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Corruption is a ubiquitous problem, but implementing serious anti-corruption measures is politically hard – the backlash from the corrupt is certain, but the broader political benefits are uncertain. Consequently, reformers face a dilemma in that even if they can pass reforms, it is not clear that the public will notice or reward them. To date, we have limited evidence on whether citizens notice anti-corruption reforms, how such reforms shape corruption perceptions, and whether there are real political benefits to reformers. In this article, we exploit a quasi-experiment embedded in the rollout of traffic police reform in Ukraine following the Euromaidan Revolution of 2013–14 to address each of these issues in turn. We find that citizens do respond quite accurately and durably in their evaluations of the most immediately affected institutions, but the spillovers to other political institutions are limited, short-lived, and offer little electoral gain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decisions the EU took in response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine have been assessed in scholarship as 'unprecedented' and 'unthinkable before'. The Union's response to the 2022 full‐scale invasion has thus been much stronger than the one linked to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The difference between the 2014 and 2022 responses can be attributed to many factors, particularly differences in the nature and scale of Russia's attacks and the US co‐ordination efforts during the Russian pre‐war military mobilization on Ukraine's borders. We show that, though these factors undoubtedly matter, it has been the path‐dependent dynamics of EU–Ukraine co‐operation on association relations, Ukraine's resilience‐building and the EU's socialization with Ukraine from the Euromaidan Revolution (2013‐14) to the 2022 invasion that contributed to the strength and promptness of the EU's response to Russia's full‐scale invasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ukrainian men and women en masse participated in the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity. Drawing on these cases of mass mobilization, the study examines gender differences in protest participation in a polity with fragile democratic institutions. Based on data from nationally representative surveys, the analysis demonstrates differences in the effects of some socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics on protest behavior. The results also suggest that the gendered impact of some variables diminishes with an increase in gender equality in society. This research expands our understanding of the relationship between gender and protest engagement in Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ukraine's tug-of-war between Russia and the West has had significant and lasting consequences for the country. In 2013, Viktor Yanukovych, the Ukrainian president aligned with Russia, opted against signing an association agreement with the European Union. This agreement aimed to facilitate trade and travel between the EU and Ukraine. This decision sparked widespread protests that coalesced in Kyiv's Maidan Square, eventually becoming known as the Euromaidan protests. In this study, we analyze the protest data from 2013, sourced from Ukraine's Center for Social and Labor Research. Despite the dataset's limitations and occasional inconsistencies, we demonstrate the extraction of valuable insights and the construction of a descriptive model from such data. Our investigation reveals a pre-existing state of self-excitation within the system even before the onset of the Euromaidan protests. This self-excitation intensified during the Euromaidan protests. A statistical analysis indicates that the government's utilization of force correlates with increased future protests, exacerbating rather than quelling the protest movement. Furthermore, we introduce the implementation of Hawkes process models to comprehend the spatiotemporal dynamics of the protest activity. Our findings highlight that, while protest activities spread across the entire country, the driving force behind the dynamics of these protests was the level of activity in Kyiv. Furthermore, in contrast to prior research that emphasized geographical proximity as a key predictor of event propagation, our study illustrates that the political alignment among oblasts, which are the distinct municipalities comprising Ukraine, had a more profound impact than mere geographic distance. This underscores the significance of social and cultural factors in molding the trajectory of political movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book review discusses "Ukrainian New Drama after the Euromaidan Revolution," edited by Molly Flynn. The book explores the experiences and emotions of Ukrainian writers and playwrights during the ongoing conflict with Russia. It highlights the resurgence of Ukrainian literature since the country regained independence in 1991 and the recent surge in publications and performances of Ukrainian works about the war. The review provides an overview of several plays included in the book, which focus on themes such as humanity, identity, and the impact of historical events like the Holodomor and Chernobyl. The reviewer praises the collection for shedding light on the human condition and the challenges faced by Ukrainians in the current war. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and its impact on the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The Patriarchate of Constantinople established the OCU as an independent church free from Russian control, which was seen by Russian politicians and church leaders as an aggressive act. The Moscow Patriarchate, led by Patriarch Kirill, adopted the ideology of the "Russian World" and declared a special military operation as a holy war. The article also highlights the perspectives of Orthodox Ukrainians and the importance of understanding Ukraine's religious narratives. [Extracted from the article]

