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Исследуется процесс морального познания в рамках культурного и языкового контекста. При изучении морального познания сложность состоит в том, что данный процесс имеет свои особенности, которые варьируются в зависимости от культуры и языка, которыми был окружен человек в процессе взросления. На основе анализа работ С. Выготского и Дж. Лакоффа в статье делается вывод, что усвоение культурных и языковых норм влияет на процесс морального познания человека и на его моральную аргументацию. Следовательно, о правильности и рациональности суждений человека можно судить только в контексте определенной культуры и языка. The process of moral cognition within the cultural and linguistic context is being explored. When studying moral cognition, the difficulty lies in the fact that this process has its own peculiarities, which vary depending on the culture and language that surrounded the person in the process of growing up. Based on the analysis of the works of S. Vygotsky and J. Lakoff concludes that the assimilation of cultural and linguistic norms influences the process of moral cognition of a person and his moral reasoning. Therefore, the correctness and rationality of human judgment can be judged only in the context of a certain culture and language.

Moral cognition refers to the human capacity to experience and respond to situations of moral significance. Recently, philosophers and cognitive scientists have turned to reinforcement learning, a branch of machine learning, to develop formal, mathematical models of normative cognition. One prominent approach, proposed by Cushman (Curr Opin Behav Sci 3:58–62, 2015), suggests that moral cognition is underwritten by a habitual (‘model-free’) system, in conjunction with socially-learned moral rules. I argue that moral cognition instead depends on three or more decision-making systems, with interactions between the systems producing its characteristic sociological, psychological, and phenomenological features. Adopting such an approach allows us to not only better explain what is going on in everyday, ‘successful’ instances of moral judgment and action, but also to more reliably predict, and perhaps thereby counter, routine breakdowns in moral behavior.

Millions of children in the United States experience parental incarceration, yet it is unclear how this experience might shape social cognition. We asked children of incarcerated parents (N = 24) and children whose parents were not incarcerated (N = 58) to describe their parents. Both groups of children also rated the extent to which they agree that they feel positive and, separately, negative emotions when thinking about their parent and best friend. This approach allowed us to test between two alternative hypotheses. On the one hand, cultural narratives in the United States convey negative messages about incarcerated people, and these messages could prompt children to report negativity when thinking about their incarcerated parents. On the other hand, children’s positivity toward close others is robust. Thus, when thinking about their incarcerated parents, children may report a great deal of positivity. Consistent with the latter possibility, children were more likely to describe their incarcerated parents using positive rather than negative terms. Moreover, children of incarcerated parents were more likely to agree that thinking about close others made them feel positive emotions than they were to agree that thinking about close others made them feel negative emotions. A similar pattern of results emerged among children whose parents were not incarcerated. These findings demonstrate the robustness of children’s positivity and can inform debates regarding contact between incarcerated parents and their children.

Dual-process theories of morality are approaches to moral cognition that stress the varying significance of emotion and deliberation in shaping judgments of action. Sociological research that builds on these ideas considers how cross-cultural variation alters judgments, with important consequences for what is and is not considered moral behavior. Yet lacking from these approaches is the notion that, depending on the situation and relationship, the same behavior by the same person can be considered more or less moral. The author reviews recent trends in sociological theorizing about morality and calls attention to the neglect of situational variations and social perceptions as mediating influences on judgment. She then analyzes the moral machine experiment to demonstrate how situations and relationships inform moral cognition. Finally, the author suggests that we can extend contemporary trends in the sociology of morality by connecting culture in thinking about action to culture in thinking about people.

