251. Obstacle 'theory': do we need it?
- Author
-
Sterling, John E. and Sterling, John E.
- Abstract
This monograph discusses the usefulness of a theory concerning only a small sector of ground combat. Using obstacles as a point of discussion, it seeks to determine how far down the benefits of theory apply. The paper begins by examining the benefits of theory in analyzing the complex phenomenon of war. These benefits include help in (1) understanding history, (2) identifying issues that might otherwise go overlooked, and (3) ensuring consistency in doctrine. The monograph then examines one small segment of ground combat--the use of obstacles--to see if these same benefits apply to an extent that justifies the effort in developing and maintaining a theory on such a constrained subject. Alternatively, the doctrine writer might develop satisfactory doctrine using only a “lessons learned” approach. In exploring the need for theory on the use of obstacles, this monograph looks for variation in the history of the use of obstacles since World War I. It examines the intentional construction of bypasses in obstacles as an overlooked issue in our obstacle doctrine. Finally, the paper examines Field Manual 5-100, Engineer Combat Operations for inconsistencies. This monograph concludes that the history of obstacles exhibits considerable variation. Furthermore, our doctrine has long overlooked at least one significant issue, and our doctrine is inconsistent. For these reasons, this monograph concludes that even a narrow portion of ground combat such as obstacles would benefit from theory. The doctrine writer who relies solely on the experiences of combat veterans, or other “lessons learned,” risks developing incomplete or inconsistent doctrine. Finally, this paper argues that if theory would be useful in the case of obstacles, it would probably also apply in many other small portions of ground combat; and that the TRADOC schools are the logical places for the development of such theories.