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Submitted by Boris Flegr (boris@uerj.br) on 2021-01-05T21:05:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruno Magalhaes de Mattos _total.pdf: 1975045 bytes, checksum: 6dafd3e7f3891e2ded37e5976cc4d337 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-01-05T21:05:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruno Magalhaes de Mattos _total.pdf: 1975045 bytes, checksum: 6dafd3e7f3891e2ded37e5976cc4d337 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-02 This academic thesis has legal basis for the recognition of the subject law of property by means of the institution of the adverse possession, which the ownership held by the claimant has to be fulfilled according to the social function provided constitutionally. Consequently, it is argued that the ownership that is able to create the conversion of a situation merely factual of domain on the thing which is in subjective ownership right has to be the one which not only preserves merely the individual interests, but its function may have a positive effect before all the socially integrated members, considering the principle of human dignity. Thus, the ad usucapionem possession does not tolerate acts merely to preserve the things and for speculative purposes because it is not seen in this conduct a socio-economic distinction and consequently visibility to this field. On the other hand, even if there is such destination it does not have to be analyzed in isolation, but associated with other values provided constitutionally which are unavailable to the citizen, such as: the right to life and own dignity, rights which directly interact with the right to dignified housing. Although the adverse possession be a principle of origin and private interest, from the moment the property was functioned to the social and human wishes by the Federal Constitution, the adverse possession got an axiological outline, and consequently it started to prize being more than having because it was also realized that the available legal assets are scarce and the values and principles extracted from the Constitution transcend the individual s willingness sphere. For this purpose, the present thesis defends the horizontal effectiveness of the fundamental rights to private relations where the social function would be inserted, and according to the positive law field it portrays the social function as the essential core of the adverse possession legal basis. As a result, this thesis suggests a re-reading of the Article 1.238 of the Brazilian Civil Code as well, it also questions the Federal Supreme Court recent decision which acknowledged the right to individual urban adverse possession to the detriment of the minimum module, which is essential source of city ordinance since the Master Plan, finally according to what provides the new law 13. 465/17, which presents the adverse possession as an instrument of land regularization; however, without dissociating it from the principles which integrate decent housing and the social function itself. A presente tese acadêmica possui como base jurídica para o reconhecimento do direito subjetivo de propriedade, por meio do instituto da usucapião, que a posse exercida pelo pretendente seja desempenhada conforme a função social prevista constitucionalmente. Logo, defende-se que a posse apta a gerar a conversão de uma situação meramente fática de domínio sobre a coisa em direito subjetivo de propriedade deva ser aquela que não apenas resguarde os interesses meramente individuais da pessoa, mas cujo exercício possa repercutir positivamente perante todos os membros integrados socialmente, e em respeito ao princípio da dignidade humana. Dessa forma, a posse ad usucapionem não tolera atos meramente conservatórios sobre a coisa, com fins especulativos, pois não se vê nessa conduta uma destinação socioeconômica dada a ela e, consequentemente, visibilidade ao domínio. Por outro lado, mesmo que haja tal destinação, esta não deve ser analisada de forma isolada, mas sim associada a outros valores previstos constitucionalmente, que são indisponíveis ao cidadão, como o direito a vida e a própria dignidade, que interagem diretamente com o direito a moradia digna. Portanto, por mais que a usucapião seja um instituto de origem e interesse privados, a partir do momento em que a propriedade foi funcionalizada aos anseios sociais e humanos pela Constituição Federal, a usucapião ganhou contornos axiológicos e, consequentemente, passou-se a valorizar mais o ser do que o ter, pois percebeu-se ainda que os bens jurídicos disponíveis são escassos e os valores e princípios que se extraem da Carta Magna transcendem a esfera de disponibilidade do indivíduo. Para tanto, a presente tese defende a eficácia horizontal dos direitos fundamentais às relações privadas, donde a função social estaria inserida; e, no plano do direito positivo, apresenta a função social como núcleo essencial do fato jurídico da usucapião. Como efeito dessa tese, propõe-se ainda uma releitura do artigo 1.238 do Código Civil; questiona-se a recente decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal, que reconheceu o direito à usucapião individual urbana, em detrimento do módulo mínimo, que é fonte essencial de ordenação da cidade a partir do plano diretor; e, por fim, diante do que dispõe a novel Lei nº 13.465/17, apresenta-se a usucapião como instrumento de regularização fundiária, mas sem desassociá-la dos princípios que integram a moradia digna e a própria função social.

