Search

A foreign jurist, on looking into the German literature on constitutional law, will soon and suddenly be struck by a peculiarity of this scholarship: the unusually strong emphasis on a marginal area of constitutional law, namely, the state of emergency. The inquiry is, of course, well-known in other countries, but the passion for, and the theoretical effort expended on, this marginal area is unique to Germany.However, this disinterest on the part of other constitutional lawyers, and the recent decline in interest on Germany's part, could yet change, turning the marginal area into a highly current issue. Combating terrorism raises questions for which the German patterns of argumentation, fine-tuned in the academic debate on the law of state of emergency, may provide a useful framework for discussion. The questions arising in the context of the struggle against terrorism test the limits of positive regulations in extreme situations, leading ultimately to the same underlying dilemma as the law on state of emergency, though with different terminology. In this sense, the constellation of legal issues involved in combating terrorism could be considered as the law on state of emergency “incognito.” However, the various argumentative patterns for law on state of emergency have not yet been directly transferred into the very timely legal discourse on counterterrorism (and no such attempt is made here), but such a transfer of argumentation suggests itself. As such, the topic has a “potential currency,” even if traditional issues of state of emergency themselves no longer count among the most current issues.

The following discussion considers to what degree Kelsen’s conception of international law was shaped either by his neo-Kantian epistemological approach or by his liberal (and pacifistic) political stance.

Idiopathic inflammatory myopathies are systemic autoimmune diseases characterized by progressive proximal muscle weakness. Cancer-associated myositis represents the worst prognostic group within this heterogeneous disease. Aim: The aim of this study was to reveal factors which increase the risk factors for association of cancerous disease in patients with myositis. Furthermore, the authors explored the most common types of associated malignancies in their patients with myositis and characterize the clinical findings in a sub-group of anti-p155/140 positive patients. Method: In this retrospective study, myositis patients with and without associated cancer were analysed (32 and 64 patients, respectively). In addition, anti-p155/140 positive and negative groups were compared, irrespective to the presence of associated malignancies. Results: The risk for associated malignancy was higher in patients with severe muscle and skin symptoms and those with dermatomyositis. Furthermore, increased risk for malignancy was noted in the presence of particular skin symptoms and the absence of systemic symptoms. The anti-p155/140 antibody was proved to be a feasible marker of an independent clinical sub-group which overlapped clinical characteristics with cancer-associated myositis. Conclusions: These results may help the identification of patients with myositis with a higher risk for associated malignancy. Orv. Hetil., 2014, 155(36), 1437–1444.

Verfassungsblog: On Matters Constitutional

En abril de 2011, el Parlamento de Hungría aprobó la nueva Constitución del Estado, denominada "Ley Fundamental de Hungría". Sus disposiciones transitorias fueron aprobadas en un diferente trámite parlamentario, el 30 de diciembre de 2011. Ambas normas entraron en vigor el 1 de enero de 2012. La tesis principal de este artículo es que la mayor parte del contenido de la actual Ley Fundamental trae su causa, en realidad, en la anterior Constitución liberal democrática, a pesar de que retóricamente quiera vincularse a un historicismo cristiano conservador. Existen, de cualquier forma, ciertas deficiencias sustantivas en la nueva Ley Fundamental: el recorte de las competencias del Tribunal Constitucional, la destitución del Comisionado para la Protección de los Datos Personales y del Presidente del Tribunal Supremo, la atribución al jefe de la administración judicial y al fiscal general de la facultad de seleccionar ad hoc el tribunal llamado a resolver un procedimiento judicial, la posibilidad de emitir una sentencia a cadena perpetua y el uso exagerado de las leyes cardinales (orgánicas). Esto incluso quiebra principios generales del constitucionalismo o las obligaciones impuestas por el derecho comunitario y por el derecho internacional. Alguna de dichas deficiencias pueden ser solventadas a través de una interpretación creativa si el Tribunal Constitucional de Hungría aceptara esta tarea como guardián de los valores constitucionales europeos.On 18 April 2011 The Hungarian Parliament approved the country’s new Constitution, named the ‘Basic Law of Hungary’. Its transitory provisions were approved in a different act of the Parliament, on 30 December 2011. Both acts entered into force on 1 January 2012. The article’s main thesis is that most of the Basic Law’s content stems from the previous democratic liberal Constitution, but that the rhetoric has changed into a conservative Christian historicising one. There are, however, also some substantive deficiencies in the new Basic Law, such as the curtailing of the competences of the Constitutional Court, the dismissal of the Data Protection Commissioner and of the President of the Supreme Court, the ability of the head of the judicial administration and of the Chief Prosecutor to choose a court for any court proceeding, the possibility of a lifelong prison sentence and the exaggerated use of cardinal (organic) laws. These either breach general principles of constitutionalism, or European Union and international law obligations. Some of these deficiencies can be resolved by means of creative interpretation, if the Hungarian Constitutional Court accepts his task as the guardian of European Constitutional values.

