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At the turn of the seventeenth century, Bruno and Cavalieri independently developed two theories, central to which was the concept of the geometrical indivisible. The introduction of indivisibles had significant implications for geometry - especially in the case of Cavalieri, for whom indivisibles provided a forerunner of the calculus. But how did this event occur? What can we learn from the fact that two theories of indivisibles arose at about the same time? These are the questions addressed in this paper. Relying on the methodology of “historical epistemology”, this paper asserts that the similarities and differences between the theories of Bruno and Cavalieri can be explained in terms of “shared knowledge”. The paper shows that the idea - on which both Bruno and Cavalieri build - that geometrical objects are generated by motion was part of the mathematical culture of the time. Tracing this idea back to its Pythagorean origins thus sheds light on the relationship between motion and continuum in mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alexander’s Infinitesimal is right to argue that the Jesuits had a chilling effect on Italian mathematics, but I question his account of the Jesuit motivations for suppressing indivisibles. Alexander alleges that the Jesuits’ intransigent commitment to Aristotle and Euclid explains their opposition to the method of indivisibles. A different hypothesis, which Alexander doesn’t pursue, is a conflict between the method of indivisibles and the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist. This is a pity, for the conflict with the Eucharist has advantages over the Jesuit commitment to Aristotle and Euclid. The method of indivisibles was a method that developed in the course of the seventeenth century, and those who developed ‘beyond the Alps’ relied upon Aristotelian and Euclidean ideals. Alexander’s failure to recognize the importance of Aristotle and Euclid for the development of the method of indivisibles arises from an unwarranted conflation of indivisibles and infinitesimals (Sect. 2). Once indivisibles and infinitesimals are distinguished, we observe that the development of the method of indivisibles exhibits an unmistakable sympathy for Aristotle and Euclid (Sect. 3). Thus, it makes sense to consider an alternative explanation for the Jesuit abhorrence of indivisibles. And indeed, indivisibles but not infinitesimals conflict with the doctrine of the Eucharist, the central dogma of the Church (Sect. 4). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In “The Jesuits and the Method of Indivisibles” David Sherry criticizes a central thesis of my book Infinitesimal: that in the seventeenth century the Jesuits sought to suppress the method of indivisibles because it undermined their efforts to establish a perfect rational and hierarchical order in the world, modeled on Euclidean Geometry. Sherry accepts that the Jesuits did indeed suppress the method, but offers two objections. First, that the book does not distinguish between indivisibles and infinitesimals, and that whereas the Jesuits might have reason to object to the first, the second posed no problem for them. Second, seeking an alternative explanation for the Jesuits’ hostility to the method, he proposes that its implicit atomism conflicted with the Catholic doctrine of the sacrament of the Eucharist, and was therefore heretical. In response to Sherry’s first criticism I point out that the Jesuits objected to all forms of the method of indivisibles, and that the distinction between indivisibles and infinitesimals consequently cannot explain the fight over the method in the seventeenth century. With regards to the Eucharist, I agree with Sherry that the Jesuits were indeed concerned about the method’s affinity to atomism and materialism, though for a different reason: these doctrines were antithetical to their efforts to impose divine hierarchy and order on the world. In as much as the technical details of the miracle of the Eucharist mattered, they provided no grounds for objecting to a mathematical (rather than physical) doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss the differences between the ancient and the modern notion of mathematical continuity. We focus on three ancient approaches to the continuum, namely the monist, the atomist and the Aristotelian approach. Afterwards, we analyze the construction of real numbers by Dedekind, Weierstrass and Cantor. The modern continuum is characterized by these constructions, but is a more general notion. We compare the ancient conception of continuity and the modern approach in order to show that the modern concept of mathematical continuity cannot be interpreted as part of the ancient theoretical framework, or as some kind of extension of this framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study notions of absolute continuity for functions defined on Rn similar to the notion of α-absolute continuity in the sense of Bongiorno. We confirm a conjecture of Malý that 1-absolutely continuous functions do not need to be differentiable a.e., and we show several other pathological examples of functions in this class. We establish some containment relations of the class 1-ACWDN which consits of all functions in 1-AC which are in the Sobolev space W1;2loc , are differentiable a.e. and satisfy the Luzin (N) property, with previously studied classes of absolutely continuous functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A novel method is proposed through an effective combination of the subdomain adaptive integral method (SAIM) with the fast far-field approximation (FAFFA) for efficient computation of electromagnetic scattering problems. In the SAIM technique, the whole perfectly electrically conducting structure is decomposed into subdomains and each subdomain is properly handled by the AIM with its local Cartesian grid individually. A current continuity boundary condition is introduced on the interface between contiguous subdomains to guarantee the accuracy. Moreover, the FAFFA technique is utilized to speed up the process of updating the modified excitation vectors. Numerical results show that the present hybrid method can not only significantly decrease the number of auxiliary grid points and the memory requirement of Green’s function matrix, but also improve the convergence of the iterative process compared to the conventional AIM. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In a series of recent articles, Matthew Clayton, Andrew Williams and Rasmus Sommer Hansen and Soren Flinch Midtgaard argue that a key virtue of Ronald Dworkin’s account of distributive justice, Equality of Resources, is that it provides a distribution that is continuous with the evaluations of the individuals whom it ranges over. The idea of continuity, or as Williams calls it the ‘continuity test’, limits distributive claims in at least one important way: one person cannot claim compensation from another when she does not believe she is worse off than him. In this article, I challenge whether an account of distributive justice should be continuous with the evaluations of the individuals whom it ranges over. My argument is that continuity competes with another consideration, namely, correctness. An account of distributive justice should track who actually is disadvantaged, not whether individuals believe they are disadvantaged. In addition, I offer an account of how we can get closer to a correct account of who is disadvantaged based on two sources of evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indivisibility of the French republic – sovereignty and French republicanism – universalism in French political thought – spatial and social dimensions of the indivisibility doctrine – indivisibility and identity-based classifications – Dilution of the indivisibility doctrine – a crisis of French universalism [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

International territorial conflicts are frequently characterized by political recourse to narratives of nationalist entitlement, stifling conflict resolution by raising domestic audience costs and discursively limiting bargaining flexibility. Conflict incentivizes elite employment of such claims precisely because security threats and fear of violence heighten popular resonance of adversarial collective identity frames. This article argues, however, that consensus mobilization behind nationalist territorial claims is highly dependent upon the particular narratives elites select to justify them. Employing controlled individual-level experiments administered to diverse populations in Israel, it demonstrates how exposure to competing narratives of homeland, security, economic prosperity, and settlement impacts support for control of East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. Although indivisible claims to 'United Jerusalem', the Golan, and West Bank settlement blocs and strategic highlands are generally considered popular consensus issues in Israel, only particular narratives trigger consensus mobilization behind each. Some narratives even encourage conciliatory policy attitudes against such appeals. As a democracy embroiled in multiple enduring territorial disputes, analysis of the Israeli case contributes to understanding of the limits and political consequences of elite rhetoric. Demonstrating the affinity between narrative frames and popular policy preferences, this article also lends insight into the intersubjective beliefs that drive mass support for nationalist territorial claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that an original debate over the relationship between time and the intellect took place in Northern Italy in the second half of the sixteenth century, which was part of a broader reflection on the temporality of human mental acts. While human intellectual activity was said to be 'above time' during the Middle Ages, Renaissance scholars such as Marcantonio Genua (1491-1563), Giulio Castellani (1528-1586), Antonio Montecatini (1537-1599) and Francesco Piccolomini (1520-1604), greatly influenced by the Simplician and Alexandrist interpretations of Aristotle's works, proposed alternative conceptions based on the interpretation of De anima 3.6 (430b 7-20) according to which intellectual acts happen in a both 'undivided' and 'divisible time'. In order to explain Aristotle's puzzling claim, they were led to conceive of intellectual activity as a process similar to sensation, corresponding to a certain lapse of time (Castellani), an instant (Montecatini), or a mix of instantaneousness and concrete duration (Piccolomini), depending on their theoretical options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Continuity Test is the principle that a proposed distribution of resources is wrong if it treats someone as disadvantaged when they don't see it that way themselves, for example by offering compensation for features that they do not themselves regard as handicaps. This principle - which is most prominently developed in Ronald Dworkin's defence of his theory of distributive justice - is an attractive one for a liberal to endorse as part of her theory of distributive justice and disadvantage. In this article, I play out some of its implications, and show that in its basic form the Continuity Test is inconsistent. It relies on a tacit commitment to the protection of autonomy, understood to consist in an agent deciding for herself what is valuable and living her life in accordance with that decision. A contradiction arises when we consider factors which are putatively disadvantaging by dint of threatening individual autonomy construed in this way. I argue that the problem can be resolved by embracing a more explicit commitment to the protection (and perhaps promotion) of individual autonomy. This implies a constrained version of the Continuity Test, thereby salvaging most of the intuitions which lead people to endorse the Test. It also gives us the wherewithal to sketch an interesting and novel theory of distributive justice, with individual autonomy at its core. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory's opponents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bynum (Putting information first: Luciano Floridi and the philosophy of information. NY: Wiley-Blackwell, ) identifies Floridi's focus in the philosophy of information (PI) on entities both as data structures and as information objects. One suggestion for examining the association between the former and the latter stems from Floridi's Herbert A. Simon Lecture in Computing and Philosophy given at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, open problems in the PI: the transduction or transception, and how we gain knowledge about the world as a complex, living, information environment. This paper addresses PI across a model of interoperating levels: perception (P)-intuition (N)-computation (C)-information (I), as factored by cognitive continuity (1), temporality (2), and constitution (3). How might we begin to characterize our experience of an abstract information object across such a matrix? Chudnoff's rationalist distinctions between perception and intuition serve as a first rung of the ladder. Turing's brief references to the utility of intuition, in an allied, rationalist-Cartesian sense, provide the next step up to computation. Floridi provides the final link from computation to information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as 'continuous'. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of 'continuity' to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory-a puzzle stemming from the thought that some of the brain processes underlying consciousness do not exhibit continuity. I argue that these problems can be solved by distinguishing between three possible bearers of the property of 'continuity'-(1) the State of Consciousness, (2) the Stream of Experience, and (3) what is represented by experience-and two different senses of 'continuity'-'strict' and 'extreme' continuity. I conclude by providing a positive account of the continuity of consciousness, according to which the State of Consciousness exhibits 'strict' continuity, and the Stream of Experience exhibits 'extreme' continuity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the differential properties of the convolution of functions with a generalized Bessel-Macdonald kernel. The integral properties of a function are characterized in terms of its decreasing permutation. The differential properties of the convolution are described in terms of its modulus of continuity of arbitrary order in the uniform norm. We obtain order-sharp estimates for the modulus of continuity of the convolution. By way of application, we present two-sided estimates for the modulus of continuity of the classical Bessel potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Z houshu 《周書》 section of the S hangshu 《尚書》, reflecting on the dynastic changes from Xia to Shang and from Shang to Zhou, understands 'heavenly mandate' as the common element that brings about all changes within a historical continuum. For Z houshu, it is 'heavenly mandate' that makes historical continuity possible. Furthermore, 'heavenly mandate' is understood to manifest itself with the hopes of the common people and to be realized by the freewill of the king. Thus historical changes can be accommodated. The Chinese idea of historical identity continued to be enriched after the Chun Qiu 春秋 Period. But in terms of its characteristic understandings of history, it remained much the same as in the Z houshu: Interpreting history with a common element recognized therein, with the stress always on continuity though historical changes are accommodated from a humanist perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocates of occasional identity have two ways of interpreting putative cases of fission and fusion. One way—we call it the Creative view—takes fission to involve an object really dividing (or being replicated), thereby creating objects which would not otherwise have existed. The more ontologically parsimonious way takes fission to involve merely the ‘separation’ of objects that were identical before: strictly speaking, no object actually divides or is replicated, no new objects are created. In this paper we recommend the Creative approach as the best way of dealing with certain problem cases involving teletransportation. Our considerations yield novel takes on psychological-continuity theories of personal identity and survival, and on the puzzle of Theseus' ship. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on different cake cutting theories and calculate their optimum efficiency. It reports that the valuation of different parts of cakes is different for different players and the density functions are used to determine the efficiency. It highlights the use of 2 cuts and 3 cuts to cut a cake between 3 players to show fair division of indivisible goods.

