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This paper evaluates the impact of an unexpected temporary hiring credit targeted at workers paid below 1.6 times the minimum wage in firms with less than 10 employees in France from December 2008 to December 2009. Using rich administrative data covering all French firms, we find that the program has had a strong and rapid impact on employment. The net cost per job created for the government was around zero. The employment effect was stronger in areas where recruitment was easier. Although the hiring credit was not conditional on net job creation, it did not increase churning of workers. Nevertheless, we estimate that a credit conditional on net job creation above the employment growth threshold of -1%, would have maximized job creation, and created about 4 times more jobs, at constant budget, provided that take-up had remained the same.

To read the most recent version of the discussion paper click here . The provision of non-pecuniary incentives in education is a topic that has received much scholarly attention lately. Our paper contributes to this discussion by investigating the effectiveness of grade incentives in increasing student performance. We perform a direct comparison of the two most commonly used grading practices: the absolute (i.e., criterion-referenced) and the relative (i.e., norm-referenced) grading schemes in a large-scale field experiment at a university. We hypothesize that relative grading, by creating a rank-order tournament in the classroom, provides stronger incentives for male students than absolute grading. In the full sample, we find weak support for our hypothesis. Among the more motivated students we find evidence that men indeed score significantly higher on the test when graded on a curve. Female students, irrespective of their motivation, do not increase their scores under relative grading. Since women slightly outperform men under absolute grading, grading on a curve actually narrows the gender gap in performance.

We study the effects of a field experiment designed to motivate employee ideas, at a large technology company. Employees were encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements via an online system. In the experiment, the company randomized 19 account teams into treatment and control groups. Employees in treatment teams received rewards if their ideas were approved. Nothing changed for employees in control teams. Our main finding is that rewards substantially increased the quality of ideas submitted. Further, rewards increased participation in the suggestion system, but decreased the number of ideas per participating employee, with zero net effect on the total quantity of ideas. The broader participation base persisted even after the reward was discontinued, suggesting habituation. We find no evidence for motivational crowding out. Our findings suggest that rewards can improve innovation and creativity, and that there may be a tradeoff between the quantity and quality of ideas.

Is tax compliance driven only by extrinsic motivations such as deterrence and tax policy or is there also a role for intrinsic motivations such as morals, norms and psychology? Agents may comply based on moral sentiments, social norms, guilt and shame (Andreoni et al. 1998), all of which are non-deterrence driven reasons for compliance. The importance of such intrinsically motivated compliance is hard to study empirically and therefore the least understood. This study uses a unique setting for making progress on this question: the local church tax in Germany. As we show in the paper, tax evaders, compliers, and donors can coexist in the local church tax system and be precisely distinguished from each other. Since there is zero deterrence in the baseline, baseline compliance provides a direct measure of intrinsically motivated tax compliance. Starting from the zero deterrence baseline we use a randomized field experiment to inject deterrence or recognition into the system. This allows us to study if policies aimed at either extrinsic motivation (deterrence) or intrinsic motivation (recognition) have qualitatively different effects on agents who have revealed each of those motivations in the baseline. Our main empirical findings are the following. First, a significant fraction of agents (23%) comply in the zero deterrence baseline where compliance would be zero absent intrinsic motivation, while the remaining 77% evade the tax. Intrinsic motivation is therefore substantial, although the majority behaves as rational, self-interested taxpayers. Second, announcing a zero audit probability (the status quo) has a small and insignificant effect on the compliance rate, showing that there is very little misperception on average. Third, tax salience and deterrence have strong effects on compliance for baseline evaders, but small and insignificant effects for baseline donors. This is consistent with the fact that the enforcement constraint is not binding for the intrinsically motivated and therefore they are naturally unresponsive to deterrence. Fourth and finally, recognition through social and monetary rewards for compliance has fundamentally different effects on baseline donors (who increase their payments) and baseline evaders (who reduce their payments). Hence, whether recognition helps or hurts depends crucially on what motivates taxpayers in the first place, with positive effects on the intrinsically motivated and negative effects on the extrinsically motivated. All of our findings can be explained by a model of tax compliance that unifies the standard Becker-Allingham-Sandmo approach (strengthening extrinsic motives for tax compliance) and the Andreoni (1989, 1990) warm-glow model of pro-social behaviour.

