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Grounding necessitarianism (GN) is the view that full grounds necessitate what they ground. Although GN has been rather popular among philosophers, it faces important counterexamples: For instance, A = [Socrates died] fully grounds C = [Xanthippe became a widow]. However, A fails to necessitate C: A could have obtained together with B = [Socrates and Xanthippe were never married], without C obtaining. In many cases, the debate essentially reduces to whether A indeed fully grounds C–as the contingentist claims–or if instead C is fully grounded in A+, namely A plus some supplementary fact S (e.g. [Xanthippe was married to Socrates])–as the necessitarian claims. Both sides typically agree that A+ necessitates C, while A does not; they disagree on whether A or A+ fully grounds C. This paper offers a novel defence of the claim that, in these typical cases, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C–thereby bringing further support to GN. First and foremost, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C because it fails to contain just what is relevant to do so, in two distinct senses–explanatory and generative relevance. Second, going for A, rather than A+, as a full ground undermines not just grounding necessitarianism, but modally weaker views which even contingentists may want to preserve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the necessity requirement in defensive actions involving multiple agents, examining how permissions to inflict harm are determined by minimizing overall harm. Topics include the comparison between agent-centered and target-centered conceptions of necessity, the impact of multiple agents' options on permissible harm, and how uncertainty affects the application of necessity in real-world situations.

This paper examines the conceptions of logic from Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein and Ayer, and regards the six philosophers as the representatives of logical exceptionalism. From their standpoints, this paper refines the tenets of logical exceptionalism as follows: logic is exceptional to all other sciences because of four reasons: (i) logic is formal, neutral to any domain and any entities, and general; (ii) logical truths are made true by the meanings of logical constants they contain or by logicians' rational insight to consequence relations; (iii) logical truths are analytical, a prior and necessary, so not‐revisable; and (iv) logical laws are normative for how to correctly think. However, logical exceptionalism has encountered difficult open problems: What are logical constants? How to justify basic laws of logic? How are logical laws accessible to us? How to explain the reasonability of rival logics and select from them? How to explain the universal applicability of logical laws? How to explain the normativity of logical laws for correct thinking? This paper concludes that logical anti‐exceptionalism is more hopeful to successfully answer these questions than logical exceptionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the explanatory role of 'status-truths' such as essence-truths, necessity-truths and law-truths? A plausible principle, suggested by various authors, is Ground by Status, according to which status truths ground their prejacents. For instance, if it is essential to a that p, then this grounds the fact that p. But Ground by Status faces a forceful objection: it is inconsistent with widely accepted principles regarding the logic of grounding (Glazier in Philos Stud 174(11):2871–2889, 2017a, Synthese 174(198):1409–1424, 2017b; Kappes in Synthese 199(1–2):2575–2595, 2020, Philos Stud 178(4):1267–1284, 2021). I defend Ground by Status against this objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the current economics education system in universities in China differs from developed Western countries, China has been deliberately emulating the economics education system in the West over the past two decades, a system that has been repeatedly criticized by international movements such as the "post-autistic economics movement" and the "International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics." This article argues that the dominant position of mainstream Western economics in Chinese higher education contradicts the scientific principles of pluralism and does not align with China's national conditions and the necessity for the development of a philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics. Based on the proposals put forward by faculty and students involved in the international movement for the reform of economics education over the past twenty-two years, this article recommends reforms to address the major weaknesses of economics education in China. The reforms address ten areas for improvement, including the overall goals of pluralism in economics education, curriculum design, teaching methods, an independent academic evaluation system, faculty development, and the evaluation of academic disciplines. The purpose of these reforms is to destabilize the dominant position of mainstream Western economics in higher education in China and gradually establish a new economics education system with a curriculum based on a plurality of approaches, a variety of critical pedagogies, and a methodology of problem-based learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper exhibits a way of understanding Heidegger’s