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The longstanding uncertainty about how policymakers should grapple with social science demonstrating racism persists in the modern administrative state. This Essay examines the uses and misuses of social science and expertise in immigration policymaking. More specifically, it highlights three immigration policies that dismiss social scientific findings and expertise as part of presidential and agency decision-making: border control, crime control, and extreme vetting of refugees to prevent terrorism. The Essay claims that these rejections of expertise undermine both substantive and procedural protections for immigrants and undermine important functions of the administrative state as a curb on irrationality in policymaking. It concludes by suggesting administrative, political, and judicial mechanisms that would encourage policymakers to leverage expertise and curb irrationality in immigration policymaking.

This review of The New Criminal Justice Thinking (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, eds.) tracks the shifting and uncertain contours of “criminal justice” as an object of study and critique. Specifically, I trace two themes in the book: (1) the uncertain boundaries of the “criminal justice system” as a web of laws, actors, and institutions; and (2) the uncertain boundaries of “criminal justice thinking” as a universe of interdisciplinary scholarship, policy discourse, and public engagement. I argue that these two themes speak to critically important questions about the nature of criminal justice scholarship and reform efforts. Without a firm understanding of what constitutes the “criminal justice system,” it is difficult to agree on the proper targets of critique or to determine what legal, social, and political problems are properly the province of “criminal justice thinking.” And, deciding which voices to accept and privilege in these discussions in turn shapes the face of the reform movement and the types of proposals and critiques that are treated as legitimate.

While slave-owning students at Princeton rarely constituted a majority of students, they were often a large plurality of the students in the antebellum period. Because of Princeton’s historic role in educating southerners, it has sometimes been referred to as the most southern of the Ivy League schools. So many students from the United States South enrolled at Princeton during the first several decades of the college that one observer wrote that one might take Princeton for a ‘Southern college slipped from its geographical moorings.’ This article explores the extent to which and whether Princeton behaved like a southern institution in its speech and actions concerning slavery and emancipation.

It has become popular to identify a “consensus” on criminal justice reform, but how deep is that consensus, actually? This Article argues that the purported consensus is much more limited than it initially appears. Despite shared reformist vocabulary, the consensus rests on distinct critiques that identify different flaws and justify distinct policy solutions. The underlying disagreements transcend traditional left/right political divides and speak to deeper disputes about the state and the role of criminal law in society. The Article maps two prevailing, but fundamentally distinct, critiques of criminal law: (1) the quantitative approach (what I call the “over” frame); and (2) the qualitative approach (what I call the “mass” frame). The “over” frame grows from a belief that criminal law has an important and legitimate function, but that the law’s operations have exceeded that function. This critique assumes that there are optimal rates of incarceration and criminalization, but the current criminal system is suboptimal in that it has criminalized too much and incarcerated too many. In contrast, the “mass” frame focuses on criminal law as a sociocultural phenomenon. This reformist frame indicates that the issue is not a mere miscalculation; rather, reforms should address how the system marginalizes populations and exacerbates both power imbalances and distributional inequities. To show how these frames differ, this Article applies the “over” and the “mass” critique, in turn, to the maligned phenomena of mass incarceration and overcriminalization. The existing literature on mass incarceration and overcriminalization displays an elision between these two frames. Some scholars and reformers have adopted one frame exclusively, while others use the two interchangeably. No matter how much scholars and critics bemoan the troubles of mass incarceration and overcriminalization, it is hard to believe that they can achieve meaningful reform if they are talking about fundamentally different problems. While many scholars may adopt an “over” frame in an effort to attract a broader range of support or appeal to politicians, “over” policy proposals do not necessarily reach deeper “mass” concerns. Ultimately, this Article argues that a pragmatic turn to the “over” frame may have significant costs in legitimating deeper structural flaws and failing to address distributional issues of race, class, and power at the heart of the “mass” critique.

This Article diagnoses a phenomenon, “criminal employment law,” which exists at the nexus of employment law and the criminal justice system. Courts and legislatures discourage employers from hiring workers with criminal records and encourage employers to discipline workers for non-work-related criminal misconduct. In analyzing this phenomenon, my goals are threefold: (1) to examine how criminal employment law works; (2) to hypothesize why criminal employment law has proliferated; and (3) to assess what is wrong with criminal employment law. This Article examines the ways in which the laws that govern the workplace create incentives for employers not to hire individuals with criminal records and to discharge employees based on non-workplace criminal misconduct. In this way, private employers effectively operate as a branch of the criminal legal system. But private employers act without constitutional or significant structural checks. Therefore, I argue that the criminal system has altered the nature of employment, while employment law doctrines have altered the nature of criminal punishment. Employment law scholars should be concerned about the role of criminal records in restricting entry into the formal labor market. And criminal law scholars should be concerned about how employment restrictions extend criminal punishment, shifting punitive authority and decision-making power to unaccountable private employers.

