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The argument goes that, as living standards rise, the demand for better environmental management increases and a liberal political system is best placed to deal with such issues. In contrast to the dominant discussions of environmentalism, which concentrates on the relationship between democracy and environmentalism, this thesis suggests that environmental protection can become a playground for authoritarian regimes to pursue ulterior motives and goals. Using the concept of environmental authoritarianism, the following research assesses the resilience capacity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) despite the gravity of its environmental crisis and mounting citizen grievances. An ethnographic methodology composed of different methods is employed to undertake the investigation including participant observation, field notes, interviews and document analysis. The implementation of cooperation and legitimation strategies are investigated at an urban city level in the field of environmental sustainability. Broadly, the thesis argues that the environmental governance capacity of the CCP has been developed around three ideas: (1) (re)centralise environmental governance efforts; (2) create a consensus around environmental protection (e.g. ‘ecological civilisation’); and (3) institutionalise grassroots movements. Using actor-network-theory as a method of analysis, I explore how these processes occur in practice at a local level through two case studies: a registered NGO working on waste reduction and a social enterprise aimed at strengthening rural communities and promoting sustainable agriculture. The thesis findings indicate that there has been a shift from fragmentation to a consolidation resulting in less room for contentious participation. The instrumentalisation of environmental issues by the government prevent environmental activists to resist co-optation by the government machinery. Still, empirical evidence demonstrates that actors continuously adapt to new pressures. Broadly, by focusing on Shanghai as a case study, the following research advances that environmental protection is being instrumentally mobilised to legitimise a variety of planning practices through the use of a complex combination of mobilising, politicising and depoliticising techniques. Wider conclusions are drawn on authoritarian resilience, China’s public participation, and authoritarian modes of environmental governance., Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis discusses how ideas, as domestic factors, have decided the formation of China’smultilateralist foreign policy. It tries to provide an profound understanding of China's foreignpolicy development with the theoretical tools provided by discursive institutionalism andhistorical institutionalism.Three empirical cases are studied: the case of WTO, the case of ASEAN+3 and the case ofShanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These three cases have represented China'sinvolvement of multilateral institutions at different time and level.The findings show that China has gradually turned to an active participants of multilateralinstitutions, and it is trying to constructing a new type of multilateralism: competitivemultilateralism. Whether it can be compatible with existing institutions is an open question., Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This dissertation looks at Northeast Asia as a region composed of China, Japan and South Korea in order to understand the regional dimension of international cooperation. It takes the Tripartite Environment Ministers’ Meeting and the China-Japan-Korea Meeting onInformation and Telecommunication Standards cases for comparative analysis. Its aim is toexamine cooperation and decision-making under uncertainty and to explore how they affectinstitutional development and enhanced regional cooperation. Analysis of current cooperation activities as well as development of chosen cases illustrates interactions between individuals, organizations and states. Risks associated with decision-making affectbehaviors of actors and self-reinforcement mechanisms of institutions creating pathdependence., Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

La diplomatie énergétique russe qui est au cœur de ce travail diffère des politiques industrielles classiques adoptées régulièrement par les États afin de développer leur pays, relancer son économie ou certains secteurs industriels. Elle entend en effet utiliser les ressources naturelles de la Russie, et singulièrement son potentiel énergétique (sachant que la Russie est à la fois producteur, consommateur, pays de transit) afin de retrouver son statut de grande puissance. Ce retour de puissance devant permettre à la Russie de sortir de la période de transition pour redevenir un acteur de premier rang dans un monde global redessiné par la fin de la guerre froide. Il s’agit pour elle de faire entendre sa voix, de participer en qualité de partenaire égal aux décisions et à l’élaboration des nouvelles normes rendues nécessaires par le bouleversement engendré par la fin de la guerre froide. La diplomatie énergétique russe s’affirme pendant les années 2003-2004, comme une démarche pragmatique, un moyen opportuniste de rencontrer un projet politique en utilisant un des rares leviers dont dispose ce pays appauvri et affaibli – sa puissance énergétique qu’il s’agit de transformer un outil de puissance politique, raison pour laquelle la politique étrangère russe va être mise au service de ce projet. Le travail fait donc référence aux spécificités internes de la Russie et au contexte international afin d’identifier les faiblesses et les forces de cette diplomatie spécifique. Russian energy diplomacy, with which this work is uniquely concerned, differs from the classic industrial policies adopted by states in order to re-launch their economies or certain industrial sectors. It has consisted of putting Russia’s natural resources and particularly its energy potential (as a producer, a consumer, and a transit country) to the practical purpose of restoring its status as a great power. For Russia, the return to power would permit the country to emerge from its period of transition and become a leading actor in the world reshaped by the ending of the cold war. It is a matter of making its voice heard, as an equal partner in international decisions and the formulation of the new political norms necessitated by post-cold war upheaval. In 2002-2004 Russia developed this energy diplomacy as a pragmatic and opportunistic means of attaining a political objective with one of the few levers at the disposal of an impoverished and enfeebled country – that is to say, its energy potential, which it turned into a political tool. To this effect, Russian foreign policy has been made to serve the same project. Consequently this work deals with internal specificities and the international energy context, in order to probe both the weakness and the strength of this particular form of diplomacy., Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales, info:eu-repo/semantics/published

La diplomatie énergétique russe qui est au cœur de ce travail diffère des politiques industrielles classiques adoptées régulièrement par les États afin de développer leur pays, relancer son économie ou certains secteurs industriels. Elle entend en effet utiliser les ressources naturelles de la Russie, et singulièrement son potentiel énergétique (sachant que la Russie est à la fois producteur, consommateur, pays de transit) afin de retrouver son statut de grande puissance. Ce retour de puissance devant permettre à la Russie de sortir de la période de transition pour redevenir un acteur de premier rang dans un monde global redessiné par la fin de la guerre froide. Il s’agit pour elle de faire entendre sa voix, de participer en qualité de partenaire égal aux décisions et à l’élaboration des nouvelles normes rendues nécessaires par le bouleversement engendré par la fin de la guerre froide.La diplomatie énergétique russe s’affirme pendant les années 2003-2004, comme une démarche pragmatique, un moyen opportuniste de rencontrer un projet politique en utilisant un des rares leviers dont dispose ce pays appauvri et affaibli – sa puissance énergétique qu’il s’agit de transformer un outil de puissance politique, raison pour laquelle la politique étrangère russe va être mise au service de ce projet. Le travail fait donc référence aux spécificités internes de la Russie et au contexte international afin d’identifier les faiblesses et les forces de cette diplomatie spécifique.Russian energy diplomacy, with which this work is uniquely concerned, differs from the classic industrial policies adopted by states in order to re-launch their economies or certain industrial sectors. It has consisted of putting Russia’s natural resources and particularly its energy potential (as a producer, a consumer, and a transit country) to the practical purpose of restoring its status as a great power. For Russia, the return to power would permit the country to emerge from its period of transition and become a leading actor in the world reshaped by the ending of the cold war. It is a matter of making its voice heard, as an equal partner in international decisions and the formulation of the new political norms necessitated by post-cold war upheaval. In 2002-2004 Russia developed this energy diplomacy as a pragmatic and opportunistic means of attaining a political objective with one of the few levers at the disposal of an impoverished and enfeebled country – that is to say, its energy potential, which it turned into a political tool. To this effect, Russian foreign policy has been made to serve the same project. Consequently this work deals with internal specificities and the international energy context, in order to probe both the weakness and the strength of this particular form of diplomacy., Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished