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AbstractThis paper explores the role of opposition parties within the context of global democratic erosion, with a focus on Turkey. It investigates the multifaceted role of opposition actors in the process of autocratisation, challenging conventional portrayals of them as mere victims or resilient forces. Drawing on a comprehensive analysis of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), spanning the critical period of 2002–2022 under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), this research uncovers how opposition strategies have evolved in response to changing political dynamics. The paper introduces two new concepts, rigid opposition and flexible opposition, to elucidate the adaptive nature of opposition strategies in the face of autocratisation. It underscores the transition of the CHP from a rigid stance, characterised by identity-based polarisation, to a more flexible approach, involving strategic alliances and inclusive discourse. This transformation is not a binary success–failure paradigm but rather a complex adaptation with inherent risks. While flexibility is crucial to limit autocratisation, its potential pitfalls carry the risks of contributing to autocratisation and the dilution of party identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As usually presented, octagons of opposition are rather complex objects and can be difficult to assimilate at a glance. We show how, under suitable conditions that are satisfied by most historical examples, different display conventions can simplify the diagrams, making them easier for readers to grasp without the loss of information. Moreover, those conditions help reveal the conceptual structure behind the visual display. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research on party leader questioning in legislatures usually focuses on single case studies, less-than-ideal behaviours across leaders, and often post-election periods. Our article compares hostility and positivity in behaviours across three parliaments and, because of the COVID-19 crisis, across different time periods and modes of operation (live, hybrid, and online) while controlling for the same leaders. Using content analysis at the sentence level (N = 3554), our data contrast parliamentary leader hostility and positivity levels in the UK, Scottish, and Welsh Parliaments across three time periods: pre-COVID-19, initial, and lockdown COVID-19. Findings for positivity are mixed, but for hostility, we find that while the initial shock of the COVID-19 crisis suppressed hostility, Westminster has higher ratios of hostility across all three time periods, and that format of operation has little effect on behaviour. Findings suggest less hostility in Scotland and Wales than in Westminster adding possible weight to 'new politics' arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intellectual dissent in the USSR has been an important feature of the political scene there since the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, in February 1966, and the appearance of the Chronicle of Current Events in April 1968. Inevitably it has generated a wide ranging debate in the West, not only about its character and long term perspectives, but also about those forces of the society which produced it. Indeed, the manifestation of intellectual discontent appeared to some as sui generis; a sudden, unannounced, but welcome relief. The dissidents seemed like a godsend. Academic empiricists, starved of reliable data; at last had some hard facts to work on. Professional anti-communists, possibly worried about the Soviet Union's apparent and disconcerting stability, could point a knowing finger at what they considered to be a significant 'anti-Soviet' tendency. Marxists, critical of the USSR, but still optimistic about its socialist potential thought that they could detect a force ready and willing to take up the fight for Leninism and the reconstitution of a genuine communism. The dissidents were indeed all things to all people in 1968. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the publication of 'Green Fuse' in The Irish Press in 1974, Éilís Ní Dhuibhne has built up an impressive oeuvre of short fiction. The recent Selected Stories, published by Blackstaff Press in 2023, pays tribute to that achievement. As the collection follows the trajectory of Ní Dhuibhne's career, with two stories from each of her six collections, it allows one to trace both recurring elements and patterns of development in her work. Ní Dhuibhne's sustained exploration of women's lives, dreams and desires, for instance, can be seen to take distinct emphases in each of the collections. This essay argues that binary oppositions are used as structuring models in Ní Dhuibhne's first four collections – in juxtaposed plotlines, stories and endings as well as contrasting characters, places and times – but, in her later collections, these oppositions move to the more subjective realm of inner reflection and imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, the issue of whether there can be opposition to the founding imams of the Hanafi sect in terms of procedure will be discussed. The general acceptance in the Hanafi sect on the subject is that there is no opposition to the founding imams in terms of procedure. It is possible to say that this perception in the sect continued until the Industrial Revolution. However, it is later observed that the issue evolved to a different point. Especially in modern period studies, the existence, limits and quality of the real opposition to the founding imams have been questioned. When we look at the issue specifically for Ibn alHumam, a different picture emerges. As a Hanafi jurist who lived in Egyptian geography in the 9th century Hijri, he presents a different prototype of a scholar and makes ijtihad on procedural issues. The opinions in question differ from the texts that find stability in the sect and reflect the views of the founding imams. It should also be stated that these issues consist of opinions that change according to customs, traditions, time and place and do not constitute fatwas. In this respect, it is seen that Ibn al-Humam put forward different views on procedural issues in the sect than the established perception in the sect and tried to base them. On the other hand, this aspect of Ibn al-Humam is clear evidence that his ijtihad activities continue on particular issues without departing from the sectarian method. It is understood that when the scholars of the sect reached scientific competence, they made ijtihad even in the field of usul, let alone fiqh. It should be noted that these jurisprudences are not the preferences of a different sect, but rather the conclusions reached based on evidence. In addition, each of his different views, which differ from the stable approach in the Hanafi sect, is not ijtihad but can sometimes be a preference on the subject. Therefore, it is