Up to now in the social sciences, what is known as citizen science—the involvement of interested citizens in scientific surveys—has been used relatively little as a method of empirical social research. While the “citizens’ dialogues” that are becoming more widespread in politics can be considered a kind of social scientific citizen science, the participants in these dialogues are not selected randomly from the population (as is the case in surveys) but volunteer to participate because of their interest in actively shaping the public sphere. However, the socio-structural characteristics of participants in citizens’ dialogues are usually unknown and therefore not statistically comparable with the characteristics of the population at large or of specific population groups. In the present paper, we report on a pretest conducted with visitors to the Long Night of the Sciences 2014 in Berlin (http://www.langenachtderwissenschaften.de/). At the event, visitors to the event—who are a kind of citizen scientists—were surveyed on socio-structural characteristics and were also asked whether they would be willing to take part in later focus group discussions. The survey was conducted with 31 participants (out of a total of around 150 visitors to DIW Berlin on the evening of the event), who answered questions on their socio-economic characteristics. Of these, eight individuals agreed to take part in later, more in-depth (focus group) discussions. The technology developed for this paper introduces the survey to respondents, describes the recording and analysis the statistical results, and extends to a statement on data privacy and the computer-based survey itself.

We investigate the determinants of couples labor supply within an experimental setting. On the one hand, we are interested in the e ect of taxes on couples labor supply, but on the other hand we focus on factors beyond purely economic incentives: the role of the social norm of a male breadwinner. 58 established cohabiting heterosexual and married couples (116 participants) perform under a piece rate payment on real e ort tasks (i.e. solving mazes) within a given time and with work e ort (i.e. number of solved mazes) serving as our proxy for labor supply. We demonstrate that gender identity and (dis)satisfaction with income opportunities dominated the e ects of taxation within a couple context.

Theory predicts that entrepreneurs have distinct attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, but empirical evidence is mixed. To better understand the unique behavioral characteristics of entrepreneurs and the causes of these mixed results, we perform a large ‘lab-in- the-field’ experiment comparing entrepreneurs to managers – a suitable comparison group – and employees (n=2288) . The results indicate that entrepreneurs perceive themselves as less risk averse than managers and employees, in line with common wisdom. However, when using experimental incentivized measures, the differences are subtler. Entrepreneurs are only found to be unique in their lower degree of loss aversion, and not in their risk or ambiguity aversion. This combination of results might be explained by our finding that perceived risk attitude is not only correlated to risk aversion but also to loss aversion. Overall, we therefore suggest using a broader definition of risk that captures this unique feature of entrepreneurs; their willingness to risk losses., Fourth wave feminists are currently seeking to bring an end to The Sun’s Page 3, a British institution infamous for featuring a topless female model daily. This paper investigates the No More Page 3 (NMP3) campaign through which feminist activists have sought to disrupt the institutionalized objectification of women more generally, and endeavour to transform a corporate arena of citizenship (focused solely on organisational activities) constructed by British retailer The Co-operative into a public arena of citizenship (focused on issues of social good more generally). Building upon insights from the institutional work and political corporate social responsibility literatures, we document the manner in which feminist activists have used The Co- operative’s social media site to publicly disrupt entrenched gender norms. Through identifying symbiotic yet competing discourses we discover themes of disruption and maintenance amongst and between interlocutors, facilitated by The Co-operative’s arena of citizenship and its notion of suspended discourse. Our analysis contributes to the institutional work literature by demonstrating the mutual need for disruption to ‘meet’ or contest maintenance work in corporate practice, and to the political corporate social responsibility literature by demonstrating the more nuanced and de- centralised role of corporations in public arenas of citizenship and within society.

International audience; This paper is based on a randomised social experiment conducted in order to understand the low take-up rate of a Complementary health-insurance voucher program for the poorest in France (the Aide Complémentaire Santé: ACS). We explore two of the main hypotheses put forward to explain low enrolment: a lack of information about the program and a voucher amount considered to be too low. A sample of eligible individuals living in an urban area in Northern France were randomly split into three groups: a control group who benefited from the standard level of financial aid; a group benefiting from an increase in the value of the voucher; and a third group benefiting from the same increase along with an invitation to an information meeting regarding ACS. We show that the voucher increase has a small but statistically significant effect on ACS take-up. The invitation to the meeting appears to cancel out the positive effect of the voucher increase. Using an instrumental variable model to control for potential selection bias, we find ambiguous evidence of the meeting attendance on ACS take-up. This study confirms the difficulties that are faced in increasing the health insurancecoverage of poor populations via subsidy programs.

This study assesses hiring discrimination based on disclosed depression. We send out pairs of job applications from fictitious unemployed candidates to real vacancies in Belgium. Within each pair, one candidate cites depression as the reason for her/his unemployment, whereas the other candidate reveals no reason for unemployment. Overall, the hypothesis that applicants disclosing former depression are treated unfavourably is rejected. However, if we break up the data by the gender of the recruiter, we see that revealing former depression as a reason for unemployment is rewarded by female recruiters, whereas it affects the hiring decisions made by male recruiters in a non-positive way.

