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Da cosa dipende il gap di produttività fra paesi core e paesi periferici nell’Eurozona? L’articolo propone una rivisitazione dell’equazione della produttività di Paolo Sylos Labini per dar conto del fenomeno della crescita vincolata dalla bilancia dei pagamenti messo in luce da Anthony Thirlwall. L’analisi cerca di verificare se gli squilibri commerciali fra centro e periferia nell’Eurozona sono rilevanti per comprendere il divario crescente della produttività fra le due aree. I risultati ottenuti sembrano confermare la presenza di un vincolo estero di natura tecnologica che grava sulla periferia. Questo vincolo presenta una correlazione significativa con il gap di produttività fra centro e periferia anche a seguito delle ristrutturazioni dei processi produttivi che hanno interessato i paesi periferici. What does the productivity gap between core and peripheral countries in the Eurozone depend on? The article proposes a revisiting of Paolo Sylos Labini’s productivity equation aimed at analyzing the phenomenon of balance of payments constrained growth highlighted by Anthony Thirlwall. The analysis tries to verify whether the trade imbalances between the center and the periphery of the Eurozone are relevant to understand the increasing gap in productivity between the two areas. The results seem to confirm the presence of a foreign technological constraint on the periphery. This constraint exhibits a significant correlation with the productivity gap between the center and the periphery, even after the restructuring of production processes undergone in the peripheral countries. JEL codes: B23; E24; O47; O52, Moneta e Credito, V. 73, N. 292 (2020): Dicembre

Considering the sequential nature of nascent entrepreneurship and business ownership, this paper examines the propensities of academic entrepreneurs to be business owners. A theoretical model sets up the empirical analysis based on survey data from a large German public research institute. Traditionally, scientists and entrepreneurs have been seen to occupy opposite ends of a spectrum in terms of their role in innovation. In academic entrepreneurship the two combine on a number of activities. In order to understand the ways in which academic inventors move from pure patenting to nascent entrepreneurship to business ownership and connect seemingly divergent activities. We model their behavior by looking at various factors among German scientists. Academic inventors present a critical case since science and entrepreneurship are often seen as radically different, not the least in terms of knowledge production. By bringing the analysis from the level of social behavior and roles to the level of knowledge production, we can better address questions such as: How is knowledge in the interfaces of epistemic communities produced? How can such knowledge be organized and sustained? and How can relations between individuals on 'opposing sides' be constructively managed? The empirical results show that scientists' positive attitudes towards commercialization of results consistently contribute to tendencies towards academic entrepreneurship; however, the academic discipline and risk aversion did not have a statistically significant impact. Having a doctoral degree lowered the propensities toward nascent entrepreneurship, but had the opposite effect on business ownership. Finally, age and experience made business ownership more likely. The results of this study would contribute to a more general theory of how scientists can combine their commercial and scientific activities in spite of an alleged divergence.

The European integration process started with the aim of reducing the differences in income and/or living standards between the participating countries over time. To achieve this, a certain alignment of institutions and structures was seen as a necessary precondition. While the goal of this income and institutional convergence was successfully achieved over a long period of time, this convergence development has weakened or even turned into divergence in the last one to two decades. This paper provides an overview of the empirical evidence for these convergence and divergence developments and develops policy implications (the challenges and possible ways out).

Many studies with different methods (CGE models, DSGE models, structural gravity equations) have recently evaluated EU's Single Market. The problem with all these studies is that they use complex models with data sets which are not replicable. The aim of this paper is to develop a simple EU model which uses readily accessible data, and which is replicable in EViews. First the 10 equations macro model is used to evaluate Austria's EU membership since 1995. Then the same prototype model is applied to make a comparison of the integration effects of a selected number of EU Member States. Our simple EU model covers the essential economic effects of EU integration of EU's Single Market, the introduction of the Euro, and the following EU enlargements: increase in intra-EU trade, price reduction because of more competition, the impact of the net budget position vis à vis the EU budget, and lastly that on growth.