En este artículo presento tres concepciones de la evolución de la inteligencia como cognición social y sus precursores en otros primates no humanos. Cada uno de estos modelos se evaluará sobre la base de dos cuestiones transversales, a saber: a) ¿Qué factores afectan al desarrollo de la cognición social? y b) ¿Qué mecanismos regulan o controlan la cognición social? Igualmente, describiré la comunicación bidireccional entre la cognición social y la cognición moral defendiendo un modelo al que llamo “moralidad como inteligencia social”, que sugiere que para tener un “sentido moral” pleno y maduro es necesario saber qué piensa el otro (cognición social) para así poder hacer el mayor bien posible y no causar daño y, viceversa, que para tener una “competencia social” plena y madura es necesario tener en cuenta información normativa (moral) para así poder atribuir estados mentales. In this article, I present three conceptions of the evolution of intelligence understood as social cognition and its precursors in other non-human primates. Each of these models will be evaluated on the basis of two cross-cutting issues, namely: a) What factors affect the development of social cognition? and b) What mechanisms regulate or control social cognition? Likewise, I will describe the bidirectional communication between social cognition and moral cognition by defending a model I call “morality as social intelligence” which suggests that in order to have a full and mature “moral sense” it is necessary to know what other people think (social cognition) in order to be able to do as much good as possible and not cause harm, and vice versa, to have a full and mature “social competence” it is necessary to take into account normative information (morality) in order to be able to attribute mental states. Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO). España. FFI2014- 53926-R FFI2015-67569-C2-2-P FFI2016-79000-P European Commission (EC) INBOTS 780073 EXTEND 779982

There is evidence that children with neurodevelopmental disorders may exhibit atypical responses to stress and alterations in concentrations and diurnal secretion of stress hormones. We assessed diurnal profiles and stress responses of salivary cortisol and alpha-amylase (sAA) in children with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and specific learning disorder (SLD) compared to typically developing children (TD). A total of 157 children of both sexes, aged between 6 and 12 years old, took part in the study distributed into four groups: ADHD (N = 34), ASD (N = 56), SLD (N = 43) and TD (N = 24). Salivary samples were collected at three time points during a day, as well as before and 5 min after an academic performance test and a moral cognition task. ADHD children had lower evening and diurnal sAA levels, adjusted for age. Also, ASD children showed lower diurnal sAA secretion, adjusted for age. The mean percentage change for salivary cortisol and sAA after both tests did not differ between the groups. In conclusion, we demonstrated alterations in diurnal autonomic functioning in children with ADHD and ASD, while hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis functioning did not differ between the clinical and the comparison groups.

There is a large scientific interest in human moral judgments. However, little is known about the developmental origins and the specific role of the primary caregivers in the early development of inter-individual differences in human morality. Here, we assess the moral intuitions of 3- to 6-year-old children and their mothers (N = 56), using child-friendly versions of five trolley dilemmas and two control scenarios. We found that children responded to moral dilemmas similar to their mothers, revealed by correlations between the responses of mothers and their children in all five moral dilemmas and a highly similar overall response pattern between mother and child across all judgments. This was revealed by a high agreement in the response pattern of children and their mothers. Furthermore, children’s overall response tendencies were similar to the response tendencies of adults. Thus, similar moral principles (e.g., the Doctrine of the Double Effect) which have been identified in adults, and describes as a universal moral grammar, may guide the moral intuitions in early childhood already. Taken together, the present findings provide the first evidence that children’s moral intuitions are closely associated with the moral intuitions of their mother.

Recent advances in decision neuroscience hold promise to address questions that have engaged organizational ethics scholars for decades. Following from this promise, two research questions emerge: (1) What are the most productive ways to enhance organizational ethics through scholarly communication and collaborative work among philosophers, social scientists, and neuroscientists? (2) What contributions have already been made, and how can we build on those contributions? Specifically, how can scholars in the field of organizational ethics, both normative and empirical scholars, shape future neuroscience research on topics germane to their research interests? Decision neuroscience confirms that people do not make ethical decisions in a strictly rational manner but that emotion and intuition play important roles. The challenge is to link neuroscience findings such as these to questions specific to empirical organizational ethics research, as well as to higher-order normative questions. Research on moral cognition is emphasized, including conceptualizations of moral cognition, brain structure and function, and dual process theory and the role of emotion. Future research suggestions are included.

The debate between monists and pluralists in moral psychology has been framed as an argument over the number of “irreducible basic elements” that can be used to describe the extent of the moral domain: Do all moral values ultimately reduce to one principle (i.e., monism), or are there multiple irreducibly distinct moral values (i.e., pluralism)? I critique the premise of this debate, arguing that the breadth of the moral domain cannot be adequately represented, understood, or explained in terms of moral values. Instead, an adequate account of moral psychology must explain moral phenomena in terms of more basic elements: ontological frames.