Drawing on the conceptual-methodological framework of assembling urbanism, the paper sheds light on the strategies, actors and labors of mobilization of the integrated approach to urban development in Ukraine in the late 2000s, its further consolidation after the Euromaidan Revolution of 2013–2014 and transformation into a dominant policy assemblage with discursive and normative power for strategic socio-spatial changes at the national and municipal levels. The research findings deepen the understanding of the complexity of mobilization––assembling––translation processes, revealing the dynamic and affective dimension of relations between heterogeneous actors and underscoring the role of political and politics in assembling urbanism studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Economic Administrative & Legal Sciences is the property of Arab Journal of Sciences & Research Publishing (AJSRP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Investigaciones Historicas is the property of Universidad de Valladolid, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ukrainians' resilience in the face of Russia's 2022 invasion can be explained by cumulative identity change through successive revolutions: the Orange Revolution in 2004, the Maidan Revolution or Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014 and the current as yet unnamed war. The two phases of the war, from 2014 and 2022, have accelerated both the civic and the social construction of Ukrainian identity. Post‐post‐Soviet Ukraine is now a consolidated civic and political nation. But there is also an increased consensus on traditional nationalist mythology, defined by opposition to Russia's aggressive reimperialisation and autocratic political culture and by Ukraine's hyper‐Europeanisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests led to a significant increase in civic engagement among the Ukrainian population. After the turn of the millennium, civic participation among the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia also expanded. During the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022, young people from Transcarpathia played an important role as volunteers in helping refugees in Transcarpathia, on the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, and in Hungary. In our exploratory study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with young volunteers from Transcarpathia. In the thematic analysis, we explored the interviewees' pre-war volunteer experience, their voluntary activities during the war, their motivations for volunteering, and finally, the potential returns to volunteering. The interviews were also used to carry out type analysis, delimiting three volunteer types based on motivations and frequency of volunteering. According to our most important result, despite the social tensions caused by the war, young volunteers in Transcarpathia show strong solidarity with Ukrainian refugees from central regions, and the activity has generally increased volunteers' well-being. Another important implication could be that the group of interviewees who only started volunteering during the war may be open to helping others in the future, which could further spread the culture of volunteering in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since gaining independence, Ukraine has recognised the need to reform its vocational education and training (VET) system to better align with new economic realities. This necessity was largely driven by the country's increasing openness to the world and its desire to integrate with the European Union, which became especially pronounced after the Euromaidan protests in 2014. As a result, the government has pursued policies that are more closely aligned with the European Union. This led to greater international cooperation in the sphere of VET in Ukraine. The study on which this article reports analyses the impact of international organisations and cooperation programmes, as well as actions, initiatives and projects, on the changes and reforms in the Ukrainian VET system from 2013 to 2022 on normative and institutional levels. We adopt a theoretical framework that explains the areas and instruments of influence on policymaking in education used by international organisations. The method applied in the study is interviews with experts from international projects and initiatives currently active in Ukraine. Our findings indicate that international cooperation programmes have had a significant impact on the development of vocational education in Ukraine, particularly in areas such as the governance of the VET system, public‐private partnerships, quality assurance, qualifications frameworks, and digitalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the Ukrainian Revolution of 2013-2014, ten years after it took place. The authors analyze artworks and cultural imaginaries created during and after the revolution to understand its political emergence, solidarity, and collective memory. The articles highlight the relevance of the art of Maidan in understanding democratic emergence and the future of Ukraine and Russia. The authors conducted fieldwork in Kyiv and visited the Maidan Museum and memory sites, as well as meeting artists and scholars involved with Maidan. The artworks offer insight into the Ukrainian people's struggle for self-understanding and their aspirations for the future. [Extracted from the article]