This article analyses the concept of the doctrine of adverse possession by comparing the legal position of the estate owner and the adverse possessor in three legal systems, England and Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland, with a view to identifying which jurisdiction offers more protection to each party. It explores the theoretical underpinnings of adverse possession in the context of the shifting priorities of land law more generally.

Sumario: I. Planteamiento de la cuestión. II. La usucapibilidad de los elementos comunes desafectables. III. La prueba del animus domini. IV. La usucapión ganada y el Registro de la Propiedad. V. Bibliografía.

Kruse maintains despite all the customary land preservation mechanisms, there is still opportunity for mischief under the current registration statutes. Kruse explains that not only has the High Court allowed individualized land holding, but the Fono has also made the individualization process relatively easy by passage of the Land Registration Act. The chapter points out that any individual can register a claim to any land not previously registered, which comprises majority of land in the territory. If no one objects within a proscribed period then the land may be individualized. Kruse scrutinizes the High Court’s application of British influences, Henry Maine and William Blackstone’s property concepts of the individual right that converted communal lands to individual ownership. Individual rights were applied and accepted by the High Court to evidence individual ownership over bush lands by applying European principles and concepts of old English law through adverse possession and individual rights.

Adverse possession is proved only when possession is peaceful, open, continuous and hostile. Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted for in order to constitute adverse possession. Animus possidendi is one of the ingredients of adverse possession and unless the person possessing the land has the requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time does not affect his title. But the position alters when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession must start with a wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile, and continued over the statutory period.

The article focuses on the National Register of the Lost Cultural Property (NRLCP) as a new so-called public register in the Polish legal system. Public registers, including records accessible to the public, are organized with the purpose of triggering specified effects within material law. An entry in the NRLCP, according to the amendment of the Polish Civil Code, should eliminate the possibility of acquiring an ownership of an object included in the Register from a non-entitled person. In this way the legislator tries to solve the problem of losing a cultural property by original owners due to thefts, burglaries and misappropriations. Those crimes have usually resulted afterwards in acquiring the ownership by the urchasers remaining in good faith. From now on, such acquisition of the cultural property shall be impossible. The text is divided into three parts. In the first part the author stresses reasons for existence of special solutions in the framework of civil law for the cultural property. Second part is devoted to the rules that compose the way in which the NRLCP should function. The third and the most significant part of the article addresses the issue of material-law effects of the entry in the NRLCP. All reflections are centred around the question whether the new regulation is appropriate and effective in protecting a cultural property.

Serbian Civil Code, modeled based on the Austrian Civil Code (1811), regulates in a unique way the influence of the time on the acquisition and loss of the rights. The uniform regulation of the influence of time on the right dates back to the Roman concept of praescriptio. Based on the ancient Romans the term praescriptio means loss and creation of right, influenced by the time. The concept praescriptio extinctive means loss of rights due to non-exercising the right in a certain time period, while institute praescriptio aqcuisitive means acquisition of right. In the Serbian Civil Code, influence of time on the right is defined by the statute of limitation. Statute of limitation includes two legal concepts, i.e. statute of limitation in a strict sense, meaning loss of rights, and statute of limitation in terms of acquisition of rights, recognized in modern domestic law as adverse possession usucapio. The guiding idea for the creation of this work was to review the concept of adverse possession (concept, conditions for acquisition of right by adverse possession, types of adverse possession) according to the provisions of Serbian Civil Code.

