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In Eastern Europe, collective victim beliefs have become integral elements of national ideologies, especially amid rising geopolitical polarization. In this study, we investigated how exclusive victimhood was related to geopolitical attitudes in Hungary and Serbia. The study involved Serbian (N = 630) and Hungarian (N = 471) adult national samples stratified by gender, age, political orientation, and place of residence. As expected, exclusive victimhood predicted higher support for a geopolitical shift from the West (i.e., EU and US) to the East (i.e., Russia and China) via Euroscepticism in both samples. In Serbia, the strongest indirect effect was observed among participants with neutral attitudes towards the war in Ukraine. In Hungary, there was no expected moderated mediation while the direct effect of exclusive victimhood on the West‐to‐East geopolitical shift was largest for pro‐Russian participants and non‐significant for pro‐Ukrainian participants. Different measures of ethnic identity showed no expected moderation effect, but an exploratory analysis revealed that exclusive victimhood partially mediated the relationship between identity measures (superiority and attachment) and support for a pro‐Eastern (vs. pro‐Western) geopolitical orientation. We discuss how the construals of the past based on exclusive victimhood shape future geopolitical preferences of the public in Hungary and Serbia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europhilism has traditionally been associated with centre-left and centre-right parties, those parties that contributed to the development of the EU. However, centrist parties vary in their support of European integration. Yet, we know comparatively little about the extent to which these parties support European integration. Should they be classified as Eurosceptic, or do they continue to support European integration? A comparative analysis of national and European manifestos of centre-left and centre-right parties in Austria, Germany and the UK between 1990 and 2019 shows that pro-European attitudes can be split into three patterns: enthusiast, equivocal and critical Europhiles. These patterns are combined with Vasilopoulou's patterns of Euroscepticism to create a continuum from support for to opposition to European integration, thereby recognising that centre-left and centre-right party attitudes can change across time. These findings have implications for research on centre-left and centre-right parties' EU attitudes by identifying the nuances of the pro-European position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By now we are familiar with studies which tie being 'left behind' to voter support for populist or other extreme views. In the UK case, this is seen in support for Brexit but can also apply to support of parties such as UKIP (e.g. Bolet, 2021; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Comparative studies show that electoral support for populist parties in part reflects lowered trust in mainstream politics (e.g. Geurkink et al., 2020; Keefer et al., 2021; Mauk, 2020), which is seen as a behavioural indicator of slipping legitimacy. Political support for populist movements is interpreted as declining legitimacy of existing governments, and that decline is seen as being tied to economic stress and the 'left behind' areas. In this article, we ask whether economics stresses also have impact upon another and possibly more direct measure of government legitimacy – tax morale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does public opinion affect political discourse on issues that parties struggle to deal with? Although scholars tend to analyse party–voter linkages in terms of policy positions, parties can respond to public opinion by changing both the positions and the salience of their policy agenda. Based on original time‐series data of party discourse and voter preferences in France, Italy and the United Kingdom (1992–2016), this paper analyses how mainstream parties have changed their political discourse on European integration in response to an increasingly Eurosceptic public. Results show that mainstream parties have adapted their positions to changes in public opinion and have at the same time deemphasized European Union issues in their discourse as the public grew Eurosceptic. Parties did not talk more about Europe even when they followed the tides of public opinion. These findings challenge our current understanding of party responsiveness, have implications for theories of party competition, and contribute to debates on the legitimacy of the European project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the variation in public support for European integration? While the existing literature has predominantly focused on economic, cultural and political factors, the influence of geography has been largely overlooked. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by examining the impact of residing in the European Union (EU) border regions on voters' perceptions and attitudes towards the EU. Contrary to previous research, our study reveals a remarkable pattern, indicating that individuals living in border regions exhibit a higher propensity to vote for Eurosceptic parties and hold negative views on the EU. Through the utilization of both behavioural and attitudinal indicators in years ranging between 1999 and 2021 and employing statistical matching, our analysis robustly supports this finding. Moreover, we delve into the underlying mechanisms driving these negative attitudes in border regions, highlighting the significance of institutional factors. A mediation analysis reveals an interesting and previously unexplored theoretical twist: We find that residing in a border region is associated with lower trust in national political institutions, which translates into distrust in the EU. These findings suggest that it might be policymakers residing in the capital of the country rather than people on the other side of the border that make borderland inhabitants' attitudes distinctly negative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Editorial: Crisis, contention, and Euroscepticism" published in Frontiers in Political Science explores the interplay between crisis narratives and Euroscepticism in the context of European integration. The research topic delves into the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on narratives of integration/disintegration in the European Union, focusing on contentious politics and governance challenges. The article highlights the rise of Euroscepticism due to compounding crises, such as the 2008 financial meltdown and the influx of asylum seekers, leading to a surge in populist movements and far-right political parties across Europe. The authors suggest that addressing Euroscepticism requires more adaptable and inclusive governance strategies to ensure the longevity of European integration. [Extracted from the article]

