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Calculations of this sort are a familiar feature of the gun control literature. The numbers are meant to suggest the futility of regulating firearms commerce as a method of reducing gun-related crime, and also to demonstrate that the vast majority of firearms are put to wholesome (or at least legal) uses: stringent regulation Itthus" imposes costs on the many law-abiding gun owners in order to inhibit the violence-prone few. But such calculations are profoundly misleading. Bruce-Briggs is comparing a stock (140 million guns) with a flow (350,000 gun crimes in one year). This comparison is analogous to comparing the number of deaths due to heart disease in one year (0.6 million) with the size of the population (225 million) and concluding that there is a very small probability of dying from heart disease (on the order of one in 400). Some simple calculations, guided by an intertemporal model, give a more accurate picture. I limit my analysis to handguns, which are used in the vast majority of gun crimes, and begin by answering the following question: How many crimes will ultimately be committed utilizing one of the 1.8 million handguns sold new in 1977? Combining the homicide number (in Table 1) with the national victim survey results for rape, robbery, and assault yields a total of 565,000 handgun crimes. Thus, there was about one handgun crime committed for every three handguns sold in

A major issue in the gun control policy debate concerns the feasibility of reducing the harmful consequences of gun availability without serious infringement on legitimate uses. For example, most states have adopted much more stringent regulation for concealed weapons than for possession under other circumstances, because of legislators' belief that carrying concealed weapons contributes a great deal to the violent crime problem but very little to the average gun owners' utility. A second example of the balance between utility and harm are federal and state laws that prohibit young people and those with felony records from owning guns. These laws spring from the belief that such people constitute only a small fraction of the population but commit a disproportionately large fraction of the violent crimes.' Similarly, the campaign to ban the "Saturday Night Special" is based upon the belief2 that the small, cheap handguns which are frequently used in crime are of little value to noncriminals. Therefore, proponents contend, a ban on such guns would have considerable benefit with little cost. This article summarizes the policy debate regarding Saturday Night Specials, and evalu

Robbery is an intrinsically violent crime, and, in fact, is defined as theft accomplished by force or the threat of physical injury. In approximately 2,000 cases in the United States each year, robbery violence proves fatal to the victim.2 This is a relatively rare event given that there are more than one million robberies annually.3 Nevertheless, the number of robbery homicides is a major contributor to the public's fear of this crime. From time to time, public concern is enhanced by reports that robbers are becoming more violent. One example from the popular press reports: Another frightening difference in the crime picture is that life now seems pitifully cheap. Law-enforcement officials think they have witnessed a shift toward gratuitous slaughter. "It used to be 'Your money or your life,' " says assistant Bronx district attorney William Flack.

Insurance and protection against various kinds of losses are both valuable activities provided to a large and perhaps increasing extent by the public sector.