Acquisitive prescription in civil law and adverse possession in common law produce particularly strong effects in law since they are means whereby property may be gained through the passage of time. Good faith plays a relatively modest role in acquisitive prescription/ adverse possession, which does not necessarily means that acquisitive prescription or adverse possession are immoral. Not only good faith has a certain role, both substantial and formal, but there are theoretical justifications that justify acquisitive prescription/ adverse possession and renders those mechanisms legitimate. Aside from justifications founded upon moral and economical arguments, what justifies it above all is a justification founded on social order related to the public interest. Moreover, additionally to a theoretical legitimacy, acquisitive prescription/ adverse possession has an utility or practical legitimacy, especially in traditions where registration of rights are essentially a matter of opposability to third parties, but also to a lesser extend in Torrens-like registration systems. Finally, the argument can be made according to which acquisitive prescription is a form of private expropriation. A compensation of the disposed owner could then infuse greater legitimacy to the law of acquisitive prescription/ adverse possession., La prescription acquisitive du doit civil et la possession adverse de la common law produisent des effets juridiques importants, puisqu’ils permettent d’acquérir la propriété suite au passage du temps. La bonne foi joue un rôle relativement modeste dans la prescription acquisitive ou dans l’adverse possession, ce qui n’implique toutefois pas l’immoralité de ces mécanismes. Non seulement la bonne foi joue un certain rôle, tant d’un point de vue substantiel que formel, mais il existe des arguments théoriques qui justifient la prescription acquisitive et la possession adverse et rendent ces mécanismes légitimes. Aux côtés de justifications fondées sur des arguments moraux et économiques, ce qui permet surtout de les légitimer est un argument fondé sur l’ordre social relié à l’intérêt public. Par ailleurs, en plus d’une justification théorique, la prescription acquisitive et la possession adverse ont une utilité ou légitimité pratique, spécialement dans les traditions où la publicité des droits est essentiellement une question d’opposabilité aux tiers, mais aussi dans une moindre mesure dans les traditions qui ont adopté le système de publicité Torrens. Finalement, on peut se demander si la prescription acquisitive ou la possession adverse peut être analysée comme une forme d’expropriation privée. La compensation du propriétaire dépossédé pourrait alors infuser une plus grande justice au droit de la prescription acquisitive et de la possession adverse., Emerich Yaëll. Comparative overview on the transformative effect of acquisitive prescription and adverse possession : morality, legitimacy, justice. In: Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 67 N°2,2015. La comparaison en droit public. Hommage à Roland Drago. pp. 459-496.

Resumen: El derecho argentino reconoce dos clases de relaciones de poder, consistentes en vínculos de hecho con las cosas cuya existencia no requiere de antecedentes jurídicos: la posesión y la tenencia. El mecanismo por el cual un sujeto puede pasar de una relación de poder a otra se denomina interversión de título, y el presente trabajo analiza los elementos y condiciones necesarios para que se produzca este fenómeno de acuerdo a la normativa del Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación y a la jurisprudencia actual. Abstract: The Argentine Law recognizes that an individual can exercise her power over a thing (possession in a broad sense) and states that this relationship creates certain consequences without paying attention to its legal background or the entitlements at stake. There are two types of power relationships named “posesión” and “tenencia”, and the mechanism that allows a person to move from one type to the other is called “interversión”. The article studies what are the legal requirements for “interversión” to take place.

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter discusses the basic principles for adverse possession; adverse possession against land which is subject to a lease; and the complex rules applicable where adverse possession is taken against land which is registered title. It covers the rationale of adverse possession; possession giving a right to sue trespassers; the Limitation Act 1980; commencement of adverse possession; offence of squatting in a residential building; preventing the acquisition of title by adverse possession; and the effect of adverse possession.

DOES wrongdoing by a squatter prevent him from acquiring title to another person's land via the law of adverse possession? The answer is plainly “no” where the squatter is a civil, tortious wrongdoer: the law not only condones, but positively requires a successful adverse possession claimant to have committed the tort of trespass over the true owner's land (this condition is inherent in the requirement that the squatter's possession be “adverse”). But what happens where the tortious acts that establish the squatter's adverse possession also constitute a criminal offence? This was the tricky question facing the court in Best v The Chief Land Registrar [2014] EWHC (Admin) 1370.

This paper, delivered as the Annual Francis Gurry Lecture at Melbourne University in 2012, considers intellectual property law as a species of public law serving public purposes. The purposes reflecting the interests of creators, owners and users of intellectual property rights are in tension. That tension affects the normative clarity of intellectual property law and its effective enforcement. It may inform the construction of intellectual property statutes and the application of evaluative criteria of validity under those statutes. In Australia, intellectual property statutes are made under constitutional authority with respect to specified categories of intellectual property, the specific content of which may vary with technological change. Official decisions effecting the creation or discontinuance in intellectual property rights are statutory and subject to constitutionally based judicial review in addition to particular appeal rights conferred by statute. At the heart of the public law aspect of intellectual property rights is a tension between their characterisation as proprietary or instrumental.

Criminal law casebooks and treatises frequently mention the possibility that criminal liability for possession is inconsistent with the Voluntary Act Requirement, which limits criminal liability to that which includes an act or an omission. This paper explains why criminal liability for possession is compatible with the Voluntary Act Requirement despite the fact that possession is a status. To make good on this claim, the paper (1) defends the Voluntary Act Requirement, (2) offers an account of the nature of omissions of the kind that need be included in that for which criminal liability is imposed in the absence of a voluntary act, and (3) argues that possession is a status that is constituted in part by an omission of this sort. The result is that to hold people criminally liable for possession is to hold them criminally liable both for a status and for an omission, an omission that is part of what it is to have that status. The paper also distinguishes possession from vagrancy, which is not a proper object of criminal liability, precisely because of constraints placed by the Voluntary Act Requirement. And the paper argues that possession incident to dispossession is not a proper object of criminal liability because it does not involve an omission of the kind that other forms of possession involve.

This article uses the recent Occupy litigation of Batty v. City of Toronto to argue that Canadian courts no longer have a robust understanding of common property and its attendant rights. The lack of judicial understanding of common property is hardly surprising given property theory’s focus on private property, particularly individual private property. This article argues that rather than use the traditional analogy of governments holding common property in trust for the public, Batty relies on an analogy of common property which treats the government as an owner. The emergence of the latter understanding of common property can be traced to Supreme Court jurisprudence from the early 1990s. Although the government-as-owner analogy of common property was introduced in a concurring judgment, more recent Supreme Court decisions have since reiterated the analogy. Such an understanding of common property is a clear attempt to force all property into a private property model and emphasize the rights of owners above all other rights in property. This article argues that the government-as-owner analogy is problematic given its emphasis on the government’s use of property rather than the public’s benefit from common property and calls for a return to the trust analogy of common property., En s’appuyant sur le récent litige « Occupy » dans l’affaire Batty c City of Toronto (Batty), cet article montre que le judiciaire canadien n’a plus de compréhension solide des biens communs, ni des droits qui y sont associés. Ce manque de compréhension judiciaire en matière de biens communs est à peine surprenant compte tenu la focalisation de la théorie sur la propriété privée, et particulièrement la propriété privée individuelle. Cet article soutient qu’au lieu d’utiliser l’analogie traditionnelle, selon laquelle le gouvernement détient les biens communs en fiducie pour le public, Batty se fonde sur une analogie qui considère le gouvernement comme propriétaire. L’émergence de cette dernière compréhension des biens communs peut être retracée à la jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême du début des années 1990. Bien que l’analogie gouvernement comme propriétaire ait été introduite par un jugement concurrent, des décisions plus récentes de la Cour Suprême l’ont réitérée. Une telle compréhension de la propriété est une tentative évidente de forcer tout le droit des biens dans un modèle de propriété privée, et d’accentuer les droits des propriétaires par-dessus tous les autres droits reliés à la propriété. Cet article soutient que l’analogie gouvernement comme propriétaire est problématique puisqu’elle met l’accent sur l’usage que fait le gouvernement des biens communs, et non les bienfaits publics qui en ressortent. L’article appelle ainsi à un retour à l’analogie fiduciaire des biens communs.

The use of three-dimensional (3D) property rights has for many years been a tool for providing secure and lasting rights for the use of land and its volume of space in complex situations involving land use in the urban society. The aim of this article is to investigate the reasons for introducing 3D property in a legal system. This is illustrated by using the Swedish system as an example. In general, without the possibility of forming 3D property units with direct ownership, other forms have to be used, such as indirect ownership or granted user rights. Benefits of ownership in comparison with different types of rights include a more secure way of guaranteeing the possession of real property and the possibility of mortgaging the property. There are lower transaction costs compared with user rights, arising from legally securing three-dimensionally delimited parts of real property. 3D property also enables an increase in the density of private ownership. 3D property is a useful way of solving problems related to the use of space by different parties with different needs. In the Swedish legislation the introduction of 3D property formation has increased the possibility of constructing and financing in particular large and more complex facilities. It has created more secure and clear ways of constructing infrastructure objects and separating them from other types of use within the space of the same traditional property.

Possession is actual control over a thing. While the relationship between a possessor and a thing allows the former to use the thing, enjoy it and dispose of it, it is not important if he or she also has the right to do so. Possession represents one of fundamental components (entitlements) of ownership, which, despite the fact that it only represents actual control over a thing, nevertheless indicates certain belonging of a thing to a person who exercises actual control. Possession is not a right and therefore does not include fundamental entitlements, but it does contain the entitlement to legal protection. A possessor, who does not necessarily even have the right to possess a thing, may require protection of possession either through selfhelp or with an action. The monograph comprehensively discusses regulation of possession, and at the same time offers systematically collected and arranged recent case law in this field.

Does an Occupying Power have a duty to protect private property rights of protected persons against acts of its own citizens? What is the extent of such a duty? This paper argues that under belligerent occupation, land disputes between individuals of both sides of the conflict are not a private matter even if the Occupying Power has no direct interest in the object of dispute. Accordingly, the Occupying State has a duty to protect the private rights of the civilians under its control, and to address such private disputes as a matter of public order. The paper discusses this claim based on recent developments in the formation of land disputes between Israelis and Palestinians in the Occupied West Bank. Until the 1990s Israel’s de-facto annexation of the West Bank’s land (although not the people) was manifested, most prominently, by establishing Israeli settlements over land identified as public property. Following the Oslo accords, a shift has occurred, when Israeli settlers, in a bottom-up process, began to cultivate private Palestinian lands and consequentially claim title based on their adverse possession. The political conflict was transferred from the public arena to the private one. The paper evaluates Israel’s response to these developments and considers the applicable legal standards.

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Bachelor of Laws Degree at Strathmore University Law School Squatter settlements are considered as residential areas inhabited by the very poor who have no access to land tenure of their own, and hence "squat" on vacant land, either private or public.Squatter settlement is the absence of security of tenure and planning.The defining characteristics of a squatter settlement are: firstly, physical characteristic, such as ,services and infrastructure at below minimum level this includes roads and water services. Secondly, social characteristic as they are inhabited by persons who belong to a lower income group mostly working in the informal sector, predominantly migrants. Thirdly, legal characteristic, which is the lack of ownership of the land in which individuals have settled, it could be public or private land. They have no security of land tenure and are constantly exposed to eviction and violence

A long line of authorities and legal writings has historically developed itself over one of the most controversial and fascinating fields of English private law. As a matter of fact, the law of possession in the common law has led to a number of researches aimed at finding out, in the first place, whether the origin of English possession traces back, or not, to Roman “possessio”. In this regard a large number of qualified authors in the late 1880’s have concentrated on the subject, mostly availing themselves of the eminent contribution of German philosophers and jurists. But the English common law has always manifested a genuine, autonomous spirit in the development of the basic features of possession, starting with the indication of the necessary co-existence of a material and a mental element. Also judicial decisions have played a decisive role in the setting up of the conditions which make it possible for a factual relationship with a given object to ripen into one capable of being recognized and protected by the law. From this point of view it becomes apparent that the characteristic form of English possession, called adverse possession, contains all the fundamental elements whereby a de facto relation gets relevant in the eye of the law.On the other hand, the very fact that a paper owner may run the risk of losing his title to a simple occupant of his land (a squatter according to the common terminology) through the mere lapse of time has prompted a legislative reform, the Land Registration Act 2002, which has strengthened the position of the owner. At the same time this change of attitude seems to have re-assured the Grandchamber of the European Courts of Human Rights as to the compatibility of the English system of adversary possession with the principles enshrined in art. 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The present study deals with all these aspects concluding that adverse possession gives rise to an institute and a discipline which are peculiar of the English law of possession and explains its fundamental characters so as to become its most faithful representation.

This paper charts the progress of a complex possession action in the English county court. The case raised a mix of inter-related questions under the Human Rights Act 1998, the Equality Act 2010 and general principles of public law in relation to assured shorthold tenancies. The purpose of the paper is to bring much more clearly and fully to the attention of academic lawyers and law students the way in which the mechanics of preparing, pleading and arguing such cases effectively shape ‘the law’ which the courts apply.

The Journal No. 10 is financed by the project of Latvian Council of Science “The Experience, Lessons and International Importance of the Restoration of Latvia’s Independent Statehood (Historical, Political and Legal Aspects)”

This Article critiques our focus on possession as the cornerstone of theories of property, examining the limitations of possession both as a theoretical concept and as a practical one. Second, the article examines how an investment-based labor approach has sharply shaped out understandings of possession. By examining the intertwining of possession and labor during colonization, the article describes how the labor approach to possession excluded more communal corollaries and instilled in American property law a consistent push toward grounding land claims at the labor-possession nexus.Re-thinking the labor-possession nexus yields important shifts. First, labor matters for other reasons than investment-backed expectations. Labor matters because the loss of investments often means violence. There is a reason for the historical correlation between changes in property rights and revolutions. Focusing investment critically places property as a first-order value when it is, in fact, a second-order value or a means to a social end (specifically, non-violence). Second, focusing on labor as investment also places such an extraordinary emphasis on possession that American scholars and courts rarely think much about dispossession. Our emphasis on possession rather than dispossession frames American property law in terms of vested rights to such a degree that while scholars may think in terms of social relations theories, American property law is stuck thinking in terms of individual ownership rights even when the courts acknowledge the social nature of property arrangements.

