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The question of the relative importance of nature and nurture in predisposing people to behave differently is a vexed one, having important implications beyond the immediate concerns of psychology. For mental illness, sociopathy or intellectual ability, for example, the broad question of the place of the individual in society is raised. We are forced to consider the nature and extent of the opportunities that face the individual and, in the light of his limitations, what might constitute realistic and humane social policies. These and similar questions naturally generate a great deal of emotion as well as interest, and emotional attitudes have often hindered an objective evaluation of the empirical evidence, resulting in exaggerated claims for the importance of nature or nurture to the complete exclusion of the other.

INTRODUCTION . ......... . . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . 167 RESEARCH AND CONCERNS LEADING TO DSM-III. . . . . . . . . . ... ..... . . . . . . . . . 168 THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-III) . . . . . . . . ... . ..... . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 RESEARCH EVALUATING DSM-III.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Reliability 177 Validity .... ... ..... ..... ....... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. ... . ......... . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . ... . . . ... . . ......... 178 THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF DSM-III. .. . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ....... . . . . . . . . . . ... 180 TOWARD DSM-IV . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 84 OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CLINICAL ASSESSMENT 187 CONCLUSION...... . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Three questionnaires measuring altruistic tendencies were completed by 573 adult twin pairs from the University of London Institute of Psychiatry Volunteer Twin Register. The questionnaires consisted of a 20-item Self-Report Altruism Scale, a 33-item Empathy Scale, and a 16-item Nurturance Scale, all of which had previously been shown to have construct validity. For the three scales, the intra-class correlations for the 296 MZ pairs were 0.53, 0.54, and 0.49, and for the 179 same-sex DZ pairs were 0.25,020, and 0.14, giving rough estimates of broad heritability of 56%, 68%, and 72%, respectively. Maximum-likelihood model-fitting revealed about 50% of the variance on each scale to be associated with genetic effects, virtually 0% to be due to the twins' common environment, and the remaining 50% to be due to each twins' specific environment and/or error associated with the test.

We have so far acquired some insight into the nature of cognitive tests which might, on theoretical grounds, be considered likely candidates for the measurement of intelligence; we must now turn to a consideration of that part of the theory which asserts that intelligence is the general or all-round cognitive ability which mediates success in such tests whatever their nature. Spearman has called this “the indifference of the indicator”; in other words, if a test or test item fulfils the conditions for a “good” test or test item laid down in his laws of neogenesis, then it should not matter much which item or test was chosen for the measurement. This implication of the theory can of course be investigated empirically, and methods for doing this were worked out by members of the London school - Karl Pearson, the great statistician, Charles Spearman himself, and Sir Cyril Burt, who succeeded Spearman in the professorial chair at University College, London. These methods are essentially based on the use of correlation coefficients, and on factor analysis, i. e. the analysis of sets of such coefficients. There are some statistical complexities to analyses of this kind, but these are inevitably outside the scope of this chapter; there are many good books dealing with the technique of factor analysis (Thomson, 1939; Burt, 1940, and Thurstone, 1947, are three classics; among modern texts are Harman, 1967, Pawlik, 1971 and Lawley and Maxwell, 1971).

I have for a long time maintained the view that for the future development of behaviour therapy, a proper theoretical basis is absolutely essential (Eysenck, 1976). I have equally maintained that such a theory must be neo-behaviouristic, i.e. based on concepts of conditioning and extinction (Eysenck, 1982). Only on such a basis can we hope to build up a model of treatment for neurotic disorders that is anything other than purely pragmatic, serendipic and ultimately haphazard and accident-prone (Eysenck, 1983). Science demands more than accidental therapeutic success; it demands a proper understanding of the dynamics of the nature and origin of neuroses if their treatment is to be successful to an altogether higher degree than it is today. Cognitive theories have recently received much applause, but there is no evidence that the methods used have any proper theoretical underpinning, that specific methods of therapy can be derived from these theories, or that they are more successful than, or even as successful as the methods of behaviour therapy originally deduced from conditioning principles (Eysenck, 1960, 1964; Eysenck & Rachman, 1965).

The problem dealt with in this book was raised in a classical query over 2000 years ago by Theophrastus, in his book Characters, written when he was 99 years old: “Why is it that while all Greece lies under the same sky and all the Greeks are educated alike, yet we all have characters differently constituted?” Individuality in human beings is so pronounced, and variability so common, that many have despaired of finding any scientific basis for constructing a model of personality; Allport (1937) has given a clear discussion of the many problems raised. The ancient Greeks suggested an answer in terms of traits and types; the theory of the four temperaments which they put forward has lasted longer than perhaps any other psychological theory, but of course it is open to many criticisms. Can modern psychology do any better?