This paper explores the spatial patterns and underlying determinants of repeated inventor collaboration across European NUTS 3 regions. It is found that only a small fraction of co-inventor linkages across regions are repeated, while community detection reveals that these collaborations are clustered in geographical space more intensively compared with collaboration in general. Additional results from gravity modelling indicate that links in the inter-regional co-patenting network emerge mainly through the triadic collaboration of regions, while geographical proximity becomes the most influential factor for repeating co-inventor ties. In addition to that, the combination of technological similarity and shared third partner regions offer a premium for the likelihood of repeating collaboration, but only when geographical proximity is present as an enabler.

Using the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (2009 to 2020 editions), this paper aims to assess the effect of Covid-19 pandemic on the probabilities of firm to innovate and grow and to compare their likelihood with that of the previous downturn. To control for a possible endogeneity bias as part of innovation decisions a Recursive Bivariate Probit Model is used. Results show that the probabilities of firms to innovate and grow are lower in 2020 (Covid-19 crisis) than in 2009 (financial crisis). The economic performance of innovative firms was also affected by the pandemic, but considerably less than the performance of non-innovative ones. Changes in the innovation patterns are also observed. Possible implications for decision-makers are derived.

Con motivo de la conmemoración del 70 aniversario de la creación del “Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft”, el Dr. Weidmann, Presidente del Bundesbank, ha pronunciado una magnífica conferencia conmemorativa analizando tanto la evolución del propio Instituto de la Economía Alemana desde su Fundación como, al propio tiempo, refleja en un análisis preciso lo que ha significado el Instituto para el desarrollo económico- social de Alemania el Orden Económico definido como “Economía Social de Mercado”. No solamente realiza un recorrido histórico, así como menciona las grandes personalidades que la concibieron y la realizaron en la praxis ,tanto teórica como en la configuración de la Política Económica, sino que lo plantea en cuanto al gran esfuerzo realizado para que pudiese tener lugar el proceso de transformación y cambio en la posguerra, esto es ,en la década de los años cincuenta, sobre todo, responde al cómo se logra concienciar de la necesidad del proceso de cambio hacia una Economía Social de Mercado. Lo que analiza es precisamente la potencialidad de este Orden Económico de una “Economía Social de Mercado” para adaptarse con flexibilidad a los diferentes procesos de cambio a lo largo de estos 70 años, así como la gran contribución realizada por el Instituto y todas sus instituciones, esto es, las instituciones económicas que aseguran el proceso de cambio y las formas en que se realizan cómo son las empresas. Con lo que entra en el tema del Asesoramiento Científico a la Política Económica, así como las diferentes formas institucionales sobre cómo ha realizado sus cometidos y lo que ha significado como proceso de coordinación entre la ciencia y la praxis de la Política Económica. Lo que se refleja en su aportación al gran tema de la relación entre el Mercado y el Estado después de la pandemia Convid-19 en la configuración del futuro de la economía y de la sociedad en base al Orden Económico de una Economía Social de Mercado. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the "Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft", Dr. Weidmann, President of the Bundesbank, has given a magnificent commemorative lecture analysing both the development of the Institute of the German Economy itself since its foundation and, at the same time, reflecting in a precise analysis what the Institute has meant for the economic and social development of Germany, the economic order defined as "Social Market Economy". It not only provides a historical overview and mentions the great personalities who conceived it and implemented it in practice, both theoretically and in the shaping of economic policy, but also describes the great efforts made to bring about the process of transformation and change in the post-war period, i.e. in the 1950s. Above all, it responds to how awareness was raised of the need for the process of change towards a social market economy. What the author analyses is precisely the potential of this Economic Order of a "Social Market Economy" to adapt flexibly to the different processes of change throughout these 70 years, as well as the great contribution made by the Institute and all its institutions, i.e. the economic institutions that ensure the process of change and the forms in which they are realised, such as enterprises. This brings us to the subject of Scientific Advice to economic Policy, as well as the different institutional forms of how it has carried out its tasks and what it has meant as a process of coordination between science and the praxis of Economic Policy. This is reflected in its contribution to the great issue of the relationship between the market and the state after the Covid-19 pandemic in shaping the future of the economy and society on the basis of the Economic Order of a Social Market Economy.