The Euromaidan revolution was the start of a process of profound change in Ukrainian identity. Russian aggression has completed this turn to a pro-Western, anti-Russian orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, Oleksandr Fedorets reports his experience of counseling veterans of combat, both in the current invasion and in the Maidan revolution of 2013–2014. Doctor Fedorets eschews the notion of a neutral analytic "third position," in wartime scenarios, in favor of a more humanitarian, trauma-informed "bearing witness" as discussed by Israeli and other analytic communities. The author reminds us that the stakes could not be higher, offering clinical vignettes both hopeful and catastrophic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In George Orwell's dystopian novel I 1984 i - which has become a bestseller among Russians after their country invaded Ukraine in February 2022[1] - a dictatorship wages war not to achieve any foreign policy objective nor grand utopian vision, but to distract the population and break its desire to resist oppression and injustice at home. Russia's doctrines have openly proclaimed the regime-preservation motive for its aggressive behavior The worldviews expressed in Russia's official foreign and security policy documents have often been interpreted as expressions of unbridled paranoia.[41] But a paranoid stance can also be adopted deliberately, to serve the purposes of a rational, cold-blooded strategy for regime preservation. A corrupt personalist dictatorship - whose leader has a 70 percent chance to end up dead, in prison, or in exile if he loses power, judging by the fate of his peers from across the globe - could not function in any other way.[47] What to Expect from the Kremlin's Regime Survivalism Regime-survivalism does not only capture the priorities of Russia's dictatorship more accurately; it also predicts that the Kremlin will behave more dangerously than the traditional realist and ideological models of Russian conduct suggest. A 2020 investigative report by Russia's independent news outlet I Meduza i found that the FSO has maintained a massive program to survey popular attitudes toward Putin and to detect potential indicators of popular rebellion.[35] Putin has been absolutely obsessed with tracking the public mood to stave off threats to his rule Putin is known to eagerly receive detailed weekly briefings on these polls, which have decisively shaped his policies and public image. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the ideological shift and asymmetric negotiation between the liberal elites and the Eastern European New Left in the aftermath of the EuroMaidan movement in Ukraine. Topics include the marginalization of the New Left's perspective; the rise of the extreme right in Eastern Europe; and the failure to recognize rising fascism and its connection to neoliberal policies.

Since the Euromaidan revolution, Ukrainian cinema has been experiencing a renaissance, associated with both the wave of civic and creative activity and the policy of the post-Maidan authorities supporting the film industry. The article analyzes the development of Ukrainian cinema from 2014 to 2019, focusing not only on organizational, institutional, and legal changes but also on the accompanying controversies. It addresses the main socio-political, economic, and cultural factors influencing progress in the number of films produced in Ukraine and their popularization on the domestic and foreign market. The article particularly emphasizes the context of Russian aggression toward Ukraine and the ongoing war in Donbas, as it influences not only the topics taken up by filmmakers but also the priorities of authorities in the field of cultural policy. Cinema has become one of the fronts of the conflict. Thus, the post-Maidan authorities' concern was both to block Russian content deemed dangerous from the point of view of national security and to produce and promote "Ukrainian-centric" narratives. The last part of the article will discuss the new Ukrainian "patriotic cinema," supported and subsidized by the state, with a focus on the role it plays in a society experiencing conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information that some western analysts believe that Intergovernmental organization, NATO's enlargement provoked the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the author argues that a collision between the West and a revisionist Russia led by Vladimir Putin, President of Russia was inevitable.

Russian disinformation described the Euromaidan as a Western plot and a conspiracy against Russia aimed at regime change in Ukraine, the consequences of which would be Ukraine's disintegration. Smith and Arutunyan show how Russia's occupation of Crimea led the Kremlin to (wrongly) believe Ukraine would not resist Russian-backed hybrid warfare in southeast Ukraine. Anna Arutunyan's and Christopher M. Smith's books were published in the year Russia invaded Ukraine. [Extracted from the article]

"Without the State: Self-Organization and Political Activism in Ukraine" by Emily Channell-Justice explores the impact of the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and the subsequent shift towards sustained civic participation and self-organization. The book analyzes how individuals and networked initiatives based on the idea of self-organization transformed passive behavior and redefined the relationship between citizens and the state. However, the proliferation of ad hoc organizations taking over state roles had unintended consequences, such as absolving state bodies of their responsibilities and reinforcing social and gender stratification. The author's research is based on her participation in leftist activist groups during the protests and interviews with approximately 50 activists. The book raises questions about the influence of previous political mobilizations, the inclusivity of self-organization across different ideological groups, and the unpredictable nature of prolonged mass protests. [Extracted from the article]

