysis within a single case study approach of inquiry. The results of this approach show two distinct tendencies. While EUCAP Somalia informally engages with local non-state actors, this engagement is rather insufficient. Results of this research further show that CSDP missions represent an important tool of EU diplomacy and their engagement with local non-state actors positively impacts the implementation of two of their core principles: local ownership and human security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that neighborhood-based middle-class civic groups in Mumbai reconfigure and constitute the local state through their everyday operations and social, legal and political interactions with the government. Amid rapid urban transformation, as neighborhoods become more internally differentiated, long-term residents forge ideational territories, rooted in place-based politics to govern their neighborhoods. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, I depict three modes of place-based state-making—détournement, quotidian and activist. I argue that middle-class residents choose and privilege their neighborhood over the nation, in local politics, recalibrating laws and regulations to serve their territorial interests. To that end, I develop a theoretical framework to think about the autonomy of sociospatial communities and their statal implications. By focusing on the 'statization' of everyday life, this article departs from the distinction between state and non-state actors, and instead (i) distinguishes between state and government, (ii) considers the state to be embedded in the local social space where civic actors can enter the state space and steer local governance, and (iii) highlights how different cultural-historical territories produce distinct configurations of the local state, thereby fragmenting the geography of urban governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines diverse infrastructural interventions in the making of Ardhisasa, the Kenyan state's digital land information management platform, as a space of contestation, negotiation, and experimentation. We analyse the platformisation of governance through theories on liminality to explain the agency of various actors in shaping the digital state. We particularly zoom into the influence of two actors: the private actors in the land sector and the civil society organisations representing informalised residents, and how they exercise agency in the development of Ardhisasa. Drawing on interviews with state and non-state actors, secondary literature, and extensive experience within Kenya's land administration system, we trace the overt and covert exercise of power in the platformisation of land administration of Nairobi. Our central thesis is that, despite its progressive development, Ardhisasa follows the tradition of a long line of large-scale infrastructural or developmental projects that rarely deliver on their promise for improvement but rather further entrench marginalised groups due to its exclusion of the already existing, albeit informalised, land administration and transaction practices that meet the needs of the urban poor. We argue that Ardhisasa's perpetual state of becoming leads to the spatialisation of liminality itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractParts of Islamist Studies, Security and Conflict Studies, and Terrorism Studies reduce Shia combatants to indoctrinated masses due to their biased scholarship. Their approach remains top-down and macro-level, overlooking lived experiences and individual perceptions of those engaged in political violence. Accordingly, this article critically engages with such scholarship by highlighting how lived experiences and individual perceptions configure non-ideational paths toward political violence. I propose an ethnographically guided phenomenological inquiry of Shia nonstate armed actors and their situatedness in warscapes. I use the concept of warscapes and the complexities of individuation in warscapes to highlight the conceptual necessity of theorizing political violence from relational grounds that blurs the boundaries of micro-level and meso-level analysis. These relational grounds are shaped by inhumanities that predate conflicts and political violence reticulate inhumanities into a network that constitutes warscapes. I show this by combining the ethnography of Shia transnational militancy with the political histories of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. My critical interventions propose that Shia militancy is not only about sectarian divisions in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria or Yemen and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s defending its territories by other means. Shia militancy is also about individual worldviews, governing the multitudes, domestic politics, taming the Shia citizenry and the state keeping entropy and disorder low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Migration towards the EU has passed for many decades via Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, using Ukraine and Belarus as transit states, yet it adopted new forms under Russia’s intensified ‘hybrid’ warfare, and its 2022 military invasion of Ukraine. This paper seeks to uncover: (1) how formal policies and informal practices were interconnected in the governing of the migration ‘crisis’ on the EU’s eastern border with Belarus (2021–2023); and (2) what different modes of power were used to govern it. The paper advances a polycentric governance perspective. It demonstrates that crisis governance was not simply pursued by the Belarussian government and the EU as direct parties to the conflict. It involved a plethora of other stakeholders including Middle Eastern states, Russia, and travel agencies as non-state actors, all entangled in specific relationships with one another. This paper’s contribution is to show how relational dynamics among these stakeholders governed the crisis via a mixture of formal and informal practices that entailed different levels of coersion. The polycentric perspective advanced here is more useful when studying crisis governance than statist, multilevel governance, or EU-centric approaches emphasising institutional logics, as it emphasises relations among actors, and the power that shapes these relations and the governance system as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the implications of COVID-19 pandemic on multi-level governance (MLG) in Ghana. Adopting a qualitative document analysis approach supported by 18 key informant interviews, the findings revealed four enablers of recentralization: COVID-19-induced legislations for centralized decision, centralized distribution of relief packages and medical supplies, centralized institutional response, and centralized government communication strategies. Despite the use of centralized policy making, the management of pandemic is fraught with institutional inefficiencies, rigidities, and ambiguities. The paper argues that the recentralization of COVID-19 management is symptomatic of a long period of neglect of MLG in Ghana. Since, local governments are perceived as inept and ill-equipped, there is a mistaken believe that recentralized decisions are more effective during emergencies. To ensure an effective response to public emergencies, its mitigation and post-crisis recovery in developing countries, a MLG approach – where central, local, and other non-state actors work together in equal partnership is crucial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2006 Turkish Seed Law prohibited the selling of uncertified heirloom seeds, triggering heated debates on and around seeds. This paper examines the construction of discourses on heirloom seeds in Türkiye, focusing on the arguments of the key social actors in the field with