We investigate the effects of team competition on pro-social lending activity on Kiva.org, the first microlending website to match lenders with entrepreneurs in developing countries. Using naturally occurring field data, we find that lenders who join teams contribute 1.2 more loans ($30-$42) per month than those who do not. To further explore factors that differentiate successful teams from dormant ones, we run a large-scale randomized field experiment (n = 22, 233) by posting forum messages. Compared to the control, we find that lenders make significantly more loans when exposed to a goal-setting and coordination message, whereas goal-setting alone significantly increases lending activities of previously inactive teams. Our findings suggest that goal-setting and coordination are effective mechanisms to increase pro-social behavior in teams.

© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. This study estimates the stigma effect of unemployment and overeducation within one framework. We conduct a randomised field experiment in which we send out trios of fictitious job applications, from male candidates with no relevant work experience, to real vacancies. One candidate graduated just a few months before the application, the two others graduated a year earlier and had been unemployed or underemployed since that time. By monitoring the subsequent callback, we find evidence of a larger stigma effect of unemployment than overeducation. The stigma effect of overeducation is found to occur for permanent contract jobs but not for temporary ones. ispartof: De Economist vol:167 issue:1 pages:1-21 status: published

Information programs that leverage peer comparisons are used to encourage pro-social behavior in many contexts. We document how imperfect information generates heterogenous responses to treatments involving personalized feedback and peer comparisons. In our field experiment in retail electricity, we find that most households either overestimate or underestimate their relative energy consumption pre-treatment. Households that overestimated respond to new information by temporarily increasing electricity consumption, whereas households that underestimated take steps that lead to long term energy conservation. We explore the implications of these results for the external validity and design of information programs.

We discuss the contribution of the experimental literature to the understanding of both traditional and previously unexplored dimensions of gender differences and discuss their bearings on labor market outcomes. Experiments have offered new findings on gender discrimination, and while they have identified a bias against hiring women in some labor market segments, the discrimination detected in field experiments is less pervasive than that implied by the regression approach. Experiments have also offered new insights into gender differences in preferences: women appear to gain less from negotiation, have lower preferences than men for risk and competition, and may be more sensitive to social cues. These gender differences in preferences also have implications in group settings, whereby the gender composition of a group affects team decisions and performance. Most of the evidence on gender traits comes from the lab, and key open questions remain as to the source of gender preferences – nature versus nurture, or their interaction – and their role, if any, in the workplace.

We present the results from a natural experiment in which single mothers on welfare were stimulated to find a job. Two policy instruments were introduced: an earnings disregard and job creation. The experiment was performed at the level of municipalities in The Netherlands, a country with relatively high benefits and low incentives for single mothers to leave welfare for work. In our analysis, we make a distinction between native and immigrant welfare recipients. For immigrant single mothers and some groups of native single mothers we find a positive employment effect of an earnings disregard. Job creation in addition to the earnings disregard increased working hours for some groups of single mothers. Although the outflow from welfare was not affected, welfare expenditures were reduced.

We conduct a field experiment in a naturally occurring labor environment and track whether the performance of workers responds to unexpected wage increases. Specifically, we investigate how the timing of wage increases affects efforts. We find that workers’ performance is substantially higher for the same total wage when their wage is increased in two steps as opposed to a single increase at the outset. Moreover, workers are more honest and are more willing to do voluntary extra work after surprising wage increases compared to a baseline condition without increases.

The investment decisions of small-scale farmers in developing countries are conditioned by their financial environment. Binding credit market constraints and incomplete insurance can limit investment in activities with high expected profits. We conducted several experiments in northern Ghana in which farmers were randomly assigned to receive cash grants, grants of or opportunities to purchase rainfall index insurance, or a combination of the two. Demand for index insurance is strong, and insurance leads to significantly larger agricultural investment and riskier production choices in agriculture. The binding constraint to farmer investment is uninsured risk: when provided with insurance against the primary catastrophic risk they face, farmers are able to find resources to increase expenditure on their farms. Demand for insurance in subsequent years is strongly increasing with the farmer’s own receipt of insurance payouts, with the receipt of payouts by others in the farmer’s social network and with recent poor rain in the village. Both investment patterns and the demand for index insurance are consistent with the presence of important basis risk associated with the index insurance, imperfect trust that promised payouts will be delivered and overweighting recent events.

When asking for donations, charitable organizations often suggest a potential amount to contribute. However, the evidence concerning the effects of such suggestions is scarce and inconsistent. Unlike the majority of earlier studies concerned with small-money solicitations, we examine the effect of larger nonbinding suggestions in the context of middle-range donations which are relevant in practice. In a randomized field experiment conducted in conjunction with the Bavarian State Opera, opera visitors received solicitation letters asking to support a social youth project organized by the opera house. The three different treatments were: no suggestion and suggestions of €100 and €200, respectively. Both suggestions were larger than average and median donations in this context. We find that suggested contribution levels substantially influence the distribution of donations actually received. The mean amounts given increase significantly if a suggestion is made. The increase is stronger in the €200 treatment. On the other hand, the participation rate decreases if a suggestion is made. Overall, the returns from the campaign increase non-significantly when a suggestion is made. The solicitation was repeated a year later, without any suggestion. There is weak evidence that suggestions have a long-term effect on individual contribution-level decisions.

