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Evolutionary pressures suggest that choices should be optimized to maximize rewards, by appropriately trading speed for accuracy. This speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) is commonly explained by variation in just the baseline-to-boundary distance, i.e., the excursion, of accumulation-to-bound models of perceptual decision-making. However, neural evidence is not consistent with this explanation. A compelling account of speeded choice should explain both overt behavior and the full range of associated brain signatures. Here, we reconcile seemingly contradictory behavioral and neural findings. In two variants of the same experiment, we triangulated upon the neural underpinnings of the SAT in the human brain using both EEG and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). We found that distinct neural signals, namely the event-related potential (ERP) centroparietal positivity (CPP) and a smoothed motor-evoked potential (MEP) signal, which have both previously been shown to relate to decision-related accumulation, revealed qualitatively similar average neurodynamic profiles with only subtle differences between SAT conditions. These signals were then modelled from behavior by either incorporating traditional boundary variation or utilizing a forced excursion. These model variants are mathematically equivalent, in terms of their behavioral predictions, hence providing identical fits to correct and erroneous reaction time distributions. However, the forced-excursion version instantiates SAT via a more global change in parameters and implied neural activity, a process conceptually akin to, but mathematically distinct from, urgency. This variant better captured both ERP and MEP neural profiles, suggesting that the SAT may be implemented via neural gain modulation, and reconciling standard modelling approaches with human neural data.

Optimal decision-making requires balancing fast but error-prone and more accurate but slower decisions through adjustments of decision thresholds. Here, we demonstrate two distinct correlates of such speed-accuracy adjustments by recording subthalamic nucleus (STN) activity and electroencephalography in 11 Parkinson's disease patients during a perceptual decision-making task; STN low-frequency oscillatory (LFO) activity (2-8 Hz), coupled to activity at prefrontal electrode Fz, and STN beta activity (13-30 Hz) coupled to electrodes C3/C4 close to motor cortex. These two correlates differed not only in their cortical topography and spectral characteristics but also in the relative timing of recruitment and in their precise relationship with decision thresholds. Increases of STN LFO power preceding the response predicted increased thresholds only after accuracy instructions, while cue-induced reductions of STN beta power decreased thresholds irrespective of instructions. These findings indicate that distinct neural mechanisms determine whether a decision will be made in haste or with caution., Competing Interests: The authors declare that no competing interests exist.

Functional neuroimaging data indicate the dorsal striatum is engaged when people are required to vary the cautiousness of their decisions, by emphasizing the speed or accuracy of responding in laboratory-based decision tasks. However, the functional contribution of the striatum to decision making is unknown. In the current study we tested patients with focal ischemic lesions of the dorsal striatum and matched non-lesion control participants on a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) task. Analysis using a computational model of response selection in a competitive and time-pressured context indicated that the decisions of patients with striatal lesions were less cautious than those of matched controls. This deficit was most prominent when the accuracy of decisions was emphasized. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the striatum plays an important role in strategically setting response caution, an essential function for flexible behavior., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

While all humans are capable of non-verbally representing numerical quantity using so-called the approximate number system (ANS), there exist considerable individual differences in its acuity. For example, in a non-symbolic number comparison task, some people find it easy to discriminate brief presentations of 14 dots from 16 dots while others do not. Quantifying individual ANS acuity from such a task has become an essential practice in the field, as individual differences in such a primitive number sense is thought to provide insights into individual differences in learned symbolic math abilities. However, the dominant method of characterizing ANS acuity-computing the Weber fraction (w)-only utilizes the accuracy data while ignoring response times (RT). Here, we offer a novel approach of quantifying ANS acuity by using the diffusion model, which accounts both accuracy and RT distributions. Specifically, the drift rate in the diffusion model, which indexes the quality of the stimulus information, is used to capture the precision of the internal quantity representation. Analysis of behavioral data shows that w is contaminated by speed-accuracy tradeoff, making it problematic as a measure of ANS acuity, while drift rate provides a measure more independent from speed-accuracy criterion settings. Furthermore, drift rate is a better predictor of symbolic math ability than w, suggesting a practical utility of the measure. These findings demonstrate critical limitations of the use of w and suggest clear advantages of using drift rate as a measure of primitive numerical competence.

A hallmark of flexible behavior is the brain's ability to dynamically adjust speed and accuracy in decision-making. Recent studies suggested that such adjustments modulate not only the decision threshold, but also the rate of evidence accumulation. However, the underlying neuronal-level mechanism of the rate change remains unclear. In this work, using a spiking neural network model of perceptual decision, we demonstrate that speed and accuracy of a decision process can be effectively adjusted by manipulating a top-down control signal with balanced excitation and inhibition [balanced synaptic input (BSI)]. Our model predicts that emphasizing accuracy over speed leads to reduced rate of ramping activity and reduced baseline activity of decision neurons, which have been observed recently at the level of single neurons recorded from behaving monkeys in speed-accuracy tradeoff tasks. Moreover, we found that an increased inhibitory component of BSI skews the decision time distribution and produces a pronounced exponential tail, which is commonly observed in human studies. Our findings suggest that BSI can serve as a top-down control mechanism to rapidly and parametrically trade between speed and accuracy, and such a cognitive control signal presents both when the subjects emphasize accuracy or speed in perceptual decisions., (Copyright © 2015 the American Physiological Society.)

