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People with symptoms of depression show impairments in decision-making. One explanation is that they have difficulty maintaining rich representations of the task environment. We test this hypothesis in the context of exploratory choice. We analyze depressive and non-depressive participants' exploration strategies by comparing their choices to two computational models: (1) an "Ideal Actor" model that reflectively updates beliefs and plans ahead, employing a rich representation of the environment and (2) a "Naïve Reinforcement Learning" (RL) model that updates beliefs reflexively utilizing a minimal task representation. Relative to non-depressive participants, we find that depressive participants' choices are better described by the simple RL model. Further, depressive participants were more exploratory than non-depressives in their decision-making. Depressive symptoms appear to influence basic mechanisms supporting choice behavior by reducing use of rich task representations and hindering performance during exploratory decision-making., (Crown Copyright © 2013. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

We evaluate two competing accounts of the relationship between beauty and category structure. According to the similarity-based view, beauty arises from category structure such that central items are favored due to their increased fluency. In contrast, the theory-based view holds that people's theories of beauty shape their perceptions of categories. In the present study, subjects learned to categorize abstract paintings into meaningfully labeled categories and rated the paintings' beauty, value, and typicality. Inconsistent with the similarity-based view, beauty ratings were highly correlated across conditions despite differences in fluency and assigned category structure. Consistent with the theory-based view, beautiful paintings were treated as central members for categories expected to contain beautiful paintings (e.g., art museum pieces), but not in others (e.g., student show pieces). These results suggest that the beauty of complex, real-world stimuli is not determined by fluency within category structure but, instead, interacts with people's prior knowledge to structure categories.

Some decisions, such as predicting the winner of a baseball game, are challenging in part because outcomes are probabilistic. When making such decisions, one view is that humans stochastically and selectively retrieve a small set of relevant memories that provides evidence for competing options. We show that optimal performance at test is impossible when retrieving information in this fashion, no matter how extensive training is, because limited retrieval introduces noise into the decision process that cannot be overcome. One implication is that people should be more accurate in predicting future events when trained on idealized rather than on the actual distributions of items. In other words, we predict the best way to convey information to people is to present it in a distorted, idealized form. Idealization of training distributions is predicted to reduce the harmful noise induced by immutable bottlenecks in people's memory retrieval processes. In contrast, machine learning systems that selectively weight (i.e., retrieve) all training examples at test should not benefit from idealization. These conjectures are strongly supported by several studies and supporting analyses. Unlike machine systems, people's test performance on a target distribution is higher when they are trained on an idealized version of the distribution rather than on the actual target distribution. Optimal machine classifiers modified to selectively and stochastically sample from memory match the pattern of human performance. These results suggest firm limits on human rationality and have broad implications for how to train humans tasked with important classification decisions, such as radiologists, baggage screeners, intelligence analysts, and gamblers.

Category knowledge can be explicit, yet not conform to a perfect rule. For example, a child may acquire the rule "If it has wings, then it is a bird," but then must account for exceptions to this rule, such as bats. The current study explored the neurobiological basis of rule-plus-exception learning by using quantitative predictions from a category learning model, SUSTAIN, to analyze behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. SUSTAIN predicts that exceptions require formation of specialized representations to distinguish exceptions from rule-following items in memory. By incorporating quantitative trial-by-trial predictions from SUSTAIN directly into fMRI analyses, we observed medial temporal lobe (MTL) activation consistent with 2 predicted psychological processes that enable exception learning: item recognition and error correction. SUSTAIN explains how these processes vary in the MTL across learning trials as category knowledge is acquired. Importantly, MTL engagement during exception learning was not captured by an alternate exemplar-based model of category learning or by standard contrasts comparing exception and rule-following items. The current findings thus provide a well-specified theory for the role of the MTL in category learning, where the MTL plays an important role in forming specialized category representations appropriate for the learning context.

This work explores the influence of motivation on choice behavior in a dynamic decision-making environment, where the payoffs from each choice depend on one's recent choice history. Previous research reveals that participants in a regulatory fit exhibit increased levels of exploratory choice and flexible use of multiple strategies over the course of an experiment. The present study placed promotion and prevention-focused participants in a dynamic environment for which optimal performance is facilitated by systematic exploration of the decision space. These participants either gained or lost points with each choice. Our experiment revealed that participants in a regulatory fit were more likely to engage in systematic exploration of the task environment than were participants in a regulatory mismatch and performed more optimally as a result. Implications for contemporary models of human reinforcement learning are discussed., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved.)