Research demonstrates that mainstream parties often take up the issues and positions of emerging Eurosceptic and anti-immigration parties. Yet, these accommodative strategies generally do not pay off. Why do mainstream parties nevertheless accommodate these niche actors? I argue that mainstream-niche competition is governed by intra-party dynamics. The pressure exerted by niche parties alone does not suffice to drive internally united mainstream parties to accommodate. However, when mainstream parties face substantial intra-party divisions on the niche party’s issue, they may yield under internal pressure. I find empirical support for my theoretical claims on the issue of European integration using expert survey data on 78 mainstream parties in 14 Western European democracies between 1999 and 2019. The findings contribute to our understanding of the conditions under which niche parties are contagious and illustrate how intra-party divisions can steer parties away from vote-seeking strategies with consequences for voter representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive mobilisation thesis suggests that increasing knowledge on the European Union (EU) would lead to increased support for the institution. We test this with a strategic case whereby we provide information on the EU's subsidiarity principle to the citizenry of a small member state and examine whether it mitigates negative EU attitudes. In an original, pre-registered, population-based survey experiment conducted with members of a panel representative of the Dutch population, respondents were assigned randomly to a control group or a treatment: a professionally produced information video mimicking EU communications. Along with estimating the overall treatment effects, based on extant literature we assess whether these effects are moderated by the respondents' prior EU knowledge and level of populist attitudes. Consistent with the information deficit theory, we find that information provision decreases negative attitudes among the least knowledgeable. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide suggestions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2016, the EU has widely been considered to be in a state of 'polycrisis', where simultaneous, mutually reinforcing challenges threaten the Union's cohesion and legitimacy. Such polycrises may fracture Europe's political space, creating cross-cutting 'polycleavages' that polarise member states and their citizens asymmetrically, thereby constraining the EU's capacity to forge effective compromises on key policy issues. In so doing, they exacerbate the risk of the EU's falling into a multi-level 'politics trap', where negative politicisation of European issues inhibits national leaders from agreeing ambitious solutions in intergovernmental negotiations, while the ensuing deadlock in turn saps the Union's output-based legitimacy and fuels a Eurosceptic 'constraining dissensus'. In this introductory article, we develop an analytical framework elaborating the concepts of polycrises, polycleavages, and politics traps, which we then use to present and interpret the main findings of the contributions to this collection, focused on the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The most important takeaway from the contributions to this collection is that – consistent with our framework – the EU has clearly proved more resilient to the potential negative consequences of politicisation than many commentators had expected at the beginning of this long polycrisis decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of Euroscepticism has shifted the structure of political conflict in the European Parliament (EP) towards an increasingly dominant pro-/anti-EU divide. Focusing on the hard case of EU enlargement, this article examines changes in MEPs' discursive and voting patterns over the past two EP mandates. It combines two original datasets containing MEP statements during plenary debates and subsequent roll-call votes to examine the polarisation, cohesion, and consistency of legislative behaviour across different European Political Groups. The findings show that soft Eurosceptics drive a deepening of the pro-/anti-EU divide by radicalising in both discourse and vote to join hard Eurosceptics in their firm rejection of further enlargement. Pro-European MEPs, in contrast, show discursive accommodation of Eurosceptic concerns, with a growing inconsistency between sceptical discourse and continued vote-based support for enlargement-related initiatives. A case study of Turkey illustrates these two mechanisms. The findings shed light on the changing dynamics of political competition in the EP and the impact of rising Euroscepticism upon MEPs' legislative behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether further European integration is desirable is an ongoing question in public opinion research: both extant research and the outcome of various EU-related referendums show that many citizens hold negative views on proposals that lead to further loss of national sovereignty. An important issue thus arises: does the prospect of such additional sovereignty loss increase negativity towards the EU? This study attempts to answer this question using a pre-registered original survey experiment conducted among members of a nationally-representative high-quality Dutch panel. Our focus is on how exposure to proposed abolishment of EU member states' right of veto affects EU attitudes. In addition, we analyse whether the exposure effect is shaped by 1) citizens' prior populist attitudes and 2) the Eurosceptic character of the medium. Concerning the former, informed by recent in-depth qualitative research, we hypothesise that populist attitudes aggravate the extent to which exposure to potential loss of national sovereignty leads to more negative EU attitudes. Concerning the latter, we hypothesise that exposure via a Eurosceptic medium might either aggravate or abate the extent to which the newspaper message leads to more negative EU attitudes. We discuss our findings and provide suggestions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If European Union (EU) member states realise differentiations in EU Treaties, what effect do we see on public and political support for future integration? We argue on the basis of a two-tier integration theory and postfunctionalism that differentiations of member states do lead to a preference for slower future integration by its citizens and parties. Once citizens and parties are used to opting out, they demand more of the same in the future. We test our arguments with time-series cross-sectional data for 1994–2018 on all voluntary primary law opt-outs in the EU. Our panel matching estimates demonstrate that opt-outs decrease integration support. After a differentiation, parties become more Eurosceptic on average and publics express a lower preference for future integration. This suggests that differentiated integration is not a cure against Euroscepticism that leads to a unified EU in the future but rather reinforces two-tier integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The objective of the article is to investigate the suitability of the European Union (EU) convergence criteria as an evaluative instrument in assessing its progression from the monetary union (MU) to the fiscal union (FU). The secondary aim was to propose a list of 'fiscal confluence criter ia' as a foundation for evaluating member states' ability to adhere to the fiscal union. Research Design & Methods: A quantitative research methodology was employed, using eight indicators and three distinct methods (Euclidean distance, standardized sums, Technique for Order Preference and Similarity to Ideal Solution) to create a joint development measure, known as the core measure, for each group: CMMU and CMFU. I employed Spearman's - to calculate the rank correlation between Monetary and fiscal union. The research sample comprised all 27 European Union member states (EU MS). I sourced the datasets from reputable databases, namely Eurostat, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and Accounting for Transparency (AFT). Findings: The integrity level of the EU member states falls notably below the established thresholds. There are significant discrepancies between the countries. Consequently, the possibility of the EU attaining the next level of integration (FU) in the foreseeable future is limited. Implications & Recommendations: Given the obvious limitations on the ability of EU member states to pursue further integration in the immediate future, policymakers, and business entities within the EU should prioritize maintaining the agreement in its current form (Economic and monetary union). Further research should immediately concentrate on the causes and remedies of rising Euroscepticism in EU MS. Contribution & Value Added: This research offers valuable insights into the potential for further integration within the EU. Moreover, it initiates a discourse on the formulation of new criteria for the next level of integration (fiscal union). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Euroscepticism has become prominent across the European Union, also in countries that were originally seen as pro‐integrationist such as the Netherlands. Based on a qualitative analysis of claims in three major Dutch newspapers, I examine the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism in the Netherlands in the context of the 2009, 2014 and 2019 European Parliament elections. Mainstreaming refers to a process in which an idea becomes an integral part of debates in the public sphere. I examine the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism through a two‐part analysis that centres around a fourfold typology, which distinguishes between supportive, Euroalternative, soft Eurosceptic and hard Eurosceptic claims. I find that Euroscepticism has indeed become mainstream, in debates revolving around arguments for and against the European Union. Furthermore, Euroscepticism has not just become more prominent but has also moved from an outsider to an insider perspective. Yet, it often remains unclear what Euroscepticism actually entails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study was devoted to the analysis of the specifics of the anti-globalist rhetoric of contemporary right-wing politicians in the European Union and the United States in the context of their vision of a multipolar world. The purpose of the study was to identify key elements and features of the anti-globalist discourse of right-wing political forces, and its influence on the development of an alternative vision of the world order. The main findings showed that the anti-globalist rhetoric of right-wing politicians is characterised by a complex combination of economic, political, and cultural aspects. It was revealed that the key elements of this rhetoric are criticism of international trade agreements, opposition to immigration, Euroscepticism, and calls for the protection of national sovereignty. It was established that the vision of a multipolar world in the discourse of right-wing politicians is presented as an alternative to global liberalism and American hegemony, focusing on the principles of national sovereignty and balance of power. The analysis showed significant differences in approaches to anti-globalist argumentation between politicians of different countries, due to the specifics of national political cultures and historical context. In particular, in France, anti-globalist rhetoric is closely linked to the idea of protecting national identity, in Italy it focuses on criticising EU fiscal rules, and in the United States it has taken the form of "economic nationalism". The study found that the anti-globalist rhetoric of right-wing politicians has significant mobilisation potential, resonating with feelings of discontent and uncertainty in certain segments of the population. However, it was established that this rhetoric often ignores the positive aspects of globalisation and may contradict the international obligations of countries. The results helped to better understand the mechanisms of development and spread of anti-globalist sentiments, and their impact on political processes in the EU and the United States

There is a notable correlation between Eurosceptic and populist political actors, discourses and agendas across Europe. Since 2015, the ongoing conflict between Poland and the European Commission concerning the rule of law has brought European integration to the centre of Polish politics. The main focus of this article is on the relationship and interaction between populism and Euroscepticism, as analysed through the example of Polish political parties. To this end, the article investigates the different forms of EU contestation by Polish populist right-wing parties and assesses the extent to which these are expressed through populist discourse. We find a strong correlation between populist and Eurosceptic attitudes of Polish political parties. With the growing number of populist parties entering the mainstream and 'uncivil society' actors transforming into political parties, the anti-elitist discourse generates a need to locate the 'corrupted elites' outside of the national power structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of European integration processes in the countries of South-Eastern Europe is of particular relevance in the context of growing geopolitical tensions and the need to strengthen stability on the European continent. The pur- pose of this study was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of European integration processes in South-Eastern Europe, assess the current state of reforms, and identify key factors that affect the prospects for further integration of the region. As part of this purpose, a considerable number of documents, reports, etc., were analysed. The study examined the specific features of European integration processes in the countries of the region that are already members of the European Union and found that they have demonstrated different models of economic growth: Southern European countries have devel- oped a consumption-oriented model based on debt financing, while Central and Eastern European countries have opted for an export-oriented model that is largely dependent on foreign direct investment. An analysis of European integration measures and reforms in countries that have not yet joined the European Union showed uneven progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Economic reforms aimed at creating a functioning market economy and increasing competitiveness stay a key challenge. Foreign direct investment has played a significant role in modernising economies, but its impact on convergence with the European Union has been mixed. Trade liberalisation has contributed to a significant increase in trade between the region’s countries and the European Union, but economic convergence is still slow. An assessment of the prospects for further European integration revealed complex geopolitical dynamics. Growing competition between the European Union and other global players, such as Russia and China, poses additional challenges to the European in- tegration aspirations of the countries of the region. The energy dependence of some countries on Russia and significant Chinese investment in infrastructure pose potential risks to energy security and may lead to conflicts of interest. The Eu- ropean Union is increasing its influence in the region through a new enlargement methodology and financial instruments. The study showed that successful integration requires structural reforms, strengthening democracy, economic develop- ment, and overcoming historical conflicts. The findings of this study can be used to develop effective strategies to support European integration processes in the region and improve EU policy towards the countries of South-Eastern Europe

