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In his treatise On General Speculative Philosophy, J. N. Tetens sets out to justify the possibility and necessity of metaphysics as a general speculative science. His primary objective is to defend metaphysics against the opponents, the most serious of which, in Tetens’s opinion, is D. Hume. In this connection, Tetens sharply criticises traditional empiricism and develops a new perspective on experience and the bases of its certainty. The main target of his critique is ‘popular philosophy’, which appeals to common understanding; he seeks to defend it from the criticism of systemic knowledge in general and metaphysics in particular. In the argument between the advocates of the Leibniz-Wolff geometric philosophy and their opponents — enlighteners-eclecticists and pietists, Tetens manages to take a neutral position conducting a synthesis of the British observingphilosophy, French ‘reasoning philosophy’, and the Leibniz-Wolff ‘geometric philosophy’. Tetens attempts to show the limitedness of common understanding and the supremacyof scientific reason. In this relation, he is an advocate of the Leibniz and Wolff’s philosophy oriented towards the ideal of scientific reason. He identifies to major branches of metaphysics: intellectual metaphysics based on internal experience and dealing with incorporeal entities and the ‘philosophy of the corporeal’ dealing with the things corporealand their properties (physics, mathematics, etc.). Both branches of metaphysics require a common basic science, which would define their status of theoretical sciences. Tetens calls such science ‘transcendental philosophy’, since its notions are transcendental. Having rejected reductionism and the related metaphysical premises of traditional empiricism, Tetens creates the framework for a new, phenomenological methodologyaimed at such study of consciousness that would exclude attitudes based on the prejudices of the metaphysical and common understanding.

The article is devoted to Meister Eckhart’s interpretation of ontological structures of reality in which the concepts of being, nothingness, existence, and Godhead play an important role. The article discusses: 1. the interpretation of being and nothingness in the prologue to the Latin Opus Tripartitum; 2. the interpretation of existence and Godhead in German works; 3. the placement of these deliberations in the context of Eckhart’s conception of abgescheidenheit. The article’s main thesis is that in his ontological reflection, Meister Eckhart comes close to thinking about the essence of reality as Will, which is a clear anticipation of an important current in German philosophy.

Hermeneutics is widely celebrated as a call for "conversation"--that is, a manner of inquiry characterized by humility and openness to the other that eschews the pretenses of calculative rationality and resists all finality of conclusions. In this, conversation takes shape in efforts to understand and interpret that always unfold in the transmission of meaning historically in language. Yet, the celebration of hermeneutics for humility and openness appears, at least, to risk embarrassment in light of claims found in Heidegger and Gadamer that conversation is always contingent on "prior accord." Critics of hermeneutics have, for some decades, interpreted this claim of prior accord to refer to a common tradition, so that the understanding achieved in conversation is restricted to those who belong to the same heritage. In this essay, the author argues that although Heidegger and Gadamer often suggest this prior accord is a matter of common tradition, crucial threads of Gadamer's thought, in particular, recommend a different view. Gadamer, in these threads, offers that "prior accord" concerns not a common tradition, but, on the contrary, the call to participate in hermeneutic transmission as such, even--and no doubt especially--when those in conversation are not familiar with the tradition or language of the other. With this, we are called to converse not first by what the other says, but by the fact that we do not yet understand, that we have already misunderstood, and that we perhaps cannot understand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a detailed analysis of the function of the notion of Volk in Martin Heidegger's philosophy. At first glance, this term is an appeal to the revolutionary masses of the National Socialist revolution in a way that demarcates a distinction between the rootedness of the German People (capital "P") and the rootlessness of the modern rabble (or people). But this distinction is not a sufficient explanation of Heidegger's position, because Heidegger simultaneously seems to hold that even the Germans are characterized by a lack of identity. What is required is a further appropriation of the proper. My suggestion is that this logic of the Volk is not only useful for understanding Heidegger's thought during the war, but also an indication of what happened after he lost faith in the National Socialist movement and thus had to make the lack of the People the basis of his thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent work, Amie Thomasson has sought to develop a new approach to the philosophy of the categories which is metaphysically neutral between traditional realist and conceptualist approaches, and which has its roots in the 'correlationalist' approach to categories put forward in Husserl's writings in the 1900s--1910s and systematically charted over the past few decades by David Woodruff Smith in his studies of Husserl's philosophy. Here the author aims to provide a recontextualization and critical assessment of correlationalism in a Husserlian vein. To this end, the author presents, first, the reasons why, later in his life, Husserl himself found his earlier treatment of categories philosophically naive, and why he increasingly advocated for a more genetic-teleological account. The author then draws upon arguments made a century earlier by Schelling and Hegel, in criticism of Fichte, to point up what might remain philosophically unsatisfying about even the post-correlationalist genetic position of the later Husserl, in light of the pronounced trend in Husserl's own development, on the questions of reason and spirit, toward absolute idealism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the works of philosopher Gottlob Frege related to the concept of subjectivity and Frege's criticism of psychologism. Topics include psychologism in 19th century German philosophy, relationship between philosophy and science in post-Kantian idealism, and and Frege's theory of perception.