Recent research indicates that toddlers and infants succeed at various non-verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks; here we asked whether toddlers would also succeed at verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks that imposed significant linguistic demands. We tested 2.5-year-olds using two novel tasks: a preferential-looking task in which children listened to a false-belief story while looking at a picture book (with matching and non-matching pictures), and a violation-of-expectation task in which children watched an adult 'Subject' answer (correctly or incorrectly) a standard false-belief question. Positive results were obtained with both tasks, despite their linguistic demands. These results (1) support the distinction between spontaneous- and elicited-response tasks by showing that toddlers succeed at verbal false-belief tasks that do not require them to answer direct questions about agents' false beliefs, (2) reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief understanding as assessed by spontaneous-response tasks, and (3) provide researchers with new experimental tasks for exploring early false-belief understanding in neurotypical and autistic populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the Institute of Croatian History / Radovi Zavoda za Hrvatsku Povijest is the property of Zavod za Hrvatsku Povijest, Filozofski Fakultet and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Thomas Kuhn is the most famous historian and philosopher of science of the last century. He is also among the most controversial. Since Kuhn’s death, his corpus has been interpreted, systematized, and defended. Here I add to this endeavor in a novel way by arguing that Kuhn can be interpreted as a global response-dependence theorist. He can be understood as connecting all concepts and terms in an a priori manner to responses of suitably situated subjects to objects in the world. Further, I claim, this interpretation is useful for three reasons. First, it allows us to systematize and defend Kuhn’s views. We can therefore better appreciate him as a thinker in his own right. Second, it deepens our understanding of both the uniqueness of Kuhn’s views and the continuity of those views with those of others. We can therefore better appreciate his place in history. And third, as I explain in the paper, my interpretation affords us the only example of an ethnocentric global response-dependence theory. We can therefore better appreciate the versatility of response-dependence itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the continued use of the early medieval horizontal waterwheel form, well into the post-medieval period in the Atlantic Provinces of the British Isles. It argues that archaeological and documentary evidence demonstrates that the horizontal mills of western Ireland represent the continued use of this technology from the early medieval period in to modern times. Similarly, it argues that the traditional horizontal mills of Scotland and its western islands can, on linguistic grounds, be linked into the same enduring tradition. The continued use of this technology in these societies appears to be as much a product of social context and choice, as it was a technological 'survival' in a 'marginalised' area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Educação is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We tested whether the intervening time between multiple glances influences the independence of the resulting visual percepts. Observers estimated how many dots were present in brief displays that repeated one, two, three, four, or a random number of trials later. Estimates made farther apart in time were more independent, and thus carried more information about the stimulus when combined. In addition, estimates from different visual field locations were more independent than estimates from the same location. Our results reveal a retinotopic serial dependence in visual numerosity estimates, which may be a mechanism for maintaining the continuity of visual perception in a noisy environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a current claim, theological interests and constraints are no longer present in the scholarly research on the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth. This article analyses the treatment of the relationship between Jesus and John the Baptist carried out in several of the most representative monographs published recently on the Galilean preacher in confessional quarters, in order to check such a claim. The study proves that they fail to take into account in a consistent way the many similarities existing between the two preachers, postulate many differences which do not bear close scrutiny, and exaggerate the importance of several others. The surprising number of unfounded inferences and incongruities riddling these works puts into question the reliability of their supposedly rigorous reconstructions, and betrays to what an extent the religious and theological myth of the absolute «uniqueness» of Jesus is yet in force today, even in the scholarly field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article deals with an unknown mathematical manuscript to be found in the Recueil Original of the manuscript of the Pensées. I give a technical description of the original manuscript, followed by a mathematical analysis of the proposition proved by Pascal. The interest of this study lies in the fact that this theorem is the only handwritten draft remaining in Pascal’s mathematical works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes Galileo's mathematization of motion, focusing in particular on his use of geometrical diagrams. It argues that Galileo regarded his diagrams of acceleration not just as a complement to his mathematical demonstrations, but as a powerful heuristic tool. Galileo probably abandoned the wrong assumption of the proportionality between the degree of velocity and the space traversed in accelerated motion when he realized that it