concept of being in general [Sein überhaupt] – the central aim of Being and Time’s questioning – by getting insight into his early years. I argue that the term “being” [Sein] as Heidegger understands it in the early 1920s describes the meaningful relation between humans and the things of their surrounding world which is given to us as a fact. I maintain that Sein überhaupt refers to this fact, i.e., the fact that every particular being is always with a certain meaning for us. I come to this conclusion by exploring (1) Heidegger’s early analysis of Umwelterlebnis, (2) his early description of medieval transcendentia, (3) his critique of formalization and the introduction of formal indication. Lastly, (4) I observe the way Heidegger introduces the concepts of Sein and Sein überhaupt pointing to the simple fact of beings’ being in meaningful relation to us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that freedom in the divine creative act is better understood as a freedom of consent rather than freedom of will. However, even if some conundrums are thus avoided, one has to face the apparent antinomy between both God's creative act from His very nature and God's absolute freedom. Freedom of consent, as defined in David Burrell's works, finds a resonance with the French spiritualist philosopher, Henri Bergson, who resolves the apparent antinomy by showing that the necessity of the action springs from the nature of the self in a way that does not contradict the free perpetual auto‐creation of the consciousness. Notwithstanding its defects, the artisan model found in Genesis allows one to draw a parallelism between the divine creative act and artistic creation. Kandinsky faced precisely such an antinomy, for his principle of inner necessity combines both the absolute free creative power of the artist and the necessity emerging from the different levels of the cosmic order. To exemplify Kandinsky's solution, this article offers an original reading of Painting with White Border, based on Kandinsky's analysis in Reminiscences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper disputes Uwe Steinhoff's view that a jus ad bellum requirement of necessity can be merged with a condition of proportionality. It argues that the proposed merger detracts from a conceptual and moral understanding of the structure and rationale of both the necessity and the proportionality considerations applicable in a range of moral contexts, including those of war and so-called lesser evils cases, where these conditions are intended as action-guiding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uwe Steinhoff's The Ethics of War and the Force of Law contains an extended critique of 'moral fundamentalism', or the project of uncovering an individualist 'deep morality' of war governed by the same moral principles and rules that govern ordinary moral life, as well as a more positive account of war that depicts it as a social practice. Much of Steinhoff's account is indebted to a series of claims involving the standing to blame, reciprocity, and the necessity and proportionality conditions on self-defence. On all these claims, Steinhoff is open to challenge. First, he is arguably over-dependent on 'standing to blame' considerations. Second, his commitment to reciprocity is under-explained. Third, the necessity condition does not clearly explain how conventional elements explain the formation of defensive standards. Fourth, there are problems in explaining how the distinct defensive conventions adopted by distinct communities can actually be made to get on to the same page when these communities go to war with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a response to the contributors of this symposium. Notably, I respond to the following objections: that my list of just war criteria is too long on an "ideal" level and too short for practical purposes; that in particular my rejection of legitimate authority is misguided; that I am wrong in claiming that in just war theory the conditions of proportionality and necessity, which are separate in the self-defense justification, must be merged; that my "social practice view" – which denies the existence of an "immutable", "deep" morality of war and holds instead that widely accepted conventions have moral force and are therefore partly constitutive of the morality of war – faces severe challenges and makes too much of standing to complain and considerations of reciprocity; and that my account of rights forfeiture is mistaken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the macro grounded in the micro? That is, is every truth about a macroscopic object fully grounded in a truth wholly about its microscopic parts? In a recent interesting paper, Martin Glazier argued for a negative answer. Following him, call the position that the macro is grounded in the micro 'priority micro pluralism' ('pluralism' for short). In this discussion note, I propose a way out for the pluralist. In brief, it consists in the recognition that some metaphysical positions, including pluralism, are best expressed by fundamentally de dicto grounding claims. In that these claims have a distinctive modal force, this recognition has far-reaching consequences that go beyond a defence of pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On a highly influential way to think of modality, that I call 'relationalism', the modality of a state is explained by its being composed of properties, and