The purpose of this study was to identify and systematise the key factors that determine the electoral support for pro-Russian political forces in the European Union in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. To fulfil this purpose, a comprehensive analysis of the historical dynamics and current state of pro-Russian parties in the EU was performed, the level of their electoral support was investigated, and the key factors influencing their popularity were identified. The findings of the study show that Russian aggression against Ukraine has become a catalyst for significant transformations in the strategies and rhetoric of pro-Russian forces, forcing them to adapt to new geopolitical realities. The study covered a heterogeneous picture of electoral support for these parties in different EU countries: while in some states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, there was a decline in the popularity of openly pro-Russian forces, in other countries they maintained or even strengthened their positions. The key factors contributing to the rise in popularity of pro-Russian political forces were economic problems related to the energy crisis and inflation, Euroscepticism and anti-globalisation sentiment, and the influence of Russian disinformation. Cultural and historical ties with Russia also play a significant role, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. The study found that pro-Russian forces have adapted their rhetoric, often po- sitioning themselves as “neutral” and focusing on criticising sanctions against Russia from an economic perspective. This strategy allows them to maintain electoral support while avoiding direct accusations of supporting the aggressor. A signif- icant aspect of their activities has been the use of information technology to spread alternative narratives and undermine trust in European institutions. The findings of this study highlight the need for a comprehensive approach to counter- ing pro-Russian influences in Europe, including strengthening economic solidarity in the EU, improving communication between European institutions and citizens, and developing effective strategies to combat disinformation

Contemporary European populism, which has become particularly widespread in the last decade of the 21st century, is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon whose impact on democratic institutions has not been fully studied. The aim of this research was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the ideological foundations, electoral successes, and impact of populist movements on the functioning of democratic institutions in the EU. The study employed a comparative analysis method to identify the differences between right-wing and left-wing populism, an analysis of the programmatic documents of populist parties, a statistical analysis of electoral data, and the activities of populist governments. The main results of the study demonstrated the ambivalent nature and multivariate manifestations of populism in contemporary Europe. Significant ideological differences were identified between right-wing and left-wing populism, particularly in interpreting the concept of “the people”, the perception of fundamental societal divisions, and approaches to economic policy. An analysis of electoral successes demonstrated a growing support for right-wing populists in many EU countries, while left-wing populist forces showed a more ambiguous dynamic. The study of the impact of populist governments on the functioning of democratic institutions revealed serious challenges to the rule of law in Central and Eastern European countries, but less radical consequences in Southern Europe. It was established that the activities of right-wing populist governments in Hungary and Poland led to a systematic undermining of the principles of the rule of law through restrictions on the independence of the judiciary, freedom of the media, and the rights of the opposition. In contrast, left-wing populist governments in Greece and Spain primarily focused on socioeconomic reforms, avoiding the systematic undermining of democratic institutions. The research results revealed a growing trend towards polarisation of the political spectrum in many EU countries, which creates new challenges for the functioning of democratic institutions and maintaining the unity of the European Union. It was established that the impact of populism on democratic processes in the EU is contextually dependent and varies depending on national characteristics and the ideological orientation of populist forces. The research results can be used by public and governmental organisations and programs that promote political education and a critical approach to political choice

The Franco-German relationship is considered a measure of the European Union's overall health. Yet the bilateral ties between Germany and another founding member, Italy, are at least as important. Historical parallels between the two countries have been present since the founding of their modern nation-states. Economic differences have caused deep rifts that influence not just diplomatic relations, but also popular opinion. The rise of right-wing parties in both countries could be considered a new parallel, but upon closer inspection, there are important differences between the Alternative für Deutschland and Fratelli d'Italia. In the aftermath of the EU Parliament elections, it is worth taking a closer look at Germany, Italy, and what their relationship means for the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses Italian responses to the Treaties of Rome in 1957 by looking at media's role as a tool to both amplify voices and construct ideas on European integration. It attempts to expand upon and also challenges existing narratives on integration in Italy – which have tended to assume that 'Euroscepticism' largely emerged in a post-Maastricht context – by showing that the matter was already the source of significant politicisation and contestation, and that political actors used the outlets at their disposal to influence public opinion. Indeed, the Italian media conversations enveloping the Treaties of Rome – at a time when the introduction of RAI television was revolutionising the media landscape, and the Treaties were broadcast and politicised as a landmark event – highlight the variety of visions of European integration that had emerged. On the one hand, the ruling Christian Democratic government had radio and television under its harness, and used these channels to push a pro-integrationist orthodoxy on the Italian public. Nevertheless, we also see dissenting visions expressed in much of the printed press, not only from the anti-Western Communists and Socialists, but also from a broad church including neo-fascists, monarchists and even federalists. The article crucially finds that there was a deliberate effort by government-aligned journalists to marginalise – rather than engage with – any dissenting views on European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that lawyers were important agents in the remaking of British Euroscepticism during the Maastricht treaty period and should be written into its history. It offers new subject matter, exploring how and why lawyers challenged the Maastricht treaty through the English courts. From its initial preparation to its ultimate failure, the legal case fused together a defence of high ideals, like the sovereignty of Parliament, with specific critiques of European 'Union'; it invoked ideas of British and English exceptionalism, while building alliances across Europe, forging transnational connections between Eurosceptic lawyers across member states. Drawing from an unexplored archive of the legal team's court preparations and correspondence preserved by William Rees-Mogg, this study reveals the hidden role lawyers played in contesting