This paper investigates unemployment persistence in the 27 EU member states by applying fractional integration methods to quarterly data (both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted) from 2000q1 to 2020q4. The obtained evidence points to high levels of persistence in all cases. With seasonally adjusted data, a small degree of mean reversion is found in the case of Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta, but this evidence disappears under the assumption of weakly correlated disturbances. More cases of mean reversion are found instead when analysing the unadjusted series. In particular, countries such as Belgium, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg and Malta display orders of integration significantly lower than 1. In addition, significant negative time trends are found in the case of Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and Romania, and a positive one for Luxembourg. Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic had mixed effects, with (seasonal) persistence increasing in some countries whilst decreasing in others and not changing in a minority of cases. On the whole, our results support the hysteresis hypothesis for the European economies., Luis A. Gil-Alana is also grateful for financial support from the MINEIC-AEI-FEDER PID2020-113691RB-I00 project from ‘Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad’ (MINEIC), `Agencia Estatal de Investigaci on' (AEI) Spain and `Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional' (FEDER), and from an internal project of the Universidad Francisco de Vitoria.

This paper analyses the structures and patterns, dimensions and interest relations behind 200 years of working time negotiations and conflicts, based on historical and contemporary literature and research, mainly but not exclusively in Germany. One main thesis is that 'new' flexibilization trends are not new at all, while the effective standardization of working hours is limited to a couple of decades in the 20th century. Nevertheless and for various reasons, working time arrangements are a social and political issue which should not be left to individual contracting but subject to reflexive labour policy. Dieses Papier analysiert die Strukturen, Muster, Dimensionen und Interessen von 200 Jahren Arbeitszeitpolitik, vor allem in Deutschland. Auf der Grundlage historischer und aktueller Literatur wird die These belegt, dass scheinbar neue Trends der Flexibilisierung von Arbeitszeiten alles andere als neu sind, wenn man den historischen Untersuchungszeitraum ausweitet. Vielmehr beschränkt sich die Phase einer tatsächlichen Standardisierung von Arbeitszeiten auf wenige Jahrzehnte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Gleichwohl und sinnvollerweise bleiben Arbeitszeitarrangements ein Gegenstand sozialer und politischer Auseinandersetzung. Sie sollten nicht den einzelnen Arbeitsverträgen überlassen bleiben sondern Gegenstand reflexiver Arbeitszeitpolitik sein.

Durch Digitalisierung und Klimaschutz entsteht ein zusätzlicher fundamentaler Erneuerungsbedarf des Kapitalstocks. Damit die dafür notwendigen Investitionen in Deutschland stattfinden, braucht es attraktive Standortbedingungen für Unternehmen, die im internationalen Wettbewerb stehen. Im internationalen Vergleich steht der Industriestandort Deutschland gut da und liegt auf Platz 4 gemäß der aktuellen Version des IW-Standortindexes. Diese relativ gute Position findet sich jedoch nicht bei allen Kategorien der berücksichtigten Standortfaktoren. Deutliche Wettbewerbsnachteile gibt es besonders bei den Kosten. Das betrifft Arbeits- und Energiekosten sowie die Steuerbelastung. Auch mit Blick auf die digitale Infrastruktur und die bürokratischen Lasten haben Unternehmen in Deutschland deutlich schlechtere Rahmenbedingungen. Seit 2013, dem Startpunkt der aktuellen Großen Koalition, wurden die bisherigen Schwächen des Standorts Deutschland noch ausgeprägter. Deutschland ist hier weiter zurückgefallen - weil sich andere Länder verbessert haben, während hierzulande wenig Fortschritt verzeichnet werden konnte. Fehlende Verbesserungen sind gleichzusetzen mit verschlechterten Chancen auf zukünftiges Wachstum. Nach den zwei Legislaturperioden der Großen Koalition muss die Standortpolitik eine höhere Priorität bekommen. Verbesserte Investitionsbedingungen für die Industrie sind notwendig, um die Erneuerung der Industrie zu forcieren und die Arbeitsplätze der Zukunft in Deutschland zu gewährleisten. The demands of digitalisation and climate protection are creating an additional need for fundamental renewal of Germany's capital stock. To ensure the necessary investments are made, the country will have to offer attractive investment conditions for companies that compete on international markets. Germany currently compares well with other countries as a business location: the latest version of the IW Business Location Index ranks it 4th in the world. However, this relatively good position is not reflected in all the location factors included in the Index, and there are distinct drawbacks to investing in Germany. These are to be found particularly in costs, with not only labour and energy costs but also the tax burden being especially high. Companies in Germany also have to contend with a significantly inferior digital infrastructure and considerable red tape. Since 2013, when Germany's two main parties formed the current government, the country's existing weaknesses as a business location have become even more pronounced. This lack of progress, combined with significant improvements in other countries, has left Germany falling further behind and is reducing the chances of future growth. After September's general election, the next legislative period must see location policy given higher priority. Germany needs improved investment conditions so that industry can be regenerated and secure the jobs of the future.