The prevention and control of delinquency can be attempted at different stages of the judicial process. Each stage can be associated with different procedures and techniques, although on occasion the same techniques may be applied at the various stages of the judicial system, as will become evident in the next chapter. Lundman (1984) argues that it is possible to identify three major prevention and control intervention points. The first stage comprises “predelinquent intervention”: that is, the primary objective is to prevent delinquency commencing in the first place. The second stage, “preadjudication intervention,” involves formal attempts to “divert” juveniles away from the judicial system into some form of counseling or crisis intervention. Finally, there is “post-adjudication intervention,” which is the central theme of this chapter, and this comprises the sentencing options available to judges and magistrates once the person has pleaded or been found guilty of an offense.

It is suggested that all sciences pass through periods of demarcation difficulties, wherein science and superstition, fact and fiction, testable theory and arbitrary speculation confront each other. This ordeal by quackery finally resulted in the divorce of astronomy from astrology, of chemistry from alchemy, and of physics from metaphysics. Psychology is still in a stage during which such a demarcation is difficult to make and experimental psychology, psychometrics, behavioral genetics, learning theory, and other attempts to make psychology into a true science are confronted by pseudosciences like psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, existentialism, and other similar movements that are essentially hostile to the scientific study of human behavior. Even within the scientific group there are fissiparous tendencies preventing the achievement of a unified science; these are discussed in some detail, and suggestions are made as to how they could be overcome. It is concluded that a unified, paradigmatic science of psychology is possible only by the exclusion of nonscientific groups, beliefs and concepts and by greater tolerance within the scientific group of different approaches.

This question is often asked, but it is probably an inadmissible and meaningless question. Does the thermometer measure temperature? If by “temperature” we mean the scientific concept, embodied in a series of laws, then by definition the answer is “Yes”; temperature is almost defined as that which is measured by a thermometer. Similarly if by “intelligence” we mean the concept as worked out by psychologists along the lines indicated in the last three chapters, then obviously IQ tests, properly constructed, measure intelligence; indeed, in a very real sense intelligence may be defined as that which is measured by IQ tests provided we allow for the presence of chance error, which is attached to all scientific measurement, and provided that the rules of test construction are followed which we have already discussed. But both temperature and intelligence arose as concepts from common, everyday observation - of hot and cold sensations in the one case, of bright and dull people, in the other. Do scientific measurements agree with commonsense observations? This question is not of very great interest if put like this, for several reasons. Nevertheless, the search for “external validity”, i. e. for agreement between scientific measurement and criteria external to that measurement, which are agreed to be relevant to the concept in question, is of some importance, and certainly of social relevance in the case of intelligence testing; it will therefore be discussed in this chapter.

Three questionnaire studies are reported in which sets of items traditionally used to measure impulsiveness were intercorrelated were correlated with measures of the major personality dimensions E (extraversion), N (neuroticism) and P (psychoticism), and also with the L (lie; dissimulation) scale. It It was found that impulsiveness in the broad sense (ImpB) breaks down into four factors (narrow impusliveness or ImpN, risk-taking, non-planning and liveliness) which are replicable from sample to sample and from males to females. These factors are positively correlated with each other and also with sociability to varying degrees. ImpB correlates quite well with extraversion, but even better with psychoticism; ImpN correlates positively with N and P, suggesting that this trait is somewhat pathological. It is suggested that the distinction between ImpB and ImpN is crucial for the discussion of the nature and measurement of extraversion and also for future experimental work on the causal background and experimental testing of impulsive behaviour patterns.

A comparison was made of the scores of 171 Japanese boys and 156 Japanese girls, and of 204 English boys and 165 English girls, on the Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity Test. Also compared were 145 male and 163 female Japanese students, with 38 male and 73 female English students. Japanese children had scores significantly higher than English children, while Japanese students had scores significantly lower than English students. There was little evidence of age increments in score for either group of children. Difficulty levels of the 42 item-pairs were very similar in the two cultures, as were internal (split-half) reliabilities. It is concluded that cultural differences between the two countries, as far as visual aesthetic appreciation is concerned, seem at best minimal.

Twin data suggest that genetic variability in neuroticism increases with age.