the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the active participation and, in some cases, resistance of farmers' associations in Italy and France to European integration from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. The article examines, firstly, how Italian associations became active, due to their faltering relationship with the Christian Democrats, in searching new forms of political influence through more radical methods of mobilisation. Secondly, through the case of the so-called wine war between France and Italy, the article reveals how resistance to European Economic Community (EEC) reform and even other EEC member states could lead to forms of Europeanisation: exchanges between European organisations reflected shared resistance to specific policies, creating new arenas for collaboration. The analysis of the French–Italian case also offers an opportunity to explore the contrast between agriculture in the Mediterranean and northern countries in the EEC, showing complex Europeanisation dynamics in which both solidarity and competition become evident. Challenging the notion of a 'permissive consensus', this article aims to dismantle the notion of a conflict-free past in the history of European integration. In this regard, it underscores the multifaceted nature of European integration, marked by continual clashes and compromises, and provides a critical lens for interpreting the present state of the Brussels institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public opinion scholarship suggests that Europeans broadly interpret Brexit as a cautionary fable rather than an encouraging blueprint to follow. Yet, Brexit singularly demonstrates the possibility of European disintegration, and is but one of multiple recent crises that have brought the potential for member state departures into focus. Drawing on new survey data from 16 countries and using logistic regressions, this article charts Europeans' perceptions of the likelihood future EU exits over the next decade. It finds evidence of asymmetric motivated reasoning: Euroscepticism and pro-Brexit views strongly associate with perceiving exits likely, while among Europhiles this association is only ameliorated, not reversed. This reveals two gaps with repercussions for understanding EU public opinion dynamics. First, between Eurosceptic policy elites' softened policy stances on exit and their supporters' steadfast sense that further departures remain likely. Second, between Europhiles' scepticism of Brexit and a residual lack of confidence in EU cohesion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit was perceived as a Pandora's box moment by both Eurosceptic and pro-integration parties in the EU, as they expected it would embolden Euroscepticism by providing a paradigm to be followed. This article explores the initial reactions of nine Populist Radical Right parties to Brexit and how they evolved in tandem with the unfolding of negotiations. It also discusses possible reasons for the differentiation in the responses of those parties, from triumphant to moderated reactions. The empirical basis is a dataset that contains the public communications of these parties on Twitter between 2015 and 2020. The results show that although there was initial differentiation with some parties calling for referenda in their own countries, by 2017 every party's communication on Brexit drastically decreased, and by the time the UK left the EU (January 2020), calls for secession had disappeared from their discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special issue recalls the alarm raised in EU capitals and Brussels after the UK's in-out referendum delivered a Leave vote in June 2016. The fear was of a domino effect and the further fragmentation of an already divided EU. Seven years later, it is clear that there was rapid attrition of Eurosceptic triumphalism, and the EU-27 showed remarkable unity. This required a sustained collective effort to contain a membership crisis and maintain the EU polity. Yet, the issue contributors challenge the notion that the alarm was unfounded and explain why this counter-factual did not materialise, even though potential for future membership crises of different sorts was revealed. Theoretically, this supports an understanding of the EU as a polity that is fragile, yet able to assert porous borders, exercise authority over a diverse membership, and mobilise a modicum of loyalty when the entire integration regime is under threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key Eurosceptic argument is that countries can selectively retain only those aspects of European integration from which they benefit, while opting out of those aspects they dislike. How convincing is this "have your cake and eat it, too" argument to voters? This article argues that voters can learn about the feasibility of such a strategy by looking at the experience of countries that pursued a similar path. Positive experiences can strengthen voters' support for a similar strategy, while negative experiences can deter them. This argument is tested in a study of the effects of the Brexit negotiations on public opinion in Switzerland. Drawing on a panel survey fielded between 2019 and 2021, the article shows that Brexit had a small but non-negligible impact on Swiss voters' expectations about the EU's resolve, as well as on vote intentions on two EU-related policy proposals. These findings confirm that voters learn from foreign political developments about the costs of non-cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the rare phenomenon of mainstream Euroscepticism that has characterised the British Conservative Party and asks whether a similar pattern has appeared elsewhere in the EU. The study traces the long-term evolution of salience and positions on the EU issue in the manifestos of a heterogenous set of centre-right parties, paying particular attention to whether Brexit or successive EU crises have had some noticeable effect. The thesis of Tory exceptionalism is largely supported by the findings – no other mainstream conservative party in the EU has talked more, and more negatively, about the EU over a long time period. Most other centre-right parties were part of the permissive consensus on the EU and have supported, more or less openly, the integration project throughout the past 30 years. However, some parties of mainstream conservatism have shown a similar negative shift as British Conservatives did in the 2000s, such as the Austrian ÖVP, the Hungarian Fidesz, the Polish PiS and (marginally) the Dutch VVD. Being in opposition or pressured by radical right challengers does not necessarily make the mainstream right more critical of the EU. Internal organisational developments (i.e. the ascent of more Eurosceptic influences within the party) constitute the most convincing proximate explanation for mainstream Euroscepticism on the right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the public opinion literature on Social Europe is growing, so far, it relies on quantitative survey evidence that hides some of the arguments and motivations lying behind the standardized results. This article reveals through qualitative research that 'welfare Euroscepticism' (i.e., opposition towards Social Europe) needs more attention in the literature and explains why. Specifically, this article uses qualitative focus group discussions on Social Europe collected in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain (134 participants in total). The participants filled out a quantitative survey before the discussions started and these survey results are in line with the usual public opinion literature on Social Europe, that is, relatively