Written in 1922, the present essay by Baeumler on the aesthetics of Croce belongs to the period of the German philosopher's thought culminating with Das Irrationalitätproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft (1923), in which he works on a systematic project about a "logic of individuality". This concept, which appears in the western world with the birth of modern aesthetics, when the notion of "judgment of taste" established itself in the third Critique by Kant, will find in Croce, during the twentieth century, one of the most attentive Philosophers to the problem it implies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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I produce a critique of Marx Horkheimer's book Critique of Instrumental Reason as a way to introduce the concept of pragmatic critical theory. I start by mentioning that C. Wright Mills's concept of 'The Sociological Imagination' has many of the qualities of critical theory while emphasizing its potential for pragmatic solutions to social problems. I discuss some of the qualities of German social theory including its tendency toward over-philosophizing, before going on to discussing this book as well as the work of such scholars as W. I. Thomas and Emile Durkheim who produced morally-relevant social analysis, and especially the work of Max Weber whose exposition on the nature of rationality is used to provide background information that puts the work of Max Horkheimer in broader sociological context. I discuss how fantasies and substitute satisfactions are substitutes for a well-balanced life. I emphasize why Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School in general did not appreciate the American concern for pragmatism, but I nevertheless show the importance of a pragmatic approach to social reform. His critique of nationalism that runs as a theme throughout this book as offering a poor substitute for a sense of community is also pertinent. I end by emphasizing that Horkheimer's emphasis on authoritarianism as a reaction to modernization, and Christopher Lasch's emphasis on narcissism as a reaction to modernization, both emphasize negative aspects of their own societies, and learning how to avoid both extremes is a useful lesson to take away from both of their writings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the reformulation of German philosopher Gottlob Frege's theory of thoughts. Topics mentioned include the shareability and communicability of thoughts as deemed by Frege, argumentations on Frege's claim that thoughts are not the products of thinking, but only grasped by thinking, and interpretation of his theory of thoughts as a Platonist doctrine or realism.