May cites a body of evidence suggesting that participants take consequences, personal harm, and other factors into consideration when making moral judgments. This evidence is used to support the conclusion that moral cognition relies on rule-based inference. This commentary defends an alternative interpretation of this evidence, namely, that it can be explained in terms of domain general valuation mechanisms.

Moral cognition, by its very nature, stems from intuitions about what is good and bad, and these intuitions influence moral assessments outside of conscious awareness. However, because humans evolved a shared set of moral intuitions, and are compelled to justify their moral assessments as good and rational (even erroneously) to others, moral virtue and moral progress are still possible.

Modern cognitve neuroscience is a field of research that focuses on studying the neural bases of uniquely human traits such as morality and the ability to make moral decisions. Recent research shows that a remarkably consistent set of neural networks are involved in moral cognition. Here, I review what we know about the main brain areas associated with morality. After the review of the core brain areas associated with morality I propose a theoretical model of the necessary requirements of moral behavior to be judged as properly moral with the introduction of notational formalism and an experimental protocol for further research. Finally, I discuss the applications of all of this in Law.

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Most business ethics scholars interested in understanding individual moral cognition or reasoning rely on the Defining Issues Test (DIT). They typically report that managers and business students exhibit a relatively high percentage of principled moral reasoning when resolving ethical dilemmas. This article applies neurocognitive processes and Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, and its more recent revision, as theoretical foundations to explore whether differences emerge when using a recognition of learning task, such as the DIT or similar instruments, versus a formulation of knowledge task, such as the Moral Judgment Interview or similar instruments, to assess individual moral reasoning. The data show that significantly different levels of moral reasoning are detected when using a recognition-based versus formulation-based moral reasoning instrument. As expected, the recognition-based approach (using a DIT-like instrument) reports an inflated, higher moral reasoning score for subjects compared with using a formulation-based instrument. Implications of these results for understanding an individual’s moral reasoning are discussed.

One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question assumes that reason and emotion are two fully independent cognitive faculties, whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for metaethics.

Why do people spend time in massively multiplayer online games? This article aims to complement games studies’ analytical toolkit with a material causal perspective on players’ time spent in Chinese World of Warcraft ( WoW). I argue that the WoW gameworld is atypically rich in stimuli that have a strong, or supernormal, capacity to activate the moral cognition reasoning systems identified by Haidt and Joseph’s “moral foundations theory.” Testimonial data gathered during long-term fieldwork in Wuhan, China, and data from a survey of 545 Chinese WoW players, wherein combat role (healer, tank) predicts frequency and type of in-game moral experience, are presented in support of this argument. Finally, the causal perspectives outlined in this article are styled in a steampunk aesthetic ( Hornbeck, 2014 ), which I use as “playful” aid to interdisciplinary discourse.

This study aims to contribute to the research on spatial metaphors for morality from the perspective of Chinese. It outlines the linguistic patterns in Chinese that manifest the putative underlying spatial subsystem of moral metaphors, which can be summarized by a central metaphor “MORALITY IS SPATIALITY.” In doing so, it focuses on 17 spatial words that instantiate in real-life discourses five pairs of moral–spatial metaphors in their positive and negative valence. The total of 10 metaphors under study forms a cluster as the spatial metaphor subsystem operating in conjunction and connection with other metaphor subsystems in our moral cognition. It is suggested that the 10 conceptual metaphors emerge from four image schemas: UP-DOWN, BALANCE, PATH, and OBJECT. A unified schematic configuration is proposed to lay out the spatial elements and relations represented by the four image schemas in a single diagram. Based on its linguistic analysis, the study also provides a list of prototypical target as...