supportive of the social dimension of the EU. However, multi‐faceted welfare Eurosceptic attitudes appeared throughout the discussion. While participants may support the general idea of a Social Europe, they are highly critical about how it actually works in practice. The analysis reveals that the public is sceptic towards both harmonizing social policies on the EU level and redistributive social policy instruments on the EU level. Three overarching and partly overlapping rationales appear to drive welfare Euroscepticism: (1) economic self‐interest, (2) cultural ideology and (3) the democratic deficit. The results emphasize the public preferences for more conditional redistributive policies and the need to make Social Europe more visible to the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a proliferation of scholarly work focusing on populist, far-left, and far-right parties, questions have arisen about the correct ways to ideologically classify such parties. To ensure transparency and uniformity in research, the discipline could benefit from a systematic procedure. In this letter, we discuss how we have employed the method of 'Expert-informed Qualitative Comparative Classification' (EiQCC) to construct the newest version of The PopuList (3.0) – a database of populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since 1989. This method takes into account the in-depth knowledge of national party experts while allowing for systematic comparative analysis across cases and over time. We also examine how scholars have made use of the previous versions of the dataset, explain how the new version of The PopuList differs from previous ones, and compare it to other data. We conclude with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of The PopuList dataset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While studies of the formal adaptation of parliaments to the European Union (EU) have dominated legislative scholarship in the last two decades, there is a growing interest in the substantive impact of the EU on legislative production and parliamentary behaviour. We contribute to this research agenda by exploring the effects of Europeanisation on the national parliament of one democratically backsliding EU member state, Hungary. Comparing periods marked by Europhile and Eurosceptic parliamentary majorities between 2004 and 2018 shows that governmental attitudes towards the EU are not reflected in parliamentary law-making and that parliamentary attention is mainly influenced by the level of Europeanisation of the policy field. This shows that backsliding governments do not generally oppose greater integration and underscores the necessity to distinguish between rhetorical Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic legislative action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do political parties in the European Union (EU) react to disintegration bids from a member state? This question is important, as scholars have argued that framing by elites (particularly Eurosceptic entrepreneurs) is crucial in shaping whether disintegration is seen as an example to follow or one to avoid. This article investigates how parties outside the UK reacted to Brexit, and argues that Eurosceptic challenger parties and mainstream pro-European parties altered their stances after the referendum vote in June 2016. I use a combination of automated and hand-coded methods to identify and analyse 2223 Brexit statements in the parliaments of five member states between 2013 and 2018. I show how after the referendum vote, challenger parties avoid Brexit and significantly moderate the Euroscepticism in their Brexit statements. By contrast mainstream parties emphasise Brexit and significantly increase the pro-Europeanism in their Brexit statements. Results show that in the short term at least, there is little evidence of Eurosceptic entrepreneurs framing Brexit as a positive precedent or example to follow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite growing interest in both party and citizens’ support for the EU, the relationship between sources of public attitudes toward the EU and the values deriving from structural cleavages remains poorly observed. Particularly, the emergence of a new Transnational Cleavage appears theoretically and empirically disconnected from the state of knowledge on the sources of support and opposition for the Union. How do past explanations of support for the EU relate to individual positioning along Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) values? Our research aims to bridge public opinion studies on support for the EU with cleavage theory, going beyond the analysis of party positions, but focusing, instead, on citizens’ beliefs at the individual level. Our results show that transnational cleavage defines a dimension on which explanatory factors of support for the EU align consistently. Differently from the U-curve of the left-right cleavage, it shows a linear trend profiling pros versus opponents of the EU integration process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While in recent times many regions have flourished, many others are stuck—or are at risk of becoming stuck—in a development trap. Such regions experience decline in economic growth, employment, and productivity relative to their neighbors and to their own past trajectories. Prolonged periods in development traps are leading to political dissatisfaction and unrest. Such discontent is often translated into support for antisystem parties at the ballot box. In this article we study the link between the risk, intensity, and duration of regional development traps and the rise of discontent in the European Union (EU)—proxied by the support for Eurosceptic parties in national elections between 2013 and 2022—using an econometric analysis at a regional level. The results highlight the strong connection between being stuck in a development trap, often in middle- or high-income regions, and support for Eurosceptic parties. They also suggest that the longer the period of stagnation, the stronger the support for parties opposed to European integration. This relationship remains robust whether considering only the most extreme Eurosceptic parties or including parties with more moderate levels of Euroscepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to unravel the connection between the representation of Eurosceptic MEPs and the EP's position on Preferential Trade Agreements. As a result of the growing importance of the EU's trade policy and the uneven contestation thereof in public space, this question seems of great importance. By zooming into the EP's INTA Committee, this article shows how the increasing representation of Eurosceptic MEPs shapes their mobilization on PTAs. More specifically, the article examines INTA's Own Initiative Procedure reports in the EP's 6th, 7th, and 8th legislative terms. Using a facet of the Post-Functionalist framework, it retraces the evolution of Eurosceptic MEPs' mobilization at the Committee and plenary levels, and points to the impact thereof on the EP's position on PTAs. In terms of results, the article finds that while Eurosceptic MEPs remain unable to substantially shape the EP's position, Eurosceptic MEPs can increasingly build contesting coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates how the systemic politicization of the EU is associated with support for different political parties. We argue that, while politicization involves actions by both Eurosceptic and Europhile parties, it does not affect parties at both extremes of the continuum in the same way. To investigate these differentiated effects, we leverage data from the European Elections Study and the