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After Evangelos Christou (1923–1956) studied philosophy at King's College, Cambridge, with Wittgenstein and others, he earned a doctorate at the Jung Institute in Zürich. He then returned home to Alexandria, near which he died in a car crash. The Logos of the Soul, published posthumously, argued for a psychology that would be neither a natural scientific psychology, devoted to causal analyses, nor a philosophical discipline that analysed mental events. Psychology would be an autonomous science of the soul, an unknown distinct from body and mind. Science deals with bodies and behaviours; philosophy with the mental concepts and acts. Psychology deals with "psychological experience". Dreams and fantasies can be sources of psychological experience, but so can perceptual acts and mental acts. Meaning occurs when something encounters an ego or self in a psychological experience. Observation in psychology is participant observation, akin to witnessing of a drama. Psychological methods, such as psychotherapy, are both means of discovery and means of becoming. Christou's work brought together Jung's analytical psychology and mid‐century British philosophy in order to stake out the ground for psychology that would be an empirical analysis of psychological experience and a logical analysis of the concepts used in that psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores a trans-Atlantic clash about time: in 1899, American philosopher Mary Calkins argued we should not spatialize time; in 1899, British philosopher Victoria Welby argued we should. I take their disagreement as a starting point to contextualize, study, and compare the accounts of time presented in their respective articles. Both Calkins and Welby cared deeply about time, writing on the topic across their careers, but their views have not been studied by historians of philosophy. This is unfortunate, for I argue their novel theories reward attention. Calkins' 1899 account draws on Kant to arrive at the earliest American-British causal theory of time, pioneers the metaphysical applications of temporal experimental psychology, and replies to F. H. Bradley's proclamation that it is 'impossible' to explain the appearance of time. Meanwhile, I read Welby's 1907 account as offering a radical metaphysic, on which time is literally a kind of space, resonating with 1880s literature around the 'fourth dimension' and H. G. Wells' 1895 novel The Time Machine. I have uncovered an early draft of Welby's paper dating to 1902 and, using this alongside other unstudied writings by Welby, trace the development of her views from the 1880s onwards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In American-British philosophy around the turn of the twentieth century, every philosopher and their dog had something to say on time. Thinkers worried about our experience of time, and the metaphysics of time. This introduction to the special issue, Time in American-British Philosophy 1880s-1930s, investigates that obsession, explaining how its philosophers spilled pints of ink on time, and produced the first-ever surveys of time. I historically contextualise their work and explore some of its driving causes, including experimental psychology of time perception, and theological worries over evolution. This article concludes by surveying the rich, wide-ranging papers within this collection, covering time in Shadworth Hodgson, William James, Mary Calkins, Victoria Welby, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, A. A. Robb, Alfred North Whitehead, Norman Kemp Smith, J. M. E. McTaggart, Karin Costelloe-Stephen, Hilda Oakeley, May Sinclair, and George P. Adams. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the influence of Henri Bergson's (1859–1941) philosophy of time on three early twentieth-century British philosophers: Karin Costelloe-Stephen (1889–1953), Hilda Oakeley (1867–1950), and May Sinclair (1863–1946). I demonstrate that three central claims of Bergson's account of temporal experience (novelty, memory, and indivisibility) were creatively incorporated into their accounts of time. All these philosophers place time at the centre of their philosophical systems, so this study of their views on time and temporality can deepen our understanding of their systems more broadly. Further, this study helps us appreciate the reception of Bergson's thought in British philosophy after it was ferociously attacked by Bertrand Russell in 1912, and can provide more detailed contours on the joint fortunes of temporal experience and Bergson's thought in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. I conclude by emphasizing reasons why contemporary philosophers should pay particular attention to the three figures' treatment of Bergson. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the common thought that anger is "not worth it" because of the bad effects that it has on the angry person. It contends that this common thought is sometimes deeply puzzling, because although it looks to be a thought about anger's unfittingness, it is hard to see what such bad effects have to do with fittingness. The paper gives an account of the elusive connection between bad effects and fit. In brief, it argues that the thought that anger is "not worth it" has to do with the sense of "importance" that the anger manifests. That anger portrays its object as more important than it actually is shows it to be unfitting, but also shows why seemingly instrumental considerations like bad effects bear on fittingness, insofar as they bear on importance. The paper then shows how this account illuminates a kind of emotional dilemma often faced by oppressed people and closes with a brief discussion of some broader implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I look at Susan Stebbing's articles and reviews that critically engage logical positivism. These appeared before the publication of A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic and helped shape the early British reception of logical positivism. I highlight Stebbing's adoption of G. E. Moore's tripartite distinction between knowing a proposition, understanding it, and giving an analysis of it and, in light of this distinction, her focus on whether the principle of verifiability can ground a plausible account of communication. Stebbing thinks not, and I reconstruct her reasons, as well as her own account of communication. In doing this, I relate her criticisms to her rejection of methodological solipsism and her dissatisfaction with the logical positivist treatment of statements about other minds and the past. I also argue that Stebbing's work provides a bridge to later criticisms of logical positivism by ordinary language philosophers. Foregrounding Stebbing's engagement with logical positivism, especially her focus on communication, paints a fuller picture of how the logical positivists came to be part of analytic philosophy despite having different concerns than many of the British philosophers engaging their work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pains are subject to obvious, well-documented, and striking top-down influences. This is in stark contrast to visual perception, where the debate over cognitive penetrability tends to revolve around fairly subtle experimental effects. Several authors have recently taken up the question of whether top-down effects on pain count as cognitive penetrability, and what that might show us about traditional debates. I review some of the known mechanisms for top-down modulation of pain, and suggest that it reveals an issue with a relatively neglected part of the cognitive penetrability literature. Much of the debate inherits Pylyshyn's stark contrast between transducers and cognition proper. His distinction grew out of his running fight with Gibson, and is far too strong to be defensible. I suggest that we might therefore view top-down influences on pain as a species of transducer calibration. This provides a novel but principled way to distinguish between several varieties of top-down effect according to their architectural features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper raises the question of how a history of the philosophy of eighteenth-century Britain should be written. First, it describes the usual answer to this question, which divides the period into what happened before Hume, then Hume, then responses to Hume. It notes that this answer does not correspond well with how the period saw itself. It then considers how 'philosophy' is defined in Britain in the eighteenth century, taking into account dictionary definitions, book titles, and university syllabi. Obvious differences between eighteenth-century and twenty-first-century philosophy are explored, including the idea that 'natural philosophy' is as much part of philosophy as moral philosophy, metaphysics, and logic, and the difficulty of making a distinction between philosophy and what we now call psychology. In the final section of the paper some difficulties are raised regarding the hypothesis that 'enlightenment' might provide an organizing concept for a more historically sensitive account of eighteenth-century British philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Research / Sosyal Bilimler Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of ODU Journal of Social Sciences Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article explores the different forms of reticence in philosophical and ethical discourses in Confucius' "Analects" and the philosophy of Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Topics covered include the explicit and implicit discussion of reticence in the "Analects" and the various forms of reticence in the "Analects" and in the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