The current importance of tourism leads us to analyze the extent to which the receipts from international tourism, and tourism in general, influence the capacity of European countries to reduce the development gaps of this sector in the European context and the extent to which the economic growth is sensitive to changes in tourist arrivals, tourism receipts and expenditures. Studying the GDP per capita and the receipts from international tourism for the period 1995-2017, we find that the European tourism has an important role in economy but secondary to capital stock and exports. The methodology used is a sensitivity analysis and a multiple linear regression with two models. The results show that, on short term, the gap in the European tourism sector is explained by the ability to attract income from the international tourism. The European growth of the tourism sector depends to a large extent on the amount of expenditures that tourists are making, on tourism receipts and, to a lesser extent, on tourist arrivals, but in all cases, the connection is a direct and positive one but, even so, the capital stock and the exports continue to play a very important role for the European economy. The analysis suggests that tourism is not a panacea for growth. On the contrary, it is one of the activities that stimulate growth along with investments, technology, or any other form of capital, together with exports and labor market conditions.

The European Union (EU) has redefined the energy sphere in Europe over the last three decades. Transnational policies targeting liberalization and integration, energy efficiency, renewables, carbon pricing, and energy security have led to major steps forward in terms of a more secure, integrated, and environmentally friendly energy supply. This paper explores, through the lenses of a paradigm shift and transition pathways, how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) grouping might advance its own energy trilemma through greater energy cooperation. We provide evidence that ASEAN has lagged behind in terms of energy transition, representing considerable risks in multiple forms - most notably, political and physical climate risks from failing to meet the Paris Agreement targets and the risk of stranded assets if accelerated transition is achieved. However, accelerated transition could come in many forms. By drawing on the EU experience, we argue that an energy policy for ASEAN should explicitly pursue a dual transition pathway strategy to yield the best outcome in terms of the energy trilemma. First, an "ASEAN Supergrid" supported by a single energy market and by common carbon pricing would "green" urban and industrial demand. Second, "Distributed Smart Grids" would help reap the social and economic benefits of providing electricity to the rural/remotely located population that have hitherto not had access to electricity. This is a dual transnational and local approach that contrasts with energy transition defined at national level. This interconnected approach should yield security, environmental, and economic dividends.

