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Although legislative brawling is a common occurrence—with 365 cases reported across the world between 1990 and 2018—we have a limited understanding of why members of representative bodies engage in violence. Does the lack of institutionalization or the violent nature of some legislators cause such behavior? This article argues that legislators with intense policy preferences engage in costly actions, such as brawling, as a means of signaling their policy commitment. To validate this claim, this article examines legislators' participation in legislative brawling and filibusters in Korea before and after the adoption of a filibuster procedure. I find that extreme members engaged in brawling before the adoption of procedural reform, while they engaged in filibusters after the adoption. This transformation of brawlers into filibusterers suggests that legislative brawling does not necessarily indicate a violent nature of some legislators but rather a desire by legislators to signal their policy commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does rhetoric about the filibuster inform people's views of political figures? We argue that support or opposition to eliminating the filibuster conveys information to citizens that they can use to assess a politician's ideological position. This information can also be used when citizens form affective evaluations of politicians, but its effects depend on people's partisan identities. We use a preregistered survey experiment—along with a secondary analysis of cross‐sectional survey data—to show that a candidate who says that the filibuster should be eliminated is viewed as being more liberal than a candidate who says that it should be protected or who says nothing. We further show that Democrats like candidates who use elimination rhetoric more than protection or no rhetoric while Republicans react in the opposite way. These results suggest that elite messaging about salient political institutions can fundamentally shape people's views of political figures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Congress is highly polarized and closely divided between the two parties, the majority party will often lack the votes to overcome a Senate filibuster on controversial matters. Majorities have tried to circumvent the filibuster by using the budget reconciliation process--which allows a simple-majority to close debate and move to a final vote--to make major policy on topics ranging from immigration to labor to climate. These efforts sometimes fail on account of the Byrd rule, a rule of legislative procedure that serves as a gatekeeper for the reconciliation process. The most important part of the rule is brief and somewhat cryptic, providing that a provision violates the rule and can be struck from a reconciliation bill if the provision "produces changes in outlays or revenues which are merely incidental to the nonbudgetary components of the provision." This Article excavates and critically examines the body of law that implements this provision of the Byrd rule. First, a key part of the Byrd rule inquiry is an allthings- considered balancing of a provision's budgetary effects as compared to its policy effects. Second, the Senate parliamentarian's office, which administers the Byrd rule, has developed other principles to implement the rule. The office is more likely to find consistent with the rule provisions that, for example, involve direct rather than indirect budgetary impacts, do not impose mandates on private parties, do not target particular entities, and do not concern certain substantive topics. Third, precedent plays a significant role in the Byrd rule inquiry: past decisions carry great weight, though the parliamentarian's office may narrow or depart from precedent in rare but important cases. Recently published materials and original interviews with Senate staffers reveal how these decisional rules shape the operation of the Byrd rule in practice. In addition to its descriptive contribution, this Article also subjects each aspect of Byrd rule doctrine to critical analysis. Some aspects of the doctrine stem naturally from the text of the rule, further a plausible purpose, and are sensible ways of implementing the rule's open-ended language. Other aspects of the doctrine risk being over- or under-inclusive relative to the plausible purposes of the Byrd rule, generate internal tensions in the doctrine, or can give rise to gamesmanship by the parties. But normatively evaluating Byrd rule doctrine on the whole is challenging because there is no present consensus about the rule's purpose, given that doctrine departed from the rule's initial goal of promoting deficit reduction efforts more than two decades ago. Understanding how the Byrd rule works on the ground holds important lessons for the operation of the contemporary Congress, the development of an underappreciated area of law, and the content of public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reformers have offered many proposals for changing the Senate filibuster, ranging from modest adjustments to outright abolition. I draw on formal models of obstruction in legislatures to analyze the consequences of three such proposals: creating an opportunity to close debate with a simple majority vote after a sufficiently long floor debate, making it more onerous for the minority to sustain filibusters, and outright abolishing the filibuster. In each of these cases, the models offer a more complete understanding of the effects of these proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We know Magee was close to Murray because the latter served as Magee's second in a duel in early 1812, in which Magee lost a finger before killing a Frenchman. In June 1812, with war on the horizon between the United States and England, Augustus William Magee, a young U.S. Army lieutenant on the Louisiana frontier, threw away a promising military career and cast his lot with a Mexican revolutionary, José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara, in a bold attempt to liberate Texas from the Spanish Empire. 55 For evidence of the connection of members of the Gutiérrez-Magee Expedition, see Bernsen, "Origins and Motivations of the Gutiérrez-Magee Filibuster." Perkins would probably have preferred to bring Augustus into the family business, but in 1807, the year after Magee's graduation from Phillips Exeter, President Jefferson's Embargo Act shuttered Perkins's trading empire. [Extracted from the article]