1 General Features of the Model.- 1.1 Models and Explanations.- 1.2 The Development of a Paradigm.- 1.3 Theory Making: Correlational and Experimental Psychology.- 1.4.1 Theory Testing: Constraints and Complications.- 1.4.2 Theory Testing: Some Sources of Error.- 2 The Psychophysiology of Extraversion and Neuroticism.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The Physiological Basis of Extraversion.- 2.3 Extraversion and Electrocortical Activity.- 2.4 Extraversion and Cortical Evoked Potentials.- 2.5 Extraversion and the Orienting Reaction.- 2.5.1 Stimulus Characteristics.- 2.5.2 Subject Selection.- 2.5.3 Measures of Electrodermal Recording.- 2.5.4 Conclusions.- 2.6 Extraversion and Pupillary Response.- 2.7 The Interaction of Extraversion and Neuroticism.- 2.7.1 Neuroticism and Stress.- 2.7.2 Normal and Patient Populations.- 2.7.3 Neuroticism and Emotional Response Patterning.- 2.8 Conclusions.- 3 A Survey of the Effects of Brain Lesions upon Personality.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 The Brain-Damaged Personality.- 3.3 Laterality of Lesion and Personality.- 3.4 Frontal Lesions and Personality.- 3.5 Cingulate Gyrus Lesions.- 3.6 Amygdala Lesions and Violence.- 3.7 Hypothalamic Lesions, Aggression and Sex.- 3.8 Thalamic Lesions.- 3.9 Temporal Lobe Lesions and Personality.- 3.10 Brain-Stem Arousal Systems and Personality.- 3.11 Individual Differences in Response to Cortical Stimulants and Depressants.- 3.12 Personality Processes.- 3.13 Brain and Personality: A Synopsis.- 4 The Genetic and Environmental Architecture of Psychoticism, Extraversion and Neuroticism.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 The Biometrical Approach.- 4.2.1 Basic Model.- 4.2.2 Estimation of Parameters in the Model Using MZ and DZ Twins.- 4.3 Empirical Studies.- 4.3.1 Older Studies.- 4.3.2 Studies Involving the EPQ and Similar Questionnaires.- 4.4 Conclusion.- 5 Personality and Conditioning.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 Basic Issues: The Major Theories.- 5.2.1 Pavlovian Typology.- 5.2.2 Modifications of the Pavlovian System.- 5.2.3 The Personality Theory of Eysenck.- 5.2.4 The Drive Theory of Spence.- 5.2.5 Gray's Reformulation of the Eysenck Theory.- 5.2.6 Summary.- 5.3 Basic Issues: The Period of Aufklarung.- 5.3.1 Summary.- 5.4 Newer Perspectives: Determinants of Responding.- 5.4.1 Studies Including Personality.- 5.4.2 Studies Excluding Personality.- 5.4.3 Summary.- 5.5 New Perspectives: Recent Extensions.- 5.5.1 Substantive Areas.- 5.5.1.1 Conditioning in Infancy.- 5.5.1.2 Response Topography.- 5.5.1.3 Extinction.- 5.5.1.4 Attitude and Evaluative Conditioning.- 5.5.2 Theoretical Issues.- 5.5.2.1 V-Form and C-Form Responding.- 5.5.2.2 Psychoticism as a Dimension of Personality.- 5.5.2.3 Cognition.- 5.5.2.4 Conditionability.- 5.6 Conditioning and Personality.- 6 Learning, Memory and Personality.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 Basic Theoretical Constructs.- 6.2.1 Attention: Selectivity and Intensity.- 6.2.2 Working Memory.- 6.2.3 Summary.- 6.3 Effects of Anxiety on Learning and Memory.- 6.3.1 Spence and Spence (1966).- 6.3.2 Anxiety: Cognitive Factors.- 6.3.3 Working-Memory Capacity.- 6.3.4 Levels of Processing and Elaboration of Encoding.- 6.3.5 Towards a Theory of Anxiety.- 6.3.6 Success and Failure.- 6.4 Effects of Introversion - Extraversion on Learning and Memory.- 6.4.1 Interrelationship Between Introversion - Extraversion and Anxiety.- 6.4.2 Introversion - Extraversion: Reward and Punishment.- 6.4.3 Cortical Arousal.- 6.4.4 Retention Interval.- 6.4.5 Distraction.- 6.4.6 Task Difficulty.- 6.4.7 Retrieval: Speed and Power.- 6.4.8 Summary and Conclusions.- 7 Personality and Social Behaviour.- 7.1 Introduction.- 7.2 Affiliation and Personal Space.- 7.3 Birth Order.- 7.4 Group Interaction and Social Skills.- 7.5 Speech Patterns.- 7.6 Expressive Behaviour and Person Perception.- 7.7 Expressive Control.- 7.8 Field Dependence.- 7.9 Suggestibility.- 7.10 Conflict Handling.- 7.11 Attraction.- 7.12 Sexual Behaviour.- 7.13 Attitudes and Values.- 7.14 Recreational Interests.- 7.15 Occupational Choice and Aptitude.- 7.16 Industrial Performance.- 7.17 Academic Aptitude and Achievement.- 7.18 Mental Health.- 7.19 Psychotherapy.- 7.20 Drug Use and Abuse.- 7.21 Crime and Delinquency.- 7.22 Cross-National Differences.- 7.23 Conclusions.- 8 A Critique of Eysenck's Theory of Personality.- 8.1 Introduction.- 8.2 Personality Description.- 8.3 Biological Explanation.- 8.4 An Alternative Theory.- 8.5 Coda 1: Strength of the Nervous System.- 8.6 Coda 2: Psychoticism.- Epilogue.