Why are we willing to help others? Recent behavioral work on episodic processes (i.e. the ability to represent an event that is specific in time and place) suggests that imagining and remembering scenes of helping a person in need increases intentions to help. Here, we provide insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms that enhance prosocial intentions via episodic simulation and memory. In Experiment 1, we scanned participants using functional neuroimaging as they imagined and remembered helping episodes, and completed non-episodic control conditions accounting for exposure to the story of need and conceptual priming of helping. Analyses revealed that activity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, as well as the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) predicted the effect of conditions on the strength of prosocial intentions. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt activity in the RTPJ, and better isolate the contribution of MTL subsystem to prosocial intentions. The effect of conditions on willingness to help remained even when activity in the RTPJ was disrupted, suggesting that activity in the MTL subsystem may primarily support this prosocial effect. It seems our willingness to help may be guided, in part, by how easily we can construct imagined and remembered helping episodes.

Recent research has provided converging evidence, using multiple tasks, of sensitivity to fairness in the second year of life. In contrast, findings in the first year have been mixed, leaving it unclear whether young infants possess an expectation of fairness. The present research examined the possibility that young infants might expect windfall resources to be divided equally between similar recipients, but might demonstrate this expectation only under very simple conditions. In three violation-of-expectation experiments, 9-month-olds (N = 120) expected an experimenter to divide two cookies equally between two animated puppets (1:1), and they detected a violation when she divided them unfairly instead (2:0). The same positive result was obtained whether the experimenter gave the cookies one by one to the puppets (Experiments 1-2) or first separated them onto placemats and then gave each puppet a placemat (Experiment 3). However, a negative result was obtained when four (as opposed to two) cookies were allocated: Infants looked about equally whether they saw a fair (2:2) or an unfair (3:1) distribution (Experiment 3). A final experiment revealed that 4-month-olds (N = 40) also expected an experimenter to distribute two cookies equally between two animated puppets (Experiment 4). Together, these and various control results support two broad conclusions. First, sensitivity to fairness emerges very early in life, consistent with claims that an abstract expectation of fairness is part of the basic structure of human moral cognition. Second, this expectation can at first be observed only under simple conditions, and speculations are offered as to why this might be the case.

Whether moral cognition is underpinned by distinct mental systems that process different domains of moral information (moral pluralism) is an important question for moral cognition research. The reduced importance of intent (intentional versus accidental action) when judging purity (e.g. incest), when compared with harm (e.g. poisoning), moral violations is, arguably, some of the strongest experimental evidence for distinct moral systems or ‘foundations’. The experiment presented here is a replication attempt of these experimental findings. A pre-registered replication of Experiment 1B from the original article documenting this effect was conducted in a sample ofN= 400 participants. Findings from this successful replication are discussed in terms of theoretical and methodological implications for approaches to moral cognition.

Despite recent interest in both the critical and machine learning literature on "bias" in artificial intelligence (AI) systems, the nature of specific biases stemming from the interaction of machines, humans, and data remains ambiguous. Influenced by Gendler's work on human cognitive biases, we introduce the concept of alief-discordant belief, the tension between the intuitive moral dispositions of designers and the explicit representations generated by algorithms. Our discussion of alief-discordant belief diagnoses the ethical concerns that arise when designing AI systems atop human biases. We furthermore codify the relationship between data, algorithms, and engineers as components of this cognitive discordance, comprising a novel epistemic framework for ethics in AI.

Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multilevel structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work – for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra May's rationalist criticisms, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information, but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.

The murals in the Dunhuang Mogao Grottoes are valuable for their historical, artistic, and religious aspects. In education, they provide profound teaching materials for enhancing human moral development. Stories in the murals can be interpreted from a modern perspective and are suited for use in a contemporary educational context. In this chapter, two stories inscribed in the Dunhuang murals provide moral lessons in teaching ethics. Some discussion questions are raised for improving moral cognition in the classroom. The first part of this chapter introduces the murals with a discussion of their backgrounds and moral implications from historical and social perspectives. The second part focuses on the content and moral implications of the two most commonly cited Jataka Tales. The third part includes discussion questions and moral dilemma scenarios, formulated according to the two tales, that educators can use in class as materials for moral development. Finally, a conclusion is reached regarding the application of these murals in moral education.

I raise two worries about the Debunker's and Defeater Dilemmas, respectively, and I argue that moral cognition is inextricable from social cognition, which tends to rationalize deep social inequality. I thus opine that our moral-social capacities fare badly in profoundly unjust social contexts such as our own.