We investigate whether the filibuster stimulates public debate and discussion within Congress, as its advocates argue, or whether, instead, it discourages legislators from devoting time and attention to bills they know will not pass, as its critics attest. To do so, we exploit multiple sources of variation in the filibuster, measures of legislative discussion, and identification strategies. In the preponderance of analyses, we observe null effects. Where significant differences are observed, they nearly always suggest that a strengthening (weakening) of the filibuster coincides with a reduction (increase) in the volume of floor speeches or time devoted to legislative affairs. Whatever benefits the filibuster may confer, they do not appear to include enhanced discussion on the floors of Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Filibusters and efforts to defeat them shape the public reputation of U.S. senators and their parties. I develop a formal model to study how senators' concerns about their own and the opposing party's reputation influence their behavior in the Senate. In the model, a majority and opposition party bargain over policy. Each party earns a reputation with a core primary constituency which observes legislative bargaining and forms beliefs about its party's policy priorities. Filibusters and attempts to defeat them are costly and can therefore credibly signal that a party values a particular issue. I identify conditions under which parties use these costly procedural moves to preserve or enhance their reputation when the costs of obstruction deter purely policy-motivated parties from filibustering or attempting to defeat a filibuster. Alternatively, under certain conditions parties strategically choose not to pursue policy victories that they otherwise would either to protect their own reputation with a constituency that values other issues more highly or to deny the opposing party the opportunity to signal. I examine the model's empirical implications for the relative frequency of filibusters, cloture votes, and tabling motions and identify conditions under which the Senate is endogenously supermajoritarian. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post commander later concluded Crawford had probably managed to conceal himself somewhere on the grounds of the fort until the arrival of the USS Convoy, a transport leaving for Ship Island, Mississippi, on which Crawford became a stowaway.[88] In September 1866, Crawford made his way to Washington, D.C. and despite being an escapee, he met with Secretary of State William H. Seward and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells. Concluding Maximilian and the French army in Mexico were in violation of the Monroe Doctrine and that Benito Juárez was the rightful leader of Mexico, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant dispatched General Philip Henry "Fighting Phil" Sheridan with 50,000 Union veterans to the border. Showing off his war wounds and claiming to be a West Point graduate, Crawford was given a captain's commission in the 5th Tennessee Volunteers by the Union governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, whom Crawford considered a personal friend. As far as Seward was concerned, "The sole objective of the expedition seems to have been the pillaging of the town."80 Hearing of what happened on the Rio Grande, General Wallace blamed Crawford's "stupidity, madness, and gross violation of instructions" for the failure of the filibusters. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on the history and impact of the filibuster in the U.S. Senate, particularly in relation to civil rights legislation. It discusses how the filibuster has evolved over time and its use in obstructing popular reform on various issues. It highlights the recent examples of the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act and the Freedom to Vote Act being blocked by filibusters, which has raised concerns about the effectiveness and compatibility of the filibuster.

We identify and analyze an enigma of U.S. Senate procedure. Why does its pivotal voter under simple-majority voting prefer that the body makes law using super-majority cloture (e.g., the filibuster, or threat thereof, within the strictures of Rule XXII)? Using a two-stage game of procedural choice and policy choice, we reveal and rationalize the Manchin Paradox and explore its implications for super-majoritarianism and legislative organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Senate filibuster and the administrative state are two of our time's most divisive and important issues. Many, especially recently, have argued that the filibuster is an anti-democratic relic that prohibits a democratic majority from passing laws supported by the majority of Americans. The Supreme Court also appears ever closer to limiting the power of administrative agencies to regulate. Administrative agencies have put humans on the moon, invented the internet, pulled millions out of poverty, built the interstate highway system, and more. However, what scholars and the legal field often miss is that budgets are core to agency's power and capacity to act. And the Senate filibuster is key to this process because it ensures the capacity of administrative agencies to serve the public good is does not ebb and flow with the short-term intererts of partisan politics. This Article argues for the preservation of the filibuster for appropriations legislation. This Article develops the concept of administrative capacity and applies it to a case study on climate science agency budgets. With a conservative Supreme Court hostile to the administrative state, agency budgets are the next frontier of executive power. Without filibuster protections, Presidents and administrative agencies may be unable to solve future challenges not because they lack the statutory authority but because they lack the administrative capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the media report on Senate procedure, and how does reporting affect the public’s views of process and policy? This paper examines both parts of this question in the context of the Senate filibuster. Using new data on coverage of