Namjera ovoga rada pokušaj je otkrivanja temelja dvaju sustava ustavnopravnog mišljenja. U tom cilju dokazuju se sljedeće hipoteze: (1) Teorijska podloga austrijske javnopravne doktrine kelzenovska je čista teorija prava, a temelji njemačke javnopravne doktrine određeni su šmitovskim decizionizmom, smendovskom teorijom integracije i naravnim pravom. (2) Austrijska pravna doktrina, osobito u području izvora prava i ustavnosudskog odlučivanja, vrlo je podrobno razrađena, ponekad čak i dosljednije od svojih njemačkih pandana. (3) Na nekim je područjima, djelomično uslijed pojačanog njemačkog utjecaja, osebujnost austrijske javnopravne doktrine umanjena. Međutim, to ni na koji način ne podrazumijeva iščeznuće njezinih specifičnih obilježja; zamijetiti se može tek određeni stupanj približavanja (konvergencije). (4) Naposlijetku, ne zbog različitih opojmovljenja prava, nego jednostavnom povijesnom i političkom slučajnošću, pojavila su se i neka neočekivana doktrinarna rješenja. Zaključno, u svjetlu izloženih razlika između austrijskog i njemačkog pravnog sustava kao međusobno bliskih, bit će izneseno i stajalište o izgledima za nastanak zajedničke europske javnopravne doktrine. Članek obravnava temelje dveh sistemov doktrinarnih pojmov in načina ustavnopravnega argumentiranja: avstrijskega in nemškega. Na podlagi primerjave avtor oblikuje štiri hipoteze: (1) Teoretični temelj doktrine avstrijskega javnega prava predstavlja Kelsnova čista teorija prava, medtem, ko temelje nemške javnopravne doktrine določajo Schmittov determinizem, Smendova teorija integracije in naravno pravo. Vse te teoretske predpostavke imajo konkretne posledice glede vprašanja opredelitve temeljnih pojmov in glede ustavnopravnega razlogovanja. (2) Avstrijska pravna doktrina je, posebno na področju virov prava in ustavnosodnega odločanja, izrazito natančno razdelana, na trenutke celo bolj dosledno kot nemška. Tovrstno osredotočenje na teorijo norm v javnem pravu je prav tako del Kelsnove zapuščine. (3) Mestoma je zanimivost avstrijske javnopravne doktrine opešala, deloma zaradi povečanega nemškega vpliva. To pa nikakor ne pomeni izginotja njenih posebnosti; opazimo lahko le določeno stopnjo približevanja. (4) Končno so se, ne zaradi različnih pojmovanj prava, temveč preprosto zaradi zgodovinskega in političnega naključja, razvile nekatere nepričakovane doktrinarne rešitve. Comparative constitutional lawyers of common law countries might have a temptation to identify German and Austrian constitutional thinking—not only because both are German speaking countries, but also because comparative law textbooks (based mostly on private law) present them as being in the same “legal family” or “legal circle”. This assumption would, however, be wrong. The German doctrinal figures more or less well known amongst comparative constitutional lawyers throughout the whole world do not apply in Austria automatically, and even what seems to be familiar for the first sight (for those who know German public law) often appears in a foreign light. Scrutiny of such differences promises insight into the merits and drawbacks of each alternative; therefore, this article undertakes to compare and contrast the two systems. The focus is not on specific tenets of Austrian or German public law but on its set of doctrinal concepts and style of argumentation, compared and contrasted to each other. To facilitate the contrast, the statements of Austrian and German authors and the various schools of thought will be somewhat amplified.The author of this article does not attempt to itemize or list out all the doctrinal differences; instead, he seeks to reveal the foundations of the two systems by proving the following hypotheses: (1) The theoretical background of Austrian public law doctrine is the Kelsenian pure theory of law, while the bases of German public law doctrine are determined by the Schmittian decisionism, the Smendian integrationism, and natural law. All these theoretical presuppositions have concrete consequences as to how to define basic concepts and as to how to reason in constitutional law. (2) Austrian legal doctrine is worked out in painstaking detail especially in the areas of sources of law and constitutional adjudication, at times even more consistently than their German counterparts. This concentration on theory of norms in public law is also part of Kelsen’s heritage. (3) In certain points, the curiosity of Austrian public law doctrine has diminished, partially due to increased German influence. By no means, however, does this imply the disappearance of distinctive features; one merely observes some degree of convergence. (4) Finally, certain startling doctrinal solutions have emerged, not for reasons of differing conceptualizations of the law, but very simply by historical and political accident.