Analysis of the role of hostility and notoriety in adverse possession cases, and the relationship of adverse possession and prescriptive extinction of easements.

The Q&A series offer the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, bullet-pointed answer plans and suggested answers, author commentary and illustrative diagrams and flowcharts. This chapter presents issues related to adverse possession.

The article discusses the liability for repairing damage in Permanent Preservation Area (PPA). Seeks to answer the question of liability of the possessor "ad usucapionem" due to the removal of vegetation in area. The objective was to present the response of the possibility of acquisition of property by way of adverse possession and reparation and indemnity liability of degrading. The article was used social science and technology as a methodological approach, since the research aims to seek ownership of the liability of repair the area. At the end it was realized that the possessor has responsibility to repair the area., O artigo aborda a responsabilidade pela reparação de danos ocorridos em Área de Preservação Permanente. Busca responder o problema da responsabilidade do possuidor “ad usucapionem” em razão da supressão de vegetação em APP. Objetivou-se apresentar a resposta entre a possibilidade da aquisição da propriedade pela via da Usucapião e a responsabilidade civil reparatória e indenizatória do usucapiente degradador. O artigo utilizou-se da tecnologia social e científica como linha metodológica, uma vez que a pesquisa visa buscar a titularidade da responsabilidade da reparação em APP. Ao final percebeu-se que o possuidor-usucapiente tem responsabilidade de reparar a APP em algumas situações fático-jurídicas.

Традиционално, државина је посматрана као чињеница (possessio non iuris est, sed facti). Један део правне доктрине сматра да је државина право. Мада има одговарајућа правна дејства и ужива правну заштиту, државина није и не може бити право. Веома често се државина и право на државину поклапaју, и правни субјект може имати право на државину (ius possidendi) засновано на неком субјективном праву, али државина може настати не само као вршење правне власти, већ и без ње, па и супротно таквом овлашћењу. Државина може да постоји независно од права на ствар, односно, независно од тога да ли се у конкретном случају правна и фактичка власт на некој ствари подударају или супротстављају. Предмет истраживања и рада на докторској дисертацији „Правна дејства државине у савременом праву“, представља анализу појма, правне природе, субјеката и објеката државине, врста и квалитета државине, стицања, преноса и престанка државине. Овако детаљно сагледавање института државине доприноси разумевању најзначајних правних дејстава које државина производи. Циљ истраживања представља критичку анализу позитивног права и прилагођавање регулативе изазовима савременог доба. Од врста и квалитета државине зависи која ће правна дејства правни поредак везивати уз одговарајућу државину. Субјективна и објективна својства државине детерминишу њен квалитет. Државина са свим позитивним елементима је квалификована државина. То је државина која је истовремено законита, права и савесна. Правна дејства државине настају онда када је државина стечена и у односу на онога ко ју је стекао. Функције државине које се остварују кроз правна дејства су: функција публицитета, функција континуитета и заштитна функција. Правна дејства државине која произлазе из публицитетне функције су: државина је начин стицања стварних права на покретним стварима, државина ствара претпоставку о постојању права својине на ствари, државина ствара могућност стицања својине од невласника, држалац је одговоран за штету која потиче од ствари која се налази у његовој државини. Правна дејства државине која произлазе из континуитетне функције су: заштита државине од одузимања или сметања, повољнији положај држаоца код кога се ствар налази у поступку по публицијанској тужби, положај држаоца приликом враћања ствари у петиторном спору за предају ствари, могућност да државина која је имала одређене квалитете и трајала законом одређено време, путем одржаја, прерасте у право својине. У закључним разматрањима докторске дисертације сублимирају се резултати истраживања, недостаци позитивноправних решења и дају предлози de lege ferenda. Tradicionalno, državina je posmatrana kao činjenica (possessio non iuris est, sed facti). Jedan deo pravne doktrine smatra da je državina pravo. Mada ima odgovarajuća pravna dejstva i uživa pravnu zaštitu, državina nije i ne može biti pravo. Veoma često se državina i pravo na državinu poklapaju, i pravni subjekt može imati pravo na državinu (ius possidendi) zasnovano na nekom subjektivnom pravu, ali državina može nastati ne samo kao vršenje pravne vlasti, već i bez nje, pa i suprotno takvom ovlašćenju. Državina može da postoji nezavisno od prava na stvar, odnosno, nezavisno od toga da li se u konkretnom slučaju pravna i faktička vlast na nekoj stvari podudaraju ili suprotstavljaju. Predmet istraživanja i rada na doktorskoj disertaciji „Pravna dejstva državine u savremenom pravu“, predstavlja analizu pojma, pravne prirode, subjekata i objekata državine, vrsta i kvaliteta državine, sticanja, prenosa i prestanka državine. Ovako detaljno sagledavanje instituta državine doprinosi razumevanju najznačajnih pravnih dejstava koje državina proizvodi. Cilj istraživanja predstavlja kritičku analizu pozitivnog prava i prilagođavanje regulative izazovima savremenog doba. Od vrsta i kvaliteta državine zavisi koja će pravna dejstva pravni poredak vezivati uz odgovarajuću državinu. Subjektivna i objektivna svojstva državine determinišu njen kvalitet. Državina sa svim pozitivnim elementima je kvalifikovana državina. To je državina koja je istovremeno zakonita, prava i savesna. Pravna dejstva državine nastaju onda kada je državina stečena i u odnosu na onoga ko ju je stekao. Funkcije državine koje se ostvaruju kroz pravna dejstva su: funkcija publiciteta, funkcija kontinuiteta i zaštitna funkcija. Pravna dejstva državine koja proizlaze iz publicitetne funkcije su: državina je način sticanja stvarnih prava na pokretnim stvarima, državina stvara pretpostavku o postojanju prava svojine na stvari, državina stvara mogućnost sticanja svojine od nevlasnika, držalac je odgovoran za štetu koja potiče od stvari koja se nalazi u njegovoj državini. Pravna dejstva državine koja proizlaze iz kontinuitetne funkcije su: zaštita državine od oduzimanja ili smetanja, povoljniji položaj držaoca kod koga se stvar nalazi u postupku po publicijanskoj tužbi, položaj držaoca prilikom vraćanja stvari u petitornom sporu za predaju stvari, mogućnost da državina koja je imala određene kvalitete i trajala zakonom određeno vreme, putem održaja, preraste u pravo svojine. U zaključnim razmatranjima doktorske disertacije sublimiraju se rezultati istraživanja, nedostaci pozitivnopravnih rešenja i daju predlozi de lege ferenda. Traditionally, possession has been viewed as a matter of facts (possession not iuris est, sed facti). A part of legal doctrine regards possession as a right. Although possession causes certain legal effects and enjoys protection of the law, possession is not and may not be regarded as a right. Very often factual possession and right to possession overlap and a person may hold a right to possession (ius possidendi) based on some personal right, however possession may be created not only as a result of lawful exercise of one’s rights, but also without, or contrary to, exercise of such rights. Possession may exist independently of property rights, that is, regardless of whether legal and factual control over a thing overlap or are at odds. The subject of this research and work on doctoral thesis titled “The Legal Effects of Possession in Contemporary Law” is analysis of the meaning and legal nature of possession; persons holding possession and things that may be subject to possession; types and varieties of possession; acquiring, transfer, and loss of possession. Such detailed overview of possession contributes to better understanding of the most significant legal effects caused by possession over a thing. The aim of the research is to provide a critical analysis of the law and to examine how the regulations have been modified to meet the challenges of modern time. Depending on the type and form of possession, the legal framework provides for different legal effects to possession over a thing. Personal and objective features determine the quality of possession. Possession, with all the positive elements, constitutes qualified possession. The qualified possession is a possession that is legal and lawful. Legal effects of possession are created at the moment the possession is acquired and they are created towards a person that acquired it. The following elements of possession are created through its legal effects: element of publicity, element of continuity, and protective element. Legal effects of possession associated with the element of publicity are the following: possession is a modus of acquiring property rights over movable objects; possession creates presumption about an existence of property rights over a thing; possession creates possibility of acquiring property rights from a person that does not hold any property rights to a thing; person having corporal possession over a thing is liable for damages arising out of the thing that he holds in his possession. Legal effects of possession associated with the element of continuity are the following: protection of possession from dispossession or infringement of possession; more favorable possession of the holder of a thing in proceedings initiated by Publiciana in rem action; position of the holder at the time of recovery of the thing in proceedings for actions initiated for recovery of possession; it is possible for possession that had certain qualities and that lasted for a period of time set by the law, through adverse possession, to transfigure into a property right. The results, shortcomings of the legislative framework and suggestions de lege ferenda, are summarized in the conclusion of the doctoral thesis.

Resumen: La desestimacion por el Juzgado del Distrito Central de California de la demanda formulada por Claude Cassirer contra la Fundacion Thyssen y el Reino de Espana sobre la restitucion de un cuadro del pintor impresionista Camille Pissarro, ilicitamente expropiado de sus propietarios judios en el contexto del Holocausto, pone fin, por el momento, a un asunto de gran complejidad y dotado de importantes implicaciones historicas, culturales, politicas y juridicas, finalmente resuelto mediante la aplicacion de las normas que regulan la usucapion extraordinaria de bienes muebles en el Codigo Civil espanol. El analisis del caso revela la variedad de cuestiones juridicas que han debido afrontarse con caracter previo, asi como la existencia de problemas de fondo que quedan por resolver. Palabras clave: bienes culturales, usucapion extraordinaria, prescripcion, inmunidad soberana. Abstract: The dismissal by the District Court of the Central District of California of the claim filed by Claude Cassirer against the Foundation Thyssen and the Kingdom of Spain for the restitution of a painting by the impressionist artist Camille Pissarro, illegally expropriated from its Jewish owners in the context of the Holocaust, brings to an end, at least for the moment, an affair of great complexity and with important historical, cultural, political and legal implications, which is finally resolved through the application of the rules of the Spanish Civil Code regarding the acquisition of movable assets by adverse possession in the absence of good faith. The analysis of the case shows the variety of legal issues that had to be previously dealt with, but also the existence of essential problems that have not been resolved.. Keywords: cultural assets, acquisition through extraordinary adverse possession, prescription, sovereign immunity. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2016.3266

Con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley N.º 29618, ya no se permitirá adquirir los bienes inmuebles de dominio privado del Estado mediante la figura jurídica de prescripción adquisitiva de dominio, en razón que la ley presume que el Estado está en posesión de todos los inmuebles de dominio privado.De esta forma constatamos que el Estado elude su responsabilidad de solucionar y de regularizar la situación del ciudadano peruano que no cuenta con recursos económicos para obtener una vivienda propia donde pueda vivir dignamente con su familia, contrariando de esta forma lo dispuesto en el artículo 2, inciso 16, de la Constitución Política del Estado que dispone: “toda persona tiene derecho a la propiedad y a la herencia”, así como el artículo 59 que dispone la libertad de trabajo, empresa, comercio e industria, mediante este artículo el Estado brinda oportunidades de superación a los sectores que sufren cualquier desigualdad. Bien sabemos que sin la propiedad el hombre no podría cumplir estas actividades.Para ello hemos consultado los antecedentes jurídicos sobre el tema, las obras de connotados pensadores teóricos, la legislación comparada y la jurisprudencia nacional., With the entry into force of the N.º 29618 Act will no longer be allowed to acquire real estate of private State by the legal concept of adverse possession, because the act presumes that the State is in possession of all proprietary properties.Thus we find that the state shirks its responsibility to resolve and regularize the situation of the Peruvian citizen who does not have economic resources for their own home where they can live in dignity with his family, contradicting thus the provisions of article 2, paragraph 16, of the State Constitution which provides: “everyone has the right to property and inheritance”, and article 59 that provides for freedom of work, enterprise, trade and industry, through this article, the State provides opportunities for advancement to the sectors suffering from inequality. We know that without ownership man could not fulfill these activities.So we have consulted the legal background on the subject, theoretical works of renowned thinkers, comparative law and national jurisprudence.

This paper examines the impact of land title systems on property values. The predominant system in the U.S. and a few other countries, the recording system, awards title to claimants over current possessors, whereas the predominant system throughout most of the world, the registration system, awards title to the current possessor. The theory illustrates that the title system effect on asset value depends on property-specific factors like the risk of a claim and title system characteristics like transactions costs. A natural experiment in Cook County, Illinois, where both systems existed side-by-side from 1897 through 1996, allows a test of the theory. The evidence for commercial and industrial properties reveals that parcels tend to self-select into the two systems as expected with registration enhancing value once the self-selection effects are removed.