After an unsatisfactory purchase, many firms are quick to apologize to customers. It is, however, not clear why they should do that. As the apology is costless, it should be regarded as cheap talk and thus ignored by the customer. In this paper, we test in a controlled field experiment whether apologizing in fluences customers' subsequent behavior. We find that apologizing yields much better outcomes for the firm than offering a monetary compensation.

We conduct a field experiment in a controlled work environment to investigate the effect of motivational talk and its interaction with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk significantly improves performance only if it is accompanied by performance pay. Moreover, performance pay reduces performance unless it is accompanied by motivational talk. By adding motivational sentences to an otherwise neutral explanation of the work task, the effect of performance pay goes from slightly negative to significantly positive. Hence, we find what we call a hidden benefit of monetary rewards: complementarity between performance pay and motivational talk. JEL-Code: C930, M520, J330.

Does students' hand tremble after marking three consecutive identical answers in a multiple choice test? We design an experiment to study if the likelihood to change incorrectly to a different answer than the last one depends on the number of identical previous answers. We do not find a clear treatment effect, but observe that indeed the likelihood to change to an incorrect answer increases in the number of identical previous answers given by the student, even after controlling for how prepared (s)he was overall and how certain (s)he was that the answer to a given multiple choice question is correct. We claim that this behavior possibly is a reasonable reaction to previous exam experience.

This paper explores whether the poor performance of many micro-enterprises can be explained by a lack of basic business skills. We randomized the offer of a free, 48-hour business skills course to female entrepreneurs in rural Mexico. We find that those assigned to treatment earn higher profits, have larger revenues, serve a greater number of clients, are more likely to use formal accounting techniques, and more likely to be registered with the government. Economically significant indirect treatment effects on those entrepreneurs randomized out of the program, yet living in treatment villages are observed. We present a simple model that helps interpret our results, and consistent with the theoretical predic- tions, we find that entrepreneurs with lower baseline profits are the most likely to quit their business post-treatment, and that the positive impacts of the treatment are increasing in entrepreneurial quality. Social Science Research Council, Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence and several institutions at Stanford University: SCID, FSI, the Michelle R. Clayman Institute for Gender Research, the Graduate Research Opportunity, and SEED

We link two important ideas: attention is scarce and a lack of information about an individual drives discrimination in selection decisions. We model how knowledge of ethnicity influences allocation of attention to available information about an applicant. When only a small share of applicants is accepted, negative stereotypes are predicted to lower attention, while the effect is opposite when most applicants are accepted. We test for such “attention discrimination” in two field experiments. We send emails responding to job offers and apartment-rental advertisements and monitor information acquisition, a new feature in this type of experiment. We vary the names of applicants to signal ethnicity and find that minority names are about half as likely to receive an invitation for an apartment viewing or a job interview. The novel finding is that minority names affect the likelihood of resumes being read on the labor market as well as an applicant’s personal website being inspected on the housing market, but the effects are opposite across the two markets. These results support the model's assumption of endogenous attention, which magnifies the role of prior beliefs in discrimination. The model implies persistence of discrimination in selection decisions, even if information about individuals is available and there are no differences in preferences, lower returns to employment qualifications for negatively stereotyped groups, and for policy, the important role of the timing of when a group attribute is revealed.

Does the rotten apple spoils his companions? This is the question we analyze in the context of a repeated population game with behavioral types. Our experimental results show that the inclusion of a non-cooperative player in an anonymous community makes cooperation much more difficult to sustain but that individuals still manage to trust some of the permanent players of society. The rotten apple lowers the quality of the companions, but is not able to completely spoil them.

People respond to those who ask. Within the charitable fundraising community, the power of the ask represents the backbone of most fundraising strategies. Despite this, the optimal design of communication strategies has received less formal attention. For their part, economists have recently explored how communication affects empathy, altruism, and giving rates to charities. Our study takes a step back from this literature to examine how suggestions–a direct ask for a certain amount of money–affect giving rates. We find that our suggestion amounts affect both the intensive and extensive margins: more people give and they tend to give the suggested amount. The resulting insights help us understand why people give, why messages work, and deepen practitioners' understanding of how to use messages to leverage more giving.