McCleskey v. Kemp, the case that upheld the death penalty despite undeniable evidence of its racially disparate impact, is indelibly marked by Justice William Brennan’s phrase, “a fear of too much justice.” The popular interpretation of this phrase is that the Supreme Court harbored what I call a “disparity-claim fear,” dreading a future docket of racial discrimination claims and erecting an impossibly high bar for proving an equal protection violation. A related interpretation is that the majority had a “color-consciousness fear” of remedying discrimination through race-remedial policies. In contrast to these conventional views, I argue that the primary anxiety exhibited by the McCleskey majority was a “leniency fear” of death penalty abolition. Opinion author Justice Lewis Powell made clear his view that execution was the appropriate punishment for McCleskey’s crime and expressed worry that McCleskey’s victory would open the door to challenges of criminal sentences more generally. Understanding that the Court’s primary political sensitivity was to state penal authority, not racial hierarchy, complicates the progressive sentiment that McCleskey’s call-to-action is securing equality of punishment. Derrick Bell’s “interest convergence” theory predicts that even conservatives with an aversion to robust equal protection law will accept racial-disparity evidence when in the service of crime-control values. Indeed, Justice Powell may have been more sanguine about McCleskey’s discrimination claim had mandatory capital punishment been an option. Accordingly, I caution that, outside of the death penalty context, courts and lawmakers can address perceived punishment disparities through “level-up” remedies, such as mandatory minimum sentences or abolishing diversion (which is said to favor white defendants). There are numerous examples of convergence between antidiscrimination and prosecutorial interests, including mandatory sentencing guidelines, aggressive domestic violence policing and prosecution, and the movement to abolish Stand-Your-Ground laws.

On December 28, 2016, President Obama issued a proclamation designating the Bears Ears National Monument pursuant to his authority under the Antiquities Act of 1906, which allows the President to create monuments on federal public lands. Bears Ears, which is located in the heart of Utah’s dramatic red rock country, contains a surfeit of ancient Puebloan cliff-dwellings, petroglyphs, pictographs, and archeological artifacts. The area is also famous for its paleontological finds and its desert biodiversity. Like other national monuments, Bears Ears therefore readily meets the statutory objective of preserving “historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest.” Unlike every other monument since the passage of the Antiquities Act, however, Bears Ears was proposed by a coalition of American Indian Tribes. The Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition, which submitted the proposal to protect Bears Ears, included representatives from the Hopi Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Mountain Ute, Uintah and Ouray Ute, and Zuni tribal governments. Historically, the Antiquities Act and other federal conservation laws played very different roles in the lives of Native people. Conservation laws divested Tribes of their lands and cultural heritage in the name of preserving these resources for others. Moreover, federal laws and policies designed to destroy tribal political structures were at their apex during the same period that early conservation policy was formed. Together, and complemented by laws that privatized vast swathes of the federal public domain, conservation law and federal Indian law effected a joint project of Indian elimination. This Article explores that dark side of conservation history, and describes the very different process that led to the Bears Ears designation. It argues that by restoring tribal connections to the landscape, Bears Ears National Monument serves as a partial act of reparations. Today, Bears Ears National Monument is under threat. President Trump reduced the Monument to a small fraction of its size and divided it into two parcels. The Tribes, along with conservation groups, have sued, arguing that the Antiquities Act authorizes the President only to create monuments, not to eliminate or shrink them unilaterally. As that legal battle plays out, the story of Bears Ears remains worth telling. Its saga explores the intertwined histories of the development of racial attitudes and environmental thought, and fills in an important chapter in the larger story of Indian appropriation. The inter-tribal effort to establish Bears Ears will leave its mark on public lands and conservation law, regardless of the ebbs and flows of current legal disputes.

With America’s increasing multicultural population and some purported beliefs that we have approached a post-racial society, the ability to recognize that race still matters is an important factor in negotiations. This paper attempts to capture and describe as much of the key literature and cases as recently as of July 2015 that identify the unique experiences for black persons in negotiation. The paper uses a workplace hypothetical and aspects of critical race analysis regarding covering and stereotype threat to make some suggestions to address these challenges especially in salary negotiations.

In the 1985 foundational article Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, Richard Delgado and his co-authors identified major concerns with the growing use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve disputes involving people of color. The seminal findings from that article highlighted the power differentials exacerbated by informal dispute resolution, and the article contributed immediately to a surge of robust critiques of the increasing use of alternative dispute resolution for those most vulnerable in our society. More than thirty years after the Delgado article, a community of respected and prominent ADR and discrimination scholars, assembled in panels at a symposium sponsored by the SMU Law Review in February 2017, explored the continued impact of ADR on disempowered disputants by analyzing discrete areas within the ADR process. Joined by keynote remarks from Professor Delgado as he reflected on his 1985 article, these scholars have provided an updated and valuable contribution as a new millennium critique of ADR based upon prejudice. As part of the scholarly reflections involved in this modern critique of ADR, this Article explores the concern of racial prejudice in using ADR in the workplace. This Black Lives Matter era has led to several situations where workplace disputes have arisen with respect to discussions about race. Employers have started to recognize that they must better prepare to handle workplace disputes related to race as a result of more protest and discussion due to the Black Lives Matter movement. This Article examines a high-profile agreement between an employer and a union to provide a dispute resolution process to help its diverse employees resolve workplace disputes. The Article asserts that black employees can find racial justice in a workplace that uses a modified merger of the mediation and arbitration program developed by those parties. That process ameliorates many of the concerns about informality and prejudice that Delgado and his co-authors first expressed in 1985. As opposed to the dismal results in the courts, this ADR process provides a much more viable opportunity for black employees to resolve discrimination matters in a dignified way that respects employee voice and offers procedural justice in the workplace. As a result, all three of the key stakeholders, including employers, unions, and black workers, can embrace this merged mediation and arbitration program as a positive dispute resolution process.

On January 25, 2017, during his first week in office, President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order calling for the “immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border” of the United States . Such a wall would span more than one thousand miles, across many different habitats and many different communities . Before a wall will be built, numerous questions must be answered: Which environmental laws apply? How might all this work? On February 16, ELI convened experts to discuss how environmental law and policy may interact with the Executive Order, and to spark discussion about important environmental resources and communities along the border . Below, we present a transcript of the event, which has been edited for style, clarity, and space considerations .