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The object of the paper is to analyse 'Europeanism', i.e. attitudes towards the European Communities in the total context of attitudes towards foreign policy issues in the Danish public, using data from two different surveys. First, the inner structure of Europeanism is analysed, and it is shown that attitudes towards European supranational integration had only a limited impact on attitudes towards the membership issue and on the referendum vote. Next, the position of Europeanism in a hypothesized foreign policy belief system consisting of internationalism, Europeanism, Atlanticism, Nordism and Universalism is reviewed. It is shown that these five orientations make up a mo derately constrained and balanced belief system, and that Europeanism seems to be one of its more central features. Another finding is a clear negative relationship between Europeanism and Nordism. Finally, some similarities and differences between the public's view of the world and the foreign policy belief systems of the political elite are discussed.

A paradox haunts the career of Paul-Henri Spaak, and one that is charac teristic of Belgian foreign policy in general. For Spaak, the man who was nicknamed 'Mr. Europe'1 for the contribution that he made to the post-war movement for European integration was also the man who, as Foreign Minister of the inter-war governments of van Zeeland and Pierlot, was associated with the policy of Belgian 'independence'. That policy is usually seen as the direct antithesis of integration. The resolution of the paradox requires a consideration of the context of Spaak's actions. The primary constraints on his freedom of action were the demands of the external and internal political situations. These were more pressing in the inter-war than in the post-war period. Secondly there was a certain economic logic to Spaak's later position, although its direct influence on Spaak was probably slight. More important, the developments in the economic sphere in the inter-war years brought to the fore two contemporary currents of thought, represented by Hendrik de Man and Paul van Zeeland. The economic positions adopted by these two intellectuals were one aspect of a more general reorientation of social and political thought occurring in Belgium at that time, and which did have a strong influence on Spaak. His participation in this process provides the key to understanding his Europeanism.

Like a number of the new foreign policy concepts put forward by the Gorbachev administration, the Soviet idea of the 'Common European Home', much used in Gorbachev's recent diplomacy towards Western Europe, has been greeted in the West with puzzlement and some mistrust. As the Common European Home project clashes very markedly with traditional Soviet foreign policy thinking, this is not really surprising. But since 1985 there has been a striking change in Soviet doctrine about international relations: a shift from hard-nosed 'realism' to a way of thinking that appears to be based on the idea of an international society held together by shared interests and values. Recent Soviet 'Europeanism' has nonetheless been interpreted in the West as a smokescreen for plans to prise Germany away from the Western alliance or to pull Western Europe and America apart. Gorbachev's response has been that he has no 'wedge-driving' intentions

Through new comminications and aggressive expansion mankind of the modern era is being thrown together with accelerating vigor. Trader and missionary influences comprised the first specialized wave of "Europeanism" over the Pacific, of cultural as contrasted with militant penetration. In more accessible and hospitable regions trade and mission activities produced what might be called a "native-mission-trader" culture wich, in the temporary absence of further cultural penetration, tended to reach an equilibrium. Later increase in informal contacts and purposeful government pressure marked another period of cultural flux, under which uprisings, reversions to savagery," and warlike restlessness occurred. Two main emphases are apparent, one looking toward assimilation, the other toward preservation of the indigenous culture and identity. In the last year or two economic conditions in the Pacific area have prevented adequate adjustment of native peoples in immigrant culture. Discriminations arise on the basis ...

To those who have followed the results of public opinion polling among the peoples of the European Communities, it would probably come as something less than a surprise to learn that a solid majority in Europe is committed to international integration. Neither might it be especially revealing to hear that the Common Market has become a symbol of "European" identification, or that "third force Europe" sentiments are harbored only among a small Gaullist minority. Nor, again, might it be all that edifying to learn that the Dutch are the most regional minded and the Italians the most parochial of the EEC populations, or that young people are much more enthusiastic about European unification than their parents. As it turns out, not one of these articles of integrationist faith and "European" folklore is true. The dashing of these and many related cliches is a tribute to the objectivity, rigor, and imagination of those who designed and executed the EEC-wide pollings reported in Les Europeens et L'Unification de L'Europe. The research project which, in June 1972, produced the 200-page report under review here, was inspired and engineered by Jacques-Rene Rabier, a respected European sociologist and Director-General for Press and Information in the European Communities. Its goal was to go beyond the superficial soundings which have heretofore characterized most survey research into European integration. EEC analysts sought first