Studies of competitive authoritarian regimes regularly emphasize the political importance of media ownership, commonly assuming that the owners' views are mirrored in the journalists' writing and thus depriving journalists of a distinctive role. We move beyond this narrow perspective, analysing anti-regime protests by journalists in order to develop a better understanding of their role in competitive authoritarian regimes. Our exploratory case study of Ukraine—comparing the stable regime (2010-13) with the Euromaidan protests in late 2013/early 2014— is based on a protest event database of media freedom-related protest actions by journalists (N = 209) and interviews with journalists (N = 31). We examine protest forms, coalition building, claims and targets. To understand journalists' agency in relation to political regime dynamics, we also look at their long-term engagement in contentious politics. While our results show that journalists' own protest actions are not game changers, mainly due to journalists' unwillingness to forge larger coalitions, the politicization of journalists, which leads to political activism and, most importantly, the creation of new media outlets with a political agenda, is an important element in regime dynamics and regime change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: How do diplomatic practices change under crisis conditions? To explore the possible effects of crisis on diplomatic standards of competence, the article zooms in on the modes of knowledge production of frontline diplomats in crisis. An illustrative case study of European Union (EU) diplomatic practice in Ukraine during the Euromaidan revolution reveals two different modes of knowledge production among members of the local EU diplomatic 'community of practice': a rule-following and reflexive mode. The article finds that the reflexive mode of knowledge production surfaces in times of crisis and reflects a heretofore under-acknowledged standard of excellence, the 'ethics of care' towards the host state's citizens. Foregrounding the 'ethics of care' as a standard of competence sheds new light on diplomatic ethics and advances International Practice Theory's (IPT) discussion about the normativity of practices and the contested nature of diplomatic competence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Russia, the main reason for starting the war with Ukraine on February 24, 2022 was the genocide of the Russian-speaking population by the Nazi government of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In this paper I investigate the Russian claims about genocide. These claims are shown to be part of the rhetorical frame Russophobic Nazi Ukraine government commits genocide on Russians, an aspect of Russian propaganda which builds on the Second World War. I demonstrated that this frame is itself an aspect of a more abstract frame, where any perceived enemy of Russia, is portrayed as a fascist or Nazi force that aims to destroy Russia and Russian culture. I investigate how this frame emerged and developed over time in five stages, starting in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, and in Russia after the Orange and Maidan revolutions in Ukraine. Russia tries to provide argumentation for the validity of the frame by referring to a number of objectively established facts relating to the situation in the Donbas, Ukraine's language laws, and the presence of right-extremists in Ukraine. In doing so, some ideas are made more salient than others (the language laws that diminish the official status of Russian in Ukraine and the hostilities in the Donbas region), while other ideas are suppressed altogether (e.g. the juridical meaning of genocide, the actual status of right-wing extremism in Ukraine, the role of Russia in the hostilities in the Donbas, and the actual status of the language laws in Ukraine). In all of these cases, the arguments used by Russia are not valid, being based on exaggerations, hyperbolic use of terminology, and lies. The main goal of this frame is to acquire and retain support for Russia's policy toward Ukraine, as well as to deflect any potential criticism on Russia itself. Ultimately, the Russian propaganda is part of the concept Russkij Mir 'Russian World', where Russian language and culture are a means to restore President Vladimir Putin's Russian sphere of influence from Soviet times or earlier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia reacted in markedly different ways to comparable upheavals in Ukraine: the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013/2014. This paper argues that a combination of important external and internal factors led to a change in Russia's dominant national role conceptions, which contributed to Moscow's more assertive foreign policy, exemplified by divergent reactions to these two upheavals. Consequently, the paper aims to contribute to the existing scholarship on role change, demonstrating mechanisms behind such changes and examining the necessary scope conditions. The analysis reveals two types of role change: long-term, comprehensive ones that may lead to shifts in foreign policy behavior and swift changes motivated by contemporary events that result from role conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Athenaeum: Polskie Studia Politologiczne is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The text discusses the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which has resulted in a large-scale armed conflict, loss of life, displacement of millions of Ukrainian citizens, and widespread destruction. The war has raised numerous questions for political scientists, such as how it happened, its impact on great power politics and European cohesion, and its effects on food and energy security worldwide. The text also highlights the importance of studying the war's influence on political science and politics in general. The collection of articles included in the text examines various aspects of the conflict, including the role of regime type, Russian disinformation strategies, and the influence of football fans. Overall, the articles contribute to understanding the impact of the war on peace in Europe and the reshaping of political relations. [Extracted from the article]

This article analyses the changing relevance of ethnolinguistic characteristics as predictors of political attitudes in Ukraine, drawing on surveys conducted before and after the Euromaidan revolution and Russian aggression. We argue that the usefulness of certain characteristics as measures of ethnic identity reflects their cognitive and social usefulness for the population, necessarily influenced by prevalent discourses and power relations. Our analysis focuses on the changing impact of ethnic categories on political attitudes in response to changes in social context which affect widespread perceptions of these categories among the population. We distinguish between two types of social interaction that are likely to activate ethnic identity and make it more useful for individuals' social navigation: internal differentiation and external delimitation. We hypothesize that the former type increases the relevance of ethno‐linguistic categorization while the latter facilitates ethno‐national identification. Of particular importance are two types of contextual change: International conflicts can contribute to the priority of external delimitation and, therefore, the activation of national identity, while domestic conflicts or crises can accentuate the need for internal differentiation and thus the usefulness of ethnolinguistic identity. Our analysis detects such change for certain categories of ethnic identity in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]