these properties being related by a higher-order and primitively modal relation. Examples of relationalism are the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong account of natural necessity, many dispositional essentialist views, and Wang's incompatibility primitivism. I argue that relationalism faces four difficulties: that the selection between modal relations is arbitrary, that the modal relation cannot belong to any logical order, that to explain how the modal relation can relate properties of different adicities additional ideological complexity has to be introduced, and that not all modal constraints are relational. From the discussion, I will extract desiderata for a successor theory of modality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a new puzzle about logical truth, necessity, and moral responsibility. We defend one solution to the puzzle. A corollary of our preferred solution is that prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility are invalid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contingentism is the view that it is contingent which things exist. Despite its plausibility, advocates of contingentism face a well-known 'challenge' to demonstrate that they can draw what appear to be intelligible modal distinctions (Williamson Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). In this article, I argue that if certain controversial modal principles fail, the challenge contingentists face becomes much more difficult. Whereas extant challenges concern contingentists' inability to draw quite theoretical second-order modal distinctions, I present a challenge which concerns contingentists' inability to draw simpler first-order distinctions. This indicates that in certain modal settings there may well be significant first-order barriers to maintaining contingentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kripke has had an enormous impact on theories of reference thanks to his distinction of the metaphysical necessity of epistemological naming, breaking with decades of descriptive traditions of reference. Nevertheless, within the process of naming, there exist in the author's theory, glimpses of propositional attitudes and intentional aspects that the author does not delve into. This paper will detail the most important aspects of the American philosopher's theory to give rise to the discussion of the scope of the intentional aspects and propositional attitudes at the moment of naming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the analysis that I propose for Borderlands / La frontera. The New Mestiza I undertake a reading of Gloria Anzaldúa’s philosophical thought mediated by Hannah Arendt’s question in The Promise of Politics as to whether politics still makes sense. The categories that I recover from Arendt’s political theory to demonstrate that Anzaldúa’s writing is also ontological are thought, action, freedom, and necessity. With these four categories, I draw a symbolic and territorial space to defer the allegory of aporia in the Chicana writer border thinking. Analysis in which I deploy the political ontology of the woman who claims to be a frontier woman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Educational Studies (1673-1298) is the property of Journal of Educational Studies Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Fichte’s ambitious project in the Foundations of Natural Right is to provide an a priori deduction of the concept of right independently from morality. So far, interpretations of Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right have persistently fallen into one of two rough categories: either they (re)interpret the normative necessity of right in terms of moral or quasi-moral normativity or they interpret right’s normative necessity in terms of hypothetical imperatives. However, each of these interpretations faces significant exegetical difficulties. By contrast, I argue that we can understand the normative necessity of right in terms of conceptual necessity. On this view, right does not tell us what ought to be done, but instead tells us what we are doing and have done. Not only does this provide for a promising philosophical account of the nonmoral normativity of right, but also provides a compelling reading of Fichte’s text in both the deduction of the concept of right in the Foundations of Natural Right as well as his discussion of the application of the concept of right and coercion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study revolves around what led to the necessity of adding letters with letters and sentences in the books of meanings of the Qur'an until the end of the fourth century AH, which are: (The Book of Meanings of the Qur'an for AlFaraa, Meanings of the Qur'an for Al-Akhfash, Meanings and syntax of the Qur'an for Alzujaj, and the two books (The Meanings and syntax of the Qur'an for Alnahaas). The researcher extrapolated the poetic evidence that bears the necessities in grammatical issues and extracted them. Although most scholars said that the Qur'an should not be carried out on necessity, we find that in their interpretations of the verses of the wise Quran they carried one of the aspects that are not permissible except in necessity. If the term necessity allows the poet to break the rules, is it possible to apply the term "necessity'' to the interpretations of scholars in some aspects of readings? Did the owners of the meanings books