Auditory perception depends on the temporal structure of incoming acoustic stimuli. Here, we examined whether a temporal manipulation that affects the perceptual grouping also affects the time dependence of decisions regarding those stimuli. We designed a novel discrimination task that required human listeners to decide whether a sequence of tone bursts was increasing or decreasing in frequency. We manipulated temporal perceptual-grouping cues by changing the time interval between the tone bursts, which led to listeners hearing the sequences as a single sound for short intervals or discrete sounds for longer intervals. Despite these strong perceptual differences, this manipulation did not affect the efficiency of how auditory information was integrated over time to form a decision. Instead, the grouping manipulation affected subjects' speed-accuracy trade-offs. These results indicate that the temporal dynamics of evidence accumulation for auditory perceptual decisions can be invariant to manipulations that affect the perceptual grouping of the evidence.

Two phenomena are commonly observed in decision-making. First, there is a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) such that decisions are slower and more accurate when instructions emphasize accuracy over speed, and vice versa. Second, decision performance improves with practice, as a task is learnt. The SAT and learning effects have been explained under a well-established evidence-accumulation framework for decision-making, which suggests that evidence supporting each choice is accumulated over time, and a decision is committed to when the accumulated evidence reaches a decision boundary. This framework suggests that changing the decision boundary creates the tradeoff between decision speed and accuracy, while increasing the rate of accumulation leads to more accurate and faster decisions after learning. However, recent studies challenged the view that SAT and learning are associated with changes in distinct, single decision parameters. Further, the influence of speed-accuracy instructions over the course of learning remains largely unknown. Here, we used a hierarchical drift-diffusion model to examine the SAT during learning of a coherent motion discrimination task across multiple training sessions, and a transfer test session. The influence of speed-accuracy instructions was robust over training and generalized across untrained stimulus features. Emphasizing decision accuracy rather than speed was associated with increased boundary separation, drift rate and non-decision time at the beginning of training. However, after training, an emphasis on decision accuracy was only associated with increased boundary separation. In addition, faster and more accurate decisions after learning were due to a gradual decrease in boundary separation and an increase in drift rate. The results suggest that speed-accuracy instructions and learning differentially shape decision-making processes at different time scales.

The ability to optimize decisions and adapt them to changing environments is a crucial brain function that increase survivability. Although much has been learned about the neuronal activity in various brain regions that are associated with decision making, and about how the nervous systems may learn to achieve optimization, the underlying neuronal mechanisms of how the nervous systems optimize decision strategies with preference given to speed or accuracy, and how the systems adapt to changes in the environment, remain unclear. Based on extensive empirical observations, we addressed the question by extending a previously described cortico-basal ganglia circuit model of perceptual decisions with the inclusion of a dynamic dopamine (DA) system that modulates spike-timing dependent plasticity (STDP). We found that, once an optimal model setting that maximized the reward rate was selected, the same setting automatically optimized decisions across different task environments through dynamic balancing between the facilitating and depressing components of the DA dynamics. Interestingly, other model parameters were also optimal if we considered the reward rate that was weighted by the subject's preferences for speed or accuracy. Specifically, the circuit model favored speed if we increased the phasic DA response to the reward prediction error, whereas the model favored accuracy if we reduced the tonic DA activity or the phasic DA responses to the estimated reward probability. The proposed model provides insight into the roles of different components of DA responses in decision adaptation and optimization in a changing environment.

This paper reports the results of a model-based analysis of movements gathered in a 4×4 experimental design of speed/accuracy tradeoffs with variable target distances and width. Our study was performed on a large (120 participants) and varied sample (both genders, wide age range, various health conditions). The delta-lognormal equation was used for data modeling to investigate the interaction between the output of the agonist and the antagonist neuromuscular systems. Empirical observations show that the subjects must correlate more tightly the impulse commands sent to both neuromuscular systems in order to achieve good performances as the difficulty of the task increases whereas the correlation in the timing of the neuromuscular action co-varies with the size of the geometrical properties of the task. These new phenomena are discussed under the paradigm provided by the Kinematic Theory and new research hypotheses are proposed for further investigation of the speed/accuracy tradeoffs., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

The influence of monetary incentives on performance has been widely investigated among various disciplines. While the results reveal positive incentive effects only under specific conditions, the exact nature, and the contribution of mediating factors are largely unexplored. The present study examined influences of payoff schemes as one of these factors. In particular, we manipulated penalties for errors and slow responses in a speeded categorization task. The data show improved performance for monetary over symbolic incentives when (a) penalties are higher for slow responses than for errors, and (b) neither slow responses nor errors are punished. Conversely, payoff schemes with stronger punishment for errors than for slow responses resulted in worse performance under monetary incentives. The findings suggest that an emphasis of speed is favorable for positive influences of monetary incentives, whereas an emphasis of accuracy under time pressure has the opposite effect.

An important aspect of cognitive flexibility is inhibitory control, the ability to dynamically modify or cancel planned actions in response to changes in the sensory environment or task demands. We formulate a probabilistic, rational decision-making framework for inhibitory control in the stop signal paradigm. Our model posits that subjects maintain a Bayes-optimal, continually updated representation of sensory inputs, and repeatedly assess the relative value of stopping and going on a fine temporal scale, in order to make an optimal decision on when and whether to go on each trial. We further posit that they implement this continual evaluation with respect to a global objective function capturing the various reward and penalties associated with different behavioral outcomes, such as speed and accuracy, or the relative costs of stop errors and go errors. We demonstrate that our rational decision-making model naturally gives rise to basic behavioral characteristics consistently observed for this paradigm, as well as more subtle effects due to contextual factors such as reward contingencies or motivational factors. Furthermore, we show that the classical race model can be seen as a computationally simpler, perhaps neurally plausible, approximation to optimal decision-making. This conceptual link allows us to predict how the parameters of the race model, such as the stopping latency, should change with task parameters and individual experiences/ability.