Economists are increasingly turning to the experimental method as a means to estimate causal effects. By using randomization to identify key treatment effects, theories previously viewed as untestable are now scrutinized, efficacy of public policies are now more easily verified, and stakeholders can swiftly add empirical evidence to aid their decision-making. This study provides an overview of experimental methods in economics, with a special focus on developing an economic theory of generalizability. Given that field experiments are in their infancy, our secondary focus pertains to a discussion of the various parameters that they identify, and how they add to scientific knowledge. We conclude that until we conduct more field experiments that build a bridge between the lab and the naturally-occurring settings of interest we cannot begin to make strong conclusions empirically on the crucial question of generalizability from the lab to the field.

Over recent years, parking policy has become a key element of urban transport policy and planning in many countries. The need of urban mobility, mostly guaranteed by private cars, in facts, impacts on the policy and regulations of parking areas. The issue is particularly relevant for work related regular trips. Workers have an inelastic demand for parking spaces and limited alternatives to private transport. Often working places have a car parking area to satisfy workers needs but when this is not provided, it implicitly conditions workers' behaviours. The aim of this research is to analyse the trade-off between parking space availability and cost, in terms of time savings (considering time in terms of foregone earnings). This information is pivotal when designing parking policies in terms of fares, investments and regulation. The cost-opportunity of saving time, having information on the availability of slots closer to the working place, is conditioned by the worker's income and earnings. Since the pivotal work of Axhausen and Polak (1991), a relevant body of literature has focused on parking behaviour, measuring many different dimensions in terms of travellers' choice of parking type and location. However, the little attention has been devoted to understand how risk and uncertainty influence drivers' behaviours in parking decision. This paper presents two studies addressing this issue. Both aims to collect disaggregate data on travellers' responses to changes in parking attributes and related information. Different components of the parking activity (e.g., general in-vehicle time, parking search time, egress time) are controlled for, in relation to the characteristics of the respondent. In order to avoid heterogeneity in relation to journey purposes we focus on workers' mobility. The first study is carried out using a standard stated preference approach; the second is carried out in a laboratory through the set up of an experiment. The collected data is used to build simple model of consumer's choice related to parking decision, taking explicitly into consideration both risk and uncertainty. Laboratory's results are compared to the field-experiment's outcome in order to identify potential significant differences and, where possible, with existing revealed and stated preference results.

Many countries provide hiring subsidies aimed at promoting the employment of people with disabilities. The effectiveness of these subsidy schemes remains unclear. The subsidy lowers wages and may thus increase employment, but may also signal lower quality of the applicant (who has to disclose a disability), which deter employers from hiring. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of employer incentives provided by the Swiss Disability Insurance using a small scale social field experiment. Participants write application letters, where it is randomly decided whether the application discloses the subsidy to the potential employer or not. The effectiveness of the hiring subsidy is measured by call-back rates for interviews. The study is conducted in two waves. The first wave focuses on graduates from sheltered Vocational Education & Training Programs. The second wave is implemented in a sample of clients from employment consulting services. Our results reveal that the subsidy is ineffective or even counterproductive in a group of adolescents who are at the end of their vocational training program, but may increase call-back rates in a group of clients of job coaching services.

Lifelong learning is often promoted in ageing societies, but little is known about its returns or governmentsÕ ability to advance it. This paper evaluates the effects of a large-scale randomized field experiment issuing vouchers for adult education in Switzerland. We find no significant average effects of voucher-induced adult education on earnings, employment, and subsequent education one year after treatment. But effects are heterogeneous: Low-education individuals are most likely to profit from adult education, but least likely to use the voucher. The findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of existing unrestricted voucher programs in promoting labor market outcomes through adult education.

Conventional pencil and paper wisdom suggests that allowing multiple attempts on homework will lead to more time spent on homework, higher homework grades, and better exam performance. For a variety of reasons, homework is increasingly being auto-administered online. This paper discusses the results of a quasi-experiment designed to evaluate student behavior under single and multiple attempt homework settings using an online homework management system. The paper explores whether multiple attempts lead to more effort and improved performance, and evaluates alternative, less desirable, behaviors that are potentially incentivized. We find that multiple attempts leads to gaming behavior that results in grade inflation without improvement in learning outcomes. The findings are important in that they provide guidance and insight into best practices to maximize student outcomes when choosing online homework settings.

Experimental evidence shows that people tend to be more cooperative with persons belonging to their own group than with others. Strangely enough, this literature largely fails to consider a type of group pervasive in modern societies: colleagues belonging to the same productive organization. This is particularly curious if one considers the importance of cooperation among colleagues for the economic performance of organizations. This paper carries out an original experimental analysis which compares the level of cooperation of social cooperative workers when they are paired with colleagues and with people from the general population. In contrast with the literature on in-group favoritism, we find that workers trust their colleagues less and cooperate less with them than they do with people from the general public, even though, in absolute terms, the level of cooperation is quite high also among colleagues. By analyzing first- and second-order beliefs, we show that the difference in cooperation is partly mediated by expectations concerning the counterpart's behavior, since workers expect their colleagues to be less cooperative than members of the general public. However, the analysis reveals that also other motivations count, such as other-regarding preferences and warm glow.