failed cloture motions over two decades, I show that news accounts typically explained these votes in generalized ways that obscured minority obstruction or equated the vote with simple defeat. These tendencies were more pronounced in television news, and they were more common as the “60-vote Senate” became the norm. I then use a survey experiment to test the opinion effects of differences in filibuster reporting. The results provide some limited evidence that more detailed reporting on cloture leads to lower support for the underlying policy, and they show that respondents who consumed more detailed reporting perceived the Senate’s procedure as less fair. Partisanship conditioned these effects, with minority-party identifiers becoming less supportive of the policy and majority-party identifiers less approving of the process. The findings demonstrate that the press does not consistently provide voters with a clear understanding of the Senate’s supermajoritarian processes, and that this reporting has consequences for voters’ judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Budget reconciliation is a special procedure in Congress that exempts policy from the Senate’s sixty-vote threshold to overcome a filibuster. A central condition is the Byrd Rule’s exclusion of nonbudgetary provisions, or provisions which produce outlays or revenues that are “merely incidental” to their “non-budgetary” components. This paper makes two arguments about this exclusion. First, Congress should classify provisions as “budgetary” or “non-budgetary” based on substance rather than form, treating implicit transfers as budgetary. This is justified by underlying economic realities and administrative costs. Second, even under a formal definition of “non-budgetary,” an implicit transfer can be restructured to comply with the letter and the purposes of the Byrd Rule. This is done by explicitly subsidizing the implicitly-taxed population and substituting a more general explicit tax. This paper’s recurring example is a 2021 Byrd Rule decision by the Senate Parliamentarian ruling that Democrats could not include a grant of legal permanent resident status to Dreamers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While President Trump was extreme in bis contempt for legal and political norms, bis presidency was consistent with the direction in wbicb tbe Republican Party bas moved over the past several decades. Strategies put in place by Trump and other Republicans, along with institutional aspects of our country's "democracy," assure tbe Republican Party's continued, outsized controt despite Trump's failure to achieve a second term. Tbis Article reviews Trump and bis Administration's contempt for political norms, explores tbe Republican Party's bard turn to tbe right, and discusses bow tbe Republicans bave been able to bold onto power greater tban one would expect considering that it is the distinct minority part¥. Finally, tbe Article examines whether the sharp trend to tbe right might be slowed. proposing reinstituting the filibuster and formalizing tbe "blue slip" process for judicial appointments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a history of smuggling and filibuster in Texas, particularly in the early 1800s. Also cited are how a group of Anglo Americans successfully staged a filibuster against Spanish Texas in August 1812, the Anglo American smugglers who were arrested by Sergeant Falcon and his men in October 1808, and other criminals like Henry Quirk, who was from Virginia.

The case for reform of the filibuster practice in the Senate is much stronger now than a few decades ago. The emergence of conservative populism and radical Republican strategies in the Senate has created more serious consequences for the Senate's traditional rules and practices. This essay draws a clear connection between conservative populism, the strategies of Senate Republicans, and legislative gridlock in the Senate. It concludes with a review of the arguments of Senators Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema against reform and argues that they fail to account for how conservative populism has so thoroughly changed their institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Senate is marching, Senate style, toward majority rule. Chamber rules have long required super, rather than simple, majorities to end debate on major and minor matters alike. But occasionally over its history – and several times over the past decade – the Senate has pared back procedural protections afforded to senators, making it easier for cohesive majorities to secure their policy goals. Both parties have pursued such changes – sometimes imposed by simple majority, other times by a bipartisan coalition. Why has the pace of change accelerated, and with what consequences for the Senate? In this article, I connect rising partisanship and electoral competition to the weakening of partisan commitments to Senate supermajority rule. No one can predict with any certainty whether the Senate will yet abolish the so-called "legislative filibuster." But pressures continue to mount towards that end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In today's hyper-partisan environment, scholars and commentators contend that the filibuster poses a nearly insuperable obstacle to a Senate majority party's agenda, limiting Congress's output to non-controversial measures. Drawing on data about congressional majority party agenda priorities from 1985 to 2020 we identify when and how majority party legislative efforts fell short of success and take stock of the degree to which the filibuster was the primary culprit. Not surprisingly, our data confirm that the filibuster is a significant problem for majority party agendas. But an even more common cause of failure is the majority party's inability to agree among themselves. Despite increased voting cohesion generally, parties in the polarized era still routinely struggle to bridge their own internal divides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on part of the argument from my recent book, The Senate: From White Supremacy to Government Gridlock (University of Virginia Press, 2021), I critique what I call "Senate exceptionalism:" the notion that the Senate is the framers' particularly special or remarkable creation. I do so by contrasting the historical and constitutional distortions that