necessary to thoroughly examine whether such differences are jurisprudence or preference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bulletin of The L N Gumilyov Eurasian National University Political Science Regional Studies Oriental Studies Turkology Series is the property of L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Rezső Rudai is one of the important, albeit forgotten figures of Hungarian social science. The first part of the essay provides a brief introduction to the author's work between the two world wars, followed by an analysis of those essays of Rudai which give a historical explanation based on large datasets to why large governing parties remained in power for a long time. Rezső Rudai comes to the conclusion that between 1867 and 1935 there were always large governing parties because they were seen as the effective representatives of the public interest, as opposed to the opposition parties which represented sectional interests. In the final part of the essay I highlight the contemporary lessons that can be drawn from Rudai's work, especially in light of the fact that between 2010 and 2024 a large governing party once again dominates Hungarian politics. The conclusion of the essay is that while naturally we do not have to accept all aspects of Rudai's trail of thought, it is enough if we recognize one of his possible explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Publicando is the property of RPPH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Actual Problems of Jurisprudence / Habaršy. Zan̦ Seriâsy is the property of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Committees’ use of their right to initiate parliament decisions have notably evolved under Sweden’s unicameral parliament. Since 2011, initiatives have increasingly served as a political instrument tactically employed by opposition parties against the will of government parties. Since the fall of 2020, this trend has risen radically, indicating that this constitutional tool is gradually being used in conflict with its original purpose. Increase in conflict levels and fragmentation within political landscape (from five to eight parliamentary parties) correspond with this escalated utilisation of committees’ initiative powers. These developments raise doubts about political parties’ ability to adhere to the lawmaker’s presuppositions that committee initiatives should be used with caution and in the pursuit of unity. Our data lends some support to earlier research’s view of committee initiatives as potential expressions of inter-party conflict, but it also highlights the need for further qualitative studies into parties’ motives for employing this parliamentary instrument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractAutomobility centred on private car use generates various externalities – or ‘antagonisms’ – that threaten its sustainability as a mobility regime. Through expanding the practice and spaces of driving, mass immobility can result. With increased car use, comes increased energy use, generating an ecological antagonism for this regime. Finally, greater car use has resulted in mass road traffic injuries and fatalities, which presents another threat to the growth and maintenance of this unique form of automobility. While these antagonisms present a risk, they have also been leveraged as a means to establish and secure the dominance of automobility. As part of a wider study exploring discourses of opposition to redistributive active travel measures in Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown, Ireland, this paper illustrates how active travel measures that present a challenge to automobility are depicted as disruptive, dangerous and dirty. These measures, precisely designed to mitigate the antagonisms of mass car use, are construed instead as primary causes of these systemic externalities. This study thereby reveals how active travel spaces themselves – and spatial regulations that favour active travellers – can be unfavourably represented as a means of politically sustaining automobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Committees of inquiry, in related literature, are often called as 'sharpest sword' of the opposition. However, this sharpness is highly dependent on how much rights the opposition is effectively provided by the fine details of the procedural rules, and whether these rights are justiciable. According to the German model, the inquiry must be launched if a quarter of the MPs require it, and the opposition enjoys minority rights also during the inquiry. Many countries implemented the first, but not the second element in their parliamentary procedures (Hungary, Kosovo, Albania, Lithuania), which led to ineffective inquiries. The only positive example for a successful transplant of the mandatory minority initiative for launching an inquiry is the neighbouring country, Austria. In most of the other countries, the majority is more effective in conducting inquiries, and, lacking judicial remedies, the opposition cannot put its right to inquiry in practice effectively. It seems that the mandatory minority initiative hardly works properly outside its original home country, Germany, and the only successful transplant country, Austria. Another evidence that legal transplants cannot survive if the legal environment and culture is not fertile and developed enough. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A vital political opposition is one of the cornerstones of democracy, yet we know surprisingly little about the conditions that shape it. In this paper, we offer a comprehensive assessment of the drivers of parliamentary opposition in European Union (EU) politics in five countries: Denmark; Germany; Ireland; Sweden; and the United Kingdom. Based on an extensive hand-coded data set of 7,520 statements made by members of parliament (MPs) during both plenary sessions and deliberations during European Affairs Committee (EAC) meetings, we examine how institutions and party characteristics shape two types of oppositional behaviour: the expression of critique and the presentation of alternatives. We find that both factors are important for understanding to what extent, and how, opposition is voiced in national parliaments. Oversight institutions' strength and a party's degree of Euroscepticism jointly function as significant determinants of the likelihood that MPs will express opposition in the form of critique. However, when it comes to the likelihood of offering alternatives, oversight institutions' strength fails to explain variations in the share of alternatives, while degree of Euroscepticism remains a significant predictor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Public Law / Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Is oppositional behaviour in legislatures gendered? Despite a growing literature on gender and legislative behaviour, there is a conspicuous absence of research on differences between female and male members