New views either on Metterich, or else on the entire Hapsburg empire, occur in such serious works of research, all published after World War II, as the following (to name just a few): Hannah Straus, Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism (N. Y., 1949); Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire (N. Y., 1950); Walter Langsam, Francis the Good (N. Y., 1949); Jerome Blum, Noble Landowners and Agriculture in Austria, 1815-1848 (Baltimore, 1948); Golo Mann, Secretary of Europe (New Haven, 1946); Arnold Whitridge, Men in Crisis: The Revolutions of 1848 (N. Y., 1949); several monographs on Austria by R. John Rath in Journal of Modern History and Journal of Central European Affairs; Veit Valentin, The German People (N. Y., 1946).2 These writers no less than the present writer in his book Conservdtism Revisited (N. Y., Scribner, 1949), remain definitely opposed to Metternich's repressive measures, so ably indicted in so many of the standard studies. "New Views" should not mean whitewashing but should mean: more criticism of the inherent contradictions of nationalism and of an abstract, too rapidly innovating liberalism; more respect for Metternich's civilized Europeanism, his Burkean conservatism, and his subtle psychological and social insights than is found in pre-1914 liberal histories like Charles Hazen's

THE movement toward the organization of the economic solidarity of Continental Europe has progressed with rapid strides since CoudenhoveKalergi launched his Pan-European appeal in the midst of the Ruhr struggle and since Mr. Loucheur two years later gave it an official and economic expression by his resolution in the Assembly of the League, calling for a World Economic Conference. While in the early stages almost every one agreed with the general view that Europe's industrial and economic future was dependent upon her ability to provide, out of the "balkanized" continental market, a unit at least roughly comparable to the large home market of the United States, the great difficulty lay in the formulation of a program for definite action towards the fulfillment of this objective. From the discussions initiated by the committee which prepared the World Economic Conference of 1997, two broad tendencies are slowly emerging. The first, under Mr. Loucheur's leadership, is based on the idea that the first steps will have to be taken through the organization and the public encouragement of private industrial agreements.' The second-primarily under English and Dutch leadership-seeks a solution by a direct attack upon tariffs. THE Two ROADS

In the following paper we will critically analyze the discourse of the History Textbook from the period 1976-2011 in order to put emphasis on changes in the presentation of History reflected in a didactic context depending on the dominant socio-political options. Our study reveals these differences from the perspective of orienting the ethnocentric discourse from the ‘80s and 90's to an Eurocentric one in the years leading up to the country's integration in the European community. The theoretical framework offered by the theory of symbolic violence presented by Bourdieu allows us to illustrate the role of the formal curriculum in imposing certain systems of meaning and ideology.

Mobility within the EU is increasing with the emergence of a culture of Europeanism, ease of movement and the affordability of travel. Personal mobility joins the mobility of goods, financial markets and financial transactions. The situation has not always been positive, partly because of the economic crisis of 2008 and later; the construction of Europe, far from being complete, continues to encounter obstacles and difficulties. The current migration crisis is one of the strongest motivations for analysing the phenomenon of human mobility in the EU. This article considers the phenomenon of migration in five regions of Italy (Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily) by citizens of countries that predominantly experience emigration (Latvia, Romania, Slovakia), immigration (Germany, Sweden, the UK) and countries like Italy where flows of both emigration and immigration are common (Ireland and Spain). The study uses regional units defined not in relation to the history of Europe over the centuries but in relation to the labour market (Labour Market Areas) identified by the National Institute of Statistics (Istat) on the basis of a contemporary parameter related to commuting. This new division of areas in relation to contemporary economic and social situations has made it possible to focus on the actual presence of immigrants by nationality and age in areas that are smaller and which more clearly demonstrate the reasons that explain mobility for production and mobility for consumption.

After three and a half decades of existence under peaceful conditions in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finds itself the focus of attention of academics, military strategists, statesmen and peace movements from both sides of the Atlantic. Since 1967 when the strategy of flexible response was formally adopted by NATO, the alliance has been more or less stable. However, during this period, as we have argued, new social, political and economic realities have emerged, indicating that now is the time for NATO to seriously consider its strategy and structure and the future direction the Atlantic alliance should take. Currently, four problem areas exist within the alliance that threaten its unity and consequently its effectiveness.

In the aftermath of World War II, the leaders of the movement for European integration had the fresh memory of almost four million dead to spur their efforts. When the Six signed the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 they stated in the preamble their resolve ‘to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny hence-forward shared’. By 1957, when the Six signed the Treaty of Rome, memories of the holocaust had been softened by over a decade of peace and the preamble to the treaty talked less grandiloquently of pooling resources ‘to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’. Today, war between the historic antagonists of Western Europe, now closely intermeshed in the EEC and NATO and deprived of empires to quarrel over, appears unthinkable, and the need to dissolve nationalism in Europeanism less pressing. Yet, paradoxically, the very success of the movement towards European unity has led to a resurgence of European nationalism.