was impossible, on the basis of that hypothesis, to build a diagram of the law of fall. The article also shows how Galileo's discussion of the paradoxes of infinity in the First Day of the Two New Sciences is meant to provide a visual solution to problems linked to the theory of acceleration presented in Day Three of the work. Finally, it explores the reasons why Cavalieri and Gassendi, although endorsing Galileo's law of free fall, replaced Galileo's diagrams of acceleration with alternative ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I propose that identity is momentary, fluid, and multiple while simultaneously providing us with a sense of sameness and continuity. building on Valsiner's ideas about human sense-making I suggest that we can reasonably deal with the multiplicity/unity paradox if we conceive of this process as resulting in the construction of a fuzzy field of hyper-generalized personal sense, which ordinarily functions as an implicit and unspeakable background of our everyday functioning, while being constantly re-created through momentary instances of foregrounded and explicit identity- dialogues. I illustrate the ideas put forward in the paper by analysing a case of a young woman experiencing a change in her being. finally, in an attempt to illustrate and further develop the case I introduce a metaphor of carpet-weaving as an apposite image for thinking about identity as a process of a multiple and fragmented, yet also a united and constant being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The set of competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods of is an important solution concept in the literature. In this paper, we consider a farsighted version of the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set by using the farsighted approach of and by modifying the domination relation defined by to incorporate farsightedness. We show that there exists a unique farsighted stable set, which coincides with the set of competitive allocations. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Interpretations of Rom. 4 have often been subordinated to a single theme from Rom. 3.21-31, such as justification by faith, the inclusion of the Gentiles, or Paul's demonstration that his gospel is in continuity with the Torah. While there is undeniable merit in these contentions, this article argues that Paul invokes Abraham for multiple purposes in order to answer his interlocutor's charges against his gospel (Rom. 3.27-4.1). Paul's argument is multifaceted and cannot be reduced to a single overarching theme. The second half of the article provides an exegesis of the oft-neglected 4.16-25 and argues that Paul crafts a reading of the Abraham story, a reading which is indebted to his prior Christological commitments, which answers the interlocutor's question from 4.1 as to how Abraham can be the forefather of both Jews and Gentiles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central doctrine of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason holds that the content of human experience is rooted in an affection of sensibility by unknowable things in themselves. This famous and puzzling affection doctrine raises two seemingly intractable old problems, which can be termed the Indispensability and the Consistency Problems. By what right does Kant present affection by supersensible entities as an indispensable requirement of experience? And how could any argument for such indispensability avoid violating the Critique's doctrine of noumenal ignorance? This essay develops a new solution to both problems, setting out from the continuity between Kant's early and mature views on sensibility and mind-world relations. Kant's early writings subscribe to an interactionist cosmology opposed to both Leibniz's preestablished harmony and Malebranche's occasionalism. The modern debate on mind-world relations shaping Kant's early cosmology points us to a widely recognized motivation for interactionism, turning on a constraint on agency within certain noninteractionist cosmologies. In particular, Kant's early conversion to a libertarian theory of freedom, together with his rejection of occasionalism, provides the basis for a compelling argument for the indispensability of world-mind affection relations. Extended to the transcendental idealist framework, the same argument reveals noumenal affection as an indispensable presupposition of some knowledge claims consistently upheld by Kant. This leads in turn to a satisfying solution to the Consistency Problem, showing that the doctrine of noumenal affection is not merely consistent with, but is partly motivated by, Kant's commitment to noumenal ignorance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are "further facts," over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with physicalism and requires us to posit hidden facts about our persistence. This essay shows how to resolve this conflict using the idea that imagining from the first-person point of view is a guide to centered possibility, a type of possibility analyzed in terms of centered worlds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National models of social action over-privilege continuity and uniformity. They discount change — which they lack the capacity to explain (other than through exogenous shocks) -and neglect diversity within countries. This paper focuses on the national culture model which it argues requires commitment to illogical arguments and to suppositions which are theoretically and empirically untenable. An evaluation of each, it is argued, points to the existence of, and possibilities for, considerable national diversity and change - not pervasive and enduring national uniformity. Reflecting on the model's rise and fall