We suggest that human category formation relies on contrastive learning mechanisms that seek to reduce prediction error. In keeping with this view, manipulating category contrast leads to systematic distortions in people's memory for category information. Simply by changing the basis of comparison (i.e., the available response options), we can systematically distort people's perceptions of novel, energy-source, and political categories. Our proposal explains perceived variations in category members' typicality, including cases in which average items are judged as highly typical and cases in which extreme or ideal members are judged as highly typical of the category. Although straightforward, our account spans findings from studies in goal-derived, cross-cultural, and object-based categorization and suggests ways in which society's perception of key issues is distorted by political discourse.

We evaluate two broad classes of cognitive mechanisms that might support the learning of sequential patterns. According to the first, learning is based on the gradual accumulation of direct associations between events based on simple conditioning principles. The other view describes learning as the process of inducing the transformational structure that defines the material. Each of these learning mechanisms predict differences in the rate of acquisition for differently organized sequences. Across a set of empirical studies, we compare the predictions of each class of model with the behavior of human subjects. We find that learning mechanisms based on transformations of an internal state, such as recurrent network architectures (e.g., Elman, 1990), have difficulty accounting for the pattern of human results relative to a simpler (but more limited) learning mechanism based on learning direct associations. Our results suggest new constraints on the cognitive mechanisms supporting sequential learning behavior.

Research on dynamic decision-making tasks, in which the payoffs associated with each choice vary with participants' recent choice history, shows that humans have difficulty making long-term optimal choices in the presence of attractive immediate rewards. However, a number of recent studies have shown that simple cues providing information about the underlying state of the task environment may facilitate optimal responding. In this study, we examined the mechanism by which this state knowledge influences choice behavior. We examined the possibility that participants use state information in conjunction with changing payoffs to extrapolate payoffs in future states. We found support for this hypothesis in an experiment in which generalizations based on this state information worked to the benefit or detriment of task performance, depending on the task's payoff structure.

In engineering systems, noise is a curse, obscuring important signals and increasing the uncertainty associated with measurement. However, the negative effects of noise and uncertainty are not universal. In this paper, we examine how people learn sequential control strategies given different sources and amounts of feedback variability. In particular, we consider people's behavior in a task where short- and long-term rewards are placed in conflict (i.e., the best option in the short-term is worst in the long-term). Consistent with a model based on reinforcement learning principles (Gureckis & Love, in press), we find that learners differentially weight information predictive of the current task state. In particular, when cues that signal state are noisy and uncertain, we find that participants' ability to identify an optimal strategy is strongly impaired relative to equivalent amounts of uncertainty that obscure the rewards/valuations of those states. In other situations, we find that noise and uncertainty in reward signals may paradoxically improve performance by encouraging exploration. Our results demonstrate how experimentally-manipulated task variability can be used to test predictions about the mechanisms that learners engage in dynamic decision making tasks.

Category learning theorists tacitly assume that stimuli are encoded by a single pathway. Motivated by theories of object recognition, we evaluated a dual-pathway account of stimulus encoding. The part-based pathway establishes mappings between sensory input and symbols that encode discrete stimulus features, whereas the image-based pathway applies holistic templates to sensory input. Our experiments used rule-plus-exception structures, in which one exception item in each category violates a salient regularity and must be distinguished from other items. In Experiment 1, we found discrete representations to be crucial for recognition of exceptions following brief training. Experiments 2 and 3 involved multisession training regimens designed to encourage either part- or image-based encoding. We found that both pathways are able to support exception encoding, but have unique characteristics. We speculate that one advantage of the part-based pathway is the ability to generalize across domains, whereas the image-based pathway provides faster and more effortless recognition.

Two basic approaches to explaining the nature of the mind are the rational and the mechanistic approaches. Rational analyses attempt to characterize the environment and the behavioral outcomes that humans seek to optimize, whereas mechanistic models attempt to simulate human behavior using processes and representations analogous to those used by humans. We compared these approaches with regard to their accounts of how humans learn the variability of categories. The mechanistic model departs in subtle ways from rational principles. In particular, the mechanistic model incrementally updates its estimates of category means and variances through error-driven learning, based on discrepancies between new category members and the current representation of each category. The model yields a prediction, which we verify, regarding the effects of order manipulations that the rational approach does not anticipate. Although both rational and mechanistic models can successfully postdict known findings, we suggest that psychological advances are driven primarily by consideration of process and representation and that rational accounts trail these breakthroughs.