Despite extensive recent investigations of moral judgments, little is known about how negative judgments like blame might differ from positive judgments like praise. Drawing on theory from both social and moral cognition, the present studies identify and test potential asymmetries in the extremity and differentiatedness of blame as compared to praise. The amplified blame hypothesis predicts that people will assign greater blame for negative behaviors than praise for positive behaviors. The differentiated blame hypothesis predicts that, as compared to praise judgments, blame judgments will more finely differentiate among distinct mental states that precede action, such as thoughts, desires, and intentions. A series of studies—using varied stimulus sets and samples—together provide robust support for the differentiated blame hypothesis and somewhat weaker support for the amplified blame hypotheses. These results illustrate systematic asymmetries between blame and praise, generally revealing that blame is more extreme and differentiated than praise. Together, the findings reflect the social costs and social regulatory function of moral judgments, suggesting that blame and praise are not mirror images and that blame might be more complex.

This article offers a theoretical framework that can be used to derive viable engineering strategies for the design and development of robots that can nudge people towards moral improvement. The framework relies on research in developmental psychology and insights from Stoic ethics. Stoicism recommends contemplative practices that over time help one develop dispositions to behave in ways that improve the functioning of mechanisms that are constitutive of moral cognition. Robots can nudge individuals towards these practices and can therefore help develop the dispositions to, for example, extend concern to others, avoid parochialism, etc.

Objectives Recent literature proved that social cognition impairments may characterize the neuropsychological profile of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) patients. However, little is still known about moral cognition in MS. In this study, we evaluated non-social, social, and moral cognitive performances in 45 relapsing-remitting MS patients. Methods Patients underwent the Brief International Cognitive Assessment for Multiple Sclerosis battery, the Cognitive Estimation and Stroop tasks, the Ekman-60 Faces test, the Reading the Mind in the Eye and Story-based Empathy task. Additionally, a task of moral dilemmas including both "instrumental" and "incidental" conditions was administered to patients. Forty-five age-, gender- and education-matched healthy control subjects (HC) were enrolled for comparisons. Results The majority of patients (i.e., 77.6%) showed deficits at non-social tasks, particularly in the executive domains. A subset of MS sample (i.e., 24%) presented with emotion recognition and socio-affective processing impairments. Overall, MS patients showed comparable levels of moral judgment with respect to HC. The rate of yes/no response in resolution of moral dilemmas and scores of attribution of emotional valence were comparable between groups. Nevertheless, lower moral permissibility and emotional arousal, particularly for the instrumental dilemmas, characterized the MS profile. Significant correlations between the attribution of emotional valence to moral actions and mentalizing scores emerged. Conclusions Our findings expand current literature on MS supporting not only deficits in executive and socio-emotional domains but also low levels of permissibility of immoral actions and emotional detachment in the moral judgment process.

Joshua May responds to skepticism about moral knowledge via appeal to empirical work on moral foundations. I demonstrate that the moral foundations literature is not able to do the work May needs. It demonstrates shared moral cognition, not shared moral judgment, and therefore, May's attempt to defeat general skepticism fails.

Conventions play a fundamental, yet contested, role in social reasoning from childhood to adulthood. Conventions about how to eat, dress, speak, or play are often said to be alterable, contingent on authorities or consensus, specific to contexts, and-thereby-distinct from moral concerns. This view of conventional norms has faced two puzzles. Children and adults judge that (a) some conventions should not be adopted and (b) some violations of conventions would be wrong even if the conventions were removed. The puzzles derive, in part, from the notion of "pure" conventions: conventions detached from non-conventional concerns. This paper proposes and examines a novel solution to the two puzzles, termed the constraint view. According to the constraint view, children and adults deem conventions as alterable within constraints imposed by non-conventional concerns. The present research focused on constraints imposed by concerns with agents to whom the norms apply and concerns with others affected by the norms. Findings from four studies with preschoolers and adults supported the constraint view. Participants evaluated actions and norms based on concerns with effects on agents and others, deeming conventions to be alterable insofar as the altered norms did not negatively impact agents or others. The constraint view offers a new framework for research on how children and adults integrate conventional and non-conventional concerns when they evaluate norms and acts.