mention the necessity of some readings? Did they choose the necessity, or did they reject it and allow others? The research aims to stand on the issues that led to the necessity of increasing the letters, clarifying the stand of scholars toward them, and solving the problem of necessity in the Qur'an by mentioning the opinions of scholars and standing by them. After the introduction, the research contained two sections, the first topic was the definition of poetic necessity, the position of Grammar scientist on necessity in the Qur'an and readings, and the approach of the owners of meaning books in resorting to necessity in letters. And the second topic was where I dealt with three issues related to the necessity of adding letters with letters and sentences, which are: (1 the introduction of a preposition on its like, (2 the increase of the conjunction (and), and (3 an increase (um), so the owners of the books of meanings in their directives to the verses of the wise Quran mentioned aspects of interpretation based on poetic necessity, even if they did not explicitly sometimes, then their opinion on necessity in the Qur'an, after an introduction in which I dealt with the grammatical issue that was addressed by the owners of the books of meanings, and I mention the opinions of scholars and whether they are necessary for them? Before concluding, I articulate the commenters' opinions, if they claimed necessity in the Holy Quran and their response for those who claimed it, and then the researcher recommends one of the opinions and a conclusion with the most prominent results of the research that I reached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quine says that ontology is about what there is, suggesting that to be ontologically committed to F s is to be committed to accepting a sentence which existentially quantifies over F s. Kit Fine argues that this gets the logical form of some ontological theses wrong. Fine is right that some ontological theses cannot be rendered simply as 'There are F s'. But the root of the problem has yet to be recognized, either by Fine or by his critics. Sometimes to adopt an ontological thesis is not merely to commit yourself to there being at least one F ; it is to take a stand on which F s there are. Once we recognize the 'particularity' of these ontological theses, we can adequately express them within the confines of a Quinean approach to ontology and ontological commitment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tasavvur: Tekirdag Theology Journal / Tekirdag Ilahiyat Dergisi is the property of Namik Kemal University, Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It is generally assumed that hinge-commitments are deprived of an epistemically normative structure, and yet, that although groundless, the acceptance of Wittgensteinian certainties is still rational. The problem comes from the intellectualist view of hinge-approvals which many recent proposals advance—one that falls short of the necessities and impossibilities pertaining to what would be the right description of how it is like to approve of hinges. I will raise the Newman-inspired worry as how to cash the abstract acceptance of principles of enquiry into real assent, as well as the question about how to extend normativity all the way back to foundations. It is my aim here to argue that ethical normativity is the only kind of normativity capable to ground the rationality of hinges. In defence of this, I will draw some consequences from Ernest Sosa's claim that hinges about the external world are logically related to the cogito. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both Kojève and Strauss, as we have seen, were theorists of reading; yet while Kojève's reading of Hegel is invoked throughout I The End of History and the Last Man i , Strauss is mentioned nowhere in the body of the text. Keywords: Fukuyama; Strauss; Kojève; Marx; Nietzsche; education EN Fukuyama Strauss Kojève Marx Nietzsche education 810 823 14 10/04/22 20221001 NES 221001 I Just as the soil needs cultivators of the soil, the mind needs teachers. To know the role Strauss played in the development of Fukuyama's argument, uninitiated pupils would have to turn to the footnotes, where they would learn that Strauss was someone of Kojève's acquaintance. Compare to Strauss's comments in "Political Philosophy of Marx", 172-3. 46 Friedrich Nietzsche, I Twilight of the Idols i , trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 41. 47 Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", 5. 48 Leo Strauss, "Nietzsche (1967)", ed. [Extracted from the article]

In this article I contrast two opposing forms of essentialism, definitional and transcendental versus productivist and historical, and trace both forms back to Kripke's Naming and Necessity (1980). Definitional essentialism, as developed by Fine, centers on kind-membership. Historical essentialism, as anticipated by Prior and developed by Almog, puts origin at its center. The article focuses on the fundamentally distinct manners in which these two views handle the necessity of origin thesis. In the final section of the article, inspired by a Nietzschean genealogical methodology, I pursue a naturalization strategy and conclude that rather than origin being necessary, it is essentialist necessity that reduces to origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the affective, emotional, and ideological questions raised by the practice of