The growing block view of time holds that the past and present are real whilst the future is unreal; as future events become present and real, they are added on to the growing block of reality. Surprisingly, given the recent interest in this view, there is very little literature on its origins. This paper explores those origins, and advances two theses. First, I show that although C. D. Broad's (1923) Scientific Thought provides the first defence of the growing block theory, the theory receives its first articulation in Samuel Alexander's (1920) Space, Time, and Deity. Further, Alexander's account of deity inclines towards the growing block view. Second, I argue that Broad shifted towards the growing block theory as a result of his newfound conviction that time has a direction. By way of tying these theses together, I argue that Broad's views on the direction of time – and possibly even his growing block theory – are sourced in Alexander. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the philosophical notion of the term “succession," first used by John Locke, as well as by British philosophers Thomas Hobbes and David Hume in terms of history and society. Topics include moral philosophy, political and religious influences, and events including the English Civil Wars, the Restoration, the Revolution of 1688, and the Jacobite rebellions.

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-69. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterizing this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925-69, a sectarian form of critical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the conceptual problems raised by climate change is that of how to think about the future. Theories of intergenerational justice and other accounts of obligations to the future in Anglo-American philosophy tend to argue that the remote future matters morally. Where did these arguments come from? This essay explores the roots of contemporary ideas about the remote future in debates that took place among Anglophone philosophers in the 1970s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article informs on British Philosophy on the marginalization of metaphysics. It mentions British philosophers remained at an unsophisticated level of education with regard to their knowledge of classical philosophy, and often, they had developed an ideological aversion to the Greek and medieval legacy, along with the book "The Advancement of Learning" by Francis Bacon.

John Henry Newman is widely acknowledged to be an important theologian. However Newman commentators suggest that his work has received little recognition by philosophers. The general consensus has been that until the latter part of the twentieth century Newman has been an isolated philosophical figure. This essay offers an historical re-evaluation of Newman's philosophical reception in order to explore whether or not his significance has been underestimated. The historical method is used in the analysis and assessment of this question. The study therefore probes the general philosophical reaction to Newman's work in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In doing so the essay offers an historical investigation and re-evaluation of the claims of Newman having a negligible philosophical legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El artículo discurre sobre la filosofía del inglés Francis Bacon, con un enfoque en el pragmatismo, el conocimiento y la metafísica. El autor comenta sobre la relación entre el saber y el poder según Bacon y describe sus ideas acerca de los conceptos de la certeza y el experimentalismo.

The aim of this paper is to present a comprehensive outlook of the conceptions of history of mind proposed by the british philosophers from Locke to the end of the XVIII century. It aims to show that, despite the seeming resemblances, the differences among those conceptions are sufficient to enable us to identify different philosophical projects.

Anscombe first became famous in Oxford for her opposition to the awarding of an honorary degree to President Truman. Very soon thereafter, however, the publication of Intention established her as an important figure in British philosophy. "Modern Moral Philosophy" marked her difference from contemporary Oxford moral philosophers and introduced a set of ideas that subsequently had great influence. At Oxford she was a singular figure but extremely welcoming to graduate students. While she gave much time to the translation, interpretation, and teaching of Wittgenstein's philosophy, she also doubted its compatibility with the Catholicism, to which she had converted and to which she was staunchly committed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article recovers "evangelical toleration" as a neglected tradition in early modern political thought with important consequences for contemporary political theory and practice. Many political theorists dismiss the prudential arguments made by "proto-liberal" thinkers like Roger Williams or John Locke in favor of toleration as a necessary precondition for evangelism and conversion as intolerant, unacceptably instrumental, and inessential to their deeper theories. By contrast, critics of liberalism treat them as smoking gun evidence for an imperial and civilizing mission underlying liberal toleration. I argue that both sides underestimate evangelical toleration's genealogical and theoretical importance. Not only were evangelical considerations essential in shaping the particular institutions associated with toleration in England and America, the varieties of evangelical toleration represented by Williams and Locke shed significant light on the very different institutions--and intuitions--governing the expression of religious difference in liberal democracies today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the debate about Michael Oakeshott’s philosophy there is very little agreement on the theoretical and historical meaning of his skepticism. Starting from the assumption that skepticism is not a fixed theory but a tradition of ideas, this article draws on both published texts and archival materials to contend that Oakeshott developed his thought by confronting himself with, and even merging, different strands of skepticism: the ancient, the modern, as represented by Hobbes and Montaigne, and the idealist, as conceived by F. H. Bradley. The article firstly shows Oakeshott’s awareness of ancient skepticism, even though its impact on his thought is contested and controversial. With regard to modern skepticism, it looks at how Oakeshott defines Hobbes’s skepticism in his “Introduction to Leviathan.” It also examines the relevance of Montaigne to Oakeshott’s image of conversation, his idea of human agency and conception of politics. Finally, the article illustrates the influence of Bradley’s skepticism on Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy and reveals the consistency between Oakeshott’s skepticism and idealism. What emerges is a complex picture, in which Oakeshott’s skepticism is a constellation of elements taken from a variety of sources. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)