Social experiments are field studies of social programs in which individuals, households or (in rare instances) firms or organizations are randomly assigned to two or more alternative policy interventions, or “treatments.” Treatments tested by social experiments have included negative income taxes, low-income housing assistance, co-insurance rates, re-employment bonuses, welfare-to-work initiatives, job training, time-of-day electric rates, and “case management” models of human service delivery. The results of such experiments not only supply the public with policy-relevant information, but also provide employment and insight to economists. This article examines the social experiments market and the characteristics of the rather complex product exchanged in this market. We investigate the social experiment industry with data extracted from The Digest of Social Experiments (Greenberg and Shroder, 1997), augmented by interviews with buyers and sellers in the market. To qualify for a 2-3 page entry in the Digest, the human subjects had to be randomly assigned among the treatments, each of which could involve different incentives, opportunities, or constraints. Data were then collected on market and/or fiscal outcomes, and subjected to professional evaluation. The definition of experiment used for the Digest and this article is deliberately narrow: we do not cover the numerous evaluations of social programs

We test whether people’s tendency to stick with the default option can help save resources. In a natural field experiment we switch printers’ default settings, from simplex to duplex printing, at a large Swedish university. The results confirm that roughly one third of all printing is determined by the default alternative, and hence daily paper consumption drops by 15 percent due to the change. The effect is immediate, lasts throughout the experimental period, and remains intact after six months. We also investigate how the more conventional method of encouraging people to save resources performs, and find it has no impact. Recent theoretical and empirical contributions indicate that the default effect works through recommendation, depends positively on the number of alternatives in the choice set, and is reinforced for difficult decisions. We demonstrate that the default option matter in a simple, non-dynamic, decision task with only two alternatives, and where people have been explicitly informed about the recommended course of action.

Interventions targeting adolescent girls are seen as a key component in the fight to break the cycle of poverty in developing countries. Policies that enable them to reach their full potential can have a strong impact not only on their own wellbeing, but also on that of future generations. This paper summarizes the short-term impacts of a cash transfer program on the empowerment of adolescent girls in Malawi during and immediately after the two-year intervention. We find that the program, which transferred cash directly to school-age girls as well as their parents, had effects on a broad range of important domains - including increased access to financial resources, improved schooling outcomes, decreased teen pregnancies and early marriages, better health - and generally enabled beneficiaries to improve their agency within their households. Underlying these overall impacts, the experiment revealed important differences in program effects between young women who were in school at the start of the intervention and those that were not, as well as between young women who received cash transfers conditional on regular school attendance and those who received cash unconditionally. The results point to the potential role that cash transfer programs can play in improving the lives of adolescent girls in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the heterogeneity of effects under different program designs.

Many school systems today are trying to attract top college graduates into teaching, but little is known about what dissuades this target group from entering the profession. This study randomly assigned applicants for a highly-selective alternative pathway into teaching in Argentina either to a survey about their motivations for applying to the program or to surveys that revealed information about their future pay or working conditions. The study finds that applicants who received information about pay or working conditions were much more likely to report that they intended to drop out of the selection process, but were no more likely to actually drop out. This can be explained by the temporary salience effects of the informational prompts. Applicants with higher undergraduate grade point averages and/or scores in the selection process, however, were both more likely to report that they will drop out and to actually do so.

The randomized controlled trial (RCT) has been a heavily utilized research tool in medicine for over 60 years. Since the early 2000's, large-scale RCTs have been used in increasingly large numbers in the social sciences to evaluate questions of both policy and theory. The early economics literature on RCTs invokes the medical literature, but seems to ignore a large body of this literature which studies the past mistakes of medical trialists and links poor trial design, conduct and reporting to exaggerated estimates of treatment effects. Using a few consensus documents on these issues from the medical literature, we design a tool to evaluate adequacy of reporting and risk of bias in RCT reports. We then use this tool to evaluate 54 reports of RCTs published in a set of 52 major economics journals between 2001 and 2011 alongside a sample of reports of 54 RCTs published in medical journals over the same time period. We find that economics RCTs fall far short of the recommendations for reporting and conduct put forth in the medical literature, while medical trials stick fairly close to them, suggesting risk of exaggerated treatment effects in the economics literature.