Vor allem in Südeuropa hat sich die Staatsverschuldung von den Vorgaben des europäischen Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts weit entfernt, sodass die Tragfähigkeit der Staatsfinanzen mitunter angezweifelt wird. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die mögliche weitere Entwicklung der Staatsschuldenquoten in Frankreich und den vier südeuropäischen EU-Mitgliedstaaten Griechenland, Italien, Portugal und Spanien. Hierbei werden drei Szenarien für die kommenden 20 Jahre entwickelt. Ein Szenario schreibt die vom Internationalen Währungsfonds für das Jahr 2026 prognostizierten Werte fort. Zwei weitere Szenarien greifen die Entwicklung in den vier sowie acht Jahren vor der Corona-Pandemie auf. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nur für Portugal und Griechenland eine Rückführung der Schuldenquoten in den kommenden beiden Dekaden realistisch erscheint. Beide EU-Mitgliedstaaten weisen bemerkenswerte Primärsalden auf. In Portugal zeigt sich zudem eine gute wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Griechenland profitiert von relativ niedrigen Zinsen. Eine Rückführung der Verschuldung auf 60 Prozent des BIP, wie es der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt vorsieht, ist indes selbst für Portugal außer Reichweite. Für Frankreich, Italien und Spanien ist von einem weiteren Anstieg der Schuldenquoten auszugehen. Während in Frankreich und Spanien nicht zuletzt die schwachen Primärsalden ursächlich sind, leidet Italien weiterhin unter einer schwachen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Damit bleibt die Tragfähigkeit der Staatshaushalte eine säkulare politische und ökonomische Herausforderung - vor allem mit Blick auf die demografischen Anpassungslasten. Especially in Southern Europe, public debt is missing the targets of the European Stability and Growth Pact by wide margins, leading to concern about the sustainability of public finances. The present article examines the possible further development of government debt ratios in France and the four southern European EU member states Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Three scenarios are developed for the next 20 years. One continues the values forecast by the IMF for the year 2026. The second and third scenarios are based respectively on the development in the four- and eight-year periods before the onset of the Covid19 pandemic. The results show that only Portugal and Greece can realistically be expected to reduce their debt ratios in the next two decades. Both EU Member States have remarkable primary balances. Moreover, the Portuguese economy is developing handsomely while Greece is benefitting from relatively low interest rates. However, not even Portugal is within reach of reducing its debt to the 60 per cent of GDP envisaged by the Stability and Growth Pact. For France, Italy and Spain, a further increase in debt ratios is to be expected. This is due not least to the weakness of the French and Spanish primary balances, while Italy continues to suffer from a sluggish economy. The sustainability of national budgets thus remains a perennial political and economic challenge - especially in view of the demographic adjustments these countries face.

This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of diffusion patterns and relatedness withinICT as a technology system in the EU28 region. Considering ICT as a technology system, first,I break down ICT into a set of distinct technologies employing OECD and WIPO classifications.Then, using text analysis and the Algorithmic Links with Probabilities method, I construct industry-technology links to connect industries with ICT and track ICT's diffusion over the period 1977-2020.The analysis highlights the heterogeneity of the technologies that constitute the ICT cluster. Asnot all ICTs are pervasive and not all ICTs are key technologies, this leads to differences in industryreliance on them. The results indicate that the ICT cluster shows signs of a "phase transition",passing the phase of building bulk elements of the infrastructure and around the 2000s entering thephase of working on the functionality for business applications deployment and users' convenience.This transition is marked by the surging relevance of ICT technologies such as mobile communication,information analysis, security, and human interface. Studying the ICT as a cluster allows puttingeach ICT technology in context to compare them in relative terms; this is especially important forthe discussion of novel and fast-growing technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI). Concerningthe structure of industry reliance on the ICT cluster, ICT's penetration is characterized by increasingscope but unevenly distributed scale; depending on the industry and the distinct ICT technologythe intensity of their connections varies significantly. Remarkably, looking closer at AI technologies,in line with the current literature, a wide array of "shallow" connections with industries is revealed.Finally, I calculate relatedness metrics to estimate proximity among ICT technologies. The analysisreveals differences in the underlying knowledge base among the overwhelming majority of the ICTtechnologies but a similar structure of their application base.

This contribution analyzes the impact of intangible capital on labor productivity growth across countries at the aggregate and sectoral levels by employing an econometric growth-accounting approach. First, our results show that intangible capital deepening accounts for around 40 percent of labor productivity growth at both the aggregate and sectoral level. Second, we find that this positive impact of intangible capital on productivity growth at both levels of aggregation is driven by investments in economic competencies, the only intangible group not covered in the national accounts. Third, our results reveal deep sectoral heterogeneities regarding investments and productivity effects of different intangible types. These findings have important implications for future EU industrial policies and are directly relevant to the EU's efforts to close its productivity gap with the US.

