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The 1965 India-Pakistan War, also known as the Second Kashmir War or the 'Seventeen-Day War', is usually understood through the lens of military history, regional geopolitics and the long-standing 'Kashmir question'. This article looks instead to the construction of social and political meaning around the conflict through an examination of the war's mediatisation in Pakistan. An analysis of different media forms—including radio broadcasts, news dailies, press photography and popular poetry—reveals how a war imaginary was shaped by both domestic crises and global ideological dissension, extending beyond the notion of a timeless Indo-Pak enmity. Taking place at a pivotal moment in the global Cold War, public narratives were built upon not only state agendas but also popular concerns regarding militarism, sovereignty and the politics of aid. These framings ultimately illustrate the deeper entanglements that exist between war, media and mass publics—extending beyond the goals of wartime propaganda alone to produce new national imaginaries and collective subjectivities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interstate reconciliation between India and Pakistan after the shock of Sino-Indian War of 1962. The post-1962 war political-security equations, particularly at the regional level, gave rise to a situation that necessitated India's reconciliatory negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir. Though the rival parties engaged in a six-round political dialogue, the process ended up in a deadlock followed by spirals of armed clashes that culminated in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The paper shows that this reconciliation process proved counterproductive because it was imposed from outside and the principal parties, in a window-driven haste and under the political-strategic constraints, could not mutually agree on to reconcile their political differences and settle the territorial dispute over Kashmir. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indo-Israeli relations have gained tremendous momentum under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. While the PM's deliberate and cohesive efforts deserve credit, other significant contributing factors must not be overlooked. Moving away from the dominant Modi-centric approach, this article explores significant contributing factors in the new phase in India-Israel relations under Modi. It concludes that more than a single factor, it is a combination of conditions and factors that actively and collectively brought about the change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The India–Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian leaders were central to Pakistan's consideration of a military solution to the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists and analysts have long argued that Indian strategic restraint is informed primarily by Indian political leaders’ aversion to the use of force. For some scholars, India’s apparent fixation with restraint can be traced to the very foundation of the modern Indian state. This article contests what it considers to be a reductionist position on strategic restraint. Instead, it argues that Indian strategic restraint has in fact been shaped more by structural issues such as the limited availability of logistics and capabilities, the impact of domestic political contest, the effect of international attention to a crisis and the need for international legitimacy, and the political, economic, and military cost-benefit analysis associated with the use of force and the potential for escalation. In sum, it contributes a historically grounded understanding of strategic restraint. The article looks closely at India’s decision-making process in one major experiment with the use of force against Pakistan in 1965. The case clearly shows that political leaders were hardly uncomfortable or unsure about the use of force. It was the military leadership at the time that sought to temper the ambitious and potentially escalatory policies considered by the then prime minister. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an overview of the history of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in India. The Indo-Pak war of 1965 offered the trigger to establish a think tank and settled on the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) as IDSA model. All directors of IDSA have had to retain a fine balance between the dependence for funding on the government and the imperative of autonomy, and IDSA shunned private and foreign funding.