evidentiary torture (basanos) as necessity (anangkê). It proposes that competing ideas about its truth-value in Athenian forensic oratory reflect a degree of ambivalence sufficient to indicate that the Athenians (can) recognize the inherent unreliability of the slave's tormented body and mind to reveal the truth. In Prometheus Bound, the torture of Prometheus is dramatized as brutal coercion by Zeus' authoritarian state and set against the 'coercion' exercised by the bonds of kinship and emotional attachment. As such it engenders unbending anger on both sides and fails to coerce Prometheus to speak. The juxtaposition of the two genres establishes the unreliability of torture for extracting information along with a recognition that the criteria of exclusion for rendering bodies torturable are arbitrary, as are the rights they help maintain in the interest of Athenian exceptionalism. Fully embracing these recognitions would necessitate a new politics of care and fundamental reorganization of the civic community to expand 'kinship' and the bonds that compel mutual recognition and political inclusion. The paper closes by turning to the use of torture by the CIA in the context of the American war on terror to elucidate the persistence of discourses of necessity in contemporary politics of righteous anger and brings forth similar misrecognitions in the interest of American exceptionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Mostly the culture of literacy has taken shape within a realm of freedom, seemingly distant from the needs of the body and the demands of sustenance. At the same time, the world represented within so much of the world's narrative, both truth and fiction, has been saturated in struggle and deprivation. This article tries to make some sense of this juxtaposition, freedom on one side and necessity on the other: in particular, the pull of past or residual forms of unfreedom in the sphere of literary representation, within and against new or emerging expressions of emancipation, themselves accompanied or countered in modern times by ever-novel styles of exploitation [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay examines the proper treament of (i) naming (ii) necessity. (A) It argues their mutual independence (B) provides a treatment of naming separately from any idea of "designation" (C) gives treatment of de re modality without any use of possible worlds, essences, concepts, rigid designators (D) it argues an ultimate asymmetry–naming/referring is a key real notion of semantics; necessity should not be the central idea in the metaphysics of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saul Kripke states in Naming and Necessity that he presents a better picture of the reference of names than the traditional description theory. I answer the question why his picture is better than the traditional description theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper celebrates the fortieth anniversary of Naming and Necessity by gathering together some reflections I have made on that work over the years. The paper focuses on aspects of the book that I think have been misunderstood, overlooked, mistakenly rejected, or simply merit more emphasis. The paper starts with the philosophy of language, first discussing Kripke's most powerful argument against description theories of reference: the "ignorance and error" argument. It then considers Kripke's causal‐historical "better picture"; his discussion of rigidity; and finally, "direct reference" an implausible doctrine that has been wrongly attributed to Kripke. The rest of the paper is concerned with essentialist doctrines that Kripke has urged about biological kinds, chemical kinds, and individuals. These doctrines have been trenchantly criticized by some philosophers of science. I think that the relevant sciences support Kripke and do not support the critics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke puts forth a series of arguments against theories of proper names he calls Frege‐Russell theories. As the title reveals, Kripke takes Gottlob Frege's theory of sense and Bedeutung to be a good representative of these theories. In this essay, I characterize how Frege might have answered Kripke. I agree with Kripke that presumably Frege thought that the sense of a proper name is the same as some definite description. I, however, question his assumption that Frege's theory of proper names was a theory of meaning as he uses the term. I go even further and suggest that it is not so obvious that Frege thought, at least always, that the role of the concept of sense in his theory is a semantic concept at all. This constitutes the heart of my reconstruction of Frege's answer. I argue that this, together with Frege's conception of natural languages, would have allowed him to hold that the sense of a proper name may sometimes be the same as the sense of an indefinite or even a wrong description. This makes Frege's theory immune to Kripke's counter‐arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kripke's arguments in Naming and Necessity that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori are convincing, but his examples that purport to be cases of contingent truths that can be known a priori are more problematic. These examples bring out something important about reference and meaning, but this paper argues that the knowledge of speakers who fix the reference of a name or word by stipulation is not appropriately classified as a priori knowledge. The paper discusses the factual presuppositions required for the success of the acts that establish semantic connections between both simple names and theoretical terms and the objects, properties, and relations to which they refer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the historical‐causal picture of reference Kripke sketches in Naming and Necessity is highly influential, Kripke in fact says very little about what reference is and how it comes about. In this paper I point out that the possibility of asking WH‐questions (i.e. 