This paper studies the effect of structural change on the historical path of aggregate labor productivity growth for a large sample of European countries, and it builds a quantitative multi-sector growth model to analyze the potential impact that structural change may have on future productivity growth. We document that the observed reallocation of economic activity since the 1970s towards the service sector has exerted a strongly negative effect on aggregate productivity growth in most European countries. Moreover, we perform a quantitative analysis to show that the expected path of structural change might continue to have a sizable dent on future productivity growth in Europe. By contrast, the impact in the U.S. is expected to rapidly diminish. We show that this differential result can be explained by the large expansion, in Europe, of certain service sub-sectors characterized by stagnant productivity.

ZusammenfassungDer hier vorgestellte Digitalisierungsindex misst den Grad der Digitalisierung von Unternehmen in Deutschland, differenziert dabei nach Branchen und ordnet den Digitalisierungsgrad in Kategorien ein. Es zeigt sich, dass die Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie mit Abstand am stärksten digitalisiert ist. Auch der forschungsstarke Fahrzeugbau ist stark überdurchschnittlich digitalisiert. Schlusslichter sind der Tourismus und das Sonstige Produzierende Gewerbe.

This paper assesses the productivity puzzle critically and gives an outlook on the COVID-19 crisis. It offers two main conclusions. First, it posits that a large fraction of the productivity puzzle can be solved by incorporating intangible capital into the asset boundary of the national accounts. Thus, the productivity puzzle is largely explained as a consequence of fundamental structural changes that are underway, transforming industrial economies into knowledge economies. Secondly, the contribution foresees a post-COVID-19 scenario that will likely lead to a pronounced increase in labour productivity growth. This depends, however, on whether the current push for digitization will be backed by actual investments into digitization and the necessary complementary investments in (business and public) intangible capital.

In this paper, we describe the historical co-evolution of innovation and economic growth in Germany since 1871. The country's rise as an industrial power in the late 19th century, through its innovation and entrepreneurial performance, is contrasted with the post-World War II period. This latter period, although it contained the German economic miracle, was nevertheless a period during which innovation went into relative decline. We document this decline and offer four broad, interrelated explanations: (i) an innovation system locked into incremental innovation, (ii) a slowdown in the diffusion of technology, (iii) weaknesses in the education system, and (iv) entrepreneurial stagnation. Implications for policy are noted. Our paper contributes to the growing literature attempting to understand the decline in business dynamism that characterises many advanced economies.

This paper computes sectoral contributions to real labour productivity growth in Malta during the two decades since 2000. The aim is to give an account of the sectoral developments affecting Malta's productivity growth in the twenty years since 2000, in the context of significant structural change. To this end, this study employs the exactly additive GEAD technique developed by Tang and Wang (2004), which allows for the decomposition of sectoral productivity growth into efficiency gains and resource reallocation. Real labour productivity growth in Malta averaged 1.2% between 2000 and 2019, double that registered in the euro area. This divergence in growth rates was driven by a consistently positive reallocation level effect in each of the sample subperiods, as a result of the large structural shifts and reforms that have occurred since 2000. On the other hand, the contribution of within-sector efficiency gains in Malta was below that observed in the euro area on average and was the main driver of cyclical fluctuations in Malta's productivity growth since 2000. Distortions such as government assistance and labour hoarding during recessions magnified these fluctuations. Across sectors, the results suggest that productivity developments were quite heterogenous, with services industries generally recording positive contributions to productivity growth. On the other hand, the manufacturing sector mainly registered negative contributions, as efficiency gains were offset by an outflow of resources towards other sectors.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between structural change, interpreted as the secular process of sectoral transformation, and labour productivity growth in the EU in several new dimensions. First, based on the latest data, we document the size of the negative effect that structural change has exerted onto productivity growth over long time horizons. We provide a comparative analysis of these and present-day trends with respect to the US. Second, we develop a general equilibrium model calibrated to match these empirical observations to analyse the potential impact that projected structural change may have on future productivity growth. This model generates structural change through both price and income effects. Our main results indicate that, other things equal, this phenomenon is bound to have a greater dent on productivity growth in the future than it has had in the past. This is the case for both newer and older EU Member States, albeit with important nuances. Our findings suggest that policies should focus on the promotion of productivity-enhancing technological innovation, as well as on the furtherance of greater levels of competition, especially in the most sluggish service sectors.