Rule-based and information-integration category learning were compared under minimal and full feedback conditions. Rule-based category structures are those for which the optimal rule is verbalizable. Information-integration category structures are those for which the optimal rule is not verbalizable. With minimal feedback subjects are told whether their response was correct or incorrect, but are not informed of the correct category assignment. With full feedback subjects are informed of the correctness of their response and are also informed of the correct category assignment. An examination of the distinct neural circuits that subserve rule-based and information-integration category learning leads to the counterintuitive prediction that full feedback should facilitate rule-based learning but should also hinder information-integration learning. This prediction was supported in the experiment reported below. The implications of these results for theories of learning are discussed.

Historically, accounts of object representation and perceived similarity have focused on intrinsic features. Although more recent accounts have explored how objects, scenes, and situations containing common relational structures come to be perceived as similar, less is known about how the perceived similarity of parts or objects embedded within these relational systems is affected. The current studies test the hypothesis that objects situated in common relational systems come to be perceived as more similar. Similarity increases most for objects playing the same role within a relation (e.g., predator), but also increases for objects playing different roles within the same relation (e.g., the predator or prey role in the hunts relation) regardless of whether the objects participate in the same instance of the relation. This pattern of results can be captured by extending existing models that extract meaning from text corpora so that they are sensitive to the verb-specific thematic roles that objects fill. Alternative explanations based on analogical and inferential processes are also considered, as well as the implications of the current findings to research in language processing, decision making, and category learning.

Mental localization efforts tend to stress the where more than the what. We argue that the proper targets for localization are well-specified cognitive models. We make this case by relating an existing cognitive model of category learning to a learning circuit involving the hippocampus, perirhinal, and prefrontal cortices. Results from groups varying in function along this circuit (e.g., infants, amnesics, and older adults) are successfully simulated by reducing the model's ability to form new clusters in response to surprising events, such as an error in supervised learning or an unfamiliar stimulus in unsupervised learning. Clusters in the model are akin to conjunctive codes that are rooted in an episodic experience (the surprising event) yet can develop to resemble abstract codes as they are updated by subsequent experiences. Thus, the model holds that the line separating episodic and semantic information can become blurred. Dissociations (categorization vs. recognition) are explained in terms of cluster recruitment demands.

What makes a person, event, or object memorable? Enhanced memory for oddball items is long established, but the basis for these effects is not well understood. The present work clarifies the roles of isolation and differentiation in establishing new memories. According to the isolation account, items that are highly dissimilar to other items are better remembered. In contrast, recent category learning studies suggest that oddball items are better remembered because they must be differentiated from similar items. The present work pits the differentiation and isolation accounts against each other. The results suggest that differentiation, not isolation, leads to more accurate memory for deviant items. In contrast, gains for isolated items are attributable to reduced confusion with other items, as opposed to preferential storage.

Accounts of learning and generalization typically focus on factors related to lasting changes in representation (i.e., long-term memory). The authors present evidence that shorter term effects also play a critical role in determining performance and that these recency effects can be subdivided into perceptual and decisional components. Experimental results based on a probabilistic category structure show that the previous stimulus exerts a contrastive effect on the current percept (perceptual recency) and that responses are biased toward or away from the previous feedback, depending on the similarity between successive stimuli (decisional recency). A method for assessing these recency effects is presented that clarifies open questions regarding stimulus generalization and perceptual contrast effects in categorization and in other domains.

