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Pro-Japanese editorials swept across nation at outset. Sympathy for underdog turned to admiration of victors and then to the apprehension that led to “yellow peril” hysteria.

The history of family planning in China since 1952 is not seen as a series of shifts between populationism and population control but rather as a continuum that began in 1952 a year before results from Chinas 1st complete census were revealed and has continued ever since. The explanation given for delaying announcement of a family planning policy until after the end of the Korean war was to increase Chinese bargaining power under the threat of a Yellow Peril. Another possible explanation is that the promotion of birth control might be interpreted by UN nations as a sign of economic hardship. The apparent return to populationism in 1958 is attributed 1st to faulty Western interpretation of Chinese actions and 2nd to the power struggle with Russia in which a semblance of Marxist pronatalist orthodoxy must be maintained. Rather the apparent shift in attitude toward population control in 1958 represents a change in emphasis from seeking technical solutions to trying to modify attitudes toward fertility. In 1962 China again adopted an open policy toward birth control with an emphasis on birth control devices as well as attitudes. However 1972 population figures which put Chinese population at under 700 million indicate that effective birth control has been undertaken for a much longer time.

During a press conference in October 1967 Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in answer to a question on the basic motivation behind United States military activities in Vietnam, stated that the real meaning of the war, and the reason it had to be won, was the containment of Chinese aggression. He dramatized his point by stating that China is aggressive and that within twenty years China would have a population of one billion and nuclear weapons as well as delivery capabilities. Hence the only sensible course is to demonstrate to China, in Vietnam, that it cannot get away with aggression rather than to wait until some future date when the cost would be much greater than it is now. The headlines in the American press chose to interpret this statement as a revival of the old and hackneyed doctrine of the yellow peril. This, in the view of many commentators, made the Secretary of State a racist. Mr. Rusk may or may not be a great many things, but he most assuredly is no racist. His statement did, however, do one thing which should have been done long ago and has even now not received the attention it deserves: it placed Vietnam in the perspective where it belongs, namely, the problem of China. The hard fact is that there is no problem in the western Pacific, whether it be Korea, Japan, Taiwan, or the many facets of Southeast Asia, to which there is an acceptable or final solution unless and until there is some moderate and reasonable change in the deadly impasse of relations between Washington and Peking. This is the heart of the second phase of the Cold War which has its locus in eastern Asia, but its reflections all around the world. All other problems of the area are peripheral to this one and all will tend to fall into place fairly easily and only when a new climate between Washington and Peking comes into existence. The various struggles in eastern Asia since 1945 have usually been explained publicly in local terms. The war in Korea was

T HE PROGRESS, SPATIAL and otherwise from limited and local state systems, in Italy, Europe, the Western hemisphere, to a world-wide system and world politics, Weltpolitik, has been accompanied by a progress in Weltangst, to use a term of German existential philosophy.' Much of grosse Politik, so-called, is conditioned, if not driven by grandes peurs, several of which, if one were to undertake a genealogy of fears and anxieties, would prove far from new ("Yellow Peril," etc.), and so are domestic politics.2 Both are anxiety-affected-in the extreme: anxiety-driven-fields. Some of the participation of the citizen in world politics takes place through a primary, unanalyzed anxiety, through what is sometimes called "an unhealthy interest," some through a rational, "healthy" interest in a problem presenting itself, newly or recurrent. Only to a limited extent would we be justified in calling the existence or the play on such anxieties characteristic of totalitarian regimes; not all leaders of democracies give or even promise "freedom from fear." The basic difference in this respect is rather this: that totalitarian regimes establish monopolies for the supreme anxifer, the fear maker, while in democracies anxiety-producers have to compete with one another as well as rationalizers of fears. One of the forms which anxiety about world politics assumes by preference, sometimes on slight, at other times on more massive, objective or subjective, provocation, is the encirclement complex, the concern about Einkreisung, kapitalistickeskoe okruzhenie, the fear of, the anxiety about one's own nation being ringed in system

Seventeen years after the victory of communism in China, Western leaders are still grappling with the implications of that victory and still groping for ways of bringing a renascent China into the comity of nations. But while there is general agreement that China poses a challenge to the Western world, there is no consensus about the nature of that challenge or the proper means of meeting it. Too often, there is an insufficient awareness that China's foreign policy is complex, and that it derives as much from Chinese history and traditions as from the communist ideology of the present rulers. Granted this complexity, understanding is hardly helped by emotional responses and misleading historical analogies. To speak of containing communism is a dangerous way of oversimplifying China's nationalistic ambitions and grievances. To talk of a "Yellow Peril" is to revive fears that are no more