One of the great problems of the sciences in general, is the constant search for universalizations, generalizations and systematizations of their objects, data, contents and results. Perhaps they are still vestiges or remnants of positivism or the identification with a possible scientism. However, in doing so, the very character, role, meaning and function of science is denied, which is to be provisional, and not permanent or eternal. Even in certain cases, there is the possibility of universalization, generalization and systematization, in which they will also remain open and not closed in themselves. Therefore, this work seeks to examine and reflect on what history is, the meaning of history and historiography by approaches, aspects and instruments of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, philosophy of history, historiography, theory of history, writing history and others. This is so that in this way we may be able to get rid of certain myths, contents and productions of a certain history and universalist historiography. Since, in such a narrative and writing of history, there were many misinterpreted, mythical and generalizing interpretations of the history of the world and of people in general, where Eurocentrism, Europeanism and Westernism took over the presentation and representation of historical and culture of the world, almost an acculturation and homogenization of peoples, cultures and ethnicities, mischaracterizing them in their own narratives and historical processes, all within a “Western historical package and product.” In which the story was placed and reduced to determinisms of different types and modes. Therefore, one of the crucial objectives here is to deconstruct such narratives, perceptions and procedures of sneaky acculturation and ethnocentrism in world history. Therefore, if it is necessary to overcome any and all narrative, writing and historical production that places groups, ethnicities and cultures between superiors and inferiors in historical production and in history, in which the superior groups make history and are the protagonists of it, while the inferior groups are the mere supporting actors in the world, as well as in historical production. This is because its history and production are fields of disputes, conflicts and clashes of ideals. Occurring thus, even by scientific production.

Darrerament, com a resultat del vot negatiu de les poblacions de França i Holanda a la ratifi cació de la Constitució Europea, estem sentint i llegint a bastament al voltant de la fi del somni europeu, però sense que ningú no especifi qui en què consisteix aquest somni. Una Europa federal, un marc de relació intergovernamental, una Europa que parli amb una sola veu, l’Europa dels pobles, serien diferents defi nicions amb les quals diversos grups de persones s’identifi carien. De fet, la defi nició ofi cial és aquella que assenyala com a objectiu anar vers «una unió cada cop més estreta», objectiu sufi cientment genèric com perquè qualsevol dels grups humans assenyalats entenguin que és vers la seva Europa que tot el procés d’integració europea es dirigeix...

En el presente trabajo se analizan dos temas del pensamiento político de José Ortega y Gasset tan centrales como poco conocidos : el concepto de Estado y la idea de nación. En ambos casos se trata de conceptos circunstanciales que ha n ido evolucionando a lo largo de la historia. En particular, por lo que se refiere a la obra orteguiana , esta evolución es fácil de apreciar si se comparan tres de sus libros más representativos de su pensamiento político: España invertebrada (1922); La r ebelión de las masas (1930); y De Europa Meditatio Quaedam (Meditación de Europa) (1960) . Al hilo de lo expuesto en estos libros, e n el presente artículo se someterá precisamente a estudio la relación existente entre la idea de Estado y el concepto de nación en Ortega, a partir de cuatro premisas: 1) la nación concebida desde un punto de vista dinámico, circunstancial e histórico; 2) las contradicciones internas de la ontología orteguiana de la nación; 3) la nación entendida a veces como sinónimo y otras co mo contrapunto del Estado; y, finalmente, 4) la interpretación no nacionalista del término nación por parte de Ortega he current article analyses two topics of José Ortega y Gasset ́s Political Though t which are as essential as not very wel l known : the notion of State and the idea of Nation. Both of them are circumstantial concepts which have been developed throughout history. Particularly , regarding Ortega’s work, this development is easy to see comparing three of the mo st representative wo rks of his Political Philosophy : Invertebrate Spain (1922); The Revolt of the Masses (1930); and De Europa Meditatio Quaedam (Meditation on Europe ) (1960) . Following the threa d of these books, in this article we will analyze the link between both concepts (‘Nation ’ and ‘State ’) in Ortega starting from following premises: 1) the N ation from a dy namic, circumstantial and historical point of view; 2) internal contradictions in 2 Ortega’s Nation’s ontology ; 3) the Nation sometimes understood as synonym, sometimes as counterpoint, of the State; 4) finally , Ortega’s non -nationalist interpretation of the term ‘Nation’.