The law of enemy property has a long and complex history in Bangladesh. Although it originated from the emergency laws promulgated during the India-Pakistan war in 1965, its legacy continued in independent Bangladesh till recent years. The law, however, did not itself encourage any encroachment of property rights; rather it has been misused by different political regimes, to legalise the unlawful benefits accrued to influential land grabbers under the pretext of enemy property. This study, through a historical review, draws a legal analysis of how the process of taking over enemy properties by the government authorities had no legal justification and was used merely as a technique to deprive religious and indigenous minorities, of their lawful property rights. The study also scrutinises the present law, which promises to return the properties and attempts to look into the reasons behind its failure to make effective returns to the lawful owners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Territorial conflicts have been among the most important fallouts of the modern nation states, with the states advancing different kinds of justifications to claim the territory in conflict. These justifications play an important role in shaping the actions of the states and the solutions thereof. The states propound their claims on ethnic, strategic, geographic proximity, economic and religious considerations. As a result, there is an acute need to study the territory in conflict, not in terms of objective attributes but as outcome of a dynamic relationship that exists between an area, social processes and ideologies that give it meaning. This dynamic relationship is visible in the territorial justifications that Pakistan has raised over Kashmir. The justifications put forward by Pakistan are not grounded in a particular claim like the two-nation theory, but they have varied with time to hide underlying economic, geostrategic and other related motives in changing global and domestic context. Shifting the claims from religious to strategic or economic basis affects the nature of the solutions envisioned. The solutions in context of changing claims go beyond Pakistan’s officially held position of United Nations sponsored plebiscite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even after 65 years of their independence, India and Pakistan are locked in a deadly territorial conflict over Kashmir. Despite several mediation attempts and many rounds of bilateral negotiations, Kashmir still defies a solution. Fisher and Ury's win-win solution in Getting to Yes is applied on India-Pakistan conflict to understand the nature of conflict and see how their four suggested methods can help addressing the deadlock in the peace process between India and Pakistan. In the second part of the paper Fisher and Ury's method, "focus on interests not positions" is used to understand the Indian fears and concerns behind India's declared policy of calling Kashmir as their "integral part". It is despite the fact that the first Indian Prime Minister, Nehru had made solid pledges in UN and on other forums of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. An attempt is made to look at Indian concerns more deeply and find out the possible ways of addressing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article demonstrates how Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan change regional security dynamic in South Asia. The formation of regions, intensification and importance of regional power is interesting for different kind of scientists, including political analysts, due to the changing values of national nations in a global world and due to the power separation between members of international system. Regional nations, which are analyzed, are one of the most rapidly growing markets, what is more, a lot of important changes in politics, which give the world a tumble of particular tendencies, happens in these countries. All things considered, it is important to get information about processes which happens in Southern Asia, especially, in India which is a regional power. The article analyzes how regional security system in South Asia. Analysis of regional security dynamic in India-Pakistan conflict demonstrates how organization serves the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of transactions among states, but the ambiguity in them also functions as a tool to manage distribution of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study deals with the enduring conflict between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. The ongoing conflict is analyzed as an enduring rivalry; characterized by three major wars (1947-48), 1965, 1971, low intensity military conflict (Siachen), mini war at Kargil (1999), internal insurgency, cross border terrorism. We examine the progress and the status of the dispute, as well as the dynamics of the India Pakistan relationship by considering the influence of USA and China in crisis dynamics. We discuss the possible solutions offered by the various study groups and persons. Most of the studies were done in crisp environment. Pramanik and Roy (S. Pramanik and T.K. Roy, Game theoretic model to the Jammu-Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. International Journal of Mathematical Archive (IJMA), 4(8) (2013), 162-170.) studied game theoretic model to Jammu and Kashmir conflict in crisp environment. In the present study we have extended the concept of the game theoric model of the Jammu and Kashmir conflict in neutrosophic envirorment. We have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an application of principle of neutrosophic game theory to understand properly of the Jammu and Kashmir conflict in terms of goals and strategy of either side. Standard 2×2 zero-sum game theoretic model used to identify an optimal solution [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the significance of American diplomatic intervention in the de-escalation of two South Asian nuclear crises – the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001–2002 military stand-off. The American role in those crises is often referred to as crisis manager or secondary in the context of the region's strategic and crisis stability. A