International audience

James Payne9s thoughtful and carefully documented essay stresses the importance of evaluating ethnic American, specifically Afroamerican, fiction within its historical context. The historical information he provides in his essay concerning the Afroamerican response to the Spanish-American War and to America9s paranoia of a supposed “Yellow Peril” does indeed shed light on how Griggs and Corrothers each imaginatively re-invested a specific social reality with an Afroamerican revolutionary furor—a rage which ironically had the best interest of the country at heart.

TpHE MALEVOLENT INFLUENCE and power of the press has often been exaggerated-as, for example, in the observation by Seldes that Hearst proved "that news is largely a matter of what one man wants the people to know and feel and think."1 It is generally acknowledged, however, that economic necessity compels publishers to print to please readers. Thus, a Hearst columnist observed that "nobody wants to know what you think. People want to know what they think."2 Further, it is said that journalists tend to emphasize crises, to fish in troubled waters, to stir up, rather than moderate, popular opinion. "Under the pressure of publishers and advertisers," wrote Innis, "the journalist has been compelled to seek the striking rather than the fitting phrase, to emphasize crises rather than developmental trends."-3 Thus, members of the press have been characterized as reactors to, not creators of, new issues and crises "like the modal members of their audience; and their communications fit audience predispositions, not through a process of tailoring, but through correspondence in outlook."4 The foregoing points provide a generalized framework for reviewing the historiography of the role of the press in the removal and detention of Japanese Americans during World War II. The standard interpretation depicts the press as a political pressure group and attempts to link it causally with Executive Order 9066 which formed the basis for the concentration camps. The historian Roger Daniels offers the clearest example of that interpretation. The press, wrote Daniels, particularly the Hearst papers, adopted and disseminated in the early twentieth century the image of the "yellow peril." A notable example was the 1907 two-part Sunday Supplement fantasy authored by Richmond Pearson Hobson entitled, "JAPAN MAY SEIZE THE PACIFIC COAST." Hobson predicted that Japan would soon conquer China and thus "command the military resources of the whole yellow race," and estimated that an army of 1,207,700 men could capture the Pacific Coast. "The Yellow Peril is here," Hobson concluded.5 That spectre of the "yellow peril" was revived in more strident form following Pearl Harbor. "Day after day," wrote Daniels, "throughout December, January, February

Anti-Asian sentiment, and specifically "Japan-bashing" has a long, established history in the film industry. Though the early twentieth-century silent films such as "Heathen Chinese and the Sunday School Teachers" (1904) and "Chinese Laundry" (1904) directed racial hatred toward Chinese immigrants in America, these films also worked to demean other groups of Asians, notably the Japanese, who were then immigrating in numbers that far exceeded those of the Chinese, the Chinese population in America having been essentially exterminated" by the U.S. government's first Exclusion Act in 1882. For example, the 1908 production of "The Yellow Peril" - in which a Chinese servant disrupts a household, is thrown from a window, beaten by a policeman, and set on fire - provided, in the words of Eugene Franklin Wong: "an oblique indication of increasingly serious immigration and racial problems between the United States and the rising Empire of Japan, with the Chinese thematically filling the role of scapegoat."(1) Partly because of the "invasion" of America by "hordes" of Japanese immigrants, and partly because of japan's military expansionism (namely its annexation of Korea in 1904 and its defeat of Russia in 1905), the Japanese began to replace "Chinamen" as America's new "Yellow Peril," a threat to everything Americans hold dear. Later, reacting racially to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the American film industry - in tandem with the U.S. government - further focused its anti-Asian sentiment on the Japanese through the production of war films. During a time when all Japanese-American actors and actresses were being herded up for internment, the movie studios "pumped up" production of manifestly anti-Asiatic racist material, revising earlier Asian villains to fit the new context of war. The "props" - (non-Japanese) Asian extras - graduated from playing the masses of huddled, silently suffering (and dying) Chinese peasants to playing hordes of insect-like, fanatic (and dying) Kamikaze pilots. The starring "Asian" roles went to white actors and actresses in yellow face who played Fu Man Chu and Dragon ladies in Japanese "drag" as Samurai-style warmongers and geishas. The evil Chinese villains of pre-war films were easily transformed into the evil Japanese villains of WWII films, since "all Asians look alike," especially considering how many of the same actors portrayed both Japanese and Chinese characters. The new war films, then, essentially perpetuated the old fear of Yellow Peril, now manifested in the Japanese enemy who - perhaps disguised as farmer or fisherman competing (unfairly) for white America's resources - sought to undermine national security and morality from the inside. The war genre succeeded in providing Hollywood with a dominant paradigm, still invoked today, to portray Japanese and American relations; many recent films - such as "Gung Ho" (1986) "Black Rain" (1989), "Captured Hearts" (1990) - that explicitly deal with Japanese and American interaction - are framed in the context of war and battle.(2) For example, while World War II is the obvious backdrop of "Captured Hearts," the "war" in "Black Rain" is drug related, with the Japanese Yakuza overthrowing the Italian Mafia as the "new ethnic" mob in America [just as the (good) Japanese character "Mas" replaces the Latino Charlie as Nick Conklin's - the motorcycle-"cowboy" - (white) cop's new ethnic sidekick]. In "Gung Ho" the "war" between the Americans and Japanese is economic, related specifically to car manufacture. Here, even though the American auto workers are employed by the Japanese, whom they have asked to buy the factory, the American workers talk in terms of "us and them," of competition between two opposing teams. In addition, both "Gung Ho" and "Black Rain" refer to the "original" war, WWII, as the source of prevailing tensions between the Americans and Japanese. In "Gung Ho," when the tension between the Japanese management and the American workers climaxes in a fight between Hunt and Kazihiro ("Kaz"), Hunt is fired and retaliates by saying, "If you're so great, how'd you lose the big one? …