in anthropology, the paper also provides an outline explanation of its retention within organization studies and speculates about its future within that discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the problem of assigning a finite number of indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., to the same number of individuals. There is also a divisible good (money) and the individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of individuals can improve the allocation for all of its members, by misrepresenting their preferences, is characterized. It turns out that given a regularity condition, the outcome of a fair and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule must maximize the use of money subject to upper quantity bounds determined by the allocation rule. If available money is nonnegative, objects may be jobs and the distribution of money a wage structure. If available money is negative, the formal model may reflect a multi-object auction. In both cases fairness means equilibrium, i.e., that each individual receives a most demanded object. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a fair division problem with indivisible objects such as jobs, houses and one divisible good like money. It is required that each agent be assigned with exactly one object and a certain amount of money. Agents are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities in money but their reservation values over the objects are private information. A dynamic mechanism is proposed that induces all agents to act honestly rather than strategically and assigns the objects with money to agents efficiently and fairly; at the same time it achieves privacy protection for the agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time prevents being from forming a totality. Whenever there is time fragmentation and multiplicity occur. Yet, there also ought to be continuity since it is the same being that was, is and will be. Because of time, being must be both identical and different. This is the key problem that Aristotle attempts to resolve in his discussion of time in Book IV of the Physics. This essay considers three privileged notions: limit, number and ecstasies on which Aristotle relies at crucial moments of his inquiry and shows (1) that limit, number, and ecstasies are actually three ways of approaching the same phenomenon, and (2) how they allow Aristotle to reconcile divisibility and indivisibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing (1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, (2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and (3) that the individuality of a cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a pespective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intutions about what counts as cognitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction. Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We consider random assignment of multiple indivisible objects. When each agent receives one object, [Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., 2001. A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory 100, 295–328] show that the probabilistic serial mechanism is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly strategy-proof. When each agent receives more than one object, we propose a generalized probabilistic serial mechanism that is ordinally efficient and envy-free but not weakly strategy-proof. Our main result shows that, if each agent receives more than one object, there exists no mechanism that is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly strategy-proof. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We study the mean sojourn times in two M/G/1 weighted round-robin systems: the weight of a customer at any given point in time in the first system is a function of its age (imparted service), while in the second system the weight is a function of the customer’s remaining processing time (RPT). We provide a sufficient condition under which the sojourn time of a customer with large service requirement (say, x) and that arrives in the steady state is close to that of a customer which starts a busy period and has the same service requirement. A sufficient condition is then provided for continuity of the performance metric (the mean sojourn time) as the quanta size in the discrete time system converges to 0. We then consider a multi-class system and provide relative ordering of the mean sojourn times among the various classes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the rise of the real and simulated cadaver of scientific and forensic investigation in popular culture and the cultural meanings of that ascent. While it spotlights the celebrity corpse, it explores the obscure one too, for modern media constructions have transformed both into infotainment commodities. In societies oversaturated with images of sex, death is the new sex, the corpse the new body to be voyeuristically explored. Gorer's essay, The pornography of death (1955) is updated with a discussion of three kinds of dead body porn, including corpse porn. Other themes examined include: the continuity and discontinuity between actual corpses and their facsimiles, how images of corpses figure with other representations of the body, cultural ambivalence about the corpse, the banality of death, the search for immortality, and how the corpse as a social construction challenges Western cultural taboos and practices surrounding the dead body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We study continuity envelopes in spaces of generalized smoothness and . The results are applied in proving sharp embedding assertions in some limiting situations. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]