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The question of Farouk's title is considered an important part of Anglo-Egyptian rivalry. However, the existing literature neglects the issue's possible impact on third countries. The purpose of this article is to highlight if, how, and why a smaller Eastern-Mediterranean state – Greece in particular – was coerced into getting involved in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, by being forced to decide whether to acknowledge Egypt's King as 'King of Egypt and Sudan'. Based on extensive archival research as well as the press of the time, from October 1951, when the issue emerged, to August 1952, when it ended with an Anglo-Egyptian compromise, this article sheds light on the formulation of Greece's policy, explains its final decision and, finally, traces and analyses the factors that influenced it. The study concludes by assessing Greek efforts to balance between Great Britain and Egypt, in other words, between its national security priorities within NATO and the need to protect its regional interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision of Gladstone's government to invade and occupy Egypt in 1882 remains one of the most contentious in late nineteenth-century British political and imperial history. This article examines the decision-making process in June and July 1882, revisiting Robinson and Gallagher's influential study in the light of more recent historiographical research and previously unused sources. It looks at who made the critical decisions, what their preoccupations were, and how they were able to get Cabinet approval. Hartington and Northbrook were the two key figures, who co-operated to overturn Gladstone's and Granville's policy in June 1882. Yet their co-operation was momentary and they found themselves on different sides of the argument over the participation of Indian forces and international support. Although they shared a sense of Egypt's importance to British imperial security, they each had a distinctive approach, so that the decision to occupy cannot be reduced to a conflict between Whig pragmatists and Radical idealists. The article also shows how the Alexandria riot on 11 June altered the context of decision-making by shifting the mood in the parliamentary Liberal party towards intervention. Parliament, not the press, was the crucial site of 'public opinion' in the Egyptian crisis in June and July 1882. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the role of sufi țuruq during Sudan's struggle for independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The decolonization of Sudan unfolded within a fragmentary political landscape characterized by a complex stratification of interests. The role of țarīqah-inspired political factions-later evolving into fullfledged parties-contributed to inhibit the birth of a cohesive nationalist movement, giving way to the emergence of a sectarian political system. As prominent members of the traditional establishment of Sudanese society (along with tribal leaders, merchants and other notables), Muslim leaders were afraid of the rising radical nationalist movement, that could have challenged recognized social hierarchies. Their interests converged with those of Great Britain, that since the early 1920s tried to foster the emergence of a moderate nationalist elite under the slogan al-Sūdān li-l-Sūdāniyyīn ("the Sudan for the Sudanese") to counter Egypt's influence in the country without subverting the structures of imperial dominance. In this sense, the decolonization of Sudan can be analysed as a "passive revolution": a gradual regime transition that allowed the dominant classes to take over political power while preserving their fundamental interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While building on previous works by such scholars as Heinz and Spalinger, the article presents a new methodology specifically devised for the analysis of Egyptian war reliefs. The article contends that many historical reconstructions regarding the 'Sea-Peoples' have ignored the basic principles of ancient Egyptian iconic art and preferred intuitive interpretations of the reliefs. This has led to historical misconceptions about the battles and aggressors. The new analysis provides a holistic reading of the reliefs within their context and is thereby able to present new insights as to the location of the battles and the nature of the 'Sea-Peoples'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares the rhetorical justifications surrounding two landmark instances of Western imperialism. In 1882, the British occupied Egypt, ousting indigenous proto-nationalist forces that supposedly threatened British and other foreign interests. The consequences of this intervention were still being worked out in 1956 when, in the wake of the Cairo regime's nationalization of the Suez Canal, the British again invaded. France participated on this occasion, with serious but differing political consequences for both. We suggest that comparing how the British and French argued about these issues, and also examining how the rhetoric of the later crisis contrasted with the earlier one, offers useful insights into the two nations' respective imperial cultures. Specifically, we suggest that the latter-day imperialists Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet couched their actions in internationalist rhetoric reminiscent both of the Gladstone government's justifications for intervention in 1882 and of French official explanations for their takeover in Tunisia a year earlier. Each claimed their actions were taken both to uphold better standards of governance and to restore regional order, itself a highly loaded concept. The language of imperial domination was eschewed; but the ends of empire were served by the use of this rhetoric of ‘liberal order’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper looks at British policy in the Mediterranean in the late nineteenth century, and the importance and role of Cyprus as an island under British administration at that time. Specifically, it aims to investigate the neglected role of Cyprus during the Arabi revolt and ensuing Egyptian campaign in 1882. In order to highlight this less-examined aspect, it examines the reasons why Cyprus had not been transformed into a suitable naval station by 1882. It also looks at the effect of the lack of military facilities on the island's use, and the politicians' perception of the usefulness of Cyprus during these events in Egypt, vis-à-vis the reaction of the British and Cyprus press. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the attempt of Anglo-Egyptian treaty to begin carving out an independent foreign policy in Great Britain. Egyptian governments launched a large-scale propaganda campaign designed to promote Egypt's interests in Sudan, a campaign which British tried to prevent in every manner of possible. The British exploited their substantial advantages as the dominant power in both Egypt and Sudan to reduce Egyptians influence.