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We investigate the policy consequences of lame-duck sessions in detail, examining whether the potential agency problem in representation significantly affects economic decision making in Congress. To this point, such an analysis has not been pursued systematically in the political science or economics literatures; thus, our findings will break new ground and structure future research for years to come. Moreover, a detailed examination of the policy consequences of lame-duck sessions is desperately needed; while lame-duck sessions were once somewhat rare, they have become regular congressional events in recent years, convening in six of the last seven Congresses. And as important economic legislation - like regular appropriations bills, as well as specific bills, like a new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - has passed in recent lame-duck sessions, understanding how they function has clear policy relevance. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the effect of position taking on electoral outcomes by investigating whether members of Congress who supported national health legislation proposed by President Truman in 1948-49 were harmed electorally. Specifically, we will seek to identify whether the American Medical Association targeted members who were pro-health care, and whether the AMA's pressure contributed to their defeat in the 1950 congressional elections. More generally, our analysis will contribute to the growing literature on the impact of position taking on electoral outcomes as well as provide some systematic analysis of a commonly-cited critical juncture in the development of health care systems in the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beginning during the Civil War era, the major parties in Congress began meeting prior to the start of a Congress and settled all organizational decisions in caucus - and made those caucus decisions binding on the House floor. Conflicts continued to occur on officer candidates, of course, and several multi-ballot contests for speakership nominations took place, but once settled, those conflicts did not spill over onto the House floor. As we argue in this paper, sometime during the Civil War/Reconstruction period, a kind of caucus-induced equilibrium developed on matters of House organization, and that equilibrium remains very much in evidence today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the elimination of the regularly occurring legislative sessions that convened after the November congressional elections with the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment in 1933, Congress still occasional meets in a lame duck session. In fact, such sessions are becoming commonplace, with the convening of post-election sessions in 5 of the last 6 congresses. These sessions are comprised of a mix of members who will return to serve in the subsequent congress and of lame ducks: defeated members and retirees. As a result, lame duck sessions would seem to differ significantly from the regular sessions that met prior to the elections. Past opponents of the lame duck sessions argued departing members showed dramatic changes in their voting behavior as a result of the severed linkages with constituents. Lame ducks, it was claimed, sought to p! lacate interests other than those they represented. If that is the case, we might expect to find noticeable differences across regular and lame duck sessions in the effectiveness of party leaders to craft an agenda and to keep their fellow partisans in the fold to support that agenda. We analyze roll call behavior and party cohesion across sessions to answer two questions. First, whether departing members make notable changes in their voting behavior in their days in office. Second, we seek to determine whether the nature of party pressures and party leadership changes in lame duck sessions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the history of electoral challenges in the U.S. Senate and their partisan and policy consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]