'what?', 'who?', 'which?') about a sound or inscription pattern (e.g., what does that refer to?) shows that in case of names especially, their reference, if there is one, will be preserved by a causal‐historical chain constituted by transmissions of the (physical) patterns themselves, even in absence of language users or any linguistic intentions. I sketch out a causal‐informational theory of reference, that holds that the causal aspect of refence transmission is due to two‐factors. On the other hand there are informational chains constituted by data transmissions, on the other, also communicational rules by which speakers can interpret the data as information of something are needed. In most part the causal‐informational theory sketched in the paper can be viewed as complementing Kripke's original causal picture. However, I will argue that Kripke's account of fixing the reference of proper names in 'initial baptisms' is inadequate. I will argue that most cases of seemingly fixing the reference via use of a definite description (e.g., the naming of Neptune) in fact presuppose a prior causal‐informational connection to the named object, thus essentially fixing the reference in the same way as in cases of baptism by ostension. I will further argue that in the cases that do not fall into the previous category, the baptism by definite description simply fail to fix any reference. I thus conclude that there is no such thing as fixing the reference of a proper name by definite description. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I try to outline what I take to be Naming and Necessity's fundamental legacy to my generation and those that follow, and the new perspectives it has opened up for twenty‐first century philosophy. The discussion is subdivided into three sections, concerning respectively philosophy of language, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy. The general unifying theme is that Naming and Necessity is helping philosophy to recover a Golden Age, by freeing it from the strictures coming from the empiricist and Kantian traditions and reconnecting it to the world and the objects that populate it. Because of this, in the concluding paragraph I tentatively suggest that Kripke's philosophy may be seen as a sui generis form of naturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present study, I focus on the diverse manifestations and aesthetic consequences of travel in the work of some artists that may nevertheless represent a vast variety of where such artistic results, connected to the experience of travel, may point to. Therefore, I am interested in what artists can "do" with the various experiences collected in a journey and how they influence their pieces and their approach to art and its working. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an account of the early career of Martha Kneale, née Hurst, and of the five papers she published between 1934 and 1950. One on metaphysical and logical necessity, from 1938, is particularly interesting. In it she considers the metaphysics of time and offers an explanation of 'the necessity of the past', which has some resemblance to Kripke's ideas about metaphysical necessities, in that it assigns an important role to experience in how we come to know them. But Kneale's view is very different from Kripke's, depending not on doctrines about rigid designation but rather on recognition of the failure of the atomist/empiricist account of 'simple' and 'complex' concepts. That account cannot deal with such things as the relations of the determinates of a determinable like colour. A plausible corollary of this, which Kneale exploits, is that some of our experience reveals to us that there are phenomena which are intrinsically complex in having multiple distinguishable aspects, but where those aspects are inseparable. Other of the papers show Kneale to have been pursuing interesting lines of thought about McTaggart's argument against the reality of time and on the mind-body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a theory of necessity operators within a version of higher-order logic that is neutral about how fine-grained reality is. The theory is axiomatized in terms of the primitive of being a necessity, and we show how the central notions in the philosophy of modality can be recovered from it. Various questions are formulated and settled within the framework, including questions about the ordering of necessities under strength, the existence of broadest necessities satisfying various logical conditions, and questions about their logical behaviour. We also wield the framework to probe the conditions under which a logicist account of necessities is possible, in which the theory is completely reducible to logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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