RACIAL antagonism resembles justice in one respect if in no other: it may sleep but it never dies. The conflict of ^ color is resurgent in the Dominions of the British Empire where Asiatic immigration is still a problem, and in the Crown Colony of Kenya where Hindus, Britishers and blacks are agitated over "racial equality." It is resurgent in the United States, whether in the case of the negro, the Indian, or the Japanese. In a domestic sense, the Oriental problem in the United States is relatively unimportant. Contrasted with ten million negroes and 250,000 Indians, there are less than 150,000 Japanese in the United States. But from the international standpoint the problem may become one of considerable magni tude. The Japanese cannot be called an "inferior" people as is done with the Indians and the negroes; and they, alone of the color groups in this country, are represented by a sensitive and powerful government abroad. Agitation of some sort against the Japanese in this country has recurred from time to time ever since 1900. President Roosevelt believed he had brought it to an end when he nego tiated the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908. President Wilson did penance for it when he consented to the Lansing-Ishii agree ment of 1917 and allowed Japan to secure Shantung at the Paris Peace Conference. Undoubtedly President Harding hoped that the Washington Conference would dissipate all the misunder standings between the two great powers of the Pacific. Nevertheless the anti-Japanese agitation continues on the Pacific Coast, under the leadership of the Exclusion League and the American Legion. It is becoming aggressive in and about Seattle, a neighborhood which hitherto has been comparatively sympathetic with the Oriental. It has appeared in other parts of the State of Washington where, because of the anti-alien policy of the Department of the Interior, Japanese farmers have been unable to renew their leases of public lands. It has cropped out in the Utah, Idaho and Montana legislatures where anti Japanese legislation has been debated. It is an endless theme in Hawaii, where the Labor Commission appointed by President Harding protested recently against the "menace of alien domina

F ROM time to time the daily press reports some new facts concerning Japanese emigration to Brazil. Sensational journalists call attention to the Japanization of this South American country. The foreign political press emphasizes the political importance of Japanese emigration to Latin America, especially from the standpoint of the United States. Occasional travelers mention large numbers of Japanese in Brazil. German publications proclaim the existence of the Yellow Peril in Brazil. The Russian political press, on the basis of the same information, condemns Japanese imperialistic expansion. The purpose of the present study is to make a survey of facts concerning Japanese emigration to Brazil as far as existing materials and information allow. The intercourse between Spanish America and Japan is of old origin. It is amusing to remember that the Japanese were anxious, as long ago as the sixteenth century, to "open" New Spain for trade, that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the Spanish fleet touched regularly at the Japanese port of Uraga and that occasionally, at that period, Japan and Mexico exchanged missions and products.2 But even in modern history, Westernized Japan has until re