We present experimental evidence on the impact of a school choice program in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (AP) that provided students with a voucher to finance attending a private school of their choice. The study design featured a unique two-stage lottery-based allocation of vouchers that created both a student-level and a market-level experiment, which allows us to study both the individual and the aggregate effects of school choice (including spillovers). After two and four years of the program, we find no difference between test scores of lottery winners and losers on Telugu (native language) and math, suggesting that the large cross-sectional test-score differences between public and private school students on these subjects mostly reflect omitted variables. However, private schools spent significantly less instructional time on Telugu and math, and instead taught more English, science, social studies, and Hindi. Averaged across all subjects, lottery winners scored 0.13`sigma` higher, and the average causal impact on test scores of attending a private school was 0.23`sigma`. Further, the mean cost per student in the private schools in our sample was less than a third of the cost in public schools. Thus, private schools in this setting deliver (slightly) better test score gains than their public counterparts, and do so at substantially lower costs per student. Finally, we find no evidence of spillovers on public-school students who do not apply for the voucher, or on private school students, suggesting that the positive impacts on voucher winners did not come at the expense of other students.

The purpose of this study is to assess the degree of employment discrimination against young people in the Ile-de-France region according to their place of residence by considering several spatial scales in order to measure the effect of the reputation of the administrative department or county (specifically Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis), the town or municipality, and of the local neighborhood. The evaluation is carried out using experimental testing-type data that we developed following a protocol that allows us to examine the specific effects associated with each of these three spatial scales on access to employment, as well as their combined effects. We are interested in discrimination regarding two specific occupations within the restaurant/catering industry, namely waiters and cooks, and we consider the impact of two levels of qualification. For each of these profiles, we constructed six fictional candidacies consisting of young men who were similar with the exception of the testing feature which differentiates them, namely their place of residence. Between October 2011 and February 2012, we studied 2,988 candidacies that were submitted in response to 498 job offers posted in the Ile-de-France region. This study consists of a statistical and econometric analysis of the responses that we obtained to these applications.

The paper deals with the impact of beauty on employability of people, stressing the first stage of the hiring process. In particular, we studied if there exists a preference for attractive candidates and if it does whether it depends on sex, physical features and racial characteristics. We monitored all relevant agencies offering jobs in Italy from August 2011 to September 2012 sending 11008 CVs to 1542 advertised job openings. To do so, we construct fake CVs and we sent the same CV 8 times, changing only name and surname, address, and the photo included. In particular, we sent 4 CVs with photo of an attractive and unattractive man and women, and 4 CVs without photo of an Italian and a foreign men and women to each job opening. Callbacks rates are statistically significant higher for attractive women and men than unattractive ones. Racial discrimination appears to be statistically relevant, but less than discrimination based on the physical features, especially for women.

We conduct a field experiment on tax compliance, focusing on newly founded firms. As a novelty the effect of tax authorities’ supervision on timely tax payments is examined. Interestingly, results show no positive overall effect of close supervision on tax compliance., Highlights • We study the impact of supervision on tax compliance with a field experiment. • We manipulate supervision through friendly deterrence. • Results suggest that supervision leads to delayed tax payments. • It is concluded that supervision causes a crowding out of intrinsic tax compliance.

The literature on skill formation and human capital development clearly demonstrates that early investment in children is an equitable and efficient policy with large returns in adulthood. Yet little is known about the mechanisms involved in producing these long-term effects. This paper presents early evidence on the nature of skill formation based on an experimentally designed, five-year home visiting program in Ireland targeting disadvantaged families - Preparing for Life (PFL). We examine the impact of investment between utero to 18 months of age on a range of parental and child outcomes. Using the methodology of Heckman et al. (2010a), permutation testing methods and a stepdown procedure are applied to account for the small sample size and the increased likelihood of false discoveries when examining multiple outcomes. The results show that the program impact is concentrated on parental behaviors and the home environment, with little impact on child development at this early stage. This indicates that home visiting programs can be effective at offsetting deficits in parenting skills within a relatively short timeframe, yet continued investment may be required to observe direct effects on child development. While correcting for attrition bias leads to some changes in the precision of estimates, overall the results are quite similar.

This paper provides empirical evidence regarding the causal effects that upgrading slum dwellings has on the living conditions of the extremely poor. In particular, we study the impact of providing better houses in situ to slum dwellers in El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay. We experimentally evaluate the impact of a housing project run by the NGO TECHO (“roof”), which provides basic pre-fabricated houses to members of extremely poor population groups in Latin America. The main objective of the program is to improve household well-being. Our findings show that better houses have a positive effect on overall housing conditions and general well-being: the members of treated households are happier with their quality of life. In two countries, we also document improvements in children’s health; in El Salvador, slum dwellers who have received the TECHO houses also feel that they are safer. We do not find this result, however, in the other two experimental samples. There are no other noticeable robust effects in relation to the possession of durable goods or labor outcomes. Our results are robust in terms of both their internal and external validity because they are derived from similar experiments in three different Latin American countries.