Chapel Hill expert survey covering two decades (1999 to 2019). The evidence supports the hypothesis that, when it comes to voters' preferences, politicization strongly favours Eurosceptic parties. We conclude that the systemic politicization of European issues is thus a one-way street leading to the reinforcement of the constraining dissensus on the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last 20 years, the European Union has been mired in crisis after crisis. At the same time, the number of infringement procedures, the formal requests from the European Commission to member states for compliance, decreased dramatically, despite the addition of 10 member states in 2004. Yet, the link between crises and Commission enforcement activity has not been systematically examined. In this article, I theorize about the role of time, and demonstrate that crises limit the Commission's ability to act as guardian of the treaties. However, crises are not deterministic in nature – the European Parliament and European Union citizens can alter the costs of Commission enforcement. I find that as Euroscepticism increases, the Commission's demand for compliance decreases, in part due to the steep reputational costs to the Commission when member states refuse compliance, especially after sanctions. The number of infringements is also positively correlated with European Parliament action, suggesting that even without formal sanctioning power, the European Parliament plays a role in European Union law enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some defenders of democratic rights and the rule of law are becoming increasingly frustrated by the European Union's inadequate response to democratic backsliding in countries like Poland and Hungary. This study focuses on Poland and introduces the concept of 'Eurodisappointment' to describe this new group, which is conceptually and empirically distinct from Euroscepticism. Rather than being Eurosceptic, the Eurodisappointed self-limit their Euroenthusiasm without opposing integration. Drawing on original survey data, we demonstrate that Eurodisappointment is particularly prevalent among women, opposition party voters, and those dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Poland. It is yet to be seen whether and how the concept of Eurodisappointment can be applied to studies of attitudes towards the European Union in other member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Support for EU membership has long been an important topic of study. Individual-level research shows that winners of globalisation, including the higher educated, express greater EU support as they profit from economic and cultural conditions resulting from European integration. Recent context-focused work suggests that individuals in 'left-behind' places are less supportive of EU integration because of their home regions' weaker long-term economic conditions. This paper brings these two research strands into conversation with each other by examining how the relationship between EU support and individual-level education is contingent on subnational economic conditions. Using harmonised Eurobarometer data from almost 750,000 respondents spanning 2004–2019, combined with subnational economic data from 201 European regions, we find no evidence that subnational economic conditions influence the relationship between EU support and respondents' education level. At the same time, when cross-sectionally comparing long-term differences between regions, we find that EU support is positively related to regional GDP per capita (though unrelated to regional unemployment), among both the higher and lower educated, and especially in the post-Great Recession period. Longitudinally, EU support is positively related to declining regional unemployment, both among the higher and lower educated, but not to increasing regional GDP per capita. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advances the literature on the spatial patterns of EU support by arguing that the relationship between regional inequality and EU trust is not linear. We posit that, to fully understand this relationship, we should systematically investigate three dimensions of regional inequality, i.e., regional wealth status, regional wealth growth, and regional wealth growth at different levels of wealth status. Using individual-level survey data for EU27 countries and the UK from 11 Eurobarometer waves (2015–2019), we show that a non-linear association exists whereby poor and rich European regions tend to trust the EU more compared to middle-income regions, and that within-region over-time growth is associated with higher levels of EU trust. We demonstrate that the association between growth and EU trust is more pronounced among poor and middle-income regions compared to rich regions. Our findings have implications about the nature of public Euroscepticism and the ways in which to address it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Europeanisation of national political parties is often considered a crucial element in the democratisation of the EU. Yet, party Europeanisation has remained limited. The traditional argument explaining this is that the low political relevance of European affairs creates limited incentives for party organisations to Europeanise. But what happens in a context where Europe ìs politically relevant? Denmark, with its high parliamentary and public scrutiny of European affairs, provides us with such a case, allowing a view through the looking glass on whether and how national political parties Europeanise in a Europeanisation-friendly context. This article finds that Danish parties Europeanise rather differently from what has previously been found elsewhere, focusing strongly on internal cohesion, to the detriment of transnational cooperation. As such, empirically scrutinising a long-standing theoretical argument, this article adds much-needed nuance to the debate on party Europeanisation, its causes and relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introduction to the special issue on 'The Europeanisation of identities through everyday practices', we argue for a more thorough shift towards everyday practices, lifeworlds and leisure-time activities as important terrains for research into (ultimately also politically relevant) identifications among Europeans. Doing so entails the idea that the Europeanisation of identities might unfold in a more subliminal manner, and might hence be anchored less in policy changes and people's positionings towards political issues in a narrower sense. In contrast, mindsets, aspirations and frames of reference might undo a more unconscious transformation due to various activities in lifeworldly, cultural, leisure time-related, and even private spheres. Drawing on a multitude of fields (e.g. cultural heritage, university cooperation, everyday routines in the border region, arts, sports and gaming) as well as varying approaches and different methodologies, this Special Issue aims at demonstrating that ever more Europeanised identities might emerge from multiple sources and activities, which are not obviously tied to political agendas and frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses the impact of European Union (EU) funds on corruption in the EU ex-communist countries by following a panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach. The panel includes 10 former EU communist countries, over 2007–2019. The key findings reveal that an improvement in the EU funds paid and their rate of absorption can reduce the level of corruption in the long-run in the recipient EU ex-communist countries. This is due to better monitoring of EU funds paid compared