Search

Russia is in the middle of modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era ballistic missiles with fewer improved missiles. In a decade, almost all Soviet-era weapons will be gone, leaving a smaller but still effective force that will be more mobile than what it replaced. As of early 2013, Russia has a stockpile of approximately 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,800 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage, along with 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. There is some uncertainty in these estimates because Russia does not disclose how many nuclear weapons it has and the United States has stopped releasing data supplied by Russia under strategic arms reduction agreements. The authors use public statements made by Russian officials, newspaper articles, observations from commercial satellite images, private conversations with government officials, and analysis of Russian nuclear forces over many years to provide the best available unclassified estimate of Russian nuclear forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2012, India successfully test-launched the Agni V ballistic missile–and though the missile needs more testing and is still several years away from operational deployment, the Agni V introduces a new dynamic to the already complex triangular security relationship among India, Pakistan, and China. India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, sufficient for 100–130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, the authors estimate that India has produced 80–100 nuclear warheads. In this article, the authors explore how the country will need even more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the allocation of money that Great Britain has decided to allocate on national defense during 1980 to 1981. Defense spending is expected to increase by 3.5 percent in comparison to 1979-80. It further provides information on the agreement made by Great Britain to accept 160 United States ground-launched cruise missiles. The British government announced of its agreement to buy Trident I missiles from the United States. It also provides information on the British Polaris force and whether it should still be considered a strategic force.

The article discusses the actions of the U.S. federal government regarding the revolutionary change to its missiles. The author points several reasons for the actions which include that the perfection and proliferation of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads have placed the country different from Europe regarding its target precision. It also notes that a huge difference existed between the destructive power of the most conventional weapons, and that the combination of the submarine and the ballistic Polaris missile is anther factor for the upset.

Reports on the plans of the U.S. government for its operational nuclear warheads as of January 2005. Future plans for the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles; Number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles that are on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines; Move of the government to put cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles into life-extension programs.

A nuclear-weapon system designed to guarantee the UK's survival could hasten its political demise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses former U.S. Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarine chaplain Fr. John "Jake" Francis Laboon, Jr. It briefly describes Laboon's education, his service in World War II, and his appointment to the U.S. Navy Commander Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet and the FBM program in 1959. It compares the FBM program with the submarine culture with which Laboon had been familiar in World War II, the U.S. submarine missile program known as the Polaris, and his leadership and mentoring of lay religious leaders within the U.S. Navy