careful analysis of American diplomatic interventions, however, reveals that the role is much greater, conceptualized here as deterrence diplomacy, meaning intense, focused diplomatic activity specifically to forestall crisis escalation and the outbreak of large-scale Indo-Pakistani war. More than is commonly realized, the United States was integral in the crisis strategies of both countries. It played a pivotal role preventing crisis escalation and the outbreak of large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan in both confrontations. And the American role was instrumental in the termination of those confrontations, particularly the Kargil conflict. Without America's effective deterrence diplomacy, any of the past South Asian crises could have escalated to the nuclear level. No global generalization can be made from this analysis because it is mostly South Asia specific. However, it is plausible to argue that the United States, as the key systemic power, will have an important role in future regional deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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The article applies an integrative approach to the problem of Kashmir, which transcends traditional geo-political analysis to include history, identity, economics, and sociology. Part I defines the sources of the India-Pakistan conflict based on the reasons for the first two wars fought between India and Pakistan. Part II looks at the most important time periods in terms of negotiations between the two countries--namely from 1953-1956 and again from 1960-1964. Part III looks at the actions of Indian and Pakistani negotiators in relation to negotiating theory. Part IV examines the role played by international law in the ongoing conflict. Part V provides suggestions for the future. It concludes that international law ultimately plays a much smaller role in the solution to conflicts than the world community expects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1971 South Asia crisis demonstrated that Britain, despite the contemporaneous discussions which were taking place over British accession to the European Economic Community, continued to possess global interests. After a brief period of neutrality in the growing conflict between India and Pakistan, the government of Edward Heath leaned decisively towards the former. This contrasted with the American 'tilt' in the other direction, towards Pakistan. The resulting differences of approach between the Heath government and the Nixon White House reflected a wider pattern of division between British and American policy makers over Asia rather than any attempt by Heath to underscore his European credentials by distancing himself from the USA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain mediated successfully in the Indo-Pakistani clash over the Rann of Kutch region in spring 1965, but when hostilities broke out over Kashmir soon afterwards, 10 Downing Street managed to alienate New Delhi with what was supposed to be an even-handed statement. The Indian government seemed to feel that the Labour government had violated some kind of historic special obligation to them, and the Anglo-Indian relationship was damaged. For his part Prime Minister Harold Wilson condemned the 'pro-Pakistani faction' in the Commonwealth Relations Office responsible for drafting the statement, although he had been warned of the likely consequences. Eventually, the Soviet Union, operating through the United Nations, mediated an end to the war. The article draws upon British government documents to fill a gap in the literature, and it ends with a few reflections on Britain's 'decline' as demonstrated by the failure to end the conflict over Kashmir in 1965. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pattern of civil-military interaction in India is informed by the notion that civilians should refrain from involvement in operational matters. The emergence of this trend can be traced back to the defeat against China in 1962. In its aftermath, the belief that the debacle occurred because of civilian interference took hold. Thereafter, politicians restricted themselves to giving overall directives, leaving operational matters to the military. The Indian 'victory' in the subsequent war with Pakistan was seen as vindicating this arrangement. This essay argues that the conventional reading of the China crisis is at best misleading and at worst erroneous. Further, it contends that the subsequent war with Pakistan actually underscores the problems of civilian non-involvement in operational issues. The historical narrative underpinning the norm of civilian abstention is at the very least dubious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the film industry in Pakistan. It is mentioned that Pakistan had a prospering film industry during the 1950s, which competed with the Indian film industry based in Bombay, India. However, in the 1970s, the Punjabi film industry hijacked the Lahore-based film industry, which produced low-budget movies that included violence and pornography. Indian movies have been banned in Pakistan since the second India-Pakistan war in 1965. However, it is stated that Indian productions are available in the form of pirated compact discs and unauthorized satellite dishes in Pakistan. "Khuda Ke Liye," directed by Shoaib Mansoor is a film released after a long gap by the Lahore based industry in Pakistan.

The article analyzes the issue behind the India-Pakistan War in 1965. According to the author, the Indian leadership agreed to the creation of Pakistan, which resulted from the liquidation of the British Empire in South Asia, only to destroy it. One of the steps undertaken by India to destroy Pakistan is withholding its apportioned share of arms in order to render it defenceless. Also noted is the willingness demonstrated by Pakistanis to defend their homeland, which showed that they are a nation.

Examines the relationship between India and Pakistan. Historical account of the conflict between the countries; Significance of crisis stability to Indo-Pakistani relationship; Role of information dissemination in dealing with the security concerns of the countries; Ways to reduce nuclear weapon concerns.