with national resources, and a more efficient and fairer channel of EU funds absorption. In parallel with the EU funds, corruption can be controlled in certain conditions by the degree of economic development, size of government, level of democratisation and religiosity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which factors influence bilateral counterterrorism (CT) cooperation between EU Member States? Although scholars have studied European CT, the question still needs to be answered. This paper addresses the issue by introducing a new theoretical framework that combines CT and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature. As citizens' threat perception increases, governments are pressed to act. Overall, centrist cabinets tend to rely more on cooperation agreements; likewise, pushed by threat perception, left-wing executives also recourse to international cooperation. I tested this framework on a newly collected dataset, which comprehends bilateral CT agreements signed among EU Members from 2002 to 2017. As such, this paper fosters studies on EU CT, focusing on a less debated issue: bilateral cooperation between EU Member States. The results support the initial hypotheses, disclosing a robust influence of threat perception and cabinet ideology on the number of bilateral CT agreements signed. Furthermore, they show that the perception of the threat is more influential on cooperation than the actual impact of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From a bottom-up perspective, cleavage theory links the socio-economic trends existing in the political community with the shape acquired by party politics. Globalization and European integration impacted European society, creating novel socio-economic divides and bringing new social, cultural and economic issues into the political discussion. The impact of the novel cleavage over the pre-existent societal socio-political fractures acquires a central role in the study of European Union politicization. Deploying critical discourse analysis (CDA) and discourse-historical approach (DHA), this study aims to comprehend how the emergence of a novel cleavage has influenced the discourse of the mainstream European parties. The manifestos of the European Christian democratic, socialist and liberal parties from the last three European Parliament elections are analyzed to assess the contemporary relevance of the left-right political competition in a scenario characterized by the salience gained by transnational issues and the electoral success of populist elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The agreements on Next Generation EU (NGEU) and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 (MFF 2021–2027) are extraordinary milestones for the EU integration process. Not only do both regulations have important redistributive effects within a defined timeframe, but both regulations shape the hierarchy of objectives and instruments of EU budgetary policies. This is particularly true for cohesion policy, which has been characterised as the model of EU multilevel governance (MLG). Drawing on historical institutionalism and Peter Hall's classification of policy change, this text examines the dynamics of change in MLG. In particular, this research looks at the timing and scope of changes in EU cohesion policy since the 1980s. We ask whether or not the adoption of NGEU and the MFF 2021–2027 is likely to represent a critical juncture for the MLG and to what extent both regulations modify objectives and instruments of cohesion policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on Euroscepticism tends to portray parties opposing European integration or criticising the European Union (EU) as a family of Eurosceptic parties (either hard or soft). Recent literature, however, offers empirical evidence on the ambivalence and diversity of the EU critique. What is still unclear are the reasons behind the chameleonic nature of Euroscepticism and the implications that this may have for the EU critique and the changes proposed about EU policy or institutions. The present article addresses this question exploring the role of EU crises to capture the changing nature of Euroscepticism and suggests that it is related to contextual pressures on the political debate around the EU. The paper develops this argument and illustrates it through the analysis of the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, covering the EU crises of the last decade, including the recent period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine invasion. Drawing on a corpus of party manifestos and speeches between 2013 and 2022, this study shows that there are three main frames used by the party to criticise the EU. It also concludes that these frames involve distinct political implications for the EU critique and the alternative proposals presented by the party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has developed cultural policy initiatives that seek to promote cultural Europeanization with the purpose of constructing European identity narratives and facilitating citizens' sense of belonging to Europe and the EU. The article focuses on the citizens' perspective to cultural Europeanization through ethnographic research on one central action in the EU cultural policy, European Heritage Label (EHL). We analyse the interviews conducted in selected EHL sites with Central and East European (CEE) citizens who were visiting the sites as well as with cultural heritage practitioners working at three EHL sites located in CEE countries. We ask how the practitioners and the visitors engage with European identity narratives and elaborate their European belonging. We especially scrutinize how everyday encounters and experiences, such as mobility, shape identifications with 'Europe' and perceptions of what is 'European'. The interviews are interpreted in the theoretical framework of 'being' and 'becoming' European. This framework indicates a centuries-long liminal position of the Central and Eastern Europe. It enables us to scrutinize CEE citizens' sense of belonging to Europe in an intersection of dual Europeanization, i.e. cultural Europeanization and 'Europeanization' of the CEE countries to overcome this liminal position and become 'true' Europeans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has the Europeanisation of football at the level of governance (due to for example the effects of the Bosman ruling and the formation of the UEFA Champions League) – influenced the identities of football fans? This paper explores how such structural Europeanisation in football is influencing identifications among fans. Based on an analysis of articulations in selected online message boards, we distil the positioning of fans towards 'Europe' in football, and the factors which shape it. We control for three main avenues of impact: the club level, the league level, and the societal context. Our inquiry is based on a set of paired comparisons of fan scenes for football clubs in four different European countries. Results show that the factor carrying the most explanatory power is the club's participation in European-level competition. Although this broadly confirms a 'contact hypothesis' – according to which the more fans are exposed to cross-border contacts, the less relevance they attribute to aspects of national belonging – significant variations of how frequent exposure to European-level competition translates into more Europeanised perceptions do exist. For European identity studies, the work corroborates that a lifeworld arena such as football can foster Europeanised identifications, albeit not in a uniform manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]