support this institutional conceit with the realities of the founding and American political development. After reviewing the parallels between the ideas and tenets of American and Senate exceptionalism, I introduce four arguments from the book that undermine the basis of the Senate's exceptionalism and in particular draw critical attention to the constitutional mythology surrounding and supporting the filibuster in the form of Senate Rule XXII and its three-fifths supermajority threshold for ending debate on many matters before the Senate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Hipogrifo: revista de literatura y cultura del siglo de oro is the property of Hipogrifo: revista de literatura y cultura del siglo de oro and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study is to analyze how the fragmentation of the pro-democracy camp affected their council voting and policy stances before 2019. The quantitative measurements including the rice and unity indices are adopted to evaluate the cohesions of the pro-Beijing and pro-democracy camps in bill voting, in which the strategies employed by the pro-democracy camp are further analyzed. Before the 2010s, the moderate democrats deliberately separated from the administration and some of them also kept distance from the radical groups. However, since the radical ideologies gained supports from time to time, the moderate democrats had been forced to follow more pro-active lines against the administration. Although the political sphere of Hong Kong has drastically changed after the 2019 Anti-extradition Protests, the cohesion of the pro-democracy parties in the previous terms of the Legislative Council still facilitates to understand the legislative process in the city. In this article, 18 then members of the Legislative Council from different parties were interviewed in 2018, providing various insights on the analysis of pro-democracy cohesion and fragmented politics in Hong Kong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes that the U.S. Senate adopt a "popular-majoritarian cloture rule," under which a motion to close debate and proceed to a final vote would carry if but only if supported by a majority of Senators who collectively represent a larger share of the population than those Senators in opposition. This rule, which would be a constitutional exercise of the Senate's power to set the rules of its proceedings, would make the body more democratic and more functional, and would be preferable both to the current filibuster rule and to simple majority rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Senate majorities of both parties have altered the rules of debate to speed up deliberations on presidential nominees, particularly on judicial nominations. These deployments of the Senate's "nuclear option," however, have had no demonstrable effect with respect to judicial nominations. We suggest the evidence highlights the role of "opportunism" rather that partisan obstruction in delaying nominations. We also document how thwarting opportunism by removing substantive legislation in favor of exclusively considering judgeships early in an administration's tenure can speed up deliberations. We recommend seven specific reforms along these lines to improve the appointments process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the development of punctuated equilibrium theory makes broad reference to the bureaucratic procedures that regulate budgetary decision making and makes reasonable assumptions about the influence of those procedures on the dynamic of resource allocation, little is known about how the specific mechanisms work. This has led to a call to understand the processes that cause friction in greater detail. This study examines how budgetary output patterns may be influenced by governments' strategic fiscal choices. Using an approach that highlights the roles of various fiscal policy‐making processes, we found significant deviations of budgetary output patterns in capital projects, restricted funds, and entitlement spending, thus signifying the influence of fiscal practices on resource allocation decisions. We further examined how fiscal influences may be realized in the political process of democratization in Hong Kong. By examining legislative filibuster cases related to capital projects, we found evidence associating democratization with greater institutional friction and consequently with larger budgetary output punctuations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the origins and history of some of the parliamentary expressions and practices used in Commonwealth Legislatures. Topics covered include the origin and meaning of filibustering, some examples of filibustering in the U.S. Congress and in the British Parliament, and the meaning of budget under the Constitution of India.

There is scientific consensus on a prevailing hypothesis that, down to near-zero levels, the occurrence of future cancer is proportional to the dose of radiation received. Some experts and professional bodies in the field, however, subscribe to this linear no-threshold (LNT) model in scientific discussions but object to the use of the model for policy-related purposes. Given the large economic interests that are affected by policy decisions, this article recommends that experts and professional bodies avoid the intermingling of scientific and policy debates and acknowledge a logical implication of the LNT hypothesis: Low-dose radiation will sicken and kill a number of people over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through empirical research a model is provided that represents strategic manufacturing effectiveness. It shows what are the important factors that directly affect strategic manufacturing effectiveness, how they relate to each other, and how they can be measured. Research is done to identify and define the stages of strategic manufacturing effectiveness. It links the four-stage framework to the concept of strategic groups and identifies two strategic groups whose effectiveness has been shown to relate positively to manufacturing competence. Details are presented on the positive effects that strategic manufacturing effectiveness has on manufacturing performance, the effects on types of industry, the sizes of firms and the types of production process used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]