Praca jest poświęcona zagadnieniu intuicji moralnych oraz ich zdolności do uzasadniania naszych moralnych przekonań. Składa się z siedmiu rozdziałów. Rozdział pierwszy prezentuje krótki rys historyczny intuicjonizmu moralnego, z głównym akcentem położonym na intuicjonizm brytyjski XVII, XVIII, XIX i pierwszej połowy XX wieku. Zwieńczenie rozdziału stanowi prezentacja argumentów, które doprowadziły do osłabienia tego nurtu. Są to kolejno zarzut dziwaczności faktów moralnych, dziwaczności intuicji moralnej (jako władzy poznawczej), zarzut subiektywności intuicji, zarzut dogmatyzmu, arbitralności, zarzut z niezgody moralnej. Rozdziały II - V stanowią kolejno krytyczną prezentację współczesnych prób obrony intuicjonizmu (tzw. nowego intuicjonizmu) podejmowanych przez takich autorów jak Robert Audi, Michael Huemer, Timothy Chappell, Sabine Roeser, James Sias. Przedstawione w tych rozdziałach stanowiska w dużej mierze unikają wymienionych powyżej zarzutów, niemniej można wysuwać przeciwko nim nowe zarzuty (analizowane przy okazji prezentacji każdej z propozycji nowego intuicjonizmu). Rozdział VI stanowi próbę zintegrowania tych stanowisk w taki sposób, aby łączyć ich silne strony jednocześnie unikając i słabości. W świetle tego rozdziału obroniona została główna teza pracy, mianowicie, że moralne intuicje mają zdolność uzasadniania naszych moralnych przekonań i jako takie mogą stanowić wiarygodne źródło poznania moralnego. W duchu nowego intuicjonizmu autor przyjmuje omylność intuicji moralnych, stąd rozdział VII stanowi propozycję doskonalenia intuicyjnego poznania moralnego poprzez stosowanie metody refleksyjnej równowagi oraz doskonalenia cnót poznawczych.

Social deprivation, as faced by children in institutional rearing, involves socio-cognitive deficits that may persist into adolescence. In particular, two relevant domains which prove sensitive to pre-adult neurodevelopment are theory of mind (ToM) and moral judgment (a complex skill which partially depend upon ToM). However, no study has assessed moral evaluation in adolescents with a history of institutional care, let alone its relationship with ToM skills. The present study aims to bridge this gap, focusing on moral evaluation of harmful actions in institutionalized adolescents (IAs). Relative to adolescents raised with their biological families, IAs exhibited less willingness to exculpate protagonists for accidental harms, suggesting an under-reliance on information about a person’s (innocent) intentions. Moreover, such abnormalities in IAs were associated with ToM impairments. Taken together, our findings extend previous findings of delayed ToM under social deprivation, further showing that the development of moral cognition is also vulnerable to the impact of institutionalization. These results could pave the way for novel research on the role of institutional rearing in ToM and moral development during adolescence. Fil: Baez, Sandra. Universidad de los Andes; Colombia Fil: Herrera, Eduar. Universidad Icesi; Colombia Fil: García, Adolfo Martín. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Houssay. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva y Traslacional. Fundación Ineco Rosario Sede del Incyt | Instituto de Neurología Cognitiva. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva y Traslacional. Fundación Ineco Rosario Sede del Incyt | Fundación Favaloro. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva y Traslacional. Fundación Ineco Rosario Sede del Incyt; Argentina Fil: Huepe, David. Universidad Adolfo Ibañez; Chile Fil: Santamaría-García, Hernando. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana; Colombia. Hospital Universitario San Ignacio; Colombia Fil: Ibáñez Barassi, Agustín Mariano. Universidad Autónoma del Caribe; Colombia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Houssay. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva y Traslacional. Fundación Ineco Rosario Sede del Incyt | Instituto de Neurología Cognitiva. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva y Traslacional. Fundación Ineco Rosario Sede del Incyt | Fundación Favaloro. Instituto de Neurociencia Cognitiva y Traslacional. Fundación Ineco Rosario Sede del Incyt; Argentina. Universidad Adolfo Ibañez; Chile. Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders; Australia