The results from 3 category learning experiments suggest that items are better remembered when they violate a salient knowledge structure such as a rule. The more salient the knowledge structure, the stronger the memory for deviant items. The effect of learning errors on subsequent recognition appears to be mediated through the imposed knowledge structure. The recognition advantage for deviant items extends to unsupervised learning situations. Exemplar-based and hypothesis-testing models cannot account for these results. The authors propose a clustering account in which deviant items are better remembered because they are differentiated from clusters that capture regularities. The function of clusters is akin to that of schemas. Their results and analyses expose connections among research in category learning, schemas, stereotypes, and analogy., ((c) 2004 APA)

SUSTAIN (Supervised and Unsupervised STratified Adaptive Incremental Network) is a model of how humans learn categories from examples. SUSTAIN initially assumes a simple category structure. If simple solutions prove inadequate and SUSTAIN is confronted with a surprising event (e.g., it is told that a bat is a mammal instead of a bird), SUSTAIN recruits an additional cluster to represent the surprising event. Newly recruited clusters are available to explain future events and can themselves evolve into prototypes-attractors-rules. SUSTAIN's discovery of category substructure is affected not only by the structure of the world but by the nature of the learning task and the learner's goals. SUSTAIN successfully extends category learning models to studies of inference learning, unsupervised learning, category construction, and contexts in which identification learning is faster than classification learning.

Computational models of infant categorization often fail to elaborate the transitional mechanisms that allow infants to achieve adult performance. In this article, we apply a successful connectionist model of adult category learning to developmental data. The Supervised and Unsupervised Stratified Adaptive Incremental Network (SUSTAIN) model is able to account for the emergence of infants' sensitivity to correlated attributes (e.g., has wings and can fly). SUSTAIN offers 2 complimentary explanations of the developmental trend. One explanation centers on memory storage limitations, whereas the other focuses on limitations in perceptual systems. Both explanations parallel published findings concerning the cognitive and sensory limitations of infants. SUSTAIN's simulations suggest that conceptual development follows a continuous and smooth trajectory despite qualitative changes in behavior and that the mechanisms that underlie infant and adult categorization might not differ significantly., (2004 International Society on Infant Studies.)

Typically, models of category learning are verified through behavioral experiments with stimuli consisting of putatively independent dimensions such as shape, size, and color. The assumption of independence is critical in both the design of behavioral experiments and the development of models and theories of learning. Using the standard classification learning paradigm and a common stimulus set, the present work demonstrates that the assumption of independence is unwarranted. Systematic relations span stimulus dimensions and govern learning performance. For example, shape is not independent of size and color, because humans quantify size and color over shape when shape is relevant to the categorization. This quantification is reflected in natural language use (e.g., "blue triangle" as opposed to "triangle and blue"). In this example, color and size are predicates and shape is the argument. Across four experiments, the difficulty of mastering a classification rule can be predicted by the number of predicates that must be unbound in order to free rule-relevant stimulus dimensions.

A substantial portion of category-learning research has focused on one learning mode--namely, classification learning (a supervised learning mode). Subsequently, theories of category learning have focused on how the abstract structure of categories (i.e., the co-occurrence patterns of feature values) affects acquisition. Recent work in supervised learning has shown that a learner's interactions with the stimulus set also plays an important role in acquisition. The present study extends this work to unsupervised learning situations involving simple one-dimensional stimuli. The results suggest that categorization performance is a function of both learning mode (i.e., study conditions) and learning problem (i.e., category structure). Unsupervised learning, like supervised learning, appears to be multifaceted, with different learning modes best paired with certain learning problems.

Two unsupervised learning modes (incidental and intentional unsupervised learning) and their relation to supervised classification learning are examined. The approach allows for direct comparisons of unsupervised learning data with the Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) seminal studies in supervised classification learning. Unlike supervised classification learning, unsupervised learning (especially under incidental conditions) favors linear category structures over compact nonlinear category structures. Unsupervised learning is shown to be multifaceted in that performance varies with task conditions. In comparison with incidental unsupervised learning, intentional unsupervised learning is more rule like, but is no more accurate. The acquisition and application of knowledge is also more laborious under intentional unsupervised learning.

Previous research suggests that learning categories by classifying new instances highlights information that is useful for discriminating between categories. In contrast, learning categories by making predictive inferences focuses learners on an abstract summary of each category (e.g., the prototype). To test this characterization of classification and inference learning further, the authors evaluated the two learning procedures with nonlinearly separable categories. In contrast to previous research involving cohesive, linearly separable categories, the authors found that it is more difficult to learn nonlinearly separable categories by making inferences about features than it is to learn them by classifying instances. This finding reflects that the prototype of a nonlinearly separable category does not provide a good summary of the category members. The results from this study suggest that having a cohesive category structure is more important for inference than it is for classification.