a view to understand how knowledge production is taking place on seed. Conducting interviews with key state and non-state actors and analyzing their published documents related to heirloom seed through discourse-historical approach, we examined the argumentative perspectives shaping the discourse on seed. The results revealed a discursive dichotomy constructed between "heirloom seed" and "certified hybrid seeds". In particular, built on commercial and food security concerns, the state discourse frames heirloom seeds as low-yield and unable to feed the nation in comparison to certified hybrid seeds, whereas non-state discourse using the perspectives of agrobiodiversity and farmers' sovereignty construct heirloom seeds with superior features, qualifying them as compatible with biodiversity and the current global and regional economic, environmental and climate problems. The study concludes that different perspectives and interests produced contradictory knowledge about seed (hence food) and caused different realities to exist simultaneously within this knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Paris Agreement, global climate governance has become decidedly more polycentric. However, it is still debated whether the turn toward greater polycentricity leads to more effectiveness in delivering public goods like climate change mitigation. This article argues that engagement in polycentric climate governance is linked to both more ambitious mitigation targets and stronger mitigation policy effort at the national level. Empirically, we analyze the extent to which countries' mitigation ambition and policy effort are associated with state-level memberships in transnational climate governance initiatives and with sub- and nonstate actors' memberships, while controlling for other potential explanations. We find that while polycentric engagement is not associated with higher ambition of countries' mitigation targets, it does correlate with greater policy effort. This is particularly the case for former non–Annex I countries, that is, countries without mitigation commitments under the old Kyoto regime. We explain these synergies with a discussion of polycentric systems' contribution to supporting knowledge exchange and learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement ushered in an era of climate governance underpinned by a polycentric theory of change, emphasizing experimentation, collaboration, and innovation while downplaying political contestation, power asymmetries, and the need for regulatory action by the state. This article explores the roles the state plays in polycentric climate governance, focusing on the tension between the regulatory state, where authorities set, monitor, and enforce rules, and the orchestrating state, which facilitates collaboration with nonstate actors to induce behavioral change. Using decarbonization in Sweden as an illustrative case study, the article synthesizes the results of two research projects evaluating the promises and limits of polycentric climate governance. The results problematize the view that Sweden is a forerunner in climate governance, suggesting that while the Swedish government has mobilized support from important industries and cities in favor of decarbonization, that support may be insufficient to achieve necessary societal transformation for deep decarbonization. Finally, the study reflects on the conditions necessary for polycentric governance to effectively decarbonize society, highlighting the pivotal role of the regulatory state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the use of religion and ethnicity during elections in Nigeria. Nigeria’s diverse ethno-religious landscape has profoundly shaped its political dynamics, and political parties often leverage these identities to gain electoral advantage. During elections, Nigerians tend to align with political parties based on the party’s religious ideology. Self-serving politicians and political parties have turned to religion as a campaign tool. This is a qualitative study using the narrative method. Data was gathered from semi-structured interviews with 11 purposively selected informants and from relevant academic literature. Documentary analysis was used to analyse the data. The findings of the study were presented thematically, thus: a) the resurgence of political religion; b) the rise of religious populists; c) the emergence of militarizated non-state actors; d) the targets of Christian religious voters; e) the targets of ethnic groups from southern Nigeria; f) the target of state apparatus; g) bad leadership; and h) the institutionalisation of authoritarianism. During election campaigns, Nigerians vote for candidates with particular religious or ethnic identities due to the fear of losing their lives or properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tracks the emergence, evolution, and decline of the Rhodesian-American religious lobby, a transnational network of churches, magazines, lobbying groups, and other non-state actors that operated during the Rhodesian Bush War from 1965 to 1980. Voicing its concerns in religious, racial, and anticommunist terms, the lobby recruited US combatants into the Rhodesian Security Forces and mobilised US evangelicals to press political leaders to recognise Rhodesian sovereignty. By threading together the post-Vietnam mercenary diaspora with waning segregationist groups and the emerging Christian Right in the United States, the lobby significantly shaped US-Rhodesia relations and global far-right politics in the late Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on authoritarian connections beyond the state requires a transregional practices approach. This special issue is an invitation to combine critical approaches to the study of authoritarian power by paying attention to spaces of contestation, authoritarian practices, as well as non-state actors and agency below and beyond the scale of the state. We focus on authoritarian practices and their spatial and temporal articulations in (1) transregional infrastructures, (2) global processes of capital accumulation and (3) nature-society relations. This enables us to capture the diversity of authoritarian actors and the interconnectedness of authoritarian power and forms of contestation across time and space. Drawing on logistics and infrastructure literature, we reconcile the contextualization of power relations with multi-scalar authoritarian practices beyond the inside-outside binary of national territoriality. We thus offer a conceptual approach to understanding the violent and repressive practices inherent to a continuum of different political settings, including liberal governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops the concept of the digital blender to comprehensively address the extent to which digital technologies further authoritarian practices and power beyond the state. By focusing on the primarily commercial nature of digital technologies, and their reciprocal transformational political economic embeddedness, the digital blender allows to highlight the role of private companies in enabling practices that are detrimental to democratic values and processes, irrespective of the formal regime-type context of a given polity, and less confined by national borders. While previous discussions primarily focus on digital technologies as mere tools at the discretion of their master, this relational perspective allows for the incorporation of transnational non-state actors and dynamics in constituting and contesting manifestations of authoritarian power beyond the state. These dynamics will be illustrated and discussed in light of insights into recent incidents involving companies such as Cambridge Analytica, Meta Platforms Inc., and the NSO Group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]