of parliament (MPs) when it comes to one of the key aspects of parliamentary debates: the voicing of opposition. This article connects the literature on gender and legislative behaviour with opposition scholarship. We examine the role of gender for oppositional behaviour in four legislatures with a focus on debates concerning European Union affairs. Our results show that female MPs generally are equally likely to express opposition as their male colleagues. This result, however, is conditioned by government status. Whilst there is no significant difference between the proportion of opposition expressed by female and male MPs from opposition parties, we find that male MPs representing government parties express more than twice as much opposition as their female colleagues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background. The baptized Kalmyks settled in the Middle Volga region and in the Southern Urals contributed to the economic development and defense of Russia’s south-eastern borders. The negative side of the creation of separate Kalmyk settlements was the desire of some of the baptized Kalmyks to return to the Kalmyk Khanate. The purpose of the work is to consider the measures taken by the Russian authorities to prevent the escape of baptized Kalmyks to the Kalmyk Khanate, as well as practical steps aimed at their detention and return in 1737–1771. Materials and methods. The basis of the research source base was the materials of the Joint State Archive of Orenburg Region and the National Archive of the Republic of Kalmykia. The historical-genetic, structural-functional methods of scientific research, the method of critical analysis of historical sources are used. Results. The analyzed sources do not allow us to judge unambiguously the effectiveness of measures aimed at preventing the escape of baptized Kalmyks. The escapes continued until the migration of the Volga Kalmyks to China and the liquidation of the Kalmyk Khanate. At the same time, the total number of fugitives by the end of 1760 did not exceed one per-cent of the total number of baptized Kalmyks settled in the Orenburg province.

This article examines Spain’s COVID-19 pandemic recovery from the perspective of politicisation as a form of political activity. The main argument is that politicisation must be considered more broadly as a part of democratic politics, as distinct from the too narrow theoretical framework of European Union (EU) politicisation. The analysis builds on recent conceptual research into politicisation and asks: Has Spain’s pandemic recovery become politicised and, if so, in what way did this politicisation occur and to what extent have politicising strategies been used? In Spain, political parties have not openly engaged in conflict about the country’s membership of the EU, but they do have a clear tendency towards a deeply partisan and highly polarised approach to domestic politics, aggravated since the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis focuses on opposition strategies during the period from the beginning of March 2020 to the end of December 2023. The main conclusion of the analysis is that politicising strategies were used by the opposition parties in contexts that gave them opportunities to exploit the situation in a novel way. On those occasions, it is possible to identify four different dimensions of politicisation. This illustrates that by attempting to utilise novel ways of acting politically, politicisation effectively becomes an intervention in the current state of affairs for political purposes. This conclusion can provide a useful conceptual framework for future research into pandemic recovery in a comparative sense and also into the concept of politicisation within democratic politics in general.

This is an investigation into government coalition, opposition and party migrations in the state of Goiás, to identify patterns of opposition and support from state deputies to the governor and the influence on the governability factor. The period covered is from 2019 to 2023 (19th legislature), with the reading of the three previous legislatures to reap comparative gains. Opposition deputies who migrated to the government were identified, using longitudinal and descriptive analysis. At the conceptual and theoretical level, coalitions, governance and the executive-legislative relationship are maintained. It isidentified that the levels of parliamentary support for the Executive's proposals are very similar between opposition and government supporters. The study expands knowledge about the government-opposition dynamics in a subnational context and helps to understand the political process in Goiás in the last 20 years.

National security in the media sphere is becoming a multifaceted task related to the implementation of Russia’s cultural sovereignty in the context of digital transformation. Strategic planning for the development of the national media space involves domestic political and diplomatic decisions of a conceptual nature that can ensure the unity of the international information space while countering threats: (1) propaganda of violent extremism, (2) popularization of destructive ideology, (3) reduction of cultural capital level of the party in power and opposition. Operational plans for ensuring media security quite often follow the logic of situational response to threats posed by enemies and implement protective measures in relation to the media space at the national level. In methodological terms, the media security of the state is characterized by systemic practices of ensuring information security (in formal legal analysis), and analysis of threats to cognitive and noospheric security (in the natural science study of communication processes). The research methodology involves the use of the method of participant observation inherent in noxology to classify threats emanating from the mass media. Among the main objectives of the article: analysis of modern Russian political and legal documents aimed at ensuring media security and countering extremism, characterizing the Russian policy of securitization of social problems in the media sphere, delimiting legal political struggle from criminal (extremist and destructive) practices of political communication. The objectives of the study include the analysis of foreign experience in ensuring national media security in the context of digitalization and the growing threat of violent extremism. The logic of competition in the digital cultural space practically excludes the use of secrecy, censorship and forcing the audience to watch propaganda in the process of ensuring media security. Public relations in the media sphere involves the choice of media content by the audience of the global information space, which means that the protection of national spiritual and moral values is implemented in the liberal paradigm and demands open dialogue between the party in power and the opposition on topical issues of national security.