This policy note examines sectoral and occupational employment impacts of the Covid-19 crisis. The crisis hit EU economies (and advanced economies in general) as they were already undergoing important structural changes due to technological change (digitisation), a factor affecting most organisations now and in the future. Some of these changes accelerated during the pandemic, along with at times dramatic changes in sectoral demand patterns (due to lock-downs) and shifts in work organisation, all of which had strongly differential impacts on various occupational groups. The policy note studies in-depth occupational employment patterns before and during the pandemic using detailed Labour Force Statistics, including analysis of the differentiated impacts on women and men. The major policy challenge is to avoid lasting gaps in overall employment as economies recover and as temporary support schemes are phased out. Further, policy makers need to focus attention on how to accompany the continuing changes in structural employment patterns. These changes can have significant and lasting impacts on the employment prospects of different segments of the labour force (in terms of age, gender and educational/skill levels). The policy note postulates a number of policy actions which should be embarked upon, both at the national and the EU level.

The COVID-19 pandemic severely affected not only incumbent firms, but also the emergence of start-ups. This paper investigates and analyzes the pandemic's effect on new business formation, as well as business exits and insolvencies, in Germany. We find that the overall level of business registrations slightly decreased during the first year of the pandemic, but that the effect is specific to certain industries. Innovative manufacturing industries and technology-oriented services experienced an increase in numbers of start-ups. High subsidies and a temporary suspension of important criteria obliging firms to declare insolvency weakened market selection resulting in fewer exits in 2020. The relaxation of insolvency regulations may lead to considerable numbers of "zombie" firms. Generally, the pandemic re-enforced ongoing structural change, but also exerted specific effects that may be temporary in nature.

Ende November 2020 wurde eine Reform des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus beschlossen, die nicht unterschätzt werden sollte. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Einführung einer staatlichen Letztabsicherung für den europäischen Bankenrettungsfonds ab 2022. Doch auch weitere Änderungen sind relevant und werden in diesem Beitrag eingeordnet. At the end of November 2020, a reform of the European Stability Mechanism was adopted that should not be underestimated. The article focuses on the introduction of a common fiscal backstop for the European Single Resolution Fund from 2022, as well as other relevant changes. Additionally, the article provides a political evaluation.

This report discusses factors that have caused a decrease in tangible investments in machinery and equipment, and intangible assets in Finland. A decline in the R&D investments of the electronics industry practically entirely explains a decrease in investments in Finland, which has prolonged the recovery from the collapse of productivity growth during the financial crisis. The corporate sector, which accounts for most investments, also contracted so much during the financial crisis relative to the rest of the economy that the aggregate productive investments remained lower than before. Companies' investments in relation to their value added did not decrease, however. The main reason for the collapse of the electrotechnical industry is the loss of the Symbian mobile phone operating system in global competition. Together with that, profitability collapsed, and no new R&D investment opportunities of a similar size were found. However, companies should not avoid competition, and instead, the competitive environment, in general, acts as an investment incentive for companies. Developments in the 2010s also highlight the importance of international competition and international trade agreements. The decline in the working-age population that began at the same time as zero growth does not explain the collapse in investments, but it has to do with their slow recovery.

In the wake of the corona crisis, the European Union must regain lost ground and create more favorable conditions for inclusive and sustainable economic growth. The best way to achieve this goal is by increasing the Union's innovativeness. This effort requires extensive and broad-based institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the incentives for entrepreneurship. Innovative entrepreneurship requires collaborations with numerous agents that provide those skills and resources that the entrepreneur is lacking: inventors, key personnel, demanding customers, and early and later-stage financiers. Based on this ecosystem perspective, we propose reforms in the following six broad areas: (i) the rule of law and property rights, ii) taxation, iii) savings and finance, iv) labor market regulations and social security, v) entry and exit barriers in product markets, and (vi) human capital for entrepreneurship. The reforms would likely strengthen Europe's innovation capacity at a time when it is needed more than ever.