In 2007, the UK Parliament began the process of developing a successor to the country's Trident-armed fleet ofVanguard-class submarines, which would allow the UK to maintain an unbroken deterrent patrol beyond the 100thanniversary of its becoming a nuclear-weapons state. At the insistence of the Liberal Democrat Party, however, the Cabinet Office has conducted a review of alternatives to this programme. Malcolm Chalmers explores the financial, strategic and technical issues raised by the review and analyses the vulnerabilities that the programme faces. He suggests that the UK remains committed to maintaining a nuclear deterrent with global reach, capable of confronting large as well as small nuclear powers into the indefinite future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revolving barrel gun is the principal component of the close-in weapons system (CIWS) that provides important terminal defense against anti-ship cruise missiles that have penetrated fleet defenses. The muzzle flow field of the revolving barrel firing is extraordinarily complex. The 3D computational model was formulated to illustrate the details of the flow field produced by the revolving barrel gun firing. The algorithm of a second order monotone upstream-centered schemes (MUSCL) approach with the advection upstream splitting method (AUSM) solver was used to simulate the high pressure muzzle flow field. The interior ballistic process was coupled with the simulation. The predicted muzzle velocity and maximum bore pressure were in good agreement with those measured in gun firing. Moreover, the muzzle flow field was obtained during the revolving barrel firing and was subsequently analyzed. The maximum lateral velocity of the first and second projectile fired was about 1.6 and 3.8 m/s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the UK undertakes its defence review, ballistic missile defence will not be at the top of the list of priorities. However, if Britain is to maintain an autonomous operational capability, this decision cannot be put off. As Iran and other rogue states continue to acquire and develop ballistic missiles, the UK must seriously consider its options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this study, 165 safety related events involving Russian nuclear submarines from 1959 to 2007 are surveyed with respect to vessel generation, reactor type, various types of initiating event (loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), transients, common cause initiators (CCI)), safety significance and the release of radioactivity. The survey of vessel operations shows that the accumulated number of vessel operating years (VOY)/reactor operating years (ROY) from 1959 to 2007 is 4991/9335. With respect to the survey of safety related events, out of the 165 events registered, there have been identified 17 accidents, 133 incidents and 15 deviations. As to event characteristics, 14 LOCA and 7 criticality events have been identified. The accident rates for each of the vessel generations exhibit the usual characteristics of a technological system under development, gradually going from a high accident rate to a stable lower level – however, with clear differences between reactor technologies (PWR versus LMC) and vessel generations. The mean-time between failures (MTBF) for various types of safety related events for the Russian nuclear submarines has been calculated for various events using the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) power-law model. When applied to the complete set of events, this model fails due to a cluster of safety related events that occurred between 1984 and 1987. With respect to releases of radioactivity, the MTBF has been calculated to 893±138 VOY. All safety related events identified as part of this study are given in . [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Speciation of 60Co in the suspended matter of the bottom layer and in the topmost layer of the bottom sediment, collected from the coastal zone of the Chazhma Bay of the Japan Sea at the place of the nuclear submarine accident in August 1985, is studied. Only 50% of 60Co is extracted from suspended matter with 0.1–2 M HCl, and 94%, from the bottom sediment, which was attributed to different degree of crystallinity of the matrix (Fe3O4, α-FeOOH, and α-Fe2O3 formed through partial oxidation of the structural materials), which controls the strength of 60Co binding, and also to readsorption on another carrier (organic matter). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British government has decided to modernise its nuclear arsenal and retain nuclear weapons at least to the 2050s. The British government's primary rationale is that it needs to retain nuclear weapons as a necessary response to an uncertain future strategic security environment. The article argues that one of the primary rationales for the retention of nuclear weapons is to maintain political and military credibility in Washington and to facilitate British participation in military interventionist activity alongside the United States, thereby assuring both continued American engagement in the world and Britain's long-term security. This vital but perhaps more indirect role for British nuclear weapons, and the wider nuclear relationship with the United States, has generally been excluded from the British government's discourse. The article concludes by arguing that parliamentary and NGO activity aimed at making Trident modernization decisions open to public scrutiny face significant obstacles, and that the policy-making process will be a long one, stretching well into the next decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article authors described the evolution of Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) guidance and navigation technologies from the first FBM system, Polaris, through succeeding generations to Poseidon. During this period, the technology evolved from a quite inaccurate single warhead missile to one with greater accuracy and the ability to deliver up to fourteen warheads to targets as much as 100 miles apart. Both guidance and navigation technologies were developed to provide more accuracy. However, these developments were evolutionary in nature, and more radical technologies were, for differing reasons, not incorporated even if they apparently promised potentially higher accuracy. Despite pressure for improved counterforce capability, a combination of warhead yield and accuracy that could threaten hardened missile silos and command centres, from other parts of the Navy and the Department of Defense, the FBM system remained predominantly orientated towards assured destruction retaliation. Although the autonomy that the Special Projects Office had earlier gained was reduced during the decade of 1960, its leaders were still able to avoid a commitment to a hard target FBM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper (published in two Parts) presents a detailed historical case study of the evolution of the Polaris, Poseidon and Trident weapons programmes, and of the development of the guidance and navigation technologies which are essential to their role in nuclear strategies. Over the last thirty years, these technologies have changed in the direction of greatly increased missile accuracy. Simultaneously, the strategic rationale of these weapons has shifted from that of ultimate retaliatory 'counter-city' deterrent (the main perceived role of Polaris) to 'counterforce' targeting of opposing silos and command posts (a major role of Trident II). Has technological change been an independent causal factor in this sequence, bringing into being a new strategy, or is technological change the consciously intended product of political will? Part I of this paper presents the historical material as far as the production of Poseidon: Part It will complete the history, and then discuss the various analytical frameworks commonly used to explain such developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the capabilities and constraints of the Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in the U.S. This missile provides all the capabilities that previously could only offered by a combination of bombers, Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, and SLBMs. It does not suffer from significant constraints that land-based forces incur due to their basing modes. The author considered that D-5 could make the peace dividend easier and safer to collect, and thus it is worth collecting even if it costs more than the current land-based strategic nuclear modernization program.

Focuses on the Trident II (D-5) missile program of the U.S. which includes about 4,000 very accurate, high-yield warheads which is four times the destructive capacity of the planned 100 MX missiles. Criticisms on the promotion of Trident II as cost-effective; Demise of the original selling features of the Trident II; Occurrence of the push for Trident II without the public's awareness of the real capabilities of Trident I.

Presents a briefing and chart on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States at the end of 1990. Briefing on the year's developments; Decommissioning of several nuclear submarines; Pie Charts, Listing of all strategic weapons.

This article discusses the commissioning of the U.S.S. West Virginia Ohio-class nuclear submarine. The third submarine scheduled to be armed with Trident II (D5) missiles has been commissioned, but if it sails on its first patrol next year as planned, the missiles are not likely to be armed with W88 warheads. The West Virginia's initial patrol may be delayed, or its missiles may be armed with W76 warheads borrowed from Trident I missiles. New warhead production has virtually ground to a halt because key plutonium processing and production facilities at the Rocky Flats plant in Colorado are shut down. For years the navy has avoided saying how many Trident submarines it wanted. But congressional pressure and a shrinking military budget, as well as an imminent strategic arms agreement, have forced a decision to terminate Ohio-class submarine production.

Focuses on the public controversy over the number of warheads being tested in the Trident II (D5) missile in the U.S. Discovery of troublesome features of the missile; Realization of the planning considerations in maintaining a large nuclear reserve force.

The article reports on issues and topics related to international efforts geared towards nuclear warfare development and testing. The nuclear-powered submarine George Washington was commissioned by the U.S. Navy, on December 30, 1959 in Groton, Connecticut. It is capable of firing l4-ton missiles with thermonuclear warheads from underwater positions. Great Britain has planned to perform underground testing of conventional explosives scheduled to take place at the Greenside lead mine in Glenridding, Westmorland.