Verfassungsblog: On Matters Constitutional

espanolEste articulo trata de analizar el dilema sobre como encontrar el equilibrio entre los principios de seguridad y libertad en la lucha contra el terrorismo. El trabajo muestra las diferentes presuposiciones implicitas relacionadas con el concepto de seguridad, la intensidad del dano percibido y el valor principal objeto de proteccion (Estado vs. Constitucion) que predeterminan el debate. Asimismo se intenta proporcionar el mapa de los discursos estadounidense y aleman en relacion con la denominada tortura de rescate (Rettungsfolter), para concluir que en orden a calificar posturas, los diferentes argumentos posibles (de constitutione lata, de lege lata, de lege ferenda e incluso morales) han ser separados. EnglishThe article analyses the dilemma of how to find the balance between security and liberty in the fight against terrorism. It shows how different implied presuppositions concerning the concept of security, the size of the perceived threat and the main protected value (state vs. constitution) shape the debate. The article also gives a map of the US and German discourses concerning life saving torture (Rettungsfolter), and concludes that in order to clarify positions, different questions (de constitutione lata questions, de lege lata questions, de lege ferenda questions and moral questions) have to be separated

“In the beginning was the Word.” This quote from the Holy Bible also stands on the ceiling of our discipline's temple. The job of legal scholarship is interpreting, and the base of every interpretation is the word.In this paper we are going to analyze how constitutional courts are able to extract the most meaning from a, necessarily, short text, such as a constitution, with the use of sophisticated tricks, or methods, of interpretation. Partly with the help of these methods, and partly on the basis of text-independent speculations, constitutional courts and legal scholars are able to develop a system of concepts (aRechtsdogmatik, or its specific constitutional part, theVerfassungsdogmatik) considerably more sophisticated than the one of the actual text of the constitution in order to serve as a helping toolkit for the solution of future cases. After analyzing some preliminary issues in part A, the largest part of this study will deal with the different methods of constitutional interpretation in part B. Then, the nature of this conceptual system will be analyzed in part C, before turning to the question of styles of constitutional reasoning in part D. The analysis concentrates on the practice of European constitutional courts, though for purposes of classification and comparison, non-European practices will also be mentioned.

One of the most frequently asked questions in any constitution-making process, in terms of both the former Hungarian constitution and the new Basic Law, is to what extent they were, are or will be legitimate. To be able to answer this, one needs to enter into some general theoretical considerations as to the function of constitutions.Modern constitutions are generally expected to do three things: to be a means of legal self-restraint for the political power (as expressed by the protection of fundamental rights and the idea of the separation of powers), to establish (constitute) the most important institutions of the state in a democratic way, and to be symbols that bind the community together. This essay examines these three requirements, arguing that any constitution that fullfills these may be regarded as legitimate (i.e. worthy of being obeyed). The closing part of the essay, in turn, contends that the procedure of constitution-making is not important in terms of legitimacy.

Este artículo trata de analizar el dilema sobre cómo encontrar el equilibrio entre los principios de seguridad y libertad en la lucha contra el terrorismo. El trabajo muestra las diferentes presuposiciones implícitas relacionadas con el concepto de seguridad, la intensidad del daño percibido y el valor principal objeto de protección (Estado vs. Constitución) que predeterminan el debate. Asimismo se intenta proporcionar el mapa de los discursos estadounidense y alemán en relación con la denominada tortura de rescate (Rettungsfolter), para concluir que en orden a calificar posturas, los diferentes argumentos posibles (de constitutione lata, de lege lata, de lege ferenda e incluso morales) han ser separados. The article analyses the dilemma of how to find the balance between security and liberty in the fight against terrorism. It shows how different implied presuppositions concerning the concept of security, the size of the perceived threat and the main protected value (state vs. constitution) shape the debate. The article also gives a map of the US and German discourses concerning life saving torture (Rettungsfolter), and concludes that in order to clarify positions, different questions (de constitutione lata questions, de lege lata questions, de lege ferenda questions and moral questions) have to be separated.

This study sought to determine the time dependency of the endothelium-dependent and -independent vascular responses after percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) with drug-eluting (DEB) or plain balloons, bare-metal (BMS), and drug-eluting (DES) stents, or controls.Long-term endothelial dysfunction after DES implantation is associated with delayed healing and late thrombosis.Domestic pigs underwent PCI using DEB or plain balloon, BMS, or DES. The dilated and stented segments, and the proximal reference segments of stents and control arteries were explanted at 5-h, 24-h, 1-week, and 1-month follow-up (FUP). Endothelin-induced vasoconstriction and endothelium-dependent and -independent vasodilation of the arterial segments were determined in vitro and were related to histological results.DES- and BMS-treated arteries showed proneness to vasoconstriction 5 h post-PCI. The endothelium-dependent vasodilation was profoundly (p0.05) impaired early after PCI (9.8 ± 3.7%, 13.4 ± 9.2%, 5.7 ± 5.3%, and 7.6 ± 4.7% using plain balloon, DEB, BMS, and DES, respectively), as compared with controls (49.6 ± 9.5%), with slow recovery. In contrast to DES, the endothelium-related vasodilation of vessels treated with plain balloon, DEB, and BMS was increased at 1 month, suggesting enhanced endogenous nitric oxide production of the neointima. The endothelium-independent (vascular smooth muscle-related) vasodilation decreased significantly at 1 day, with slow normalization during FUP. All PCI-treated vessels exhibited imbalance between vasoconstriction-vasodilation, which was more pronounced in DES- and BMS-treated vessels. No correlation between histological parameters and vasomotor function was found, indicating complex interactions between the healing neoendothelium and smooth muscle post-PCI.Coronary arteries treated with plain balloon, DEB, BMS, and DES showed time-dependent loss of endothelial-dependent and -independent vasomotor function, with imbalanced contraction/dilation capacity.

The two main reasons why democracy won the contest for the leading legitimacy claim in the modern world are its capacity to generate loyalty and its self-correction potential. In order to use these virtues, the European Commission (conceptualised as the government of the EU) should be elected solely by the European Parliament. According to the general perception, a modification of the treaties would be inevitable in order to achieve such a change. The paper attempts to show that this perception is wrong: there is another (currently more viable) way to achieve this outcome, which was successfully used a long time ago to reform the British constitutional system on a step by step basis. In the U.K., there is currently (and there was) no legal rule prescribing that the monarch has to appoint as Prime Minister the person who commands the majority support of the House of Commons. It is happening though, by a (legally non-binding) constitutional convention. After analysing the concept of constitutional conventions and its applicability to the EU, the paper reaches the conclusion that we can achieve a parliamentary system under the current legal regime, if politicians in the European Parliament have the ambition to take the necessary steps. If it happened, then the EU government system would become similar to some extent to today’s German system, where a party coalition in the lower chamber supports the government, and the upper chamber takes part substantively only in the legislation but not in the formation of the government.

In recent decades, various theories have postulated that principles have a structure distinct from that of rules (or norms). This contribution introduces and critically analyzes these theories (esp. the one of Robert Alexy) in order to develop a new approach to the concept and function of principles. Its main thesis is that “principles” should not be conceived as structurally different from “rules”; a “principle” means simply a “very important rule”, so the differentiation is of rhetorical nature. This result does not deny, however, the existence of special functions bound to “principles”. It simply wants to get rid of a superfluous common place on the distinct logical structure of principles. It is superfluous because the phenomena explained by it can also be otherwise (i.e. by the traditional rule paradigm) explained. Its introduction, thus, only superfluously, unnecessarily complicates the explanation.