Angela Carter's reception of German Romantic philosophy is one important aspect of her commitment to deconstructing and revising Western literary tradition. In The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman (1972), Carter suggests that the Romantic ideals of harmony and transcendence limit personal freedom, and that the Romantic imagination is not as liberating as its champions claim. This is illustrated through the protagonist Desiderio, whose fragmented sense of self arises from his liminal position as a mixed-race inhabitant of a postcolonial nation. His yearning for a clear identity is characteristic of the Romantic desire for a lost harmony, but Carter criticizes this European philosophy for its potential to mythologize a dangerous form of self-sacrifice. The postcolonial context of the novel illustrates the very real dangers that arise when any particular ideology gains the upper hand, and the Romantic desire to unite the world is warped into a vision of control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Analysis of Wonder is a stimulating and worthy introduction to the difficult and unique thought of Nicolai Hartmann. In this venue, the focus is upon criticisms of Cicovacki's book. The opportunity to elicit further clarification and argumentation from Cicovacki should be fruitful. Hartmann's philosophy is truly unique in nature and vast. As such, it is worth noting at the outset that, given the nature of Cicovacki's book and a lack of deeper familiarity with Hartmann's philosophy, the concerns raised herein may very well be issues in Hartmann that Cicovacki is replicating. The criticisms addressed herein present five sets of worries related to The Analysis of Wonder. The first three may be relatively minor concerns having to do with (1) what is meant by the rediscovery of the world; (2) Cicovacki's criticisms of post-modernism and existentialism; and (3) Cicovacki's use of Arendt as a way of framing Hartmann's value to contemporary philosophy and beyond. The latter two sets of worries are more substantive. They involve (4) Hartmann's account of the importance of a loving attitude and (5) Hartmann's theory of personality. Again, these are presented in the spirit of an invitation to dialogue more about Hartmann, a figure who Cicovacki represents well in The Analysis of Wonder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the trademarks of Nicolai Hartmann's ontology is his theory of levels of reality. Hartmann drew from many sources to develop his version of the theory. His essay 'Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der alten Philosophie' (1943) testifies of the fact that he drew from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. But this text was written relatively late in Hartmann's career, which suggests that his interest in the theories of levels of the ancients may have been retrospective. In 'Nicolai Hartmann und seine Zeitgenossen,' Martin Morgenstern puts the emphasis on contemporaries of Hartmann: Émile Boutroux, Max Scheler, Heinrich Rickert, Karl Jaspers, and Arnold Gehlen. But there is another plausible source for Hartmann's conception of levels that has so far remained overlooked in the literature. Hartmann studied with and was influenced by Nikolai Lossky. Lossky has a theory of levels that he adopted from Vladimir Solovyov. Solovyov presents his theory of levels, among other places, in Oпpaвдaнie дoбpa ( Justification of the Good) (1897), where he says that the five principal stages of the cosmogonic process of ascension toward universal perfection, which are given in experience, are the mineral or inorganic realm, the vegetal realm, the animal realm, the realm of natural humanity, and the realm of spiritual or divine humanity. This theory appears to bear significant similarities with the theory of levels of reality that Hartmann will develop a few decades later. Solovyov was widely read in Russia and it would be unlikely that Hartmann was not at least minimally acquainted with his work. Chances are that Hartmann came into contact with it in some details. An intellectual lineage could thus likely be traced from Hartmann back to Solovyov. In this paper, I document and discuss this possible lineage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his article 'The Megarian and Aristotelian Concept of Possibility' ('Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff,' 1937), Nicolai Hartmann attempts to revive an interpretation of the conception of possibility of the Megarians that stood in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of possibility and thus in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of modality in general. In this introduction, I undertake to situate Hartmann's article in its historical context. Did Hartmann come to adopt this thesis through his study of ancient Greek philosophy? Or did he already have a predilection for the Megarian conception of possibility prior to this? If so, how did this predilection come about? Was there an influence from his friend Vasily Sesemann, who published an article discussing the Megarians the previous year? Or were both Hartmann and Sesemann influenced early on by their mutual Russian teacher Nikolai Lossky, or even by a general tendency pervading Russian thought-itself grounded in the fatalism typical of the Russian collective unconscious-as we find it expressed in the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov, Lev Tolstoy, and other Russian thinkers? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laurence Sterne has been read and enjoyed in the German-speaking world since his own lifetime, in excellent German translations by Johann Joachim Christoph Bode and others. His importance to the development of the German novel has been the focus of a number of studies, but his attractiveness to German-language philosophers has been much less noted. In a chronological survey from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth centuries, this article begins with the role Sterne reception plays in the German cult of sensibility (Empfindsamkeit) before focusing in turn on Hegel, Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, Benjamin, Wittgenstein, Lukács and Luhmann. Superior philosophical stylists such as Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche and the early Lukács succumbed to the temptation to imitate surface features of Sterne’s style, but the most interesting cases arise when philosophers have spent time reflecting on Sterne’s thematic concerns as well as his formal innovations. There have been three main areas of interest: Sterne’s characterisations and the question of peculiar individuality, Sterne as a sentimentalist and moralist, and ‘Shandyan humour’. An attempt is made to distinguish between philosophers (such as Wittgenstein) who merely enjoyed reading Sterne, and those (such as Marx, Nietzsche and Luhmann) who can be described as more properly ‘Sternean’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Magical realism is known with its oxymoronic characteristic, magic plus realism. It became known with the boom of the magical realist novel in the 1960s in Latin America and became globally recognized from 1980 onwards. However, it is mostly forgotten that it had started its journey from Europe. The term "magic realism" first appeared in German philosophy in 1798 in Novalis' notebook. Then, it entered art criticism in 1925 through Roh's essay and developed in Italy through by Bontempelli. Later, after transformation and formation, magical realism appeared in the novels as a popular mode first in Latin America and then worldwide. The present study charts the path and discusses the development of magical realism from its commencement in Europe. In addition to presenting the views of Novalis, Roh and Bontempelli on initiating the term, it compares their views to show what characteristic in their views inspires today's magic realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I offer a selective, systematic rather than historical account of Merleau-Ponty's highly complex relation to classical German philosophy, focussing on issues which bear on the question of his relation to transcendentalism and naturalism. I argue that the concerns which define his project in Phenomenology of Perception are fundamentally those of transcendental philosophy, and that Merleau-Ponty's disagreements with Kant, and the position he arrives at in The Visible and the Invisible, are helpfully viewed in light of (1) issues which Merleau-Ponty identifies as raised by Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement, and (2) Schelling's conversion of Kantian idealism into a Real-Idealismus. Finally I address the question of whether, and on what basis, Merleau-Ponty's claim to have surpassed systematic philosophy can be defended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 18th century philosopher Salomon Maimon, who originated from a small village in Eastern Europe and who, despite having been destined to become a rabbi at a young age, emigrated to Berlin and other German locations to study philosophy, showed a strong bond to the medieval philosopher Moses Maimonides, most obviously by his self selected surname. Besides this, Maimon's philosophical works have been significantly influenced by the rationalistic philosophy and theology of Maimonides. Most importantly, Maimonides' theory of divine reason, which in turn refers to Aristotle's Metaphysics, is incorporated into the philosophy of Maimon, who decisively transformed this conception into his own notion of an infinite intellect. In this article, it shall be demonstrated that Maimon uses this concept, derived from Maimonides' thought to a large extent, yet significantly differing from it in important aspects, to argue against Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy: At first by rejecting the Kantian dualism of sensibility and intellect, then by trying to uncover Kant's notion of the thing in itself as meaningless and eventually by trying to eliminate this notion from the system of transcendental philosophy in general. To present this specific constellation of argumentation, at first Maimon's reception of central Maimonidean thoughts shall be examined in a strongly selective manner. In a second step, the application of these thoughts to the difficulties of Kant's philosophy by Maimon has to be drafted. By inquiring the multifaceted relation of Maimon to the medieval philosopher in these important aspects, Maimonides' particular relevance for German philosophy in the late 18th century shall be revealed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early modernity, church historians initially showed little interest in Berthold of Moosburg. They knew him as a commentator of Proclus, but they did not recognise his importance for the history of Neoplatonism. The librarians and bibliographers who came across Berthold's commentary on Proclus in the Balliol College Library at Oxford showed no interest in the philosophical content of this work. An article on Berthold in the monumental work Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum (1719) summarised the available information. It was Johann Albert Fabricius (1668-1736) who took notice of it. Fabricius was very interested in Proclus as well as in Neoplatonic theology and its narration in the Elements of Theology; he had started to collect all available information regarding this issue and had also come across Berthold's commentary. However, he did not ignore him, as many had done before, but prop erly recognised the importance of Berthold for the history of the reception of Proclus's philosophy. Fabricius always referred to the Dominican thinker when deal ing with Proclus's Elements of Theology, in particular in his own Bibliotheca graeca. One of the attentive readers of this work was the German philologist Friedrich Creuzer. In 1822, within the framework of publishing Neoplatonic writings, Creuzer reedited Proclus's Elements of Theology. As a consequence of this new edition, Proclus together with his medieval commentator came into the focus of leading representatives of classical German philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]