Personality, as it is usually treated in psychological text-books, is a very uncertain and fuzzy topic. Textbook writers tend to treat it either with benevolent eclecticism, simply presenting eponymous chapters detailing the various virtues of models presented by writers, or by ferocious idiosyncrasy, the writer disregarding all models but his own. What is missing is a paradigm, universally accepted and giving rise to a kind of research which Kuhn characterised as “ordinary science.”

A chapter under this title would have been looked upon as unusual even a dozen or so years ago. However, in recent years there has been a tendency to look upon the social consequences and the “relevance” of scientific discoveries and theories, and to raise questions concerning these; as a consequence, it may be useful in this brief terminal chapter to consider some of the queries raised. There are three major reasons for raising problems of this kind. The first is the growing feeling that scientific discoveries have an important effect on society, and that society must watch and monitor these discoveries and their applications lest they lead to harmful and undesirable consequences. This feeling became particularly strong in the aftermath of the dropping of the first atomic bomb, and has been gaining strength ever since. The motives underlying this particular source of anxiety are undoubtedly wholly desirable, and in line with modern conceptions of a democratic society. There is no reason why scientists should be exempted from public scrutiny, and why they should not be asked to account in popular terms for their work and the results of this work. Salus publicae summum bonum. It used to be taken for granted that IQ testing had a small but on the whole beneficial influence on social conditions; this has been questioned, and it has been suggested that instead the influence of IQ testing has been to further disadvantage children already disadvantaged for reasons of class or race.

1. Introduction.- 2. The Constitutional Theory of Criminality.- 3. Crime and Personality.- 4. Criminality, Heredity, and Environment.- 5. A Biological Theory of Criminality.- 6. The Function and Effectiveness of Sentencing.- 7. The Prevention and Treatment of Illegal Behavior.- 8. Sexual Deviations.- 9. Summary and Conclusions.- References.

In the last chapter we found 69% of variation to be due to genetic influences and only 31% to environmental ones. Clearly, genetic factors outweight environmental factors in causing the wide range of intellectual ability found in human populations.

It has been well said that psychology has a long past, but a short history. People have puzzled over psychological problems for thousands of years, ever since the dawn of recorded history, yet the development of a science of psychology is scarcely a hundred years old. Plato and Arisotle already discussed the notion of “intelligence”, but it is only in this century that attempts have been made successfully to measure this important variable. Many misunderstandings have attended this venture, and it will be one of the functions of this book to clarify the points on which these misunderstandings have arisen. However, before doing so it may be useful to trace quite quickly, and without too much detail, the early development of the concept with which this book is essentially concerned. Like most scientific concept, this one arose out of everyday observation. The concept of temperature arose from the different feeling caused in human beings by fire and sunlight, on the one hand, and ice and snow, on the other; in this way were the notions of “cold” and “hot” born, and became the subject matter of science. Similarly, the concept of intelligence arose from observations of people trying to solve problems, to learn difficult and demanding things like mathematics, languages, and history; some seemed to find no difficulty in all this, and succeeded brilliantly, while others were very slow, and often failed altogether.

We have so far considered the meaning of intelligence, the kinds of problems that are suitable for the measurement of intelligence, and the evidence for the existence of a global capacity which might rightly be called intelligence. However, to undertake the actual measurement of this hypothetical construct requires more than the existence of individual problems; we must have a scale having certain psychometric properties. The problem is similar to that of the early workers in the field of temperature measurement who also required to have a proper scale, which they attempted to provide by having a freezing point (0° centigrade) at the bottom, and the boiling point (100° centigrade) at the top, and dividing this range into one hundred equal parts. Something analogous was needed in psychology, and this was first of all provided by the French psychologist Alfred Binet. His work generated eventually the concept of the IQ, but the actual method he used has been given up by modern workers. The scales he constructed are age scales, i. e. they relate a person’s performance on a given set of tests to the average age at which these tests are successfully completed by children of different ages. As we shall see, age scales are complex to construct, depend on assumptions which are only very partially fulfilled in reality, and lose all meaning once the growth of intelligence with age ceases in late adolescence.

WHATEVER the current norms might be with regard to public opinion about various issues, and whatever factors contribute to their change with time, attitudes are far from uniform. Eysenck1 has shown how responses to a public opinion questionnaire could be resolved into two main factors: ‘radicalism’ (R) against ‘conservatism’ and ‘toughmindedness’ (T) against ‘tendermindedness’. Individual differences in opinion are, to some degree, the social manifestation of individual differences in personality. Significant covariation has been detected between various measures of extraversion (E) and T. Wilson2 has suggested personality correlates of R. Such relationships, together with available evidence for the genetic determination of personality differences (see, for example, ref. 3), justify a more penetrating analysis of the extent to which variation in opinion and personality share a common genetic basis.

The work of Piaget (1950, 1956, 1958) was at first unjustifiably neglected in the English-speaking countries, and then equally unjustifiably elevated to the status of sacred doctrine (Phillips, 1975). Piaget is fundamentally concerned with the stages through which intellectual development passes, and not at all concerned with individual differences, or intelligence as measured by I. Q. tests. This might seen to suggest that this work could not be very relevant to this book, but such a view would be mistaken. If the child, in growing up, passes from stage A, through B and C, to stages D, E, F etc., then clearly these stages fulfil the same function for anyone interested in the measurement of intelligence as did the agerelated test items in Binet’s work. We might classify a child’s mental age in terms of the stage which he had reached, and then obtain something like on I. Q. by relating this stage to his actual chronological age. Piaget himself would not be interested in this and would consider it an abuse of his theoretical work, but the question of whether such a scheme would be workable, and how it would relate to ordinary measures of I. Q., is an important one. Piaget’s work is sometimes suggested as an alternative to orthodox psychometric intelligence testing. As we shall see, his tests and test items behave very much in the same way as do those customarily used by psychometrists interested in intelligence testing, and so far as they do they suggest that they belong to the same paradigm.

It has been suggested in the Introduction that the modern theory of intelligence, as here presented, constitutes a good example of a scientific paradigm. As we have seen, the conception of intelligence as general, innate cognitive ability is strongly supported by a great variety of researches. This does not mean that alternative theories have not been offered, or that improvements in the model are impossible. In this Chapter we shall be dealing with two alternative models which attempt to change the picture of the structure of the intellect; in the next Chapter we shall be dealing with attempts to put on the map developmental models of one kind or another which have sometimes been suggested to supplant, but which in reality only supplement, the paradigmatic theory. The authors considered in this Chapter are Guilford, whose structure-of-intellect theory suggested the title, and Eysenck, whose work falls into the same category, although quite different in intent and design from Guilford’s. In the next Chapter we shall be concerned with Piaget and Jensen; again two quite dissimilar authors attempting to approach similar goals along quite different paths. These are of couse not the only, but they are perhaps the major efforts at theoretical reconstruction of the Spearman-Thurstone model, and we must note most carefully to what extent they require a change in the paradigm outlined so far.

We have seen in previous chapters that genetic factors play an important part in the causation of criminal behavior, that constitutional factors are strongly implicated, and that personality features are vitally important for the commission of antisocial or altruistic acts. Is it possible to put forward a biological theory of criminality that would bring together all these different aspects and explain more in detail why certain individuals are more predisposed than others to commit antisocial acts? Such a question is not intended to suggest that human behavior is completely and inevitably conditioned by biological factors; we have already insisted on the biosocial nature of human beings, that is, the combination of biological and social factors in determining behavior. Thus whatever the biological predisposition of a person, it can become activated only in interaction with certain environmental variables. Nevertheless, it is surely important to ask just what the nature of these biological variables might be and to advance theories that might throw light on this biological side of the equation.