This study showcases the usefulness of field experiments to the study of environmental and resource economics. Our focus pertains to work related to field experiments in the area of 'behavioral' environmental and resource economics. Within this rubric, we discuss research in two areas: those that inform i) benefit cost analysis and ii) conservation of resources. Within each realm, we show how field experiments have been able to test the relevant theories, provide important parameters to construct new theories, and guide policymakers. We conclude with thoughts on how field experiments can be used to deepen our understanding of important areas within environmental and resource economics.

In recent years, randomized controlled trials have become increasingly popular in the social sciences. In development economics in particular, their use has attracted considerable debate in relation to the identification of ‘what works’ in development policy. This paper focuses on a core topic in development policy: governance. It aims to address two key questions: (1) what have the main contributions of randomized controlled trials been to the study of governance? and (2) what could be the contributions, and relatedly the limits of such methods? To address these questions, a systematic review of experimental and quasi-experimental methods to study government performance was conducted. It identified 139 relevant papers grouped into three major types of policy interventions that aim to: (1) improve supply-side capabilities of governments; (2) change individual behaviour through various devices, notably incentives, and (3) improve informational asymmetries. We find that randomized controlled trials can be useful in studying the effects of some policy interventions in the governance area, but they are limited in significant ways: they are ill-equipped to study broader governance issues associated with macro-structural shifts, national level variation in institutions and political culture, and leadership. Randomized controlled trials are best for studying targeted interventions, particularly in areas of public goods provision, voting behaviour, and specific measures to address corruption and improve accountability; however, they can provide little traction on whether the intervention is transferable and ‘could work’ (and why) in other contexts, and in the longer run.

The Cold War division of Korea, regarded as a natural experiment in institutional change, provides a unique opportunity to examine whether institutions affect social preferences. We recruited North Korean refugees and South Korean students to conduct laboratory experiments eliciting social preferences, together with standard surveys measuring subjective attitudes toward political and economic institutions. Our experiments employ widely used dictator and trust games, with four possible group matches between North and South Koreans by informing them of the group identity of their anonymous partners. Experimental behaviour and support for institutions differ substantially between and within groups. North Korean refugees prefer more egalitarian distribution in the dictator games than South Korean students, even after controlling for individual characteristics that could be correlated with social preferences; however, the two groups show little difference in the trust game, once we control for more egalitarian behaviour of North Koreans. North Korean refugees show less support for market economy and democracy than South Korean subjects. Attitudes toward institutions are more strongly associated with the experimental behaviours among South Korean subjects than among North Korean subjects. An online appendix to accompany this publication is available here

En este documento se exploran, en un contexto experimental, el impacto de dos intervenciones dirigidas a incentivar la formalización empresarial en Bogotá, Colombia, y el impacto de la formalización sobre varias dimensiones de desempeño de los negocios. El diseño experimental de la evaluación permite establecer relaciones de causalidad y avanzar sobre lo aprendido hasta ahora en esta literatura. Encontramos que uno de los programas que actualmente emplea la Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (CCB), entidad a cargo del registro que hace formal a un negocio en Colombia, para incentivar la formalización no tiene ningún efecto sobre la decisión de formalización, mientras que el otro sí tiene un efecto muy importante. Encontramos también que la decisión de formalización impacta positivamente en los ingresos operacionales y los activos de las firmas, pero no afecta el empleo, el acceso al crédito, ni la rentabilidad de los negocios.

We examine the relationship between the price of giving and the decision to contribute in a framed field experiment (n = 2,440). In a departure from previous research using match rates and rebates, we vary the price of contributing to the public good directly. Treatment groups differ between subjects by the amount of money subjects have to give up in order to provide one unit of the public good. In contrast to earlier results, the theoretical prediction of a clear negative relationship between price and the decision whether to contribute is borne out by the experimental evidence. We estimate the mean elasticity of the probability to contribute as -0.31. The direct price effect is robust across specifications including sociodemographic controls for the highly heterogenous, Internet-representative non-student sample of subjects.

Many studies suggest that daily income earners behave as if they have daily income targets. Less work has examined the determinants of the targets themselves. Using data on labor supply, shocks, and self-reported cash needs from 257 bicycle taxi drivers in Western Kenya, we provide evidence that many individuals treat their daily cash need as the day's target. We conjecture that in a physically demanding job, workers may have an incentive to quit early and so set a personal rule of "earning enough for the day's need" as an internal commitment device to provide effort. This heuristic is more common among less educated workers and has substantial welfare costs: greater variance in hours worked is associated with worse health, and we estimate that workers would earn 5% more by working a set number of hours each day (more if their wage elasticity were positive).